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The author or concept searched is found in the following 23 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analog/Digital | Goodman | III 163ff Many topology diagrams, for example, only need to have the correct number of points or joints connected by lines according to the correct scheme. Here, the points and lines act as characters in a notational language. These diagrams, as with electrical circuits, are purely digital. It does not depend on a vague idea of the analog as something similar, but solely on technical requirements. III 165 Models of this type are in reality diagrams. Or: diagrams are flat and static models. A molecular model of sticks and table tennis balls is digital. A working model of a windmill can be analog. --- IV 168 A schema can be called digital in which two characters are effectively differentiated. Analog: a schemata is analog in which a path consisting of pairs of non-differentiated characters exists between two characters in the schema. (Warning: misleading notions in connection with the expression.) IV 169 "Digital" and "analog" do not apply to isolated symbols but only to schematas. Since schematas are not images and pictures, the question of how the pictorial and the analog are related can cause us some trouble. For example, a unicorn or Lincoln picture is a card with a pattern of white and black squares. IV 170 We are now assuming a pack A, a stack of cards, some of which are pictures, some are inscriptions of letters, words, numbers, etc., and some cards are not supposed to belong to a known category. Since the cards are effectively differentiated, the schema is digital. E.g. now we add A by adding many more cards of the same size, one for each pattern, so that not only all the patterns composed of dots, but also all shades of any kind are included. In this extended pack A' each card is indistinguishable from many others. The schema is analog and even completely tight. But although A' is analog, it includes A and many other digital schemata! Such digital sub-schemata can be thought to have arisen through elimination from A'. However, a digital schema does not need to consist of characters composed of dots, but can consist of several nuanced images. IV 171 Images that are not composed of dots belong to as many digital schemes as images composed of dots. An analog scheme generally contains many digital schemata and a digital schema is included in many analog schemata. But obviously no digital schema includes an analog one. IV 174 A symbol only works as an image if it is considered a character in the complete pictorial scheme. A complete schema is pictorial only if it is analog. Verbal, if it is digital. In other words, not every analog, complete schema is pictorial and not every digital complete schema is verbal. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Explanation | Ricoeur | II 71 Understanding/explanation/Ricoeur: (...) it may be said, at least in an introductory fashion, that - understanding: is to reading what the event of discourse is to the utterance of discourse and that - explanation: is to reading what the verbal and textual autonomy is to the objective. meaning of discourse. >Discourse/Ricoeur. II 72 Explanation/tradition: finds its paradigmatic field of application in the natural sciences. When there are external facts to observe, hypotheses to be submitted to empirical verification, general laws for covering such facts, theories to encompass the scattered laws in a systematic whole, and subordination of empirical generalizations to hypothetic-deductive procedures, then we may say that we "explain." Understanding/tradition: Understanding, in contrast, finds its originary field of application in the human sciences (the German Geisteswissenschaften), where science has to do with the experience of other subjects or other minds similar to our own. It relies on the meaningfulness of such forms of expression as physiognomic, gestural, vocal, or written signs, and upon documents II 73 and monuments, which share with writing the general character of inscription. The immediate types of expression are meaningful because they refer directly to the experience of the other mind which they convey. Tradition/Ricoeur: The dichotomy between understanding and explanation in Romanticist hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It opposes two methodologies and two spheres of reality, nature and mind. II 75 Understanding/Ricoeur: (...) we have to guess the meaning of the text because the author's intention is beyond our reach. II 79 Interpretation: (...) if it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal. The text presents a limited field of possible constructions. The logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and scepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our immediate reach. II 81 Structural Linguistics/interpretation/understanding/Ricoeur: [the approach of the structural schools of literary criticism] proceeds from the acknowledgement of what I have called the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference. (>Reference/Ricoeur). The text intercepts the "worldly" dimension of the discourse - the relation to a world which could be shown - in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the discourse to the subjective intention of the author. According to this choice, the text no longer has an exterior, it only has an interior. To repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of the literary object into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind of closed system that phonology discovered underlying all discourse, and which Saussure called langue. Literature, according to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of langue. >Langue/Ricoeur. II 86 Explanation/literature/texts/Ricoeur: [The] transposition of a linguistic model to the theory of narrative perfectly corroborates my initial remark regarding the contemporary understanding of explanation. Today ((s) 1976) the concept of explanation is no longer borrowed from the natural sciences and transferred into a different field, that of written documents. It proceeds from the common sphere of language thanks to the analogical transference from the small units of language (phonemes and lexemes) to the large units beyond the sentence, including narrative, folklore, and myth. