Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Calculus | Mates | I 63 artificial language/formal language/counterpart/Mates: the statements of the natural language correspond the artificial formulas, as a counterpart, not as abbreviations. >Symbols, >Equivalence, >Propositional forms, >Propositional functions, >Formal language, >Natural language. If symbols are associated with no sense, then it is an uninterpreted calculus. >Interpretation/Mates. I 115 Propositional calculus: the propositional calculus has no quantifiers. >Propositional calculus, >Quantifiers, >Quantification. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Determinism | Inwagen | Pauen I 273 Determinism/Peter van Inwagen/Pauen: determinism is not an implication of physicalism. The principle of causal closure refers to the fact that only physical explanations may be used. This does not mean that the cause/effect ratio must always be deterministic. The principle of physical determination does not make a statement about the necessity of certain causal chains but only requires that there is a physically describable change for every change that can be described in a higher level. van Inwagen: determinism thus stands for the thesis that the state of the world can be derived anytime later from a complete description and knowledge of the state of affair. >Initial conditions. Pauen: it is more than controversial that the determinism applies to our physical reality. --- Lewis V 296 Determinism/VsSoft determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against the soft determinism which I pretend to represent): E.g. supposed to reductio that I could have lifted my hand, though determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises which I cannot deny that I could have produced a false conjunction HL from a proposition H over a time before my birth and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: if so, then I could have falsified L. Premise 6: but I could not have falsified L (contradiction). LewisVsInwagen: 5 and 6 are not both true. Which one is true depends on what Inwagen means by "could have falsified". But not in the ordinary language but in Inwagen's artificial language. Even there it does not matter what Inwagen himself means! What is important is whether we can give a sense to this at all, which makes all premisses valid without circularity. Inwagen: (verbally) third meaning for "could have falsified": namely, and only if the acting person could have arranged things the way that his/her acting plus the whole truth about the prehistory together imply the nontruth of the proposition. Then, premise 6 says that I could not have arranged things the way that I was predestined not to arrange them like that. Lewis: but it is not at all instructive to see that soft determinism has to reject premise 6 that was interpreted in that way. V 297 Falsification/action/free will/Lewis: provisional definition: an event falsifies a proposition only if it is necessary that in the case that the event happens, then the proposition is false. But my act of throwing a rock would not itself falsify the proposition that the window in the course remains intact. Everything that is true, is that my act invokes another event that would falsify the proposition. The act itself does not falsify any law. It would falsify only a conjunction of prehistory and law. Everything that is true, is that my act precedes another act - the miracle - and this falsifies the law. Weak: let us state that I would be able to falsify a proposition in the weak sense if and only if I do something, the proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily by my act and not necessarily by any event evoked by my act). (Lewis pro "weak thesis" (soft determinism)). Strong: if the proposition is falsified either by my act itself or by an event which has been evoked by my act. Inwagen/Lewis: the first part of his thesis stands, no matter whether we represent the strong or weak thesis: If I could lift my hand although determinism is true and I have not lifted it then it is true in the weak and strong sense that I could have falsified the conjunction HL (propositions on the prehistory and the natural laws). But I could have falsified the proposition L in the weak sense although I could not have falsified it in the strong sense. Lewis: if we represent the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we represent the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: represents both premises by considering analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I believe that the cases are not analogous: they are cases in which the strong case and the weak case do not diverge at all: Premise 6/Inwagen: he asks us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than the light. LewisVsInwagen: but that does not help to support premise 6 in the weak sense,... V 298 ...because the rejected presumption is that the physicist could falsify a natural law in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: here we are to reject the assumption that a traveler might falsify a conjunction of propositions about the prehistory and one about his/her future journey differently than by falsifying the nonhistorical part. LewisVsInwagen: you can reject the assumption completely which does nothing to support premise 5 in the strong sense. What would follow if one could falsify the conjunction in the strong sense? That one could falsify the non-historical part in the strong sense? This is what premise 5 would support in the strong sense. Or would only follow (what I think) that the non-historical part could be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveler does not help here because a proposition about future journeys could be falsified in the weak as well as the strong sense! Cf. >Strength of theories. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Everyday Language | Minsky | Münch III 130 "Proximity"/simulation/Minsky: Terms like "proximity" are too important for our everyday life to give them up because they cannot be axiomatized. >Axiomatization, >Localization, >Formalization, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Comprehension, >Simulation. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Experiments | Dupré | Perler I 298 Experiment/Research/Language/Animal/Interpretation/Dupré: it is disputed whether the monkeys A) are only simply conditioned a la skinner, so that they produce desired results. That is, the monkey does essentially the same as the rat which is pushing a lever. ((s): This could just as well be interpreted as symbol use?). That is, it is claimed that the monkey does not know that a character (used by him) means e.g. "Banana". Then the sign "Give me a banana" would be the same as shaking the tree, so that some fall down. B) Actual use of symbols. This does not have to mean yet that the monkeys have all the abilities that we have in this context. >Animals, >Animal language. I 299 E.g., monkeys can learn to produce utterances that are suitable for different foods. But they do not seem to be able to answer when they are to sort out these objects! A similar separation of production and reception has been established in children. However, this is just the exception, most monkeys can very well generalize. For example, a gorilla from Patterson can supposedly report from the past and utter threats as well as insults: e.g. death: "Pleasant, Heia, Nest" "When gorillas die?" "Problem old". Dupré: these are certainly more than conditioned reflexes. >Conditioning. I 300 Experiment/Research/Language/Animal/Interpretation/Dupré: A) sign language: Gardners, Terrace, Patterson, Fouts: Level of communication as high as possible. Communicative intention exceeds "literal" interpretation. B) Artificial Languages: Premack, Rumbaugh: Possibility to gain clean data has priority. Possible behavior is narrowly limited. Therefore there are only a few characters. >Gestures. Dupré: this dichotomy is actually a caricature: for the representatives of b), on the one hand, criticize the affective connections, and grant particular importance to spontaneous utterances. On the other hand, the representatives of a) are strict with the tests. I 308 Double blind test: even the observer does not know the correct answer. I 309 Dupré: but also here the desired answer can be suggested, if the blind observer wants to figure out what the animal "means". Method/Ockham's razor/animal/experiment/Dupré: commitment to economical explanation: curtails the allegations of the monkey researchers allegedly in two directions: 1. If there is a channel through which the observer might have given the monkey a correct answer,... I 310 ...then we assume that the assumption that exactly this happened is more economical than the one that the monkey has shown an ability. 2. Ockham's razor is mostly directed against the assumption of creative linguistic usage in monkeys. Adoption of an error is more economical. I 311 DupréVsOckham: Economy is hardly an objective, theory-independent concept. Why is it more economical to adopt a complex and hidden communication channel than to assume that the monkey knows what it is doing? "Kluger Hans"/Dupré: also shows that there is a high degree of communication between humans and animals. ((s) This can also be called "sign use", if the animal obviously understands it correctly.) I 312 Typically occurs in activities where there are correct or incorrect answers. N.B.: these are, ironically, precisely the experiments that are supposed to provide unique data. But if the monkey produces new, unexpected utterances, then the criticism cannot work. Ironically, it is precisely the stereotypical reactions that are suspected of being manipulated. >Stereotypes, >Manipulation. I 313 Method/primate research/Dupré: perhaps these standards of animal research are just not appropriate. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Formal Language | Fodor | II 111 Artificial language/theory/Fodor: a theory can form more artificial (formal) languages, but we require from the theory that it decides which is the correct (appropriate) language. >Ideal language, >Everyday language, >Correctness, >Adequacy, >World/Thinking. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Formal Language | Mates | I 63 Artificial language/formal/counterpart/Mates: the statement forms of the natural language comply with formulas of the artificial, namely as a counterpart, not as abbreviations. >Propositional forms, >Propositional functions, >Natural language, >Equivalence. If symbols are not assigned to meaning, then "uninterpreted calculus". >Interpretation, >Sense, >Symbols. I 74 artificial language L/Mates: E.g. statement j: always true in relation to an interpretation I - values of "j": statements of the language L - values of I: interpretations of L. Cf. >Value progression/Frege, >Ideal language, >Universal language. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Formal Speech | Formal speech: expression of R. Carnap (R. Carnap, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften, Hamburg, 2005 p. 120). In the formal manner of speech it comes to rules on the use of linguistic expressions and to the question of which inferences are allowed in order to build new statements. For example, it's not about whether two expressions mean the same thing, but whether they are mutually substitutable. See also formal language, Content speech, ideal language, artificial language, everyday language. |
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| Gavagai | Brandom | I 576 BrandomVsQuine: Sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong. >Reference, >Pointing, >Ostension. I 578ff Gavagai/BrandomVsQuine: if you want to use singular terms for (rabbit) parts, there must be predications of them, which do not only address them through the wholenesses in which they appear - if "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects that it sorts - there must be a term for "the same Gavagai" (in the derived scheme) - no natural language can be as non-autonomous that it needs a richer meta-language (of the theorist) - only artificial languages can do without it. >Meta-language, >Sortals, >Individuation. 580 I Solution/Brandom: it is about accuracy of inferences, not superficial stimuli. VsQuine: since no natural language can be non-autonomous in this sense - only artificial languages whose use is specified in a richer metalanguage can be that - a straightforward translation is to be preferred. BrandomVsQuine: this is about correctness of inferences, not about Quine’s thin base of surface stimuli. Gavagai: how do you distinguish whether the rabbit fly or the flash of bright stumpy tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, it does not depend on the RDRDs(reliable differential responsive dispositions) and the corresponding causal chains, but on their inferential role. >Inferential role. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Ideal Language | Gadamer | I 419 Ideal Language/Gadamer: Leibniz: (...) in the combinatorics of a (...) performed system of signs - this was Leibniz's idea - new truths could be obtained which would be of mathematical certainty, because the "ordo" I 420 portrayed by such a sign system would have a correspondence in all languages.(1-3) >Ideal Language/Leibniz, >G.W. Leibniz. GadamerVsLeibniz: In truth, this ideal makes it clear that language is something other than a mere sign system for designating the objective whole. The word is not only sign. >Words, >Signs. In a sense that is difficult to grasp, it is also almost something like an image. One only needs to consider the extreme counter-possibility of a pure artificial language to recognize a relative right in such an archaic theory of language. The word is mysteriously bound to the "depicted", belonging to the being of the depicted. >Representation, >Image, >Image theory, >Word meaning. I 421 [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses. Cf. >Formal language, >Formal way of speaking. Gadamer: The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides. Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But this does not mean, on the other hand, that the word is ahead of all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subject to itself. The experience is not, at first, wordless and is then, through the naming, made an object of reflection, for instance in the manner of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. 1. Cf. Leibniz, Erdm. p. 77. 2. Leibniz, De cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) Erdm., p. 79ff. 3. As is well known, already Descartes in his letter to Mersenne of November 20, 1629, which Leibniz knew, developed the idea of such a sign language of reason, which contained the whole of philosophy, on the model of the formation of number signs. A preform of this, admittedly in platonizing restriction of this idea, is already found in Nicolaus Cusanus, Idiota de mente Ill, cap. VI. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Ideal Language | Leibniz | Gadamer I 419 Universal Language/Ideal Language/Leibniz/Gadamer: The fundamental survey of the contingency of historical languages and the indeterminacy of their concepts would only be possible through mathematical symbolism: in the combinatorics of such a performed sign system - this was Leibniz's idea - new truths could be gained, which would be of mathematical certainty, because the "ordo" Gadamer I 420 depicted by such a sign system would have an equivalent in all languages.