Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bridge Laws | Cartwright | I 15 CartwrightVsBridge Laws: this is too simple a view of how explanations work; we must first provide a description of the situation before we can figure out the mathematical requirements of the theory. >Description, >Facts, >Situations, >Experiments. I 132 Bridge Principles/BP/Cartwright: Tradition (Hempel, Grünbaum, Ernest Nagel): the propositions of a theory consist of two types: a) internal principles: content of the theory, laws about the behavior of the objects b) bridge principles: connect the theory with more accessible aspects of reality (> "prepared description") Early: connection with monitoring reports. >Observation, >Theory ladenness. Vs: that does not work because of the theory ladenness of the observation new: connection of the the theory with already understood vocabulary. >Vocabulary, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. Hempel/late: (1979)(1) this kind of explanation is not really deductive - HempelVsBridge-Principles: Problem: not invariably valid. I 135 Bridge principle: saying which equations are to be chosen - (how we get into the mathematical language and out of it again). I 205 CartwrightVsBridge Principles: instead of it we need insights on which operator is the right one for each problem. ((s) Operators/Cartwright/(s): represent the energies that are relevant in a situation within the equations.) 1.C. Hempel 1979, “Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives”, in Théodore F. Geraets (ed.), Rationality To-Day, Ottawa, Canada: The University of Ottowa Press, 46–58. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Concepts | Wright | I 162 ff Concept/Wright, Crispin: concepts appear intensionally in the response to judgments. Thus they do not make any requirements for the details of their extensions. >Extension, >Intension, >Judgment. I 201 ff Perception/Theory/Wright: 1) Observing equals perceiving, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is conceptually characterized. (McDowell pro). This is now a good basis for the conception that the conceptual features of the subjects are different. >Theory ladenness, cf. >Psychological Nominalism. 2) Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world goes beyond experience in infinitely many ways. >Experience. 3) The comprehension of concepts does not merely consist in classifying. They include the possession of beliefs (e.g. that things form a species at all). >Beliefs. --- II 229ff Concept/Predicate/Wright: e.g. concept: color - predicate: red. >Predicates, >Predication. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Description-Dependence | Description dependent: E.g. actions, situations, facts are dependent on the choice of the description, the linguistic means or the underlying theories. See also theory ladenness, context dependent, theories. |
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| Experience | Esfeld | I 64 Experience/Kuhn/Hanson: experience is conceptual and thus a theory-laden observation, therefore beliefs are not controlled from the outside. This leads to incommensurability (McDowellVs). >Incommensurability, >Theory ladenness, >Observation. I 191ff Experience/Esfeld: experience has the function to bring about changes in a belief system. Problems: a) experience itself is outside the belief system and b) experience is conceptual (contradiction). Solution/Sellars: the solution is rational control (restriction) by the way the conceptual content is shaped by dealing with the world - then we do not need Quine’s observation statements that are outside of holism. >Experience/Sellars. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Experiments | Hacking | I 287 Experiment/HackingVsLakatos/HackingVsFeyerabend: an experiment is neither a statement nor a report but an action, which is not about mere words. >P. Feyerabend. I 293 E.g. Herschel’s theory of thermal radiation was (falsely) aligned with Newton, but that did not affect his observation. He noted that infrared had to be included in the white light. A previously existing theory would have prevented him from this finding out. HackingVsTheory Ladenness of observation. >Theory ladenness, >Observation, >Method, >Discoveries. I 299 Observing is a skill (HackingVsHanson). I 380f Experiment/Hacking: an experiment is never repeated but always improved. An experiment usually does not work, therefore observation is not so important. I 418 Crucial experiment/experimentum crucis/Hacking: e.g. Michelson-Morley. >experimentum crucis. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Facts | Mayr | I 49 Facts/Mayr: there are no pure facts, all are theory-laden. >Theories, >Theory dependence, >Observation, >Theory ladenness. I 49 Def knowledge/Mayr: facts and their interpretation. >States of affairs, >Interpretation. I 93 Fact/theory/law/Mayr: after the discovery of Pluto a theory became a fact. The laws of thermodynamics were just able to be called facts. >Laws, >Laws of nature. E.g. that birds have feathers is, however, a fact and not a law. >Generalization, >Generality. I 96 Biology/Mayr: here concepts play a bigger role than laws. >Concepts, >Classification/Mayr, >Order/Mayr. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Observability | Peacocke | I 90 Observability/Peacocke: Thesis: Observability is a property of certain terms and not of other terms. - The phenomena that are crucial to the concept of observability, are the ones corresponding to the individuation of Fregean thoughts and their constituents: the phenomena of cognitive significance and the epistemic possibility. - That has nothing to do with the correct use of the word "observe". >Observation, >Fregean thoughts, >Cognitive significance. I 103 Observability / PeacockeVsQuine: does not depend on the sophistication and training of the observer nor with the level of science - ((s) because of Peacockes stronger emphasis on the perceptual component.) >Theoretical Terms, >Theoretical Entities, cf. >Theory language, >Observation language, >Terms, >Unobservables, >Method, >Knowledge, >Theory ladenness. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Observation | Wright | I 201 ff Fashionable idea/realism/theory/science/WrightVs: every observation is theory-laden. >Theory ladenness. Perception/theory/Wright: 1. Observing equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is dominated conceptually. (McDowell pro). >Sensory impressions, cf. >Psychological nominalism, >Nominalism. This is now a good basis for the view that the conceptual features of the subjects is different. 2. Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world engages with infinitely many ways beyond experience. >Experience. 3. The acquisition of concepts is not merely in classifying. They include the holding of beliefs. (For example, that things in general form a species). Wright: that is certainly fine, but: beliefs should not be presupposed a priori for the terms. That is not appropriate. Terms are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. >Beliefs. I 207 WrightVsTheoreticity of observation/theory ladenness: if all observation is theory-laden, there are no statements, which any subject is obliged to consent. - The legitimate assertibility is rather a four-digit relation between: statement - subject - experience development - background assumptions. >Justified assertibility, >Background. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Probability | Cartwright | I 38f Objective Probability / Cartwright: not the same as relative frequency. - o. prblty: so to speak the opposite of the apparent correlation. The question what are the probabilities, is never based on causal considerations. Nevertheless, causal statements can be reduced to probability statements if there are additional empirical facts (to secure the asymmetries). Karl Pearson/Cartwright: Pearson thesis: probability should remain theory-free. >Theories, >Theory ladenness, >Causality, >Causal explanation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: Horwich I 493 Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? >Realism, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Truth. Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. >Method, >Reliability. Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods. >Theory dependency. Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism. >Positivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles. >Observation Language. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts". >Science/Kuhn. Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". >Theory ladenness. N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation. >Observation. Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism. Ad. 3. Vs: Horwich I 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept. BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism. Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Cf. >Redundancy theory. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth. >Deflationism. Horwich I 494 Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true. M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically. Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community >Literal truth, >Bare truth. M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today. Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism. >Constructivism. Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths. >Empiricism, >Correspondence. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Theoretical Terms | Peacocke | I 91f Observational terms/Theoretical Terms/TT/Peacocke: Square: has to be experienced as such - an X-ray tube not. >Observation terms, >Observation language. For scientists, the X-ray tube can be constructed entirely different, for lay persons not - different term. Sensitivity for the property: necessary but not sufficient condition. E.g. "tomato-like": appearance or taste, no theory is required. Square: a minimal theory of perspective is required. There is nothing "square-like" what would correspond to "tomato-like". >Properties, >Predicates, >Perception, >Seeing, >Knowledge, >Categorization, >Perspective, >Terms. Without square term no sensation of square, (not only no representation). A perspectively distorted square is perceived as a square, but not perceived as distorted. Higher order; >description levels. Not so with "tomato-like": something that is tomato-like cannot be known as a tomato. >Forgeries. "Tomato-like" is not a criterion, otherwise tomato is an observation term. - Representation: tomato, not "tomato-like" >Representation, >Criteria, >Knowledge. I 94ff Theoretical Terms/Peacocke: every perception has representational content - e.g. "The particle collision produced the track". >Representational content, >Conceptual content, >Content, >Perception, >Causality, cf. >Measurement. Problem: then the causality is in the representational content, then we have a priori knowledge. Solution: observational terms and perception must be characterized simultaneously - applying only for observed content (not for theoretical terms). - The experience must also be made if the object is not covered by these theoretical terms. I 100 Particle pair/observation terms/theoretical terms/Peacocke: here, not the same conditions apply for changing angle, etc. - one can imagine here that the track of the particle pair in the cloud chamber does not result from a particle collision. - Unlike e.g. square - but that does not mean that squareness would be a secondary quality in the sense of power to evoke a feeling. I 101 Theoretical Term: when a perceived object falls below a theoretical concept, then there must be a level of representational content on which the experience could be made, even if the object does not fall under this theoretical term - just thereby "track caused by a particle collision" turns into a theoretical term. >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Symmetry/Peacocke. I 154 'As'/seeing-as/perception/thinking/Peacocke: E.g. 