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Formalism | Bigelow | I 176 Symbol/blackening/Bigelow/Pargetter: some authors say that symbols are mere blackening on paper (e.g. numbers) or mere noises. >Blackening of the paper. BigelowVsFormalism: Problem: on the one hand there are too many symbols then, on the other hand, too little. Too little: for very large numbers there is no corresponding blackening or noise. Too many: for smaller numbers there are too many different ways of representation, more than numbers are distinguished. E.g. "4", "four", "IV". >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Numbers, >Numerals, >Inscriptions, >Universals. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Forms | Quine | V 107 Form/similarity/Quine: E.g. ovate: is something that is more similar in shape to each of two eggs than these are to one another. It is always between two things. (s) Idealization: applies to two arbitrarily chosen things. It cannot differ independently in one direction from both eggs - pomegranate-colored: in the middle between two concrete colors. V 165 Form/analytic geometry/Quine: are class of classes of pairs of real numbers. ((s) Two-dimensional). V 184 Form: a variety can only be recognized as a square if it is marked - against this: Colour: Scarlet red, for example, does not need to be marked. Form/Colour/Quine: Difference: the union of squares is usually not a square, while the union of several scarlet areas is scarlet red. Form/Colour/Ontology/Quine: classic solution: comes down to a double ontology: matter and space. Spatial diversity: is an aggregate of points, physical objects, particles. Certain particular at a time. Squares: are spatial manifolds. For example, a certain cross-section of a physical object will occupy almost exactly a certain square, and it will occupy an infinite number of squares that almost coincide with it almost exactly. Spatiotemporal Identity/Quine: is then no longer a problem. A square, a certain aggregate of points retains its identity for all times. V 186 Manifold/Quine: these were merely individual squares, circles, etc. These were not abstract objects like squares. Forms: would be classes of such, i.e. objects of higher abstraction - Forms/(s) i.e. are classes of classes of points. Letter forms: are classes of inscriptions. >Similarity. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Goedel Numbers | Quine | X 82 Goedel Numbers/Goedelization/Quine: can do without sets. XII 58 Context here: is the investigation of the nature of a possible language for evidence theory: Protosyntax/Indeterminacy/Quine: the language is here a formalized system of the proof theory of the first level, whose subject area consists only of expressions, i.e. of strings of a certain alphabet. VII (c) 59 N.B.: instead of interpreting the strings as sets of inscriptions, they can be regarded as a (mathematical) sequence (of signs). Character String/Expression: is then a finite set of pairs of a character and a number. Vs: this is very artificial and complicated. Simpler: Goedel numbers themselves (the characters disappear). Problem: Question: how clear is it here that we have just started to talk about numbers instead of expressions? It is only reasonably clear that we want to fulfill laws with artificial models that are supposed to fulfill expressions in a non-explicit sense. See also the reduction of multi-sort logic: XII 72. In connection with referential or substitutional quantification: see XII 80. X 125 It is not possible to form a Goedel number for each irrational number. >Goedel/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Infinity | Quine | V 165 Infinity/material/Quine: if you need an infinite number of characters (e.g. for natural numbers) you cannot say, a sign is a physical object, because then you will soon come to an end. Also forms are not used as classes of inscriptions. These are again physical realizations of forms. IX 64 Infinity/Quine: is only necessary for induction - x = {y}, y = {z}, z = {w} ... ad infinitum - this is the case if {,,,x}. XIII 96 Infinite Numbers/Quine: For example, suppose we randomly assign items to any class, the only limitation is that no object can belong to more than one class. Problem: then there will not be enough items for all classes! A class for which there is no correlate will be the class of all objects that do not belong to their correlated classes. Because its correlate should belong to it, iff it does not belong to it. Cantor: proved in 1890 that the classes of items of any kind exceed the number of items. XIII 97 The reason for this has to do with the paradoxes, if the relation, which is mentioned there, is specified correctly. It turns out that there are infinitely many different infinities. For example, there are more classes of integers than there are integers. But since there are infinitely many integers, the infinity of infinitely many classes of integers must be of a higher kind. For example, there are also more classes of classes of integers than there are classes of integers. This is an even higher infinity. This can be continued infinitely many times. The argument here depended on the class of non-elements of their own correlated classes (nonmembers of own correlated classes). Russell's Antinomy/Quine: depended on the class of nonelements of selves. Cantor's Paradox/Quine: if one takes the correlation as self-correlation, Cantor's paradox amounts to Russell's Paradox. That is how Russell came up with it. Cantor/Theorem/Quine: his theorem itself is not a paradox. Russell's Antinomy/Solution/Quine: is prevented by excluding a special case from Cantor's theorem that leads to it. (See Paradoxes) Cantor Theorem/Corollar/unspecifiable classes/Quine: the existence of unspecifiable classes follows as a corollar