Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 39 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Climate Costs | Shue | Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…). Norgaard I 331 A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6). Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7). Norgaard I 327 Some (Shue 1993 (1); Neumayer 2000 (8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19) 7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. 8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92. 9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Costs | Singer | Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…). Norgaard I 331 A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6). Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7). Norgaard I 327 Some (Shue 1993(1); Neumayer 2000(8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19) 7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. 8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92. 9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Constitutional Economics | Persson | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Tabellini | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Continuum | Brouwer | Thiel I 347 Continuum/Brouwer: Brouwer sees the continuum, in contrast to Cantor, who regarded it as a finished infinite whole, and also in contrast to the French functional theorists and Weyl, who conceived it as a countable set of constructible elements, as a "medium of free development". Intuitively given, but not countable. >Countability, >Infinity, >Real numbers, cf. >Continuum hypothesis, >G. Cantor, >Numbers, >Number theory. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Continuum Hypothesis | Cantor | Berka I 295 Continuum hypothesis/Cantor (1884): if an infinite set of real numbers is not countable, the set of real numbers R itself has the same cardinality. >Real numbers, >Countability, >Sets, >Set theory, >Continuum. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Cooperation | Piaget | Habermas III 33 Cooperation/Piaget: Piaget developed the combined model of social cooperation, according to which several subjects coordinate their interventions in the objective world through communicative action.(1). Habermas: only when one tries to separate cognitive-instrumental rationality from communicative rationality do contrasts emerge, e. g. in terms such as accountability and autonomy. III 34 If the demands are geared to success, it is sufficient to demand that alternatives can be chosen and that conditions can be monitored. However, if rationality is measured by the success of communication processes, the demands are higher: here only those who, as members of a communication community, can orientate their actions towards intersubjectively recognized claims of validity may be regarded as responsible. Cf. >Rationality/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Intersubjectivity, >Interactionism. 1. J. Piaget, Die Entwicklung des Erkennens III, Stuttgart 1973, p. 190. Two types of interaction: a) interaction between agent and objects mediated by teleological action, b) through communicative action: Interaction between the subject and other subjects. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Correctness | Tarski | Berka I 489 Correctness/domain/Tarski: according to the sentences 14-16 (or Lemma I) there is for each natural number k such a statement that is true in any area with k elements and in any area of the other thickness. In contrast: Every statementthat is true in an infinite range is also true in any other infinite domain. Properties/classes: so we conclude that the object language allows us to express such a property of classes of individuals, such as the existence of exactly k elements. There is no means for designating any specific type of infinity (e.g. countability) and we cannot distinguish by means of a single or a finite number of statements... I 490 ...two such properties of classes such as finiteness, infinity from each other. >Infinity. I 491 Truth (in the domain): depends on the scope in the finite case, not in the infinite. I 491 Correctness in the doamin/provability/Tarski: if we add the statement a (every nonempty class contains a singleton class as a part) to the axiom system correctness and provability will be coextensive terms. >Provability. N.B.: this does not work in the logical algebra, because here a is not satisfied in all interpretations. I 516 "In every correct domain"/Tarski: this term stands according to the extent in the middle between the provable sentence and the true statement, but is narrower than the class of all true statements generally. It does not contain statements whose validity depends on how big the total number of individuals is.(1) 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Corruption | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 209 Corruption/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: Gerring and Thacker (2004)(1) find that parliamentary systems suffer from significantly less corruption than do presidential ones. They argue (2004(3), p. 314) that "effective accountability arises from a highly structured relationship between voters and political parties and from the relatively clear lines of authority instituted by a centralized political apparatus." Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005)(2) also find that parliamentary systems suffer less from corruption than do presidential ones and also draw on the concept of accountability to explain why. Their argument is that parliamentary systems "allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature... " They conclude that after "political institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of corruption… lose virtually all their relevance." In his survey, Treisman (2007)(3) replicates these results but finds that presidentialism becomes insignificant as soon as one controls for Catholicism or when a dummy for South America is included. Parisi I 210 Geography/history: In a recent study, Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2013)(4) find a large degree of heterogeneity across the characteristics usually attributed to the forms of government and conclude (2013(4), p. 3): "Indeed, knowing whether a constitution is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a constitution's executive-legislative structure ... than is knowing the geographic region in which the constitution was produced or when it was written." Cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. Parisi I 211 Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(5). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Gerring, J. and S. Thacker (2004). "Political Institutions and Corruption: the Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 34:295—330. 2. Lederman, D., N. Loayza, and R. Soares (2005). "Accountability and Corruption." Economics and Politics 17(1): 1-35. 3. Treisman, D. (2007). "What have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Annual Review of Political Science 10: 211-244. 4. Cheibub, J., Z. Elkins, and T. Ginsburg (2013). "Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 44(3):515-544. 5. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Crowd Psychology | Le Bon | Haslam I 12 Crowd psychology/Le Bon: Gustave Le Bon (1895/1960)(1) used careful observations of a range of large groups and collectives to develop an influential theoretical analysis of crowd behaviour that emphasized emotional, irrational and unconscious influences. Le Bon’s perspective on the potentially negative aspects of groups was highly influential, and can be seen as an intellectual precursor to modern research on deindividuation – the potential for an individual to lose his or her sense of self-awareness and accountability when submerged in a group (Zimbardo, 1969(2). >Group behavior, >Coercion, >Persuasion, >Responsibility, >Behavior. 1. Le Bon, G. (1895/1960) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (translation of La Psychologie des foules). New York: Viking Press. 2. Zimbardo, P.G. (1969) ‘The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse, and chaos’, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 17: 237–307. Steven J. Karau and Kipling D. Williams, “Social Facilitation and Social Loafing. Revisiting Triplett’s competition studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Delegative Democracy | O’Donnell | Gaus I 150 Delegative democracy/minimalist liberalism/O’Donnell/Dryzek: (...) minimalism can allow forms of democracy that are very thin indeed, to the extent they barely merit the description 'democratic'. O’Donnell/Dryzek: For example, what Guillermo O'Donnell (1994)(1) calls delegative democracy passes the minimalist test. Under delegative democracy, found especially in Latin America but also in the post-communist world, leaders submit themselves to regular elections, but otherwise govern without accountability, without any sense that election promises need to be remembered and without constitutional constraint (except of course the one specifying regular free elections). PettitVsO’Donnell: Delegative democracy completely misses what Philip Pettit (1999)(2) calls the contestatory as opposed to electoral aspect of democracy. In light of this aspect, the guarantee of freedom (defined as non-domination) is the ability of citizens to contest the content of collective decisions under fair terms, be it via access to courts, legislatures, or administrative review. >Minimalist liberalism/Dryzek, >Democratic practise/Dryzek. 