Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI Takeover | Yudkowsky | Bostrom I 119 AI takeover/Yudkowsky/Bostrom: (1) Crack the protein folding problem to the extent of being able to generate DNA strings whose folded peptide sequences fill specific functional roles in a complex chemical interaction. (2) Email sets of DNA strings to one or more online laboratories that offer DNA synthesis, peptide sequencing, and FedEx delivery. (3) Find at least one human connected to the Internet who can be paid, blackmailed, or fooled by the right background story, into receiving FedExed vials and mixing them in a specified environment. (4) The synthesized proteins form a very primitive “wet” nanosystem, which, ribosome-like, is capable of accepting external instructions; (…) (5) Use the extremely primitive nanosystem to build more sophisticated systems, which construct still more sophisticated systems, bootstrapping to molecular nanotechnology—or beyond.(1) >Ethics/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Norms/Bostrom, >Risks/Bostrom, >Technology/Bostrom, >Goals/Bostrom, >Ethics/Yudkowsky. 1. Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2008a. “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk.” In Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković, 308–45. New York: Oxford University Press. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Anthropomorphism | Yudkowsky | Bostrom I 112 Anthropomorphism/superintelligence/Yudkowsky/Bostrom: Even if we recognize that a superintelligence can have all the skills and talents we find in the human distribution, along with other talents that are not found among humans, the tendency toward anthropomorphizing can still lead us to underestimate the extent to which a machine superintelligence could exceed the human level of performance. Eliezer Yudkowsky (…) has been particularly emphatic in condemning this kind of misconception: our intuitive concepts of “smart” and “stupid” are distilled from our experience of variation over the range of human thinkers, yet the differences in cognitive ability within this human cluster are trivial in comparison to the differences between any human intellect and a superintelligence.(1)(2) >Superintelligence, >Artificial intelligence, >Strong artificial intelligence, >Human level AI. 1. Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2008a. “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk.” In Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković, 308–45. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2013. Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, Technical Report 2013–1. Berkeley, CA: Machine Intelligence Research Institute. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Artificial General Intelligence | Norvig | Norvig I 27 Artificial general intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Artificial General Intelligence or AGI (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007)(1), (…) held its first conference and organized the Journal of Artificial General Intelligence in 2008. AGI looks for a universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment, and has its roots in the work of Ray Solomonoff (1964)(2), one of the attendees of the original 1956 Dartmouth conference. Guaranteeing that what we create is really Friendly AI is also a concern (Yudkowsky, 2008(3); Omohundro, 2008)(4). >Human Level AI/Minsky; >Artificial general intelligence. 1. Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. (2007). Artificial General Intelligence. Springer 2. Solomonoff, R. J. (1964). A formal theory of inductive inference. Information and Control, 7, 1–22, 224–254. 3. Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. In Bostrom, N. and Cirkovic, M. (Eds.), Global Catastrophic Risk. Oxford University Press 4. Omohundro, S. (2008). The basic AI drives. In AGI-08 Workshop on the Sociocultural, Ethical and Futurological Implications of Artificial Intelligence |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Artificial General Intelligence | Russell | Norvig I 27 Artificial general intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Artificial General Intelligence or AGI (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007)(1), (…) held its first conference and organized the Journal of Artificial General Intelligence in 2008. AGI looks for a universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment, and has its roots in the work of Ray Solomonoff (1964)(2), one of the attendees of the original 1956 Dartmouth conference. Guaranteeing that what we create is really Friendly AI is also a concern (Yudkowsky, 2008(3); Omohundro, 2008)(4). >Human Level AI/Minsky; >Artificial general intelligence. 1. Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. (2007). Artificial General Intelligence. Springer 2. Solomonoff, R. J. (1964). A formal theory of inductive inference. Information and Control, 7, 1–22, 224–254. 3. Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. In Bostrom, N. and Cirkovic, M. (Eds.), Global Catastrophic Risk. Oxford University Press 4. Omohundro, S. (2008). The basic AI drives. In AGI-08 Workshop on the Sociocultural, Ethical and Futurological Implications of Artificial Intelligence |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Russell | Brockman I 22 Artificial Intelligence/Stuart Russell: The goal of AI research has been to understand the principles underlying intelligent behavior and to build those principles into machines that can then exhibit such behavior. Brockman I 23 In the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing theoretical notion of intelligence was the capacity for logical reasoning (…). More recently, a consensus has emerged around the idea of a rational agent that perceives, and acts in order to maximize, its expected utility. AI has incorporated probability theory to handle uncertainty, utility theory to define objectives, and statistical learning to allow machines to adapt to new circumstances. These developments have created strong connections to other disciplines