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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intensions | Frege | Frege II 45 Intension/Extension: the thought is not the meaning (Fregean reference) of the sentence (but the content). For the terminology see also >Fregean Sense. ((s) The terms 'intension' and 'extension' come from Carnap and were not used by Frege himself). Sense/Frege: sense corresponds to the intension. >Way of givenness. Extension: the extension is the object. >Object, >Extension. Dummett I 18 Def "sense" of an expression/Frege: is the way in which its reference is given. Therefore we must first have the concept of the reference. But if we now have the concept of the reference before that of the sense, we cannot claim that the reference is a property of the sense, but only a property of the expression! This becomes clear in the Basic Laws, where Frege determines the interpretation of his symbolism through determinations which prescribe each expression its respective reference. Taken together, these determinations determine for each formula under which conditions it is true. The sense is to be mentioned later. Accordingly, the determinations would be incomprehensible if the concept of the reference to an expression had been derived. I 18 Frege then later explains the sense by referring to the determinations that regulate the reference. >Fregean sense, >Reference. Dummett I 48 Reference/Frege: theory of reference was there before the theory of "sense". "Sense" determines the reference. Husserl: reference equals "sense": The sense determines the relation (the "meaning") in the strong sense that it is - assuming the facts of the world - the factual sense of an expression that explains how it is given its factual "meaning" (relation). (Not only Evans' "weak" sense that no two expressions can have the same sense, but different "meanings" (reference). Thus, a theory of reference is not yet a theory of sense, but its indispensable basis. Not unlike Frege, Husserl takes the view that the sense of an expression is a constitutive element to which it owes its respective reference. >Sense/Husserl. Dummett I 48f Use/Frege/Dummett: the use gives the meaning. The meaning gives the reference (Frege). Meaning is not equal to reference: e.g. unicorn: the term is not meaningless, therefore one knows only that it does not refer to any object. I 48ff Use/Frege/Dummett: use provides meaning - sense provides reference (Frege). Meaning is different from reference: e.g. unicorn. >Non-existence, >Use, >Unicorn example. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Logical Constants | Dummett | II 105 Logical Constants/Inferences/Meaning/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the acceptance of a system of inferences (relationships, truth table) contributes to the meaning of the involved words. N.B.: because speakers can give their words a different meaning, forms of generally accepted inferences may not be philosophically criticized. - By rejection of certain forms of inference we affect the meaning of the logical constants. Truth condition: therefore we cannot accept truth conditions as a general principle for the detection of the meaning. >Meaning. II 107 Logical Constants/Dummett: some authors: Davidson's meaning theory does not provide the meaning of the non-logical basic concepts itself, but rather the logical constants. E.g. "London denotes London" belongs to the theory of sense". Logical constants: from the axioms: e.g. "for each sentence S and T [S or T] is true if and only if S is true or T is true". N.B.: the truth theory does not force us at all to assume the traditional meanings of the logical constants. - If they may also have a different meaning in the meta language, we may even keep the classical axioms! >Truth theory, >Metalanguage, >Sense, >Axioms. II 109 Logical Constants/Meaning/Dummett: this is no circle: when the logical constants occur themselves in an effective proof, because we assume that we understand the construction of the proof. Problem: undecidable sentences: no effective proof, then there is a circle, then the meaning of the logical constants is not clear. >Circular reasoning, >Decidability. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Meaning Theory | Dummett | II 72 Meaning Theory/Dummett: The use of words consists only in sentences with these words. - Therefore, there does not have to be a direct connection of the understanding of words with a single linguistic ability. Cf. >Idiolect. II 72 Meaning Theory/Dummett: Without the concept of force understanding of a sentence would require nothing less than the complete knowledge of all the properties that a sentence could have in every possible situation of an utterance ("infinitely many circumstances"). >Theory of force, >Understanding. II 72 Meaning Theory/Dummett: 1st a) theory of reference, b ) Theory of sense, 2nd Theory of force. >Reference, >Sense, >Assertive force. II 116 Meaning Theory/Dummett: A meaning Theory is basically constructed with truth as the fundamental concept - here we follow the alternative: instead of verifying truth - but it s not sure if that is possible. III (c) 101 A meaning Theory Theory of meaning/Davidson: presupposes that the concept of truth is understood ( and undefined ) - Precondition: hold-as-true. Translation/Davidson: it is possible to know of every sentence that it means the same as one sentence of another language without knowing what both mean - and for all sentences. III (c) 105 Meaning/Davidson: similar to translation : from T - sentence "la terra they muove" is true if and only if the earth moves " we gain by replacing the m-set " ... " means " ... ". Problem: that is no explanation of the meaning, not propositional knowledge: knowledge that the earth moves. III (c) 107 Meaning Theory: in addition we must believe that knowledge of the meaning consists in the knowledge that the earth ... - that is not merely to know that the sentence B is true. III (c) 101 Meaning Theory/Dummett: a) "modest" theory: explains no new terms: Tarski, Davidson: it refers to sentences that the speaker holds to be true ( > radical interpretation). - An unspecified language mastery is expected to come up to the understanding of the object language. b ) "dignified" theory is to explain these new terms. III (c) 132 Meaning Theory/summary/Dummett: a theory of meaning must be atomistic or molecular, not holistic. It must be dignified, not modest, generous and not sober. - It does not leak into direct attributions of meaning , but must explicitly represent what is constitutive of the knowledge of the meaning of an expression and not just what everyone needs to know. Question: must it be based on the notion of a meaning theory or not? - I do not know. III (d) 133 Meaning Theory: Knowledge of reference is not sufficient for linguistic knowledge. III 226 Meaning Theory/Dummett: it may not require psychological or semantic terms. