Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Denotation Husserl I 29
Naming/Husserl: besides the meaning, the sense, the word has the function to name something. Words as the "name" of an object. ((s) Cf. Myth of the museum).
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Denotation Rorty VI 147
Naming/Rorty: language is more than naming. VsThermometer theory of meaning. >Thermometer, >Myth of the museum.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fido-Fido-Principle Rorty III 217
"Fido" -Fido: "Fido" is the name of the name of the dog. Ryle: The idea that all the words are names is the ’Fido’ -Fido Theory of meaning. It is frequently linked to Plato (e.g. by Austin).- It is contrary to Saussure and Wittgenstein: no association but use. >Use Theory, >Myth of the museum.
III 218f
"Fido"-Fido theory of meaning (Ryle): all words are names (RyleVs)(suitable for dogs, but not for abstractions) - WittgensteinVs "Fido"-Fido use, not associations. "Fido"-Fido: one learns the meaning of "Fido" by someone pointing to the corresponding dog, but one does not learn the meaning of "good" by someone pointing to something. One can vaguely remember the dog, but not vaguely "good". Alleged Problem: I do not know if someone is calling the name of the dog or the dog (DerridaVs).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Gavagai Field II 201
Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Theory/Reference/FieldVsQuine: the indeterminacy does not only refer to the absolute sense. - either a) to the absolute - b) to the relative reference. Absolute reference/Field: here there is no fact which decides what Gavagai has as an extension.
---
II 202
Correspondence theory/indeterminacy/Gavagai/Field: new correspondence theory: partial signification: Gavagai has the relation of partial signification - a) to the quantity of rabbits - b) to the quantity of rabbit parts. - This is only interesting, if one can explain truth with it. - Then "is" is either identity relation or partial identity. Indeterminacy: is then the thesis that there is no fact that decides about it. - This does not mean that there is no disquotation scheme. - Modification: "signifies partially a and partially b".
Partial signification/everyday language: E.g. "tall man": 180-185cm?
---
II 204
Problem: relativized signification and denotation leads again to the myth of the museum. - For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation manual M: T signifies {x I Fx} relative to M iff M T displays to a term which signifies y (or {x I Fx}). Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: Quine needs a connection between "rabbits" ((s) not "Gavagai") in our language and actual rabbits. But his indeterminacy thesis denies the existence of such a one which does not consist at the same time equally well out of rabbit parts.
---
II 216
Gavagi/metalanguage/Field: we need defined expressions for the description of the partial extension: - E.g. "Rabbit" partly signifies the set of rabbits and partly the set of the unseparated parts of rabbits. - Question: how can this be understood by someone for whom the last two tokens of "rabbit" are indeterminate? - N.B.: the sentence is just as understandable and has the same truth conditions when the meta language is indeterminate. ---
II 220
Gavagai/indeterminacy/Field: the addition of "is an unseparated part of" to language reduces the indeterminacy. - (This comes from an inflationary view).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Gavagai Quine I 59ff
Gavagai: the totality of the sentences can be permuted so that verbal behavior remains, but correlation disappears - translation manuals can be internally consistent and mutually incompatible.
I 67
Gavagai: this is about stimuli, not rabbits. - (> forgery). - A verification shall be carried out by the community.
IV 425
GavagaiVs >" href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?erweiterte_suche_1=Museum&erweiterte_suche_2=Myth&x=9&y=11">myth of the museum".
V 119
Reference/Gavagai/Quine: problem: we do not know whether the child who agrees to "red" also referred to red - Red: can be a general term for set of red surfaces - or a general term for any visible color spot - but not for parts of color spots - this does not allow abstraction - no problem: to realize that the reference is made to the mere presence of red - different translation manuals lead to different translations. >General Terms/Quine, >Translation/Quine.
VI 73
Gavagai/Quine: the translation vagueness in particular should not be shown with that, because the translation with "Look, a rabbit" is well secured - the point was that the reference is not determined by the translation. Because "Gavagai" is a whole sentence, there was no compensation possibility - Reference/explanation: reference is explained by quote eradication "rabbit" refers to rabbit. ---
XII 18
Gavagai/Quine: must neglect differences such as "There is a rabbit" and "Look, a rabbit" - no single term can be attributed, but only an entire sentence in which "rabbit" appears - do not assume objectification - even if the presence of rabbits is an expression condition, they might still be temporal stages or rabbit parts - not sufficient: to ask whether "an X is present" - solution: "the same x" - expression conditions are not sufficient to know whether the stranger refers to an object - Solution: A-u-B is at least acknowledgment for whole sentences.
XII 47
Gavagai/Quine: Problem: a whole rabbit is given iff a non-severed part or a temporal stage is given.
XII 48
Gavagai/color/color word/generic term/mass term/Quine: the big difference between "Rabbit" and "Sepia" is that "Sepia" is a mass term like "water" - "Rabbit" on the other hand, is a term of crushed reference. Therefore it cannot be dominated without the individuation principle. One must know where one rabbit ends and another one begins - that does not work by pointing (ostension) - where does a Gavagai end and where does another one begin? - inextricably - ((s) Because Gavagai is not a mass term, that is important.) - Important argument: if you take the part of the universe, which consists of rabbits, it is identical to the part, which consists of un-severed rabbit parts and with the one that consists of temporal stages of rabbits - only difference: how to split it - ostension cannot teach that - pointing to a whole is always also pointing to its parts and vice versa.
XII 50
Translation Manual: offers no solution: Problem: stage/part/rabbit: perhaps we always ask in a foreign language "Do they belong together?" instead of "Is it the same?" without knowing it.
XII 51
Gavagai/Quine: behaviorist criterion: a stable, relatively homogeneous object against a background will probably be denoted by a relatively short term - but merely imposed on the foreign language - (yet reasonable hypothesis).
XII 52
Gavagai/native tongue/part/whole/time stage/Quine: within our own language, we can distinguish between whole rabbits, rabbit parts and rabbit stages, because the apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is determined - when translating from another language, this itself is subject to indeterminacy.
XII 53ff
Gavagai/Japanese/classifier/Quine: 1) numeral "5" 2) animal classifier 3) "Ox" - Explanation A: declined numeral of the genus "animal" (ox: individuative term, here for all cattle) - B: 3rd word here is a mass term "lifestock" (e.g. here only cattle) - Japanese: in both cases it is "five cattle" - German: both are equally good translations - both fit into language behavior - reference (extension): is different. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Language Acquisition Tomasello Gärdenfors I 6
Language acquisition/Tomasello/Gärdenfors: (Tomasello 2001)(1) Thesis: the child's attention is often focused on a single object.