(1) >Language/Leibniz. Gadamer: It is probably clear that such a claim of the characteristica universalis to be an ars inveniendi, as Leibniz claims, is based precisely on the artificiality of this symbolism. It enables us to calculate, i.e. to find relations from the formal laws of combinatorics - regardless of whether experience leads us to corresponding contexts in things. Leibniz: For human reason, there is no higher adequacy of recognition than the notitia numerorum(2), and all calculation is based on the same pattern. GadamerVsLeibniz: [1.] But it is generally true that the imperfection of man does not permit adequate knowledge a priori and experience is indispensable. [2.] Knowledge through such symbols is not clear and distinct, because the symbol does not mean a vivid given. Such knowledge is "blind" in so far as the symbol takes the place of a real knowledge, indicating its availability alone. Leibniz: The ideal of language, which Leibniz pursues, is thus a "language" of reason, an analysis notionum, which, starting from the "first" concepts, would develop the whole system of true concepts and achieve the representation of the Universal of Being, as it would correspond to divine reason. GadamerVsLeibniz: In truth, this ideal makes it clear that language is something other than a mere sign system for designating the objective whole. The word is not only sign. In a sense that is difficult to grasp, it is also almost something like an image. One only needs to consider the extreme counter-possibility of a pure artificial language to recognize a relative right in such an archaic theory of language. The word is mysteriously bound to the "depicted", belonging to the being of the depicted. 1. Cf. Leibniz, Erdm. p. 77. 2. Leibniz, De cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684) Erdm., p. 79ff. 3. As is well known, already Descartes in his letter to Mersenne of November 20, 1629, which Leibniz knew, developed the idea of such a sign language of reason, which contained the whole of philosophy, on the model of the formation of number signs. A preform of this, admittedly in platonizing restriction of this idea, is already found in Nicolaus Cusanus, Idiota de mente Ill, cap. VI. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Intensions | Brandom | I 671 Definition intension: functions from indices to extensions. A more robust type of content that is shared by the listener in the best case. >Extensions. I 672 Functions of the kind in question are so finely individuated that it is difficult to see how the use of an expression may determine that sometimes this and sometimes another function should be associated with it. (among others, reason for QuineVsIntensions). Quine: reference instead of meaning. >Reference/Quine, >Meaning/Quine. I 674 The difficulty with such an approach is exactly the one stressed by Quine: what exactly of these practices deserves to be characterized in a way that it deals with some assertions and inferences as privileged? This can only be set for artificial languages. I 675 Intension/Extension/BrandomVsTradition: three-stage instead of two-stage approach: 1) inferential significance fundamental 2) extensional dimension in concepts of substitution-inferential definitions 3) equivalence classes of expressions that correspond to what is being spoken about. Tradition: leaves out the communication dimension. Brandom: Content not as a function, rather as practical account management. I 792 Meaning/Reference/Sense/Frege/Brandom: only in the interaction with the world that lies outside the mind the "sense" determines the "meaning"; this has nothing to do with representation intentions, but certainly with success. >Sense. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Interpretation | Mates | I 72 Interpretation/logic/Mates: an interpretation assigns: individual constants: individuals - one-digit predicates: properties (classes of individuals) - two-digit predicates: relations - statement letter: truth values - truth values come into play when the logical constants are interpreted. >Individual constants, >Individuals, >Properties, >Predicates, >Relations, >Truth values, >Constants. I 73 Truth values: may change when we pass from one interpretation to another, without the form of the statement being changed - the terms "true" and "valid" refer to all interpretations of a particular type. >Truth, >Validity, >Universal validity, >Proofs, >Provability. I 74 A statement is always true in relation to an interpretation. I 78 Interpretation/QL/Mates: if quantifiers have to be considered, we need a helping concept. We need two interpretations I and I"- b: is an individual constant - then b-variant - the interpretations then differ at the most in what they assign to b ("at most to b-th place"). I 81 Then has the substitution y"(namely y a/b) a specific truth value at every interpretation. >Inserting. I 83 Complete interpretation: not desirable because we also examine statements, where not names for all individual constants are available - e.g. real numbers. >Real numbers, >"Not enough names". I 91 