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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Wright | I 226 f Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers. >Identification. Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. that there are no abstract objects). >Nominalism. But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! >Singular terms, >Reference, >Conceptual role, >Inferential role. Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! >Meaning, >Semantics, >Non-existence. Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. >Numbers, >Platonism. I 227f Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is evaluable in relation to truth, or not. >Truth-evaluableness, >Morals, Discourse. If the "capacity for truth" (truth evaluability) is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions. >Realism. I 223 ff It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner. Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference). >Minimalism. I 242 Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are. >Objects of thought. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Conditional | Wright | I 54 Minimalism/logic/conditional/Wright, Cripsin: we cannot ask for more than for a statement to obviously appear as a conditional. Wright: there are no "deeper" notions of a "real" conditional tense" or "deeper" notion of an assertoric content. >Content, >Assertion, >Assertibility. For our purposes, surface features suffice, even though it were certainly be possible to fix the corresponding features. ((s) In particular, no metaphysical assumptions about a "true-making realm" are necessary.) >Truthmakers. Expression theory/Wright: must make a distinction between genuine and merely apparent conditionals: e.g. genuine conditional: If it rains tomorrow, the visit is canceled e.g. apparent conditional: If you behave badly, the visit is canceled. Cf. >Truth evaluability. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Content | Wright | I 45 Content/"Deep Content"/"Deep Reference"/Wright: can be masked or simulated by syntax. (negations, conditionals). >Expression Theory. ((s) For the expression theory the question is: do the sentences have content or is it only simulated syntactically?) >Syntax, >Signs, >Meaning, >Reference. Common basis of realism and anti-realism: that this is not the case! >Realism, >Anti-realism. E.g. with Frege's numbers, there is no deep reference. The suitability of an expression to refer to one object depends on its syntax. It ensures that it can function as a singular term. >Singular terms, >Numbers/Frege. Then no more questions can be asked whether the object reference is successful. However, it is conceded that the appropriate contexts in which this is the case are true. (No "deep reference",or "deep content".) I 44 Syntactic Surface Characteristics: it must be ensured that a sentence that contains a truth predicate can be embedded in conditionals and has significant negations. >Negation, >Truth-predicate. Content/Wright: must satisfy discipline and surface syntax (e.g. conditional, negation) of a discourse. The thus secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes). >Discourse, >Platitudes. I 157 Content/Wright: in conditions: is needed to prevent expressions like "whatever it takes" (> role/Wright, > circularity). - Solution: independence condition: fulfillment must be logically independent of the details of the extension of the terms (projectivistic terms such as color, morality, humor ) - then only terms within intensional operators - WrightVs provisional equations for moral discourse. I 242f Def wide cosmological role: (I 250) a content has a wide cosmological role iff the mention of facts of which it consists can occur at least in certain types of explanations of contingencies; explanations whose possibility is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of the discourse. >Minimalism. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality has no wide cosmological role. Wide cosmological role of content: we want to measure its reach for a discourse on the extent to which the provision of the various facts can potentially contribute to the explanation of all those things that have nothing or not directly something to do with our attitudes by which we conceive such facts as objects. I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not from our attitudes. >Meaning, >Content, >Conventions, >Language community. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Correctness | Wright | I 272f Def "Correct"/Wright: here: T-predicate for minimally truth-enabled discourses. >Truth predicate, >Truth evaluability, >Minimalism, >Discourse. >Truth. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) Wright I 276 Correctness/Negation/Logics/Truth/Wright: when both truth and correctness are at play, there is a distinction between the a) actual, strict negation: transforms any true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one that gives another form of negation: b) Negation: works in such a way that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument reaches no truth. >Negation, >Truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal (Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. >Nonfactualism. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict concept of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the predicate of truth will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but there are problems elsewhere now: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition >Truth conditions. I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for "A" is true jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. Meaning Minimalism/correctness/Wright: Correctness cannot regard certain sentences (e.g. about primary qualities of material bodies) as candidates for substantial truth. >Content. The attribution of a truth condition can therefore be correct for such a proposition. Thus, even in a conservative matrix, the assertion "S has the truth condition that P" is true can be correct. But the whole basis of the argumentation is that minimalism of meaning has no choice but to view "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition as inevitably at least incorrect otherwise there is no affirmation of (i) as a premise. ((i): It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition). The insertion of "S" has the truth condition that "P" for "A" in (II) consequently produces, in a conservative matrix for meaning minimalism itself, a correct antecedence, but an incorrect consequence. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Summary: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the disquotation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), if, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The proposition is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argumentation at all. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Language Games | Wright | I 260 Life forms/Wittgenstein/Cavell: orientations of the interests and feelings, sense of humor, for significance, for similarity for the decision if an utterance is a statement, an explanation ... >Life, >Community, >Language Community, >Discourses, >Understanding, >Similarity, >Assertion, >Explanation, >Truth evaluability. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Minimalism | Wright | I 52 Definition minimalism/Wright: Ingredients: (i) the equivalent scheme "it is true that P if and only if P, (ii) "P" says that P, (iii) a sentence can be characterized as true if its proposition is true, (iv) the validity of the modus tollens, (v) that it is not malicious, "P" corresponds to the facts "more than" "the things are as "P" says that they are" - recognizes truth as a real property.(VsDeflationism) >Deflationism, >Truth, >Validity, >modus tollens, >Propositions, >Sentences, >Equivalence. I 102f Minimalism/Wright: neutral between anti-realism: (Super-assertibility) and Realism: evidence transcendental truth. >Superassertibility, >Assertibility, >Realism, >Anti-realism. I 225 Minimal capacity for truth/Wright more than minimal capacity for truth: if the facts must be mentioned in the best explanation of our true beliefs to which the beliefs relate. >Truth evaluability, >Best Explanation/Wright. ((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) I 267ff Global Minimalism/Wright: ... it could be a global minimalism concluded rather than a total skepticism: all meanings and the truth are only at the most minimal capable of truth. I 271 Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence no fact - attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism. >Non-factualism. I 285 Boghossian: "global minimalism": with the truth also all meaning tilts. >Meaning, >Facts. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Roles | Wright | I 250 Def Wide cosmological role: A content plays a wide cosmological role exactly in the case in which the mention of facts, of which it is composed, may occur at least in certain types of explanation of contingencies, explanations, the ability of which is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of discourse. >Truth evaluability. ((s) Truth capacity/truth-apt/truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality plays no wide cosmological role (problem for the moral realism). Cosmological role: see >Content/Wright. How can the specification of any facts contribute to explaining? I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not by our attitudes. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Subjectivity | Wiggins | Wright I 143ff Subjective/objective/McDowell/Wiggins: subjective value judgments can be true or false, therefore they are objective. >Truth evaluability/Crispin Wright, >Emotivism, >Cognitivism. Judgment/Wright: there is a difference extension-determining, extension-reflective. >Euthyphro. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Supervenience | Wright | I 198f Disputational supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes the other when disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. >Dependence, >Discourse, >Truth-evaluability, cf. >Correctness/Wright. ((s) Truth evaluability/truth-apt: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) See also color/Wright. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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