1. Tomasello, M. (2001). Perceiving intentions and learning words in thesecond year of life. In M. Bowerman & S. Levinson (Eds.),Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Upton I 75
Language acquisition/Tomasello/Upton: Tomasello (2006)(1) describes a similar approach in his usage-based theory, which argues that the essence of language is its symbolic dimension, not its grammatical construction. Language is learned as a specific tool for conversation and communication. Concrete words are learned initially, with no grammatical rules at all. All the child has is a collection of useful concrete speech units, which form the basic building blocks of language. Gradually, the ability to construct longer and more complex utterances emerges. Initially, children do not possess the fully abstract categories and schemas of adult grammar. Children construct these abstractions only gradually and in piecemeal fashion. ((s) Vs: Cf. >Myth of the museum.)
General cognitive process/Tomasello:

intention-reading (e.g. joint attention), by which they attempt to understand the communicative significance of an utterance;
pattern-finding (categorisation, schema formation), by which they are able to create the more abstract dimensions of linguistic competence.


Upton: This implies that language development follows on from the development of our thinking processes.



1. Tomasello, M. (2006) Acquiring linguistic constructions, in Kuhn, D and Siegler, R (eds) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 2: Cognition, perception, and language (6th edn). New York: Wiley.

Tomasello I
Michael Tomasello
Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation Frankfurt/M. 2011


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Language Acquisition Nativism Upton I 2
Language Acquisition/Nativism/Upton: Def nativism/language development: the nativist position argues that the environmental input from language is insufficient for infants and children to acquire the structure of language. Proponent: Noam Chomsky. Language acquisition device/LAD/Chomsky/Upton: thesis: there is a “universal grammar” that applies to all human languages and is pre-specified (Chomsky, 1979)(1); Pinker, 2007(2)).
VsNativism: >Language Acquisition/Empiricism.


1. Chomsky, N (1979) Human language and other semiotic systems. Semiotica, 25: 31–44.
2. Pinker, S (2007) The evolutionary social psychology of off-record indirect speech acts. Intercultural Pragmatics, 4(4): 437–61.



Upton I 74
Language acquisition/Nativism/Upton: [environmentalists assume that] gradually, the child learns the association between the word and the object and tries to imitate the sounds made by the mother – resulting in reinforcement, repetition and so on. Cf. >Myth of the museum. NativismVs: Nativists such as Noam Chomsky argue that this is too simple an explanation for what is essentially a complex behaviour. In particular, learning theory cannot explain how children are able to construct novel sentences or the ease with which children learn the rules of grammar. There is evidence, for example, that parents do not reinforce or explicitly correct syntax or other grammatical errors (Brown, 1973)(1). Chomsky (1979)(2) argues that there must therefore be an innate mechanism for language learning. He calls this the language acquisition device (LAD). >Language Acquisition/Chomsky.