1. O'Donnell, Guillermo (1994) 'Delegative democracy'. Journal of Democracy, 5: 55—69. 2. Pettit, Philip (1999) 'Republican freedom and contestatory democratization'. In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordön, eds, Democracy i Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 163—90. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Soviet Union | Krastev I 91 Democracy/Soviet Union/Krastev: (...)Marx's final gift to the Soviet elites was persuading them not only that capitalism was designed for the predatory self-enrichment of a few but also that Western democracy was a shrewdly constructed system for maintaining class domination. Democracy, viewed in this cynical light, had nothing to do with the accountability of politicians to citizens. On the contrary, the democratic illusion of accountability helped mask and preserve the autonomy of a political ruling class that was never, as a whole, chosen in a fairly contested multi-candidate election. >Democracy/Policy of Russia. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Disenchantment | Weber | Habermas III 293 Disenchantment/Worldviews/Religion/Modernity/Weber/Habermas: Weber observes enchantment primarily in the interaction between believers and God. The stronger this is designed as communication, Habermas III 294 the more strictly the individual can systematize his/her inner-worldly relations under the abstract aspects of morality. >Communication/Habermas. This means a) the preparation of an abstract concept of the world b) the differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c) the formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. >Norms, >Validity claims, >Ethics, >Abstraction, >World. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles. >Principles, >Tradition, >Cultural transmission. Habermas III 295 Cognitive dimension: here, the disenchanting of things and events is accompanied by a demythologization of the knowledge of the existing. All the more reason for individuals to systematize their relationships with the world, this time under the abstract aspects of a cosmological-metaphysical order whose laws govern all phenomena without exception. This means a) the preparation of a formal world concept for the existing as a whole with universals for the legal, space-time context of entities in general, (1) b) the differentiation of a purely theoretical attitude (out of touch with practice), c) the formation of an epistemic ego in general, which, free of affects, worldly interests, prejudices, etc., can surrender itself to the view of the existing.(2) >I, Ego, Self, >Rationality, >Rationalization. Habermas III 296 HabermasVsWeber: Weber has never analyzed in more detail the cognitive structures that emerge on the obstinate rationalization paths of religious and metaphysical worldviews. It is therefore not sufficiently clear that there is still another step between the results of world view rationalization and that world understanding that is "modern" in a specific sense. >Modernity, >Modernization, >Worldviews. Habermas III 297 Modernity/Habermas: Modernity has no reserves in ethics or science that would be exempt from the critical force of hypothetical thought. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. >Generalization, >Criticism. 1. A Koyré, Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum, Frankfurt 1969. 2. H. Blumenberg, Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung, Frankfurt 1974. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Empiricism | McDowell | Rorty VI 201 McDowellVsDavidson: In so doing (i.e. eliminating experience), the old philosophical questions still look as if they were reasonable. It will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak through the back door again. We still need something that allows us to make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. >Understanding7McDowell, >Reality, >Experience/McDowell, >Justification/McDowell. --- McDowell I 12 Minimal empiricism/McDowell: Thesis: thinking that is focused on judgments is in so far responsible for how things are, (in the world) as it can be carried out right or wrong - it’s about justification in front of the "tribunal of experience". >Tribunal of experience, >Accountability towards the world, |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Equal Rights | Kant | Höffe I 312 Equal Rights/Kant/Höffe: Although Kant grants sovereignty to the united will of the people, not all citizens receive the right to vote and with it active citizenship. He rightly distinguishes between active and passive citizenship and grants only the latter to minors. But it is not convincing if he derives discrimination under public law, i.e., merely passive citizenship, from an economic position ("journeyman, servant, ") or gender ("woman"), i.e., from private law or even biological circumstances. HöffeVsKant: This is where Kant is subject to prejudices of his time. It would be correct to link active citizenship to legal capacity, i.e. accountability (...). >Citizenship, >Political elections, >Democracy, >Electoral systems, >Society. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Federalism | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 210 Federalism/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: (…) the conjectured economic benefits of federalism are expected to arise from the competition between constituent governments; its costs are based on the necessity of cooperating on some issues. Hayek: Thus, Hayek (1939)(1) argues that competition between governments will reveal information on efficient ways to provide public goods. Assuming that governments have incentives to make use of that information, government efficiency should be higher in federations, ceteris paribus. Tiebout: In Tiebout's ( 1956)(2) famous model, the lower government levels compete Parisi I 211 for taxpaying citizens, thus giving lower-level governments an incentive to cater to these citizens' preferences. Costs: (…) if the number of states is large, economies of scale in the provision of public goods could remain unrealized. For example, Tanzi (2000)(3) suspects that those providing public goods will be insufficiently specialized. Moral hazard: Also, federal states need to deal with a moral hazard problem that is not an issue in unitary states.* The federal government will regularly issue "no-bail-out clauses" but they will not always be credible.** With regard to the issue of overborrowing, Wildasin (1997)(6) argues that large states can become "too big to fail." On the other hand, it has been argued (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7) that large member states can internalize more of the benefits generated by responsible fiscal policies. Solution: A number of factors might mitigate this free-rider problem: If strong, disciplined parties are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, then party leaders may be able to prevent state officials from externalizing the negative effects of overborrowing (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7). Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(3). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. Parisi I 212 Government spending: For a long time, the evidence concerning the effects of federalism on overall government spending was mixed. Over the last several years, though, this appears to have changed. Rodden (2003)(8) shows for a cross-country study covering the period 1980 to 1993 that in countries in which local and state governments have the competence to set the tax base, total government expenditure is lower. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics. * The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be more aptly described drawing on principal-agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For such a view, see Seabright (1996)(4). ** Rodden (2002(5), p. 6 72) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if it does not bail out the constituent governments. 1. Hayek, F. (1939). "Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism." New Commonwealth Quarterly 2: 131-149. 2. Tiebout, Ch. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 3. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. 4. Seabright, Paul (1996). "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model." European Economic Review 40:61-89. 5. Rodden, J. (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World." American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670-687. 6. Wildasin, D. (1997). "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations." Nashville, TN: Mimeo. 7. Rodden, J. and E. Wibbels (2002). "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism - Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." World Politics 54: 494-531. 8. Rodden, J. (2003). "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government." International Organization 57: 695-729. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Governmental Structures | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Constitutional economics/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 209 Corruption: Gerring and Thacker (2004)(3) find that parliamentary systems suffer from significantly less corruption than do presidential ones. They argue (2004(3), p. 314) that "effective accountability arises from a highly structured relationship between voters and political parties and from the relatively clear lines of authority instituted by a centralized political apparatus." Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005)(4) also find that parliamentary systems suffer less from corruption than do presidential ones and also draw on the concept of accountability to explain why. Their argument is that parliamentary systems "allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature... " They conclude that after "political institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of corruption… lose virtually all their relevance." In his survey, Treisman (2007)(5) replicates these results but finds that presidentialism becomes insignificant as soon as one controls for Catholicism or when a dummy for South America is included. Parisi I 210 Geography/history: In a recent study, Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2013)(6) find a large degree of heterogeneity across the characteristics usually attributed to the forms of government and conclude (2013, p. 3): "Indeed, knowing whether a constitution is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a constitution's executive-legislative structure ... than is knowing the geographic region in which the constitution was produced or when it was written." Cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Gerring, J. and S. Thacker (2004). "Political Institutions and Corruption: the Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 34:295—330. 4. Lederman, D., N. Loayza, and R. Soares (2005). "Accountability and Corruption." Economics and Politics 17(1): 1-35. 5. Treisman, D. (2007). "What have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Annual Review of Political Science 10: 211-244. 6. Cheibub, J., Z. Elkins, and T. Ginsburg (2013). "Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 44(3):515-544. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Governmental Structures | Persson | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Governmental Structures | Tabellini | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Imitation | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 78 Imitation/Policy of Russia/Krastev: The politics of imitation in post-communist Russia has unfolded in three distinct phases. >Imitation/Krastev. 1) Already in the 1990s, the electoral accountability of politicians to citizens was stage-managed and illusory. If the Yeltsin regime had been accountable, it would not have shelled the Supreme Soviet in 1993, stolen the 1996 election, carefully avoided putting the Gaidar economic reform programme to a popular vote, or allowed Russia's national wealth to be 'looted by a narrow group of future oligarchs with the complete consent of Boris Yeltsin and his team of "reformers.(1) Nevertheless, simulating democracy proved useful as a way for the Kremlin to reduce pressure from Western governments and NGOs (...). Vladislav Surkov: The multilayered political institutions which Russia had adopted from the West are sometimes seen as partly ritualistic and established for the sake of looking 'like everyone else,' so that the peculiarities of our political culture wouldn't draw too much attention from our neighbors, didn't irritate or frighten them. They are like a Sunday suit, put on when visiting others, while at home we dress as we do at home.(2) Krastev I 79 2) The second phase, which segued smoothly from the first, began around the turn of the millennium, when Putin acceded to the presidency. He continued to organize elections, but did so primarily to persuade Russian citizens that there were no viable alternatives to the current wielders of state power. 3) The third phase, which represents a more radical break, can be traced to 2011—12. At around that time, for reasons to be discussed, the Kremlin shifted to a strategy of selective mirroring or violent parody of Western foreign policy behaviour meant to expose the West's relative weakness in the face of Kremlin aggression and to erode the normative foundations of the American-led liberal world order. We are still in the third phase today. Krastev I 88 (...) while overly optimistic Westerners were right that Russia, after 1991, was predestined to imitate the West, they were wrong to assume that the mimic's desire to become like the model is the sole reason for imitation. Russia was undoubtedly weak, but its elites, except for a handful of socially isolated and unrepresentative liberals, were not prepared to accept the kind of moral subordination required from willing imitators of an acknowledged superior.(3) Many members of Russia's political elite, in fact, were dreaming secretly of revenge without regard to strategic gains. As German cultural historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch wrote in his elegant and insightful book The Culture of Defeat: 'Losers imitate winners almost by reflex.' But such imitation is not necessarily deferential: 'The borrower is not interested in the soul, the spirit, or the cultural identity of the creditor nation,' he argued.(4) Krastev I 89 Krastev: On the contrary, imitative politics can be essentially competitive and conflictual. Krastev I 124 Imitation/Policy of Russia/Krastev: Because hypocrisy helps us avoid conflict by hiding beliefs that are insulting and hurtful, attacks on hypocrisy often signal a desire to fight. This is what makes Russia's switch from simulation to mockery - from counterfeiting democratic accountability domestically to holding up a mirror to US misbehaviour internationally - so dangerous. The change was possible, presumably, only because the aspiration to become like the West was never genuinely internalized by powerful forces inside Russia. A good example of aggressive imitation is Putin's March 2014 speech announcing Russia's annexation of Crimea. This offcial address lifted whole passages from speeches by Western leaders justifying the dismantling of Serbian territory in Kosovo and applied them to the Crimean case.(5) Thus, what most Western observers took to be the first step in Putin's attempt to restore Moscow's empire was explicitly justified by the rhetoric of US President Woodrow Wilson extolling the fundamental right of popular self-determination. Krastev: By clothing its own violent actions in an idealistic rhetoric borrowed verbatim from the US, Moscow aims to unmask the Age of Imitation as an Age of Western Hypocrisy. Vaunted Western values, such as the self-determination of peoples, are simply Western interests in disguise. The implication is that the entire post-Second World War international system will collapse if other nations start imitating the real West. 1. Alexey Pushkov, ‘Russian Roulette’, National Interest (3 March 2008). 2. Vladislav Surkov, 'Putin's Lasting State', Russia Insider (13 February 2019); https://russia-insider.com/en/vladislav-surkovs-hugely-important-new- article-about-what-putinism-full-translation/ri26259 (13.08.2020) 3. According to the Russian-born historian of nationalism Leah Greenfeld every society importing foreign ideas and institutions has 'inevitably focused on the source of importation - an object of imitation by definition -and reacted to it. Because the model was superior to the imitator in the latter's own perception (its being a model implied that), and the contact more often than not served to emphasize the latter's inferiority, the reaction commonly assumed the form of ressentiment.' Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 15. 4. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (Metropolitan Books, 2013), pp. 33—4. 5. Bojana Barlovac, 'Putin Says Kosovo Precedent Justifies Crimea Secession', Balkan Insight (18 March 2014). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Infinity Axiom | Gödel | Berka I 367 Axiom of infinity/Gödel: the axiom of infinity can be formulated as follows: "There is exactly a countable number of individuals".(1) >Infinity, >Individuals, >Countability, >Quantification, >Validity. 1. K. Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I, Mh. Math. Phys. 38 (1931), pp. 175-198. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Internet Security | Zittrain | I 155 Internet Security/network safety/Zittrain: In an effort to satisfy the desire for safety without full lockdown, PCs could be designed to pretend to be more than one machine, capable of cycling from one split personality to the next. In its simplest implementation, we could divide a PC into two virtual machines: “Red” and “Green.” (1) The Green PC would house reliable software and important data—a stable, mature OS platform and tax returns, term papers, and business documents. The Red PC would have everything else. In this setup, nothing that happens on one PC could easily affect the other, and the Red PC could have a simple reset button that sends it back to a predetermined safe state. Someone could confidently store important data on the Green PC and still use the Red PC for experimentation. Knowing which virtual PC to use would be akin to knowing when a sport utility vehicle should be placed into four-wheel drive mode instead of two-wheel drive, a decision that mainstream users could learn to make responsibly and knowledgeably. A technology that splits the difference between lockdown and openness means that intermediaries could afford to give their end users more flexibility—which is to say, more opportunity to run others’ code. I 156 We want our e-mail programs to have access to any document on our hard drive, so that we can attach it to an e-mail (…)requires the ability to cross the boundaries from one application to another, or one virtual PC to another. For similar reasons, we may be hesitant to adopt complex access control and privilege lists to designate what software can and cannot do. (2) >Spam, >Internet, >Internet culture >Networks, >Social media, >Social networks. 1. For a sketch of such a machine, see Butler Lampson, Microsoft, Powerpoint on Accountability and Freedom 17—18 (Sept. 26, 2005), http://research.microsoft.com/lampson/slides/accountabilityAndFreedomAbstract.htm. 2. See, e.g., Granma’s Rules of POLA, http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/granmaRulesPola.html (last visited June 1, 2007) (outlining six rules for desktop security based on the Principle of Least Authority); Sudhakar Govindavajhala & Andrew W Appel, Windows Access Control Demystified 2 (Jan. 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript under submission), available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-sudhakar/papers/winval.pdf (detailing how the “fine-grained and expressive” character of Windows access control makes it difficult to evaluate the consequences of commercial access-control configurations, which leads to misconfigurations and “privilege-escalation vulnerabilities”); Introduction to Capability Based Security, http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/capabilityIntro/index.html (last visited June 1, 2007). |
Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Lifeworld | Luhmann | Habermas IV 232 Lifeworld/Luhmann/Habermas: Luhmann hypostasizes the world that has been pushed back behind media-controlled subsystems, which no longer directly follows the action situations, but only forms the background for organized systems of action, into "society". >Society/Luhmann. Habermas IV 394 Lifeworld/Mechanization of the Lifeworld/Luhmann/Habermas: (see Communication Media/Parsons): Lifeworld/Parsons/Habermas: the conversion of the coordination of actions from language to control media means a decoupling of the interaction from life-world contexts. In this context Luhmann speaks of a mechanization of the lifeworld; by this he means "the relief of sense-processing processes of experiencing and acting from the reception, formulation and communicative explication of all sense references implied (Habermas: in the lifeworld context of communication-oriented action)".(1) >Communication/Luhmann. Habermas: Media-controlled interactions can connect in space and time to ever more complex networks without these communicative networks having to be overlooked and taken responsibility for, even if only in the form of a collectively shared cultural knowledge. Then it is no longer a question of the accountability of the interaction participants. >Action/Luhmann, >Action system/Luhmann. 1. N. Luhmann, Macht, Stuttgart 1975, S. 71. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Loewenheim | Gödel | Berka I 314 Loewenheim-Skolem/validity/Gödel: if something is "universally valid in every domain of individuals", then it says the same as "universally valid in a countable domain".(1) >Validity, >Scope, >Term scope, >Countability. 1. K. Gödel: Die Vollständighkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, in: Mh, Math. Phys. 37 (1930), pp. 349-360. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Loewenheim | Hilbert | Berka I 340 Loewenheim/Hilbert/Ackermann: Loewenheim has shown that every expression that is universal for the countable domain has the same property for every other domain. In Loewenheim, however, the sentence appears in the dual version: Every formula of the function calculus is either contradictory or can be satisfied within a countable infinite range of thought. >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability, >Models, >Model theory, >Functional calculus, >Countability. General Validity/Hilbert/Ackermann: examples of formulas which are valid in each domain are all formulas that can be proved from axioms of a system. >Validity, >Universal validity. Loewenheim/Hilbert/Ackermann: Loewenheim has made another remarkable proposition: in the treatment of the logical formulas one can restrict oneself to those in which only function symbols with a maximum of two vacancies occur(1). This corresponds to: Schroeder: the general relative calculus can be traced back to the binary calculus(2). >Logical formulas. 1. L. Löwenheim: Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül, Math. Annalen 76 (1915), pp. 447-470, p. 459. 2. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann: Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik, Berlin, 6. Aufl. Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1972, § 12. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Logos | Ancient Philosophy | Taureck I 25 Logos/Concept/Conceptual History/Conceptual Change/Ancient philosophy/Taureck: three aspects: 1. Word, 2. Thought, 3. Reason. --- I 26 Etymology: (before the taking up through philosophy) Logos: (collection, unit) - counting A) enumeration, narrative - speech - account/calculation (counting, accountability) B) The narrated - matter - number, the counted. >Language/Ancient Philosophy, >Language/Aristotle, >Language/Plato, >Writing/Plato. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Models | Kauffman | I 415 Model/economy/Kauffman: in economics and other systems there are an enormous number of niches. What gives rise to these? According to which rules do workstations, tasks, functions and products connect to networks? >Niches, >Rules, >Progress, >Society. Thesis: we can view goods and services as sign strings that affect other strings. Hammer acts on nails and two boards. >Character strings, >Functions/Kauffman. I 416 Model/Kauffman: what use are models if we do not know the true laws of complementarity and substitutability? >Substitutability. Their benefit is that we can recognize the kind of things we would expect in the real world if our model is in the same "universality class". ((s) cf. >Brandom on singular terms, predicates in relation to the degree of generality). Definition Universality class/physics/Kauffman: Class of models that show the same robust behavioral patterns. >Models, cf. >Model theory. Lambda Calculus/Church/Kauffman: System for performing universal calculations. Also Emil Post. Universal system and Turing machine, all these systems are equivalent. >Lambda calculus, >Turing machine. I 417 Model/Post/Kauffman: For example, a system where the left-hand list of sign strings represents the "grammar", each pair of sign strings specifies a substitution. I 419 The sign strings can then interact with each other, like enzymes on substrates. Arbitrary rules can lead to non arbitrary ones! >Arbitraryness, >Contingency, >Necessity. The number of possible grammars is infinite. >Grammar, >Infinity, >Countability, >Overcountable. Complexity: if the right links of the sign strings are shorter than the left ones, the "soup" will react inert, because all the chains become shorter, and no longer fit on an "enzymatic digit". The different regions form universality classes. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Ordinal Numbers | Russell | Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 18 Ordinal numbers: result from counting. Objects can only be counted when some come first, and others come afterwards. >Numbers, >Countability, >Supernumarary, Cardinal numbers: they are the basic numbers of the infinite numbers (not the ordinal numbers). They are not obtained by sorting and counting, but by a different method, which, if necessary, shows whether a quantity is bigger. This method does not say in the same way as counting how many elements a set has! Each element is linked to a number in pairs. Thus, infinite sets are defined numerically. >Sets, >Set theory, >Functions. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Pain | Cavell | I (a) 44 Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: different objects require very different identity criteria. E.g. in the case of sensations, style, colors, diseases, for example, it may be a description, in the case of material objects it may be a place. >Identity, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. I (a) 45 Pain/Identity/Cavell: it seems as if we could say of pain and of cars, but not of colors: in a certain way there are two, but in a certain way only one. >Colors. Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sence perceptions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would be the same! E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two. Why not with pain then? Because here "equals" means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not! >Description, >Imagination, >Equality. I (a) 46 Why should not the skeptics have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors, the question is also answered: it is one! But with pain? Pain/Malcolm: there is a danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas. It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places. Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors of headaches are different. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, not! However, we have the same insidious pain which Dr. Eternity describes as part of the eternity syndrome! I (a) 47 Malcom only shows, by adjusting the pain to the colors, how both are counted or identified by means of descriptions. Only in this respect they then behave like cars! Colors cannot be counted differently, but this does not show that pain cannot be counted differently! If I were put under pressure here, I would even say that pain in this respect is more like objects than colors. I (a) 48 Pain/Cavell: Thesis: in pain it is important that the other needs our attention! This makes it so important to know how strong the pain is. This seems to make a standard description necessary. Physical identity (i.e., empirical indistinguishability) is not sufficient: for example, two peas in a pod can be indistinguishable, but we do not say it is one pea! >Indiscernibility, >Indistinguishability, >Countability, >Similarity, >Classification, >Identification. I (a) 49 However, it is not necessary either, because if there is a standard description that secures the application of "(descriptive) equal", then we can tolerate an unlimited discrepancy. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Policy of Russia | Holmes | Krastev I 14 Policy of Russia/post-communism/Krastev: The Kremlin’s first response to the global pre-eminence of liberalism was a form of simulation of the sort adopted by relatively weak prey to avoid being attacked by dangerous predators. Russia’s political elite, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, was by no means uniform. Krastev I 15 Democray: The creation of ‘imitation democracy’ in 1990s Russia involved none of the arduous work of real political development. It was essentially a matter of erecting a Potemkin façade with a superficial resemblance to democracy only. >Imitation/Krastev. By 2011–12, this democratic charade had outlived its usefulness. Russia’s leaders then switched to a resentment-fuelled policy of violent parody, a style of imitation that is brazenly hostile and intentionally provocative. It certainly cannot be captured by bland analyses of foreign policy imitation as ‘observational learning’.(1) Mirroring: Russia’s interference in the American Presidential elections in 2016, to come to the most salient example of this tauntingly ironic ‘mirroring’ approach, was understood by its organizers and perpetrators as an attempt to duplicate what the Kremlin considered the West’s unwarranted incursions into Russia’s own political life. Democracy: Thesis: Having simulated the accountability of politicians to citizens in the 1990s, we argue, the Kremlin today has lost all interest in democratic charades. Instead of pretending to imitate America’s domestic political system, Putin and his entourage prefer to imitate the way America illicitly interferes in the domestic politics of other countries. Krastev I 111 Policy of Russia/Krastev: The Crimean annexation was, fundamentally, a bid to re-legitimize a system that was losing its credibility. It did this by demonstrating that Moscow could Lrastev I 112 defy the West with impunity. The spectacle of an unopposed violation of international norms replaced the spectacle of an unopposed violation of democratic norms. Small successful wars fought in symbolically important places like Crimea turned out to have a bigger political pay-off than winning rigged elections. Putin's brazen defiance of Western norms and expectations gave his regime a greater boost than ethno-nationalism or any strategic gains achieved by 'returning' Crimea to the motherland. Against those who 'pursue only one goal - to destroy Russia as a nation', as Putin said in his election victory speech of 2012, 'we have demonstrated that nobody can impose anything on us. Nobody can impose anything.'(2) Krastev: The Crimea annexation proved the point. Putin had staged a sovereignty drama. Restoring Russia's strength and sovereignty, meaning its de facto independence from Western influence, remains today the fundamental theme of Putin's public discourse. 'Efforts to contain Russia have failed, face it,' he repeated in 2018. 'Nobody listened to us. Listen now.“(3) Russia/China/Krastev: (...) unlike China, Russia cannot be defined as a classic rising power. Its global weight is minimal compared to the influence once exerted by the Soviet Union, and while it has succeeded in improving its position in the short term, its long-term prospects as a global heavyweight are questionable. Krastev I 114 Post-imitation: After 2012, the Kremlin jettisoned its attempts to shore up its domestic legitimacy by imitating Western-style democracy. The new purpose was to discredit the Western-dominated international order by exposing its fundamental hypocrisy. The tone of the new approach was sarcastic: Americans give lip-service to international law, we are told, but act according to 'the rule of the gun'. Krastev I 134 Policy of Russia/Krastev/Holmes: (...) Moscow's resentment-fuelled policies (...) don't rise to the level of a well-considered, long-term strategy. Indeed, Russia's policy of ironic mimicry and reverse engineering of American hypocrisy may be slowly nudging the world towards disaster. Aggressive imitation assumes, in a self-fulfilling way, that all grounds for trust between Russia and the West have been fatally eroded. Paranoia: Distinguishing public justifications from hidden motivations is only common sense. But focusing dogmatically and obsessively on this distinction, as Putin seems to do, is a slippery slope. Krastev I 135 Because they spy cynicism behind every American invocation of humanitarian ideals and want to prove that they are no longer as naive as they were when they believed America's two-faced promises not to expand NATO eastward, they have thrown themselves into a strutting disregard for elementary humanitarian values, as if jettisoning moral inhibitions in the siege of Aleppo, for example, made them into worthy counterparts to the amoral America whose purported villainy they love to revile. 1. Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Imitation in International Relations. Observational Learning, Analogies, and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine (New York; Palgrave, 2005). 2. This was Putin's famously tearful 'Election Victory Speech' in Manezhnaya Square (4 March 2012); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-c6qLcDAoqxQ. 3. Anton Troianovski, 'Putin Claims Russia Is Developing Nuclear Arms Capable of Avoiding Missile Defenses', Washington Post (1 March 2018). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Policy of Russia | Krastev | Krastev I 14 Policy of Russia/post-communism/Krastev: The Kremlin’s first response to the global pre-eminence of liberalism was a form of simulation of the sort adopted by relatively weak prey to avoid being attacked by dangerous predators. Russia’s political elite, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, was by no means uniform. Krastev I 15 Democray: The creation of ‘imitation democracy’ in 1990s Russia involved none of the arduous work of real political development. It was essentially a matter of erecting a Potemkin façade with a superficial resemblance to democracy only. >Imitation/Krastev. By 2011–12, this democratic charade had outlived its usefulness. Russia’s leaders then switched to a resentment-fuelled policy of violent parody, a style of imitation that is brazenly hostile and intentionally provocative. It certainly cannot be captured by bland analyses of foreign policy imitation as ‘observational learning’.(1) Mirroring: Russia’s interference in the American Presidential elections in 2016, to come to the most salient example of this tauntingly ironic ‘mirroring’ approach, was understood by its organizers and perpetrators as an attempt to duplicate what the Kremlin considered the West’s unwarranted incursions into Russia’s own political life. Democracy: Thesis: Having simulated the accountability of politicians to citizens in the 1990s, we argue, the Kremlin today has lost all interest in democratic charades. Instead of pretending to imitate America’s domestic political system, Putin and his entourage prefer to imitate the way America illicitly interferes in the domestic politics of other countries. Krastev I 111 Policy of Russia/Krastev: The Crimean annexation was, fundamentally, a bid to re-legitimize a system that was losing its credibility. It did this by demonstrating that Moscow could Lrastev I 112 defy the West with impunity. The spectacle of an unopposed violation of international norms replaced the spectacle of an unopposed violation of democratic norms. Small successful wars fought in symbolically important places like Crimea turned out to have a bigger political pay-off than winning rigged elections. Putin's brazen defiance of Western norms and expectations gave his regime a greater boost than ethno-nationalism or any strategic gains achieved by 'returning' Crimea to the motherland. Against those who 'pursue only one goal - to destroy Russia as a nation', as Putin said in his election victory speech of 2012, 'we have demonstrated that nobody can impose anything on us. Nobody can impose anything.'(2) Krastev: The Crimea annexation proved the point. Putin had staged a sovereignty drama. Restoring Russia's strength and sovereignty, meaning its de facto independence from Western influence, remains today the fundamental theme of Putin's public discourse. 'Efforts to contain Russia have failed, face it,' he repeated in 2018. 'Nobody listened to us. Listen now.