'This acid burns the table': only liquid is seen, not 'as acid'. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Theories | Deutsch | I 14 Theory: the vast majority of theories are rejected because they give poor explanations, but not because they cannot be experimentally confirmed. >Explanations, >Experiments, >Review, >Confirmation, >Verifiability. I 17 Understanding/Theory: we do not necessarily have to understand everything that a theory can explain. For example quasars: in the past it was thought that their explanation would require a new physics. But now we believe that they can be explained by general relativity. >Understanding, >Relativity Theory, >General Relativity. I 26 Initial state: There is the misunderstanding that theories of the initial state would be the most elementary. No theory can explain the beginning by something earlier. >Beginning. I 74 f A theory should provide justifications (Popper) instead of accumulating or predicting facts. Activities as such have no meaning. >Verification. But it is not the case that theories become untenable by refutation, they are actually already untenable because they are bad explanations. I 83 Languages are theories! They embody assumptions about the world in their vocabulary and grammar. >Language of theories, >Observation language, >Theory ladenness. I 83 Vs Ad hoc-Theory: an ad hoc-theory is derived from the dominant and only supplemented by one of the unexplained additions. This addition is actually a new theory. There are no reasons for this. ...because your theory, unlike mine, does not explain your predictions. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Theories | Hacking | I 292 Theory/Hacking: I have no idea what a theory of "non-distortion through exposure to air" would be like. Observation without theory: e.g. Herrschel’s discovery of heat radiation 1800. >Discoveries, >Observation, >Seeing, >Method, >Science. I 291 ff His first assumption was that which we believe today. His theory was then entirely aligned to Newton, but that did not affect his observation. Problem: his observation was burdened by absolutely inadequate accuracy claims (precision, accuracy). He measured down to the thousandth, something which he was not able to do! The absence of a theory made him notice something: invisible infrared had to be included in the white light. (Hanson would have claimed that we would only be able to notice such a thing if we previously had a theory). >Theory ladenness. I 348 Unit/theory/Hacking: magnetism can affect light. Thus, it was possible to unify both (from interaction). >Unification, >Reduction. 1. Hanson, R. N. (1958). Patterns of discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Theories | Wright | I 205f The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not be to question the contrast between data and theory. >Input/Output, >Data, >Theory-ladenness. Theoreticity of observation/theory/Wright: the type if theory ladenness that it needs to bring the distinction data/theory in trouble is a lot more (see above): It must be shown that the conditions for legitimate assertion (assertibility) is necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experience, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions, >Content, >Experience, >Perception. I 207 WrightVsTheoreticity of observation/theory ladenness: if all observation is theory-laden, there are no statements, to which any subject is obliged to agree to. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). >Analyticity, >Two Dogmas. Wright: the legitimate assertibility is rather a four-digit relation between: Statement - subject - experience development - background assumptions. >Background. Evidence: Whether a theory is erroneous or properly, must now (see above) be visible in principle at least. However, such confirmation may ultimately only be provided with independent credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation). >Confirmation. The Example can show the possibility that this remains undecidable. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Zombies | Stalnaker | I 19f Zombies/perceptive faculty/Stalnaker: you cannot say that there are possible worlds with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. General Picture: consciousness refers to a property that we find in us, and that we probably know, because we have it. But the fact that we are conscious does not provide special access to the nature of this property. I 239 Zombie/materialism/Stalnaker: simple argument VsMaterialism: Zombies are conceptually impossible. Then there would be two possible worlds that are physically indistinguishable, but can be distinguished in terms of qualitative experiences and consciousness that can be inside them. Then the consciousness does not supervene on the physical. >Supervenience, >Consciousness, >Materialism. I 242 MaterialismVsVs: materialism must accept that there could be zombies in the real world, but assert that there are none. I 251 Materialism must be compatible with the having of consciousness. I 241 Zombie/Stalnaker: z-World: is a world in which there is nothing, except that which supervenes on the physical. The absence of consciousness is not mentioned but it is possible that there are zombies - otherwise the z-world is like the w-world. Later: a-world: the a-world additionally has consciousness, qualia, and so on ((s) that is not explicitly denied for the z-world). I 244 Zombie/theoretical weight/theory-laden/Stalnaker: if consciousness is theory-laden, it is built into the meaning of what the theory assumes about it. Then the word is no longer innocent and then we might learn something new about it. >Theory ladenness. I 245 Example: if water turned out to be a collective term for all manner, then we would say "It is not water" (because it were no element). On the other hand: innocent use: the innocent use corresponds to the whatever ((s) the concept of role then denies theory ladenness?). >Roles. I 252 Zombie/conceivability/Stalnaker: conceivability as an argument for possible existence: limited sense of conceivability: if it is conceivable that we live in an a-world, then it is conceivable in this restricted sense that there are zombies there. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Materialism: if he is right and we live in a z-world, then there is no possible world that could be described correctly as a zombie world. Conceivability: in a restricted sense conceivability is not an argument VsMaterialism. One would have to assume beforehand that materialism is wrong. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Bridge Laws | Hempel. Vs Bridge Laws | Cartwright I131 Bridge Principles/Cartwright: Tradition (Hempel, Grünbaum, Ernest Nagel): the propositions of a theory consist of two types: I 132 a) internal principles: content of the theory, laws about the behavior of the objects. b) bridge principles: link the theory to more accessible aspects of reality ("groomed description"). early: connection to observation reports. Vs: that will not do because of the theory ladenness of observation. new: connecting theory with already understood vocabulary. Hempel/Late: (1979) this kind of explanation is not really deductive. HempelVsBridge Principles: Problem: they are anything but invariably valid. E.g. a large iron rod attracts iron filings, even if it is non-magnetic. So is it magnetic? Bridge principles are not universal laws. CartwrightVsHempel: the situation is simultaneously not as bad and even worse than Hempel says: if the right type of description is given, I 133 We know what equations we have to apply, and the principles which tell us this are necessary and valid without exception. Problem: such a "right kind of description" is extremely rare! And there are few formal principles for it. Only rules of thumb. |
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| Duhem, P. | Hacking Vs Duhem, P. | I 219 Observation / Hacking: Vs "theory ladenness of observation" (.. Duhem, Putnam et al) all observation is theory-laden, concepts derived from theories, etc. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke Vs Observation Language | I 88 Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts/Peacocke: the distinction can be defended. The attacks against it fall into two groups: 1) VsObservational Concepts/some authors: Vs allegedly too casual, arbitrary (permissive) way to make the distinction. E.g. one and the same device can be seen as an x-ray tube or a Geiger counter. These concepts enter the representational content. I.e. experience itself represents something as X-ray tube. So there is no conscious inference taking place! Theory Ladenness/Hanson/Peacocke: most provocative formulation: that theoretical concepts determine the content of experience; milder formulation: theoretical assumptions can determine some reasons to express a sentence typically classified as observation sentence. Theoretical Concept/Tradition: X-ray tube is one typically considered a theoretical concept. If it now enters the representational content, it meets certain standard conditions for observability. Observability: again depends on the ability (sophistication) of the observer. 2) VsDistinction Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts: the classical approach to observability is empty: nothing really fulfills the conditions. In reality, theoretical considerations do indeed play a role. Both criticisms can be represented together, although that means claiming that the distinction simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Putnam, H. | Nagel Vs Putnam, H. | I 25 NagelVsPutnam: has always been flirting with subjectivism. I 132 Internal realism fails because of its own test of rational acceptability. What we actually accept is a worldview that confirms or refutes our perceptions. Even our interpretation of the quantum theory and the related observations would be a view on the suchness of the world, even if a physicist says it could not be interpreted realistically. It would not be a view that would rightly be restricted by means of an "internalist" interpretation. Our point of view is a set of beliefs that affect the real suchness, while it is being admitted that we do not know many things. The only method of determining the rational acceptability is thinking about whether it is true. With all the evidence and arguments, and considering all the things that are cited by others as relevant. Nagel: we must not equate acceptability with truth, otherwise we would rob both terms of any content. Internal Realism/Putnam: internal realism should not contain any reduction of truth to epistemic terms, truth and acceptability are interdependent. NagelVsPutnam: that is not clear. Putnam seems to be making concessions lately, however, see his explanation for why Wittgenstein was not a relativist: a position outside the language game is something else than participating in the language game itself. Putnam: but why should metalanguage be so sure of itself?" I 133 Brand: the belief that the world is organized is quite confirmed in a number of areas, namely: if they predict observations that, in turn, cannot be explained by our belief in these hypotheses. The "theory ladenness" of the observation in my opinion is of little importance. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Theory Ladenness | Wright Vs Theory Ladenness | I 204 Fashionable Thought/Realism/Theory/Science/WrightVs: every observation is "theory laden". Perception/Theory: 1. Observation equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensory perception, because it is conceptually coined. (McDowell pro). This now provides a good basis for the view that the conceptual equipment of the subjects is different. I 205 2. Every pre-philosophical utterance about the material world reaches beyond experience in an infinite number of ways. 3. The coverage of terms does not consist merely in classifying. They contain the possession of beliefs. (e.g. that things form a species at all). WrightVs: that is certainly all right. The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not, however, be to question the opposition between data and theory. I 206 Concept/Wright: a) Beliefs should not be assumed a priori for the concepts. This is not appropriate. Concepts are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. b) The everyday content of experience is not an obstacle for pre-theoretical data. It can always happen that one agrees to an experience pattern against his background beliefs, even if this can be cancelled later again. Theoreticity of Contemplation/Theory/Wright: 4. The kind of theory ladenness needed to get the distinction data/theory into difficulties is rather the following(see above): It must be shown that the conditions for assertion (assertibility) are necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experiences, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs. I 207 WrightVsTheoreticity of Observation/VsTheory Ladenness/Wright: if all observation theory is laden, there are no statements to which any subject is obliged to agree. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). Wright: the justified assertiveness is rather a four-digit relation between: Statement - Subject - Course of Experience - Background Assumptions. I 208 Theory/Observation: Example A and B disagree on the stature of a theory Ho based on the observation Oo. B evaluates the same observations under a theory H1. A agrees that if H1 is accepted, his experience does not give enough reasons to accept Oo. Then it is not about vagueness, it is about status. This status question continues now, if it is about H1 instead of Ho: B accepts H1 because of O1, but A represents a theory H2...(I 209+) about O1. I 209 The other agrees that, if the other theory applies, the reaction of the other is appropriate. Divergence on each point, but agreement on conditional acceptability. I 210 We determine that the respective observation reports are correct in terms of experience and background theory. If everyone works with incorrect data, the result is that they create their reports in the context of an incorrect background theory. If he works with materially incomplete data, he necessarily works with a true background theory, which he does not agree with! Problem: can it be certainly considered a priori that there are nevertheless cognitive deficits regarding the theoretical background obligations? (Can only mean that one accepts a wrong theory). Evidence: whether a theory is erroneous or flawless must now (see above) at least in principle be recognizable! Such a confirmation, however, could ultimately only be provided by independently credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation). I 211 However, the example shows the possibility that this remains undecidable. Vs: the relationship between experience and observation reports can plausibly be described as that of a "positive presumption". I.e. it is not as if experience tends to confirm or refute a report only in the context of appropriate empirical background beliefs, there is rather a Def default relation of confirmation between experiences and statements. Example "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification insofar as it concerns the color. An appropriate justification by experience can be overridden in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but is otherwise presumably valid. ((s) As long as nothing else "appears"). Question: can one now assume cognitive deficiency after all? A theorist who accepts O n 1 may either do so because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or he may prejudice the validity of the evidence. If now there is no other support for Hn, the assumption of Hn by the first theorist remains unjustified, and the denial in law. I 212 VsVs: this does not take into account that the regress of theories can interlock backwards. Therefore, one cannot claim that both theorists are to blame either for defending unsupported theories or for being cognitively deficient. Problem: Evidence/Theory/Observation: if the truth is limited by evidence and all observation is theory laden, then differences of opinion cannot certainly be traced back to cognitive deficiencies. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theory Ladenness | Pro | Esfeld I 64 Experience / Kuhn / Hanson: conceptually. Therefore, observation is theory-laden. So much so that a system of beliefs is subject to no control from the outside. This then leads to incommensurability. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Theory Ladenness | Pro | Goodman I 120 Facts are theory-laden (Norwood Hanson). They are theory-laden, just as we expect of our theories that they are fact loaded. - Facts are small theories and true theories are big facts. This does not mean that you get to correct theories at random. We must always proceed from old theories or an old version. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Theory Ladenness | Pro | Peacocke I 89 Theory ladenness / Feyerabend (Against Method, 1975.168): Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions, not before them. Without theory, one is completely disoriented and unable to act. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theory | Boyd, R. | Horwich I 493 Boyd / M. Williams: Boyd very cleverly makes theory ladenness of our methodological judgments a base of his realism. His thesis: Methods that are theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". Punch line: so he cannot be accused of making an unacceptable rigid separation between theory and observation. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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