1. Brown, R. (1973) A First Language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Chomsky, N. (1979) Human language and other semiotic systems. Semiotica, 25: 31–44.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Meaning Sellars I 56
Thermometer theory/meaning/Price/Sellars: main representative: Price - thesis: meaning consists of the syntax of a predicate and the fact of a reaction - SellarsVs: error: to regard meaning as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity - (s)> tags -> myth of the museum. ---
II 306
Meaning/tradition (atomism): relationship between a linguistic and non-linguistic subject is purely logical. ---
II 307
SellarsVs: Consequence: then truth would be a purely "relational property" But it is not a "real property" - meaning is no "real relationship"! - it is more complicated.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Picture Theory Quine XII 44
Definition Myth of the Museum/Quine: explanations: are the meanings - descriptions: are the words - QuineVsPicture Theory: close to the myth - QuineVsMyth: 1. according to it meanings are to be mental entities - 2. even without this assumption: the semantics would be somehow fixed in the mind: whether it should go beyond behavior and dispositions is unclear. >Meaning/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Proper Names Husserl Chisholm II 138
Name/Husserl: a name denotes an object directly, but not attributively.
Husserl I 29
Naming/Husserl: besides the meaning, the sense, the word has the function to name something. Words as the "name" of an object. ((s) Cf. Myth of the Museum).
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Introspection Chomsky Vs Introspection Münch III 304
Museum myth/Chomsky: Vsintrospection: introspective evidence is not reliable, diffuse and sometimes influenced by prejudice to the meaning or structure of certain words and phrases. >Myth of the museum.
Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126. – dt: Introspektion und Beschreibung des Sprachgebrauchs, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992

Chomsky I
Noam Chomsky
"Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky II
Noam Chomsky
"Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Chomsky IV
N. Chomsky
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965
German Edition:
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Chomsky V
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Myth/Museum Field Vs Myth/Museum II 201
Def Museum Myth/Myth of the Museum/Mere Tags/Gavagai/Quine/Field: the thesis that it is determined (somewhere) whether means Gavagai rabbit or rabbit part. ((s)> Naive Realism). Indeterminacy/FieldVsMyth of the Museum: pro Quine: if the indeterminacy is to be rejected, then only because of physical facts.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Myth/Museum Quine Vs Myth/Museum XII 44
Definition Myth of the Museum/original point/Quine: Thesis: Exhibits: the meanings
Labels: the words.
QuineVsMyth of the Museum:
1. Then meanings should be mental entities.
2. (more important, it also exists when meanings should not be mental but platonic ideas or even concrete objects): the semantics is still considered somehow as set in the mind of humans. Thus, it becomes unclear. It should then be something that goes beyond behavior and dispositions.
---
XII 46
Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/Quine: E.g. Suppose, in a foreign language there is a word for which there are two mutually incompatible German translations. But no ambiguity in the foreign language. Assuming the foreign expression can be translated in the same use into German in both ways. And both can be equally well reconciled by compensation with the foreign and the own speaker's behavior (assumed with all behavioral dispositions).
Problem: then you could never know which translation is right or wrong.
QuineVsMyth of the museum: would not be a solution, because we would have no access to the museum. ((s) to the mental entities).
1. decomposition of translation: E.g. "ne ... rien" in French: the "rien" could be translated into German as "something" or equally well, with "nothing".
Compensation: you can make both in accordance with each other: by translating the "ne" with either "no" or translate it as empty.
Solution: Here we have simply broken down the French into too small parts. The example is disappointing.
---
XII 47
Problem: The decomposition is still a problem because it has to be admitted with this length of expressions, which correspond to predicates. Because then they must bear meanings. 2. E.g. (W + O, § 12): Gavagai: based on the fact that exactly a whole rabbit is present if a non- seperated part or a temporal stage is present.
Ostension/Show: also repeated showing on several occasions does not help.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Tradition Sellars Vs Tradition I 57
Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association).
I 62
Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report,
a) without that this is a public language implementation, and
b) without speaker/listener!
Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought.
I 65
Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits.
Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions.
I 84
Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas.
I 88
SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical.
I 86
Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists.
I 87
Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing.
SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Wittgenstein Quine Vs Wittgenstein I 209
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but yet different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3, 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes. (QuineVs/FregeVs)
I 210
Identity/QuineVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's mistake is easier to recognize: Wittgenstein: "To say of two things that they are identical is nonsense and saying of one thing that it is identical with itself says nothing." Quine: Indeed identity statements that are true and not idle consist of unequal singular terms that refer to the same thing, of course.
XII 96
Facts/QuineVsState of Affairs/QuineVsWittgenstein: the concept has no meaning, because most sentences are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But that is no problem for the verification theory of meaning.

XII 44
Representation Theory/Language/QuineVsWittgenstein: traditional, close to the myth of the museum.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Thermometer Th. Price, H.H. Sellars I 56
Thermometer theory / meaning / Price / Sellars: main representative: Price - thesis: meaning consists of the syntax of a predicate and the fact of a reaction - SellarsVs: error: to see meaning as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity - (s)> tags -> "myth of the Museum").

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Gavagai Quine, W.V.O. IV 425
The Gavagai-Example serves just to refute the myth of the museum, the legend of somewhere fixed meanings (descriptions). The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation does not mean that there are no points of view at all: there are the principles of simplicity, brevity and the principle of indulgence. (However, they are not empirically verifiable).
VI 73
Quine: Ironically, at the time I had not yet meant the indeterminacy of translation in the strong sense: it was not intended to illustrate this, because "Gavagai" is an observation sentence whose translation with "Look, a rabbit" is perfectly assured. What this translation cannot succeed in doing, however, is the determination of the reference! This thesis was the real punch line of the example. Only the term here was identical with the whole sentence, so that there was no possibility of compensation.