“(3) Russia/China/Krastev: (...) unlike China, Russia cannot be defined as a classic rising power. Its global weight is minimal compared to the influence once exerted by the Soviet Union, and while it has succeeded in improving its position in the short term, its long-term prospects as a global heavyweight are questionable. Krastev I 114 Post-imitation: After 2012, the Kremlin jettisoned its attempts to shore up its domestic legitimacy by imitating Western-style democracy. The new purpose was to discredit the Western-dominated international order by exposing its fundamental hypocrisy. The tone of the new approach was sarcastic: Americans give lip-service to international law, we are told, but act according to 'the rule of the gun'. Krastev I 134 Policy of Russia/Krastev: (...) Moscow's resentment-fuelled policies (...) don't rise to the level of a well-considered, long-term strategy. Indeed, Russia's policy of ironic mimicry and reverse engineering of American hypocrisy may be slowly nudging the world towards disaster. Aggressive imitation assumes, in a self-fulfilling way, that all grounds for trust between Russia and the West have been fatally eroded. Paranoia: Distinguishing public justifications from hidden motivations is only common sense. But focusing dogmatically and obsessively on this distinction, as Putin seems to do, is a slippery slope. Krastev I 135 Because they spy cynicism behind every American invocation of humanitarian ideals and want to prove that they are no longer as naive as they were when they believed America's two-faced promises not to expand NATO eastward, they have thrown themselves into a strutting disregard for elementary humanitarian values, as if jettisoning moral inhibitions in the siege of Aleppo, for example, made them into worthy counterparts to the amoral America whose purported villainy they love to revile. 1. Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Imitation in International Relations. Observational Learning, Analogies, and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine (New York; Palgrave, 2005). 2. This was Putin's famously tearful 'Election Victory Speech' in Manezhnaya Square (4 March 2012); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-c6qLcDAoqxQ. 3. Anton Troianovski, 'Putin Claims Russia Is Developing Nuclear Arms Capable of Avoiding Missile Defenses', Washington Post (1 March 2018). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Real Numbers | Cantor | Thiel I 197 Real numbers/Cantor/Thiel: Eugen Dühring 1861: Every amount, which is thought of as something finished, is a definite one. Real numbers/CantorVsDühring/Thiel: an uncountable whole is something finished (even something "actual"), i.e. a certain number. Cantor: no countable list of dual sequences can contain all the dual sequences. Rather, from the outset the set of real numbers or the set of dual sequences is considered given, and the assumption that this set is countable, is then depicted as refuted by the diagonal construction. The unquestionable assumption of the "set" of all real numbers or dual sequences corresponds entirely to the interpretation of the conducted proof which, according to the classical view, provides more than the purely negative result of non-countability: I 198 Since the already accepted set of all real numbers must have a powerfulness, that is infinite, but not equal to the basic numbers. >Countability, >Sets, >Set theory, >Continuum. So there must be a greater powerfulness. Corresponding to the notion of the determinateness of all amounts or powerfulnesses, it also receives a name, e.g. "c". Thus, we also seem to have a "transfinite" cardinal number: the powerfulness of the continuum, which is greater than the powerfulness of the set of the basic numbers. Cantor has positively attempted to prove a whole more realm of the over-countable. ConstructivismVs: there is no set of real numbers since a statement form representing this set is missing. >Constructivism. In addition, with the dual sequences, this means an impermissible advance on construction means, which are not yet available. The special construction instruction for dual sequences would even be contradictory because it demands to construct a dual sequence that is different from all dual sequences. (So it is also different from itself). (s) E.g. it is, however, easy to construct with the numbers 2 and 3 a number different from these: "2 + 3 = 5". Vs: sure, but that does not correspond to the requirement to construct a number that is different from all natural numbers. But this can also be done: E.g. 2/3 is different from all natural numbers. >Continuum hypothesis. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Real Numbers | Thiel | Thiel I 238 Def Real transcendental numbers: such real numbers which are not solutions of any algebraic equations anxn+....= 0 are with integer coefficients ai. They could indicate a simple procedure, from which they concluded, because of the non-countability of the totality of the real numbers proved by Cantor, that after deduction of the real numbers a non-empty totality must remain, I 239 the transcendental real numbers. However, due to this typical "classical" conclusion, one is not in a position to actually produce such a number. Nevertheless, Liouville had long before constructed real transcendental numbers in 1844: 1/10 + 1/10² faculty + 1/10 3 faculty... If one wanted both cases (conservative and classical) logically simply by "(Ex)Tr(x)" (with "Tr" for transcendental), one would simply blur the difference. For the fundamentals of mathematics it is important to mark effective proofs of existence as such. In some cases the existence is not questioned at all, but a concrete answer to a mathematical question is sought. I 240 Example: largest common divisor of two basic numbers. An "effective method" does not solve the problem by trial and error, but in a finite number of steps. >Calculability, >Infinity, >Continuum. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Religion | Weber | Habermas III 235 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber examines the religious foundations of rational living in everyday consciousness, e.g. of Calvinists, Methodists, Pietists, Anabaptist sects. Main features are - Radical condemnation of magical means - loneliness of the individual believer - Secular fulfilment of professional duties as an obedient instrument of God - Transformation of Judeo-Christian world rejection into an inner-worldly asceticism. - Principle-led autonomous lifestyle. >Calvinism, >Judaism, >Christianity, >Religious belief. Habermas III 273 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber thesis: there is a commutated rationalization of all world religions. According to F. H. Tenbruck, Weber was thus in the group of evolutionism at that time.(1) >Rationalization. Tenbruck: "The rational constraints that religions are to follow arise from the need to receive a rational answer to the theodicy problem, and the stages of religious development are the ever more explicit versions of this... Habermas III 274 ...problem and their solutions. (2) >Theodicy. Monotheism/Weber/Tenbruck: for Weber, monotheism was an idea that first had to be born, but then had far-reaching consequences. Punitive God: the idea of a rewarding and punitive deity was also new, as was the sense of mission, according to which the human had to understand himself/herself as an instrument of God. Protestantism/Weber/Tenbruck: added to this the predestination. (3) >Protestantism. Habermas III 274/275 R. DöbertVsWeber: Weber does not distinguish enough between the problematic content and the structures of consciousness that emerge from the ethicization of world views. (4) Contents: reflect the various solutions to the theodicy problem. Structures: can be seen in the statements on the world, which are determined by formal world concepts. >Worldviews. Habermas III 281 Weber: The world religions try to satisfy "the rational interest in material and immaterial balance" by explanations that increasingly meet systematic demands. (5) Habermas III 293 Disenchantment/World Images/Religion/Modernity/Weber/Habermas: Weber observes de-enchantment above all in the interaction between believers and God. The stronger this is designed as communication, Habermas III 294 the more strictly the individual can systematize his/her inner-worldly relations under the abstract aspects of morality. >Disenchantment. This means a) The preparation of an abstract concept of the world b) The differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c) The formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles. Habermas IV 281 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber has shown that the world religions are dominated by a fundamental theme, namely the question of the legitimacy of the unequal distribution of happiness among people. Theodicy/Weber/Habermas: the theocentric world views designed theodicies to reinterpret and satisfy the need for a religious explanation of the suffering perceived as unjust into an individual need for salvation. Cosmocentric worldviews: offer equivalent solutions to the same problem. Common to religious and metaphysical worldviews is a more or less pronounced dichotomous structure that makes it possible to relate the socio-cultural world of life to a background world. The world behind the visible world of this world and phenomena represents a fundamental order; such worldviews can assume ideological functions if the orders of the stratified class society can be represented as homologies of this world order. >Metaphysics. 1.F.H. Tenbruck, Das Werk Max Webers, KZSS, 27, 1975, p. 677 2. Ibid p. 683 3. Ibid p. 685 4. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt 1973. 5. M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I Tübingen, 1963, p. 253. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rule of Law | Barth | Brocker I 244 Rule of Law/Barth: Thesis: The borders to the unjust state would be crossed where the state sought to make church proclamation practically and systematically impossible. This happens at the beginning already then, "if the state begins to demand love, then it is always already on the point of becoming the church of a false God and thus the unjust state. The rule of law does not need love, but sober acts of determined accountability" (1). >State, >Politics, >Society. Barth is of the opinion that, on the basis of these theological considerations, a clear prevalence of the democratic constitutional state can be asserted over other forms of state, "that Christians could want the earthly state [...] not as Pilate's State (see Governance/Barth) but only as a constitutional state" and that furthermore "for the character of the State as a constitutional state each of them [the Christians] is jointly and severally liable" (2). 1.Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, in: Theologische Studien 1, Zollikon 1938. Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, in: ders., Rechtfertigung und Recht, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde, Evangelium und Gesetz, Zürich 1998, p.41 2. Ibid. p. 42 Georg Pfleiderer, „Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht 1938)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Similarity | Fodor | Rorty I 255 Similarity/Rorty: sufficient: the expectation system should be abstract and complicated in the same sense because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of the stimuli among one another. >Stimuli. --- Fodor IV 18f Sameness/similarity/everyday language studies/intentionality/Fodor/Lepore: problem: in order to state similarity, identity must already have been defined. Problem: believing almost the same: requires countability and identity of beliefs, e.g. when someone asks you a color, you would answer something like "red". Problem: we have no idea what the truth conditions would be for these generalizations! Therefore, we cannot do without identity in favor of an equality solution: we need a yet-to-be-found stricter concept of similarity (with respect to beliefs or semantic entities) ((s)> VsAnalyticity). Holism: if he is right, the concept "token of the same type" is defined only if all beliefs are shared. Problem: they are almost of the same type. >Holism. IV 123 Similarity/functional role/causal/association/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: analog: what a mental picture reminds you of does not depend on what role it plays in mental processes. Hume: but the causal role depends on what the image is associated with; and an idea (imagination) can easily be associated with anything that is consistent with its content. Conclusion: the truth conditions are independent of the causal role. Hume is not a functionalist in terms of content. Fodor/Lepore: no one believes today, that the content of a representation depends on what it reminds someone of. Only exception: is connectionism. >Connectionism. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Terminology | Weber | Habermas III 286 Ethics/Worldviews/Weber/Habermas: a world attitude (Weber distinguishes it from worldviews) expresses rationalisation to the extent that it is directed towards nature and society as a whole and thus presupposes a systematic concept of the world. A worldview can be considered rationalized to the extent that it highlights the "world" as a sphere of moral probation under practical principles and separates it from all other aspects. It presents the world a) As a field of practical activity at all b) As a stage on which the actor can fail ethical, c) As a totality of situations to be judged according to "last" moral principles and to be dealt with according to moral judgements and therefore d) As an area of objects and occasions of moral action. Habermas III 228 Def Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization any expansion of empirical knowledge, of forecasting ability and of instrumental and organizational control of empirical processes. Habermas III 351 Def Positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Habermas III 318 Def Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands."(1) Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views. Habermas III 322 Value spheres/Weber/Habermas: The different (cultural) value spheres are: cognitive, normative and aesthetic ideas. Ideal goods exist within the scientific community, the religious community and the art business. Habermas III 258 Def Ideas/Cultural Relativism/Weber/WeberVsRelativism/Habermas: When Max Weber speaks of "last points of view" under which life can be rationalized, he does not always mean the cultural values, the contents that develop within a sphere of life in historical configurations, but sometimes also those abstract ideas that are decisive for the autonomy of a value sphere as such: such ideas are truth and success for the cognitive value sphere; justice and generally normative correctness for the moral-practical value sphere, beauty, authenticity, truthfulness for the expressive value sphere. Habermas: these ideas (or aspects of validity) must not be confused with the special contents of individual value spheres. Habermas III 258 value spheres/Weber: - cognitive value sphere: decisive: truth and success - moral-practical value sphere: decisive: justice and normative correctness in general - expressive value sphere: decisive: beauty, authenticity, truthfulness. Habermas III 231 Def rtionalization/law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. Gaus I 195 State/Weber/Morris: [a „definition“ of the state most often is] an abbreviated version of Max Weber's well-known characterization of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1919(2): 78). Weber says that 'the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the "right" to use violence. Habermas III 244 Def Value rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber: "He who acts purely value rationally, regardless of the consequences to be foreseen, in the service of his conviction of what seems to command duty, dignity, beauty, religious instruction, reverence, or the importance of a 'thing' of whatever kind. ... value rational acting is acting according to 'bids' or according to 'demands', which the actor has posed for him- or herself."(3) Habermas III 152 Procedural Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber subjectively refers to a purpose-oriented action, "which is exclusively oriented towards (subjectively) as appropriately presented means for (subjectively) unambiguously conceived purposes."(4) Habermas III 245 Weber calls actions that satisfy the conditions of the rationality of means and choice 'procedural rational' and actions that satisfy the conditions of normative rationality are called 'value-rational'. Both aspects can vary independently of each other. Progress in the dimension of procedural rationality can be made at the expense of value-rational actions.(5) 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S.552. 2. M. Weber (1946 [1919]) 'Politics as a vocation'. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociologv, eds and trans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University 3. M.Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964. 4. M Weber, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M. 1968, p. 170. 5. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S. 22. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Universal Validity | Gödel | Berka I 314 Universal Validity/Goedel: universal validity leads to universal quantification: for formulas with free individual variables A(x,y,...w) this means the general validity of (x)(y)...(w) A(x,y,...w). >Universal quantification, >Quantification, >Existential quantification. Def Satisfiability/Goedel: "satisfiability" leads to >existence quantification. ((s)"there is a model".) This is then correspondingly the fulfillability of (Ex)(Ey)...(Ew) A. Then one can say: "A is universally valid" means: "~A is not fulfillable". >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. Refutability: refutability is the provability of negation. >Negation, >Proofs, >Provability. I 310 Provability/universal validity/Goedel:... here we have proved the equivalence between "universally valid" and "provable". Over-countable/Goedel: N.B.: this equivalence contains a reduction of the over-countable to the countable for the decision problem because "generally valid" refers to the over-countable totality of the functions, while "provable" presupposes only the countable totality of the proof figures.(1) >Decision problem, >Countability. 1. K. Gödel: Die Vollständighkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, in: Mh, Math. Phys. 37 (1930), pp. 349-360. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Quine, W.V.O. | McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 162 McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions. On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview. I 184 McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. I 185 McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine. I 186 Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema. I 188 DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory. I 189 Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma. Esfeld I 63 Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system. VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system? 2. Confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"? Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system! Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs. Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors! Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs). Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason? I 64 (S.McDowell I 157ff). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| substit. Quantific. | Quine Vs substit. Quantific. | V 158 VsSubstitutional Quantification/SQ/Quine: the SQ has been deemed unusable for the classic ML for a false reason: because of uncountability. The SQ does not accept nameless classes as values of variables. ((s) E.g. irrational numbers, real numbers, etc. do not have names, i.e. they cannot be Gödel numbered). I.e. SQ allows only a countable number of classes. Problem: Even the class of natural numbers has uncountably many sub-classes. And at some point we need numbers! KripkeVs: in reality there is no clear contradiction between SQ and hyper-countability! No function f lists all classes of natural numbers. Cantor shows this based on the class {n:~ (n e f(n))} which is not covered by the enumeration f. refQ: demands it in contrast to a function f enumerating all classes of natural numbers? It seems so at first glance: it seems you could indicate f by numbering all abstract terms for classes lexicographically. Vs: but the function that numbers the expressions is not quite the desired f. It is another function g. Its values are abstract terms, while the f, which would contradict the Cantor theorem, would have classes as values... V 159 Insertion character: does ultimately not mean that the classes are abstract terms! ((s) I.e. does not make the assumption of classes necessary). The cases of insertion are not names of abstract terms, but the abstract terms themselves! I.e. the alleged or simulated class names. Function f: that would contradict Cantor's theorem is rather the function with the property that f(n) is the class which is denoted by the n-th abstract term g(n). Problem: we cannot specify this function in the notation of the system. Otherwise we end up with Grelling's antinomy or that of Richard. That's just the feared conflict with Cantor's theorem. This can be refute more easily: by the finding that there is a class that is not denoted by any abstract term: namely the class (1) {x.x is an abstract term and is not a member of the class it denotes}. That leaves numbers and uncountability aside and relates directly to expressions and classes of expressions. (1) is obviously an abstract expression itself. The antinomy is trivial, because it clearly relies on the name relation. ((s) x is "a member of the class of abstract expressions and not a member of this class"). V 191 Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Nominalism/Quine: the nominalist might reply: alright, let us admit that the SQ does not clean the air ontologically, but still we win something with it: E.g. SQ about numbers is explained based on expressions and their insertion instead of abstract objects and reference. QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be inserted are just as abstract entities as the numbers themselves. V 192 NominalismVsVs: the ontology of real numbers or set theory could be reduced to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for the sQ based on Gödel numbers. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. This is not about the extrapolation of the concrete and abhorrence of the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the refutal of the most transcendent nnumbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are the work of man." QuineVs: but even that does not work, we have seen above that the SQ about classes is, as a matter of principle, incompatible with the object quantification over objects. V 193 VsVs: the quantification over objects could be seen like that as well. QuineVs: that was not possible because there are not enough names. Zar could be taught RZ coordination, but that does not explain language learning. Ontology: but now that we are doing ontology, could the coordinates help us? QuineVs: the motivation is, however, to re-interpret the SQ about objects to eliminate the obstacle of SQ about classes. And why do we want to have classes? The reason was quasi nominalistic, in the sense of relative empiricism. Problem: if the relative empiricism SQ talks about classes, it also speaks for refQ about objects. This is because both views are closest to the genetic origins. Coordinates: this trick will be a poor basis for SQ about objects, just like (see above) SQ about numbers. Substitutional/Referential Quantification/Charles Parsons/Quine: Parsons has proposed a compromise between the two: according to this, for the truth of an existential quantification it is no longer necessary to have a true insertion, there only needs to be an insertion that contains free object variables and is fulfilled by any values of the same. Universal quantification: Does accordingly no longer require only the truth of all insertions that do not contain free variables. V 194 It further requires that all insertions that contain free object variables are fulfilled by all values. This restores the law of the single sub-classes and the interchangeability of quantifiers. Problem: this still suffers from impredicative abstract terms. Pro: But it has the nominalistic aura that the refQ completely lacks, and will satisfy the needs of set theory. XI 48 SQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: the SQ does not make any ontological commitment in so far as the inserted names do not need to designate anything. I.e. we are not forced to assume values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: we precisely obscure the ontology by that fact that we cannot get out of the linguistic. XI 51 SQ/Abstract Entities/Quine/Lauener: precisely because the exchange of quantifiers is prohibited if one of the quantifiers referential, but the other one is substitutional, we end up with refQ and just with that we have to admit the assumption of abstract entities. XI 130 Existence/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: with the saying "to be means to be the value of a bound variable" no language dependency of existence is presumed. The criterion of canonical notation does not suppose an arbitrary restriction, because differing languages - e.g. Schönfinkel's combinator logic containing no variables - are translatable into them. Ontological Relativity/Lauener: then has to do with the indeterminacy of translation. VsSubstitutional Quantification/Quine/Lauener: with it we remain on a purely linguistic level, and thus repeal the ontological dimension. But for the variables not singular terms are used, but the object designated by the singular term. ((s) referential quantification). Singular Term/Quine/Lauener: even after eliminating the singular terms the objects remain as the values of variables. XI 140 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: is ontologically disingenuous. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Various Authors | Cantor Vs Various Authors | Thiel I 197 Eugen Dühring 1861: any number that is thought of as something finished is a certain one. Real Numbers/CantorVsDühring: an uncountable totality is something finished (even "actual"), i.e. a certain number. Cantor: no countable list of dual sequences can contain all dual sequences. Rather, the set of real numbers or the set of dual sequences is considered given from the beginning, and the assumption that this set is countable is then presented as disproved by the diagonal construction. The unquestionable acceptance of the "set" of all real numbers or dual sequences fully corresponds to the interpretation of the evidence presented, which, according to the classical view, provides more than the purely negative result of noncountability: Thiel I 198 since the already accepted set of all real numbers must have a thickness, this is indeed infinite, but not equal to that of the basic numbers. Thus, greater thickness. According to the idea of the determination of all numbers or thicknesses, it then also gets a name, e.g. "c". Thus we seem to have a "transfinite" cardinal number: the thickness of the continuum, which is greater than the thickness of the set of basic numbers. Cantor has positively tried to prove a whole further realm of the supernumerable. ConstructivismVs: there is no set of real numbers, since there is no form of statement representing this set. In addition, with the dual sequences it is an inadmissible anticipation of means of construction that are not yet available. The special construction instruction for dual sequences would even be contradictory, since it demands to construct a dual sequence, which is different from all dual sequences. (So also different from itself). Vs: sure, but this does not correspond to the requirement to construct a number, which is different from all natural numbers. But you can do that too: Example 2/3 is different from all natural numbers. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| responsibility | McDowell, J. | Rorty VI 201 McDowell / Rorty: "accountability to the world": in order to understand the world-directedness of a mental state or process (belief, opinion), you have to put it in a normative context. It must be an attitude that one adopts rightly or wrongly. A thinking that targets judgments, is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correcty or not correcty. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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