that build on similar concepts, including control theory, economics, operations research, and statistics. Purpose: For example, a self-driving car should accept a destination as input instead of having one fixed destination. However, some aspects of the car’s “driving purpose” are fixed, such as that it shouldn’t hit pedestrians. Putting a purpose into a machine (…) seems an admirable approach to ensuring that the machine’s “conduct will be carried out on principles acceptable to us!” Brockman I 24 Problem: neither AI nor other disciplines (economics, statistics, control theory, operations research) built around the optimization of objectives have much to say about how to identify the purposes “we really desire.” >Artificial Intelligence/Omohundro, >Superintelligence/Stuart Russell. Brockman I 29 Solution/Stuart Russell: The optimal solution to this problem is not, as one might hope, to behave well, but instead to take control of the human and force him or her to provide a stream of maximal rewards. This is known as the wireheading problem, based on observations that humans themselves are susceptible to the same problem if given a means to electronically stimulate their own pleasure centers. Problem: This idealization ignores the possibility that our minds are composed of subsystems with incompatible preferences; if true, that would limit a machine’s ability to optimally satisfy our preferences, but it doesn’t seem to prevent us from designing machines that avoid catastrophic outcomes. Solution/Stuart Russell: A more precise definition is given by the framework of cooperative inverse-reinforcement learning, or CIRL. A CIRL problem involves two agents, one human and the other a robot. Because there are two agents, the problem is what economists call a game. It is a game of partial information, because while the human knows the reward function, the robot doesn’t—even though the robot’s job is to maximize it. Brockman I 30 Off-switch Problem: Within the CIRL framework, one can formulate and solve the off-switch problem - that is, the problem of how to prevent a robot from disabling its off switch. A robot that’s uncertain about human preferences actually benefits from being switched off, Brockman I 31 because it understands that the human will press the off switch to prevent the robot from doing something counter to those preferences. Thus the robot is incentivized to preserve the off switch, and this incentive derives directly from its uncertainty about human preferences.(1) Behavioral learning/preferences/Problems: There are obvious difficulties, however, with an approach that expects a robot to learn underlying preferences from human behavior. Humans are irrational, inconsistent, weak willed, and computationally limited, so their actions don’t always reflect their true preferences. 1. Cf. Hadfield-Menell et al., “The Off-Switch Game,” https:/Jarxiv.orglpdf/ 1611.0821 9.pdf. Russell, Stuart J. „The Purpose put into the Machine”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. Norvig I 27 Artificial general intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Artificial General Intelligence or AGI (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007)(1), (…) held its first conference and organized the Journal of Artificial General Intelligence in 2008. AGI looks for a universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment, and has its roots in the work of Ray Solomonoff (1964)(2), one of the attendees of the original 1956 Dartmouth conference. Guaranteeing that what we create is really Friendly AI is also a concern (Yudkowsky, 2008(3); Omohundro, 2008)(4). >Human Level AI/Minsky; >Artificial general intelligence. 1. Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. (2007). Artificial General Intelligence. Springer 2. Solomonoff, R. J. (1964). A formal theory of inductive inference. Information and Control, 7, 1–22, 224–254. 3. Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. In Bostrom, N. and Cirkovic, M. (Eds.), Global Catastrophic Risk. Oxford University Press 4. Omohundro, S. (2008). The basic AI drives. In AGI-08 Workshop on the Sociocultural, Ethical and Futurological Implications of Artificial Intelligence |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Correspondence Theory | Ramsey | III 72 Correspondence/Correspondence Theory/Fact/Ramsey: which fact corresponds to e.g. Jones thinks that Smith is either a liar or an idiot if reality does not contain any such either or. >Disjunction, cf.>Disjunctive predicates. If we believe that reality contains no such "either or," we must change our approach. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. But that does not necessarily speak against Correspondence Theory. We have given a truth definition without any correspondence. ((s) >Tarski per correspondence (explicitely)) >Correspondence theory/Tarski. Ramsey: we can rewrite the truth definition with correspondence, though. >Truth definition. Fact/Ramsey: if A is B, then by common usage we can say that it is a fact that A is B and then say that it corresponds to the belief that A is B. >Facts. Fact/falsity/Ramsey: if A is not b, there is no fact corresponding to it. ((s) RamseyVsNegative Fact). >Negative fact. Problem: we cannot describe the nature of this correspondence unless we know the analysis of the propositional reference of "believe that A is B". >Reference, >Propositional attitude, >Thought content. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Facts | Armstrong | III 144 f Negative Facts/Negative States/Armstrong: negative facts are harmless: if something has a certain speed, then it has no other speed at the same time. - (But already implied: -> derived laws - III 147) b Solution: better assume negative properties than negative laws: otherwise laws are not instantiated ((s) >Instantiation). Negative facts: have a negative properties - But only as caused, not causal (-> derived laws.) II (d) 149 General Fact(s)/Russell/Armstrong: All quantification needs "general facts" as true makers -(Armstrong pro) - Armstrong: i.e. also a Regth needs general facts - Martin: nothing in the concept of "gen facts" helps to distinguish real laws from mere GF - Armstrong: dito - Gen Facts/Armstrong: do not involve universals either - we have to go behind the general facts, since they do not involve a direct connection of types - II 150 Lewis: if they are approved, they regulate the world by prohibiting certain additional states. Martin III 175 "General Fact"/Russell/Martin: no law, mere conjunction, aggregate, etc. But: Unexceptionality: can also be general fact (and still not a law). Martin III 181 General Fact/Totality: Martin: Problem: Negative facts. - Solution/Martin: the general term "what-and-how-something-exists" is of the first level ((s) not a summary of lower level entities). "what exists" has subdivisions on the same level. - Subdivisions should have the same level as the whole. - Then there is no need for a "general fact". ((s) Cf. >General facts). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Facts | Brandom | I 466ff Def Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory). >Deflationism. Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p. >Truthmakers. I 469 E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different. However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought. Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially. RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion. --- Brandom I 476 Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts. I 477 Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties. I 866 Negative Fact/Brandom: there is no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions. - Also > conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual. >Norms. --- Seel2 III 149 Def Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created. "There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain). KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: Conclusion from thinking to being. >Thinking, >Being. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Facts | Chalmers | I 40 Definition Positive Fact/Chalmers: A positive fact in world W is one that applies in every possible world that contains W as a real part, correspondingly a positive property in W is one that is instantiated in every world containing W as a real part. (Chalmers I 363: Containment of possible worlds.) Lewis (1983a)(1) and Jackson (1993)(2) have noticed that it is pointless to define the relation of containing worlds once and for all. But you can use them as a basic term. ...+...) >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Possible worlds. On the other hand: Negative facts always imply negative existence statements, which cannot be evaluated locally on their part. >Existence sentences. We will restrict ourselves to positive facts and properties when considering supervenience. >Supervenience, >Supervenience/Chalmers, >Properties. I 85 Negative Facts/Chalmers: Facts that involve negative existence statements are not logically determined by any localizable facts. Even facts about conscious experience cannot help here. ((Chalmers I 369 Negative facts and logical supervenience ...+...). >Experience. I 86 Solution/Chalmers: we must introduce a second-level fact which, according to the enumeration of the microphysical, phenomenal, indexical, etc. facts says: "This is all." All the negative facts follow from the fact of the second level together with all the basic single facts. Reductive explanation: negative facts are not a serious problem for reductionist explanations. >Reduction/Chalmers, >Reductionism. 2nd level fact/Chalmers: there will be probably a statement "that is all" for every possible world and such a fact is never included in the single facts. It merely expresses the finite nature of our world or of any other world. It is a simple way to deal with negative and universally quantified facts. (> universal quantification, > lists, exterior/interior, > totality, cf. Lists. I 87 Facts/World/Chalmers: Facts about the world are exhausted by 1. Physical single facts 2. Facts about conscious experience 3. Natural laws 4. A fact of the 2nd level, which means "This is all." 5. An indexical fact about my localization. >Indexicality, >Laws of Nature, >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. Lewis, Extrinsic properties. Philosophical Studies 44, 1983: pp. 197-200 2. F. Jackson, Armchair metaphysics. In: J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (Eds) Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht 1993 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Facts | Geach | I 21 Facts/GeachVsRoss: even if we assume that when "p" and "q" stand for true propositions, and such sentences as "the fact that p" have any entities called "facts" as their correspondence, even then there is no entity corresponding to the "fact that not p"! >Proposition, >Sentence, >Nonexistence. Geach: the opposite of a fact is not itself a fact. GeachVsRoss: this is anachronistic in that he attributes "facts" to Aristotle at all. "ta pragmata" cannot be translated as "facts", although it is often translated in this way. But the present context does not even contain any word for facts. I 21 Facts/Geach: facts spread across Europe like syphilis at the end of the 19th century, especially in the field of journalism. I 22 In a logic textbook by Wisdom it says: "in this book we will use facts approximately as they are used in the 'Strand Magazine'". Geach: the use of the term "facts" is always a sign that things are not yet properly analyzed logically. Their construction always provides a pair of assertions: Example (7) Smith was surprised that Brown's wife had left him. This splits into two allegations: (8) Smith was surprised to hear that Brown's wife had left him. (9) Brown's wife left him. (s) 1. From what or whom does he know, 2. (still necessary: whether it was also "a fact"). Geach: this appeals only to assertion formulas and does not contribute to analyzing a sentence of "the fact" that it contains as a conjunction. For there would be one (7) corresponding sentence in the form