Interpretation/translation/truth/intention/artificial language/Mates. Problem: The interpretation also has a "manner of being given". E.g. "2" as the "smallest prime" or "only even prime number" - translation: not unambigiuous - solution. helping concept: "predicate of the German language" - Problem: no systematic rules - meaning/everyday language: depends on the context. >Sense, >Everyday language. I 92 Interpretation specifies truth conditions (WB) fixed - truth condition: Then here in German. - With that it will give every statement a meaning. >Truth conditions, >Translation, >Translation indeterminacy. I 93 Interpretation/logic/Mates. would there be a complete I, then scheme: (W) X is only true if and only then at I when p - although the truth conditions are in German. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Language | Gadamer | I 383 Language/Gadamer: Gadamer Thesis: The fusion of horizons, which happens in understanding, is the actual achievement of language. >Horizon/Gadamer. I 388 Understanding: Understanding a language is not really understanding in itself and does not include a process of interpretation, but an execution of life. One understands a language by living in it - a sentence that, as is well known, applies not only to living languages but even to dead languages. I 408 Language as form: (...) it is undeniable (...) that linguistics and philosophy of language work under the premise that the form of language is their sole subject. But is the concept of form even relevant here? The language that is alive in speech, that encompasses understanding everything, I 409 also that of the interpreter of texts, is so much involved in the execution of thought or interpretation that we have too little in our hands if we want to disregard what languages pass on to us in terms of content and only think of language as form. The language unconsciousness has not ceased to be the actual mode of being of speaking. Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: It had no word for what we call language. I 421 Ideal Language/GadamerVsLeibniz: [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses. The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides. Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But, on the other hand, this does not mean that the word precedes all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subservient to itself. The experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. I 449 Language/Gadamer: Language [has] its actual being only in conversation, that is, in the exercise of communication (...). This is not to be understood as if the purpose of language is indicated. >Communication/Gadamer. I 453 In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world presents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of existence, because it comprises all being-for-itself I 454 in whatever relationships (relativities) it manifests itself in. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does therefore not mean that the world becomes the object of language. I 461 Language/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: "Centre of the language": (...) we are guided by the hermeneutical phenomenon. But its all-determining reason is the finiteness of our historical experience. In order to do justice to it, we took up the trace of language, in which the structure of being is not simply reproduced, but in whose paths the order and structure of our experience itself is first and forever changing. Language is the trace of finiteness, not because there is the diversity of human language construction, but because every language is constantly being formed and developed, the more it expresses its experience of the world. We have questioned important turning points in Western thought about language, and this questioning has taught us that, in a much more radical sense than Christian thought about what is finite, what happens in language corresponds to the finiteness of man. Cf. >Language/Christianity. It is the centre of language from which our entire experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds. >Experience/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. I 462 "Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word, therefore, as the event of its moment, also makes the unsaid, to which it refers to in responding and waving, be present. I 465 The important thing is that something happens here. Neither is the interpreter's consciousness mastering that what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of Tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and which we have to listen to, really strikes us as if it were addressing us and meant I 466 ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its respective new possibilities of meaning and resonance, newly acquired by the other recipient. >Object/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Translation | Mates | I 93 Translation/formal language/Mates: a translation of everyday language in the artificial language is meaningless as long as the artificial language is not interpreted. >Interpretation, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Formalization, >Natural