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Meaning Theory | Wiggins | Avramides I 26 f Meaning Theory/Wiggins: layer model of meaning theory: 1st level: isolates what was said literally - in terms of >truth conditions, level of the sense, > formal theories (Frege, Davidson etc. >"Semantics"). 2nd level: >assertive force; use theories, >"pragmatics". Further levels: >perlocutionary effects, >conversational implicatures. McDowell/Avramides: (McDowell 1998) can be seen as a further development of Wiggins' approach: 1. theory of sense: interacts with theory of force. One way: we start with the core theory, (theory of sense; central concept: truth). Then we develop the theory of force as a supplement. Another way: we start with a picture of the whole containing sense and force and then work our way to the core. Avramides: Question: whether a theory on the first (Wiggin's) level can be worked out in isolation. McDowell: development of Wiggins theories - 1st Theory of sense 2nd Theory of force - force, because we have to pay attention to the speaker. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Verificationism | McDowell | II 47/48 Verificationism/Dummett: Contradictory term to McDowell's sense which is based on truth: the doctrine that mastery of language is acquired only through the acquisition of linguistic behavior. Problem: Bivalence - if we accept it, then no behavior in undecidable sentences is possible - this is typical for the realism. >Realism. Solution/Dummett: justifiable assertion. >Assertibility/Dummett, cf. >Antirealism. II 62 Verificationism/McDowell: Problem: The meaning of the concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be acquired by means of evidence (how one acquires concepts usually). However, evidence for the truth of sentences (so both together). >Truth criterion, >Evidence. McDowellVs: because a non-empirical Tarski theory is included by the theory of sense, it does not follow that susceptibility for evidence is excluded, it is necessary for the attribution of beliefs. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle Theory | Newen Vs Bundle Theory | New I 233 Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?). Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems: 1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined 2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name. Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato". Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly. Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description. I 234 Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke: (meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value. I 235 E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato". Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory: E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"." Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name. KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is I 236 the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object. A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.) Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable. Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)". Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning) Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object. Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense. Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names). Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition. I 237 ((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Sense Data | Ryle Vs Sense Data | I 301 RyleVsSense Data. E.g. someone who says: "The headlamps are blinding!" need not be blinded himself. - It is a fallacy to say that the blinding is therefore not a property of the headlamps, but a characteristic of the sense-data of blinded individual. --- I 280 SenseData/RyleVsSense Data/Ryle: some theorists want us to turn away from robins and cheeses, and to turn to such things as looking at something and fragrances (sense data). That would mean, if I can observe this sight when I catch the sight of the robin, then I must catch something like a sight of the sight. Or a fragrance of a fragrance. Regress. E.g. When someone is watching horses racing the question is whether he had a good seat, but not if someone is itchy. Hence, also not the question whether the sensation of his itching was superficial. --- I 282 Attention/Ryle: Observing or sighting include noticing, but noticing does not include observing. RyleVsSense data/Ryle: it was wrong from the start to compare the objects of the open observation, such as cheese and robins to objects, which are supposed to be accessible only to a privileged observation: namely, my sensations. Sensations are, in fact, not objects of observation. We do not need to build a "theater of the outside world" in order to compare it to an inner "theater", the mind. The properties that observable objects can have, cannot be sensibly attributed or denied for sensations. --- I 283 It is senseless to say sensations had a position, size, temperature, color, or smell. Also no place. In any case, not in response to a question such as "Where was the robin?" In a certain sense this is already the tingling in my foot or "burning in my nose" but that is a different sense than pepper grains in my nose or pointy stones under my foot. My cringing is not hidden from the shoemaker because it is within me. On the contrary, it cannot at all be described as a needle, object within or outside public access. Or within the public object that I am myself. Likewise, letters cannot be classified as main words or time words as property words. --- I 286 Seeing/hearing/tasting/Ryle: are not used to describe "pure" or "unmixed" sensations, for we are talking about seeing horse races and listening to trains, tasting wines. Horse racing, trains and wines are not sensations, horse racings do not stop when I close my eyes, good wines are not destroyed when I have a cold. We need, therefore, apparently ways of talking about what ceases when I close my eyes, etc. Sense data/RayleVsSense data: the sight or the appearance of the horses actually changes as tears flow, or the taste of