of a conjunction: (10) Smith heard with surprise that Brown's wife had left him and Brown's wife had left him. then that is the assertion of (11) If it is not the case that Smith was surprised, then Smith had a tacit agreement with her lover. but that would turn out to be equivalent to: (12) If it is not the case that both (Smith heard with surprise that Brown's wife had left him) and (Brown's wife had left him), then Smith had a tacit agreement with her lover. But that is blatantly wrong. See also >Facts/Chalmers (positive and negative facts). I 21ff Facts/Geach: A wrong attempt was made to reduce hypothetical statements to categorical statements - e.g. the fact of the thunder now and the fact of the lightning after. I 259 Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "p u q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually - Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be "a kind of horse". - But not: e.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful". Solution: "the fact that ..." is always to split as a pair of statements. >Conjunction, >Statement. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Facts | Martin | Armstrong III 144 f Negative Facts/Negative States/Armstrong: negative facts are harmless: if something has a certain speed, then it has no other speed at the same time. - (But already implied: -> derived laws - III 147) b Solution: better assume negative properties than negative laws: otherwise laws are not instantiated ((s) >Instantiation). Negative facts: have a negative properties - But only as caused, not causal (-> derived laws.) Armstrong II (d) 149 General Fact(s)/Russell/Armstrong: All quantification needs "general facts" as true makers -(Armstrong pro) - Armstrong: i.e. also a Regth needs general facts - Martin: nothing in the concept of "gen facts" helps to distinguish real laws from mere GF - Armstrong: dito - Gen Facts/Armstrong: do not involve universals either - we have to go behind the general facts, since they do not involve a direct connection of types - II 150 Lewis: if they are approved, they regulate the world by prohibiting certain additional states. Martin III 175 "General Fact"/Russell/Martin: no law, mere conjunction, aggregate, etc. But: Unexceptionality: can also be general fact (and still not a law). Martin III 181 General Fact/Totality: Martin: Problem: Negative facts. - Solution/Martin: the general term "what-and-how-something-exists" is of the first level ((s) not a summary of lower level entities). "what exists" has subdivisions on the same level. - Subdivisions should have the same level as the whole. - Then there is no need for a "general fact". ((s) Cf. >General facts). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Facts | Millikan | I 104 Facts/Real value/Millikan: the real value of a sentence is the fact in the world. Wrong sentence/correspondence/Millikan: here the singular term has an indirect, "piggyback" - relation to its referent. N.B.: but this is not the relation of a "should-be-like-that". Correspondence: takes place only in true sentences. Normal relation/E.g. Unicorn/Millikan: (in the wrong sentence > non-existence) the "should-correspond" is not correspondence, but the possession of meaning! Its referring is its having a certain kind of meaning or sense. I 222 Negative fact/Millikan: we must be able to show that a negative act is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. And we cannot do that. We just moved around in circles. Non-existent fact/Millikan: a non-existent fact cannot be an object of an icon and not an object of a representation. Negative fact/Millikan: a negative would then have to be something other than a non-existent fact. N.B.: but if we can show that, we do not even have to accept that "non-p" says "that p does not exist". Negative sentence/image/fact/negation/Millikan: what I then have to assert is that negative sentences represent actual and/or existing world states (facts). It is well known how to do this: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is only applied to the logical predicate of the sentence ((s) internal negation). In doing so, the meaning of the predicate is changed, so that the predicate applies (maps) to the opposite as it usually does. I 223 This can then also be extended to more complex sentences with >external negation: E.g. "No A is φ" becomes "Every A is non-φ". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well-known: 1. Problem: how to interpret the function of "not" in very simple sentences of the form "x is not" E.g. "Pegasus is not (pause)" Here "not" can be interpreted as operating over predicates! Sentences of the form "x is not" are, of course, equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist". Problem: we have said that "exists" is not a representation. Thus "not" cannot be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. For example, "Cicero is not Brutus" cannot operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, since simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" has to have other functions. Problem: In which relations do these different functions stand together? For we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. I 226 Negative Facts/Imperative/Indicative/Not/Negation/Millikan: E.g. "do not do A" has the eigenfunction to produce the same state as the one which would make the indicative sentence "H did not do A" true. Making true: So, it is a question of creating a state that makes a sentence true. Millikan: It is not a question of producing non-existent things, but of creating existential things. E.g. "John did not go to the office". This is not a question of whether one has not an opinion in the end whether John is going to the office. Negative Belief/Millikan: if a negative belief exists in this context, it must have a positive function. Conversely, John has done something that was contrary to going to the office. Alternative/Negation/Millikan: there is a structured space of alternatives, in which John necessarily acts. Alternatives/complexity: the less complex they