language. "Minimum translation":a minimum translation translates true in true and false in false statements. >Truth preservation, >Truth transfer. I 102 Translation/meaning/sense/interpretation/Mates: to know whether something is a satisfactory translation (of a formal language), we need not only to know the meaning (reference), but also the sense - otherwise we can obtain various everyday language translations. Sense/Mates: cannot be stated in a list as meaning. >Sense. Meaning/Mates: meaning gives the non-logical constants truth conditions: E.g. 2 < 3 is true, if the smallest prime number is less than 3. >Meaning. Sense/Mates: sense provides the content: that the smallest ... is smaller. Reference/Mates: reference provides truth conditions: true, if ... >Truth conditions. Sense: content: that it is true. >Reference, >Content. I 110 Translation/variables/Mates: the translation is not affected by the substitution of the variables, but only by the substitution of the constants. >Variables, >Constants. I 111 Translation/summary/Mates: 1. meaningless without interpretation. (Assignment of objects to the individual constants) 2. If an interpretation is given, one can get a "standard translation" for every formal statement, and this by means of the definition of "true in interpretation I" - Problem: if the same interpretation is given in various ways (E.g. 2 = "smallest prime" or "sole even prime number") one can obtain several non-synonymous translations. >Way of givenness, >Intension. Two formal statements may be equivalent, without being equally good translations. >Equivalence. Conversely it is possible: that two statements are adequate but not equivalent - (only for ambiguity). >Adequacy, >Ambiguity. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Truth Definition | Tarski | Berka I 403 Truth-Definition/Tarski: in artificial languages: not solvable if they contain variables of an arbitrarily high order. >Levels, >Variables, cf. >Type theory. Solution: truth-concept as undefined basic concept - it can be used in a "deductive discipline".(1) Berka I 477 Truth/Truth-Definition/language/Tarski: would the language be finite, it took just a list to fill in the scheme.(2) 1. A.Tarski, „Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den Sprachen der deduktiven Disziplinen“, in: Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Klasse 69 (1932) pp 23-25 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 119 Truth-Definition/Tarski: has other interesting consequences: we can use it to prove the semantic sentence of contradiction and the semantic sentence of contradiction - but not the corresponding logical sentences, because these contain the term "true". (They belong to the propositional calculus). >Semantics, >Logic, >Excluded Middle, >Truth predicate, >Semantic closure, >Metalanguage, >Provability, >Propositional logic, >Propositional calculus. Also, it is shown that truth never coincides with provability - because there are true statements that are not provable.(3) 3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 156 Truth/Tarski: we get the truth-definitions simply because of the definition of fulfillment: Definition fulfillment/Tarski: fulfillment is a relationship between any object and propositional function - an object satisfies a function when the function is a true statement, when replacing the free variable with the name of object - Snow satisfies the propositional function "x is white" - Vs: that is circular, because "true" occurs in the defintion of fulfillment - Solution: fulfillment itself must be defined recursively - if we have the fulfillment, it relates by itself on the statements themselves - a statement is either satisfied by all objects, or by none. Skirbekk I 162 Truth Definition/Tarski: not circular, because the conditions under which statements of the form "if ... then" are true, are extralogical. Skirbekk I 163 Truth-Schema/Tarski: correct: (T)X is true if and only if p. - wrong: (T") X is true if and only if p is true ((s) Vs: here 'true' occurs twice) - Tarsk: Confusion of name and object) statements and their names) - ((s) p is the statement itself, not assertion of its truth.) >Redundancy theory. Skirbekk I 169 Truth-Definition/Tarski: "actually" does not occur, because it does not concern the content - also no assertibility condition because the definition is not epistemologically - epistemologically would be "snow is white" not true.(4) 4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Carnap, R. | Fodor Vs Carnap, R. | II 111 Formal Language/ideal language/Carnap: suppose we had three artificial languages L1, L2, and L3, each of which is considered as a possible idealization of the natural language L. The sentence S in the language L should be: - analytic in L1, - synthetic in L2, and - none of both in L3. How do we know whether S in reality is analytic, synthetic, or none? We ask of a theory that it answers this question. FodorVsCarnap: the theory would have to explicate the concepts of analytic in L, synthetic in L, etc. But none of the languages developed by Carnap and his successors does that. Therefore, they are not idealizations of natural languages. II 112 As long as, beyond that, these idealizations use terms that are not interpreted for natural languages, they claim wrongly to explain something. Then we have no way to detect deviations. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Church, A. | Quine Vs Church, A. | I 368 QuineVsChurch: The subject does not need to speak the language of the object sentence. There is a German phrase of which is true that the mouse, which is afraid of the cat, fears it. But in a certain way they remain language relative (Church). Ex A sentence in a given concrete translation might have a slightly different meaning. For Church this is even likely, because he also accepts all sorts of artificial languages. So we improve: (7) Thomas true-believes in German "Cicero..." I 369 According to Church, we would then have to make all other possible translations as well (8) Thomas believes true in German "Cicero has denounced Catiline." But an Englishman who does not speak German would find other information in (8) than in a full translation. (9) Thomas believes that Cicero denounced Catiline (in English). However, since (8) reflects the meaning of (7), (9) must miss the meaning of (7). QuineVsChurch: not necessarily because a certain concept of meaning is required. Quine: (7) not satisfactory because of the dependence on a language. Such relations of a sentence, a person and a language cannot be linked with the propositional attitudes. I 370 Sheffler + about expressions and degrees XI 55 Identity/Necessity/Church: the values of the variables could be reduced to intensions and thereby make all the true identity statements necessary. QuineVsChurch: it is a mistake to think that the quantified modal logic can tolerate only intentions, but no classes or individuals. Proof: Specification/Quine: every thing x, even an intention is, if it can at all be specified, specifiable in random matching manner. ((s) >indeterminacy of translation, indefinite >reference, >inscrutability of reference). XI 56 Suppose x is determined as the only thing by the condition "φx", so it is also determined as the only one by the conjunction "p u φx". Now you select any truth for "p" that is not implied by "φx", and both specifications contingently turn out to be consistent. So you gain nothing by taking intentions as values of the variables. Should we try again with necessary identity? Identity/Necessary Identity/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: let us consider the following postulate (1) ((w)(Fx w = x) u (w)(Gw w = x))> N(w) (Fw Gw) The demands that if there are always two open sentences that determine the same thing x as the only thing, they should be necessarily equivalent. Although this would repeal the referential opacity of the rules - it would also repeal modal distinctions themselves at the same time! (... + ...) |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Markerese | Lewis Vs Markerese | IV 189/190 Semantic Markerese/Semantic Markers/LewisVsKatz: (after Jerrold Katz, Paul Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions (Cambridge, Mass. MIT, 1964). Semantic markers: are symbols, objects in an artificial language that we can call "semantic markerese". The semantic interpretation by this means merely leads to a translation algorithm from the object language into the Markerese help language! But then we can also know the markerese translation without knowing anything about the meaning of the original English sentence! Namely, without knowing the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics without truth conditions is not semantics! The translation into markerese depends either on our (future) competence as speakers of markerese or on our ability to apply semantics at least to markerese. But then translation into Latin would be just as sufficient if the semantics for markerese were perhaps also somewhat simpler. Markerese/Lewis: pro: is attractive because it only handles symbols. Finite combinations of familiar entities form a finite set of elements with finite applications of finite rules. No problem for ontological thriftiness. VsMarkerese: but it is precisely this pleasant finiteness that prevents the semantics of markerese from establishing relations between the symbols and the real world of non-symbols! So it's not real semantics. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Ordinary Language | Black Vs Ordinary Language | II 207 Everyday language/Austin: Passed the long test of survival of the fittest, finer distinction than theoretically designed artificial languages. II 208 VsOrdinary language, Phil.der/Black: it is intellectually conservative. II 161 VsLanguage/Black: There is a long tradition to rebel against alleged or actual deceptions by language: E.g. Logan Pearsall Smith: "I stood there for a while, thinking about language, about its perfidious meanness and its inappropriateness, about the shamefulness of our vocabulary and how the moralists have spoiled our words by infusing all their hatred of human happiness in the words like in little poison bottles." "Logophobia"/Abhorrence of language/BerkeleyVsLanguage: "most of the knowledge is confusedbvand darkened by the misuse of words; since the words so much oppose understanding, I am determined to make as little use as possible of them and to try to involve them bare and naked in my ideas." II 162 LockeVsLanguage: was so impressed by the errors, the darkness, the mistakes and the confusion which is caused by the bad use of words that he wondered if they contributed more to the improvement or prevention of knowledge. (Essay Book III, Chapter XI Section 4). WhiteheadVsLanguage: it is incomplete and fragmentary, it only represents a transitional stage beyond the monkey mentality. Main risk for philosophy: false confidence in the appropriateness of the language. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Brigham Young: I long for the time in which the pointing of a finger or a gesture can express every idea without expression. (1854) Swift: (trip to Balnibarbi): ... the project of the second professor was aimed at abolishing all words ... II 163 The smartest followed the new method to express themselves through the things they carry in a bundle on their backs ... III 166 SartreVsLanguage/Black: "disgust": Roquentin tried to retreat into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Positivism | Fodor Vs Positivism | II 107 Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages can be constructed so that they have any desired property. II 108 When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem. II 109 Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica(1). This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic. II 110 FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply. II 112 Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally. II 113 Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously. II 117 Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before. Fodor/Lepore IV 49 Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 577 E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units. I 578 BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur. I 579 Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of "the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme). The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups. I 580 VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough. BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli. I 601 Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing. I 666 BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective. II 217/218 The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism). II 224 BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings. BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Various Authors | Locke Vs Various Authors | Danto I 112 LockeVsInnate Ideas: God created us so that we can acquire the basic ideas with our senses, therefore it would be superfluous to provide us with innate ideas. Locke I 78 Second Treatise Law/LockeVsFilmer: Adam did not obtain an absolute right of dominion over his children or the world either by paternity law or by God's positive gift. Had he possessed this, his heirs would not have possesed this. If these had attained it, there would be neither a determination of the natural nor the positive right from which it could be seen who was entitled to the right of inheritance. I 79 Legitimacy/Locke: claims to derive political violence from the "true origin": the state of nature without power. Locke I 159 Law of Nature/LockeVsGrotius: unthinkable without God's existence (Grotius: but thinkable, even if the assumption would be a great crime!). Locke II 195/196 Language/LockeVsArtificial Language: (fashion of the time, according to Leibniz, according to the algebra model): instead, analysis of the use of language, critical discussion of its function. An individual cannot reform his or her mother tongue. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Various Authors | Mates Vs Various Authors | I 281 Renaissance/Humanism/Logic/Modern Times/Mates: HumanistsVsLogicians: barbaric style, boring, men with scientific inclinations found Aristotle's syllogistics worse than useless. Mates: the next 4 centuries were meaningless in terms of logical literature. Peter Ramus: (1515 72) (was murdered in the night of Bartholomew and martyr of Protestants): Mates: Ramus gave the logic the service to ask everyone seriously whether Aristotle should not have allowed such syllogisms: For example, "Octavius is Caesar's heir; I am Octavius; therefore I am Caesar's heir. VsRamus/Mates: Aristotle's defenders found themselves in the desperate position of having to argue, this syllogism has to be reformulated: "Whatever Octavius is, is Caesar's heir; whatever I am, is Octavius; so whatever I am, is Caesar's heir". I 83 Artificial Language L/Interpretation/Mates: Vs complete interpretation: but we do not want to be limited by allowing only those areas for which there are enough individual constants (names) in L, so we stick to the old definition. We want to make examples about the real numbers. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
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