the wine is affected by the cold, and the sounds of the train become quieter when I cover my ears. It seems, then, that we can talk about "pure" sensations when we talk about "appearance" "sound" "taste", "fragrance", "tingling", etc. It also seems that with these expressions we can make distinctions and exclude those sensations which are achieved by reasoning, education, memory, presumption, habit, imagination, or association. (Covering one's ears does not help in the memory). --- I 287 SenseData/RyleVs: but what does it mean to get a momentary sight or a momentary scent? And what is the sight or smell like that you get? 1. The sight of a horse race is not a sporting event on a racing field. Just as anyone can be a witness of the race, not everyone can be a witness of the sight. (Already because of the perspective, not the point of view) Nor can anyone else have my tingling. Definition Sense Data/Ryle: (e.g. scent, sight, tingling, ringing) is private property of a single perceiver. Further, the sight of a horse race is described as a short-lived patchwork of color spots. RyleVsSense Data: but the visual appearance of things or the sight which is described as color spots can not be viewed as surfaces of ordinary flat objects. They are simply spots of color, not spots of colored plaster or colored canvas. Tradition: the representatives of the theory of sense data agree that sense data is something private, but not in that, --- I 288 that they are of a psychical nature or "in my mind". Tradition: the representatives now ask themselves the question: What is the fact that their recipient has it or receives it? Answer is simple: according to some, he should perceive or observe, some even say that people do not see a horse race, but only observe color spots. --- I 290 Sense data/deception/Ryle: It is claimed, in particular, that the theory solves paradoxes in the description of illusions. If the squinting man asserts that he sees two candles and the drunk says, he sees white mice, one can now translate that the squinting one sees two "candle appearances" and the drunken one in reality "white mouse appearances". Their only error then lies in the conclusion of existence. Next: For example a forward tilted plate looks elliptical (in fact is wrong). There is an elliptical white spot in the field of view. RyleVsSense data theory: the whole theory is based on a logical blunder, namely, the approximation of the concept of sensation to that of observation. --- I 291 Sense data/RyleVsSense data/Ryle: Having a look at a horse race is explained by having something else, namely a color combination. Regress: If having the sensation of a horse race implies having something else, then having that other, the color spot must again imply having something else, an earlier sense-date. --- I 294 SenseData/RyleVsSense data/Ryle: one cannot say meaningfully, one sees the appearance of a plate and not the plate itself, because appearance is already a main word for seeing. There is no other object, the "appearance" next to the plate. One does not say "I see a flat elliptical spot of white" but: "Maybe I see an elliptical and not slanted piece of white porcelain." E.g. We can say that a closer plane looks faster than the one more distant, but we cannot say "it has a faster look". "Looks faster" means, looks as if it was flying faster. Talking about the apparent speeds of airplanes does not mean talking about the speeds of the appearances of airplanes. --- I 298 Indeterminacy/VsSense data theory/Ryle: one who is peeking through a hole in the hedge may say he sees an area of yellow ... but will not be able to tell if it is dandelion or yellow canvas. He could only say, "I saw something yellow." Contrary to this normal use of expressions of indeterminacy, the sense data theory supports continuous talking of this kind. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Verificationism | Goodman Vs Verificationism | I 49 Verification/Goodman: The history of the verification theory of sense is tragic. A.J.Ayer, Language Truth and Logic: Philosophical nonsense was to be eliminated without simultaneously discarding many useful theories. Goodman: The failure led to an overestimation of the problem: If there is no general theory of the good, vice does not become virtue. The heroic attempt to distinguish sense and nonsense failed, similar to the attempt to define the difference between right and wrong, which caused libertinistic circles to think that everything is permitted. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Theory of Sense | McDowell, J. | II 42 McDowell: Thesis: wants a theory of sense (ST), (Theory of sense) which is at the same time a meaning theory. A theory of sense ascribes a suitable property first to the components and establishes rules according to which the whole proposition is then true or false. Then it shows how for an indicative proposition a theorem of the form "s is true if and only if p" whereby "s" is replaced by an appropriate description of the sentence and "p" by a sentence. EMD II 43 It would be nice to have a general condition for the relation between the substitutions for "s" and "p" of this form: "s is f if and only if p". The hope is then that one replaces "f" with "true" by the general rule. That would seem to be the desired answer to what a truth theory is. II 44 McDowell: Thesis: a theory of sense (ST) and a theory of force in combination makes it possible to determine from a complete description of the utterance to come to it: "He claims that p" or "he asks that p" etc. whereby what replaces "p" is the sentence used on the right side of the theorem. I.e. we have a two-sided theory from the theory of sense and the theory of force. Acceptability in this theory would require that the descriptions of propositional actions fit into a wider context. II 46 Thesis, then, is not the illumination of the concept of meaning by other concepts and even less reduction, but simply a description of its relation to these other concepts. II 47 Sense/Truth/McDowell: Thesis: Sense is not what a truth theory is about, but rather truth is what a sense theory is about. The gap could also be filled quite differently, the above considerations ensure that the theorems would continue to be acceptable if this other filling were again replaced by "true, if and only if". Thus, as Frege thought, a sense theory will specify the truth conditions for sentences, either directly or by justifiable transformation. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
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