are described, the less their number. Negative fact/negation/not/Millikan: thesis: if something is not the case, that means something else is the case. E.g. to obey a negative command must be something that could have also caused a positive action. But positive facts cause positive states. So that something is not the case,... I 227 ...must always correspond to the fact that something else is the case. Otherwise we could not explain how negative intentions can be executed. Belief/conviction/real value: here it is parallel: intentions cause their real values. Conversely, real values of beliefs cause beliefs, e.g. because John's jacket is brown, I believed that John's jacket is brown. Negative belief: correspondingly: real value of belief that John's jacket is not red must be the belief that it is not red, or - more specifically - brown. But I do not assure myself of this by not seeing the jacket, but by seeing that the jacket has a different color. Opposite/Millikan: only properties and relations have opposites but these are not absolute. There must be a common foundation. We should assume that "not" has not different meanings in different contexts. I 257 Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence forms a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Facts | Taylor | II 263 Facts/F/tradition/Barry Taylor: description of sentences = existing situations - logical complexes - constituents: the entities that are relevant for the truth of any sentence - Problem: relevance when a totality of F is given. >Relevance. Def existing/Taylor : an element exists if its description is true. II 264 Theory of Tradition/Tradition: logical truths: all have the same descriptum - VsTradition: coextension: not the same F: E.g. having a heart, having kidneys. >Coextension. But synonymy: "aardvark/groundhog": here we have the same fact. >Synonymy. Tradition needs the principle of material adequacy: that is, the entities (constituents) must be relevant for the truth of the sentences that they describe. >Adequacy. II 269 Vs: this is vague and formulation-dependent. II 277 Negative facts/B. Taylor: conflict between principle of material equivalence and condition 3: intuitively, the same elements are relevant for the truth of the sentence S as for its negation. But S and ~ S have opposite truth conditions. >Truth conditions. That is, the sentences must have different descriptions. - Solution: take the negation sign itself as an element; above the elements which are themselves relevant for the truth of S. - Then neg F as category sui generis. >Negative fact. Negation: must have common constituents with the corresponding positive F. >Negation. II 277/8 Definition Fact/F/Barry Taylor: new: every F x in S associates with the set of "F-states (x)" of total states, so that x exists iff the actual total state is an element of the set of F-states (x). II 279 Then facts are equivalence classes on S (= sentence or set of F) under the relation ~, but whereby the descriptum of a sentence is now seen as an equivalence class to which belongs its descriptum in the former sense, and the new fact as existing, if their elements in the former sense exist. - Facts are then elements of S. II 280f Facts/application/B. Taylor: we no longer need that for truth conditions - and not anymore for a Tarskian truth theory - (the semantic apparatus is strong enough). >Truth conditions, >Truth theory, >A. Tarski, >Theory of truth//Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski. Facts: were used to explain connection between analytic/synthetic sentences - analytic sentences do not describe any F. Cf. >Truthmakers. New: method: to paraphrase sentences of natural language - e.g. Fischer's victory over Spasskij caused Breshnievs anger: victory (f,s) anger (b) - then expand syntax: by double-digit sentence operator "tries victory (f,s) anger (b)". Problem: fulfillment and truth for the extended language. - "Causes" is not truth-functional: solution: perhaps two-digit predicate of the meta-language "caus": should only be valid between existing facts - (and such that are equivalent to these - a sequence of elements satisfies caus(A,B) under the interpretation I iff caus(ascribe (A,s), ascribe(B,s)). >Satisfaction, >Truth functions, >Attribution, >Causation, >Truth. |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 |
| Facts | Wittgenstein | Wright I 278 Content/content/Wittgenstein: all content has become soft. No relevant facts. --- Chisholm II 175 Fact/Wittgenstein/Simons: no object. (Like Russell). >Object. --- Wittgenstein II 31 Fact/thought/world/Ogden/Richards/Russell: Thesis: relation between sentence and fact is external. - WittgensteinVsRussell: it is internal. >Relations, >Complex. II 83 Individuals/Wittgenstein: only events. - Facts are individuals. >Individuals. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts - positive and negative relate to the form of sentences and not to the facts. >Negation. II 391 Facts/Wittgenstein: always contain something temporal, mathematical facts or sentences do not. --- III 148 Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: between facts there can be no relationships. - (Because there is no link between elementary propositions). - An object can appear in several facts. - But neither a fact nor an object can change. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. --- IV 16 Negative fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: non-existence is a negative fact. - 2:06. >Non-existence. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Negation | Dummett | II 118 Double Negation/Dummett: weaker claim as an assertion: that the sentence can not be falsified. See also >Multi-valued Logic/Dummett. III 14 Negation/Dummett: there is no single rule for the negation. ((s) Because of the different logical operations like "and", "or" etc.). III 15 Problem: how do we determine the general sense of negation when the sense of the original sentence is given? III 29 Even in the negation of statements there must be something [that corresponds to the facts of the statement]. Cf. >Negative facts. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Negation | Frege | Chisholm II 181 ff Negation/Frege/Simons: negative facts pose a problem here. Solution: we simply take two truth values (true/false) and a function that swaps the two. WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection should not be represented as a function. Operator N: forms a conjugate's negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) are false. Notation: x^: all values of x. Negation/Simons: negation only has the smallest range: atomic sentences. Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N. Frege IV 61 Negation/denial/judgment/FregeVsKant: Kant speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. That is quite unnecessary. Even a negative judgment is a simple judgment. >Judgment, >Sentence, >Thought. IV 64 Negation/denial/Frege: negation is not equal to the judgments. It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments. IV 69 Description/subordinate clause/name/Frege: E.g. "The negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a notion. The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. IV passim Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its negation as an independent second idea. Thoughts are not made up, but grasped. Their truth is not their being thought. They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. Thus, "today" becomes "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring. Tugendhat II 66f Negation/Frege: negation is not a property and does not always come with the sign of negation. E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. Proof: negation in sub clauses: only the whole sentence is asserted. In the clause (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset. Tugendhat II 12 Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not to the assertion. >Proposition, >Propositional content. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Negation | Millikan | I 221 Not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: Thesis: "not" is an operator who operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the sense of the entire sentence. >Operator. Negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences cannot have non-existent facts as the real value. Reason: Negative facts do not have causal forces that could play a role in a normal explanation. Negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. E.g. "not-p" is called "the fact that -p does not exist" In a similar way, Wittgenstein has understood it as well. >Fact. N.B.: we had said above, that existence sentences are not representations. Image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but understood sentences of the form "x does not exist" are understood in this way as to map a non-existent fact. Then the variable "x" in "x does not exist" does not go via names of single objects (objects, elementary objects) but via representations of possible states (possible facts). >Picture theory. Meaning/Non-existence/Negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning ((s)> Non-Existence/Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology it means that they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time, he could claim that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. N.B.: that made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: could we not maintain at least half of this equivalence? The from "not-p" to "that -p does not exist"? >Equivalence. MillikanVsWittgenstein: No, not even this we can do. If Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that -p does not exist," then that would mean for my position that negative sentences do not map world states and are not representations. Millikan: instead, they would represent linguistic facts, "not-p" would then be an icon, but it does not represent, whereby a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Protoreferent/Millikan. "p" would not be a representative of "not-p" but a protoreferent. Question: would "not-p" be an icon of which the "p is false" ((s) linguistically) explicitly represented? Vs: then "not" would be no operator anymore! Not/Negation/Operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: i.e. The mapping rule for "not-p" is a function of the mapping rule for "p". 1. If "not" is not an operator, it might happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p," but still the sense of "not-p" absurd. 2. If "not-p" says "that -p does not exist", "not-p" must also be true if some variant in "p" is not fully determined, i.e. has no adapted meaning. E.g. "Pegasus was not a winged horse" e.g. "The present king of France is not bald" would be true sentences! 3. Certainly, it is the case that "'p' is false" at least maps (icons) that "p" has no real value. Correspondingly, "x does not exist" maps then the fact that "x" does not have referents. N.B.: if "not-p" says "that -p does not exist" it still maps a negative fact. > Facts/Millikan. I 224 Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: Thesis: negative sentences, whose opposites are normal representative sentences, must themselves represent positive facts. >Prepresentation, >Sentence. I 224 Negation/stabilization function/not/representation/Millikan: what is the stabilization function of "not" in normal representing sentences? It is not needed to "erase" the rest of the sentence. "Erase": sometimes occurs, but then it is called "Sorry" or "I did not mean that". Negation/"not": its function is not to produce no believe. That would not be a function. Eigenfunction: of "not" is relational. That is, it is a (mathematical) function of the eigenfunction of the sentence without "not". Sentence: has the function of producing a belief. Likewise, a sentence with "not" has to produce something that has a potential benefit. Negative sentence: perhaps it should eliminate a false belief? But that would be similar to "does not exist" works. >Existence, >Nonexistence. I 224 Negative sentence/"not"/imperative/Millikan: an imperative like "bring no dirt into the house" has very well a positive function. E.g. if you do it anyway, it is not done with an excuse "I did not want it". For the command was not, to do it without purpose. Not sufficient: "I did not intend it". Correct: I intended not to do it. Not sufficient: "I did not know I did it" Correct: you have to know that you do not do it. Not/imperative: here the usage is not parallel to the function of "does not exist". I 257 Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence maps a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Negation | Strawson | II 271 NegationStrawson: "not" is a crystallized something that is implicit in each descriptive use of language. Cf. >Thought/Frege, >Negative fact, >World/thinking. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Negation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 150 Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation. II 51 Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. II 51 Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use. II 72 Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table). II 74 Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. II 75 Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. >Chess. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. >Facts. II 114 A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. >Thoughts/Frege. II 221 Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. >Picture theory. II 234 Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. >Generality. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions. Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so: E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room". >Disjunction. Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation. E.g. "I like it and I do not like it". II 239 Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application. >Use, >Signs. E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover? II 276 Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. >Symbols. II 282 Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent. The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification, > semantic ascent). II 288 Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. >World, >Reality. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean. >Meaning (Intending). II 289 Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid. II 290 Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. >Understanding. --- IV 79 Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Frege, G. | Chisholm Vs Frege, G. | Chisholm II 179 Negation/Frege: Problem: negative facts: solution: simply postulate of two truth values, as well as of a function xi () which turns the truth into falsehood and everything else into the truth. WittgensteinVsFrege: The connecting element does not represent functions or anything else. Against the functional representation of the connections by Frege. I 111 Descriptions/Chisholm: can they be non-significant? E.g. "Senator Baker would be another Jimmy Carter". Question: Do we use "Jimmy Carter" in a way here that refers to Jimmy Carter? Chisholm: Yes. Proper names/Names/Frege: can sometimes be used as a concept word: E.g. "Trieste is not Vienna". ChisholmVsFrege: but this statement does not tell us that we must not expect to find in Trieste the kinds of things that are typical for Vienna? Then "Vienna" does not act as a concept word here. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Wittgenstein | Millikan Vs Wittgenstein | I 221 not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining". Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs. b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence. Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist. Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities. negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value. Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation. negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way. Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations. projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts). Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"? MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can. When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations. Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference .Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"? Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator! Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p". 1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd. 2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements! 3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference. Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact. negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles. non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation. negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact. Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist". negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts). It is well known how such a thing is done: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does. I 223 This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known: 1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist." Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions. Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem: Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense! Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real. Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function. 2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value. real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function. Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves. I 229 "not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense. Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense. sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense. I 303 Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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