from Cantor's theorem. I.e. classes for which we cannot specify the containment condition. There is no other identifying move either. For example, the infinite totality of grammatically constructible expressions in a language. According to Cantor's theorem, the class of such expressions already exceeds the expressions themselves. Classes/larger/smaller/criterion/Quine: our criterion for larger and smaller classes here was correlation. Def greater/classes/quantities/Quine: one class is larger than another if not each of its elements can be paired with an element of the other class. XIII 98 Problem: according to this criterion, no class can be larger than one of its real subclasses (subsets). For example, the class of positive integers is not larger than the class of even numbers. Because we can always form pairs between their elements. This simply shows that infinite sets behave unusually. Infinite/larger/smaller/class/quantities/Quine: should we change our criterion because of this? We have the choice: a) We can say that an infinite class need not be larger than its real subclasses, or b) change the criterion and say that a class is always larger than its real parts, only that they can sometimes be exhausted by correlation with elements of a smaller class. Pro a): is simpler and standard. This was also Dedekind's definition of infinity. Infinite/false: a student once wrote that an infinite class would be "one that is a real part of itself". This is not true, but it is a class that is not larger than a (some) real part of itself. For example the positive integers are not more numerous than the even numbers. E.g. also not more numerous than the multiples of 3 (after the same consideration). And they are also not less numerous than the rational numbers! Solution: any fraction (ratio) can be expressed by x/y, where x and y are positive integers, and this pair can be uniquely represented by a positive integer 2x times 3y. Conversely, we get the fraction by seeing how often this integer is divisible by 2 or by 3. Infinite/Quine: before we learned from Cantor that there are different infinities, we would not have been surprised that there are not more fractions than integers. XIII 99 But now we are surprised! Unspecifiable: since there are more real numbers than there are expressions (names), there are unspecifiable real numbers. Names/Expressions/Quine: there are no more names (expressions) than there are positive integers. Solution: simply arrange the names (expressions alphabetically within each length). Then you can number them with positive integers. Real Numbers/Cantor/Quine: Cantor showed that there are as many real numbers as there are classes of positive integers. We have seen above (see decimals and dimidials above) that the real numbers between 0 and 1 are in correlation with the infinite class of positive integers. >Numbers/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Inverted Spectra | Churchland | Fodor IV 195 Qualia/Quality/Sensation/inverted spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the change is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could reveal it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the inverted spectra appear to show that behaviorism is false. And also the functionalism. (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been interchanged. And precisely the concept of the sensitive identity becomes ambiguous. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The inscriptions of the points of the dice could also be inverted. ((s) One could always describe it, but one would not know which sensations are present in the other.) --- IV 195/196 Even though this frequency combination represents this particular pink, it is conceptually possible that something has the first property, but not the second. Inverted spectra/Qualia: Problem: there seems to be no property of a sensation except its qualitative content on which the qualitative content supervenes. In particular, there appears to be no proportioned or neurophysiological property on which supervenience is guaranteed. Inverted spectra/tradition: would say that Churchland's dimensions in the Qualia color dice represent by reference to properties that they do not necessarily possess. Or, if you think that it is "metaphysically necessary" that color sensations have the psychophysical properties that they have, then one would have to say that this necessity is not brought about by any necessity between sensual concepts and psychophysical concepts. One might well know that a sensation corresponds to a point in the color dice and still does not know how it is. The dimensions do not determine the content. Why not place a semantic space next to it, add the condition that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They would have to name content states through their content. E.g. Perhaps then one could identify uncle, aunt, president, Cleopatra etc. along these dimensions? --- IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra, as a politician, is closer to the president than to marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content instead of identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: Equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Media | Ricoeur | II 26 Media/writing/text/Ricoeur: The most obvious change from speaking to writing concerns the relation between the message and its medium or channel. At first glance, it concerns only this relation, but upon closer examination, the first alteration irradiates in every direction, affecting in a decisive manner all the factors and functions. It is because discourse only exists in a temporal and present instance of discourse that it may flee as speech or be fixed as writing. Because the event appears and disappears, there is a problem of fixation, of inscription. What we want to fix is discourse, not language as II 27 langue. > Inscription: What we write, what we inscribe is the noema of the act of speaking, the meaning of the speech event, not the event as event. >Writing/Ricoeur. Literature: [When] is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary'stage of spoken language[,] [t]hen writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. II 29 The best way to measure the extent of this substitution is to look at the range of changes which occur among the other components of the communication process. >Literature/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Memory | Margalit | Morozov I 280 Memory/Delete/Data/Forgetting/Margalite/Morozov: Avishai Margalit makes a distinction between forgiveness as an extinction, which he calls "blotting out" and forgiveness as an uncovering, which he calls "crossing out".(1) Morozov: i. e. making invisible or preserving an original inscription. For Margalit, preserving while crossing out is morally preferable.(2) Morozov: while technology helps us quickly and easily with extinguishing, it is not so easy to use it for forgiveness. cf. >Abolition. 1. Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 189. 2. ibid. |
Margalit I Avishai Margalit The Ethics of Memory Cambridge, MA 2004 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Nominalism | Meixner | I 87 Nominalism/Meixner: the thesis that all entities are individuals. I 88 These words must then be concrete sound events or concrete inscriptions for the nominalist. The word "word" in turn must not denote a type object (also called "ontological individualism"). Radical nominalism/Meixner: Thesis: That all entities are actual individuals. Most radical nominalism/Meixner: Thesis: All entities are actual physical individuals. Materialism/Meixner: Materialism would like to represent the most radical nominalism, but it turns out that only a restricted nominalism can be represented. Reconstructive nominalism: thesis: all entities are individuals and the basic individuals (BI) are physical, but at the same time: 1. most individuals (including BI) are non-actual 2. all sets over BI are also individuals (honorific "physical"). Then universals can be regarded as individual-like entities. a) Variant of Carnap: basic individuals taken as individuals. b) David Lewis: BI on the contrary equated with maximally consistent individuals. (Sets of properties). >Actualism, >Possibilism, >D. Lewis. I 94 Nominalism: Thesis: There are no true-making entities. >Universals, >Truthmakers. Extreme nominalism: must change the language. >Everyday language, >Ontology. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Number Theory | Quine | IX 81 Elementary Number Theory/Quine: this is the theory that can only be expressed with the terms "zero, successor, sum, power, product, identity" and with the help of connections from propositional logic and quantification using natural numbers. One can omit the first four of these points or the first two and the fifth. But the more detailed list is convenient, because the classical axiom system fits directly to it. Quine: our quantifiable variables allow other objects than numbers. However, we will now tacitly introduce a limitation to "x ε N". Elementary Number Theory/Quine: less than/equal to: superfluous here. "Ez(x + z = y)" - x ε N > Λ + x = x. - x,y ε N >{x} + y = {x+y}. IX 239 Relative Strength/Proof Theory/Theory/Provability/Quine: Goedel, incompleteness theorem (1931)(1). Since number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems IX 239 (in reality, all the Goedel numbers of theorems) of an existing set theory can be defined in that same set theory, and different things can be proved about it in it. >Set Theory/Quine. Incompleteness Theorem: as a consequence, however, Goedel showed that set theory (if it is free of contradiction) cannot prove one thing through the class of its own theorems, namely that it is consistent, i.e., for example, that "0 = 1" does not lie within it. If the consistency of one set theory can be proved in another, then the latter is the stronger (unless both are contradictory). Zermelo's system is stronger than type theory. >Type theory, >Strength of theories, >Set theory, >Provability. 1.Kurt Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. In: Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik. 38, 1931, S. 173–198, doi:10.1007/BF01700692 II 178 Elementary number theory is the modest part of mathematics that deals with the addition and multiplication of integers. It does not matter if some true statements will remain unprovable. This is the core of Goedel's theorem. He has shown how one can form a sentence with any given proof procedure purely in the poor notation of elementary number theory, which can be proved then and only then if it is wrong. But wait! The sentence cannot be proved and still be wrong. So it is true, but not provable. Quine: we used to believe that mathematical truth consists in provability. Now we see that this view is untenable to mathematics as a whole. II 179 Goedel's incompleteness theorem (the techniques applied there) has proved useful in other fields: Recursive number theory, or recursion theory for short. Or hierarchy theory. >Goedel/Quine. III 311 Elementary Number Theory/Quine: does not even have a complete proof procedure. Proof: reductio ad absurdum: suppose we had it with which to prove every true sentence in the spelling of the elementary number theory, III 312 then there would also be a complete refutation procedure: to refute a sentence one would prove its negation. But then we could combine the proof and refutation procedure of page III 247 to a decision procedure. V 165 Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Numbers/Quine: Dilemma: the substitutional quantification does not help elementary number theory to any ontological thrift, for either the numbers run out or there are infinitely many number signs. If the explanatory speech of an infinite number sign itself is to be understood again in the sense of insertion, we face a problem at least as serious as that of numbers - if it is to be understood in the sense of referential quantification, then one could also be satisfied from the outset uncritically with object quantification via numbers. >Quantification/Quine. V 166 Truth conditions: if one now assumes substitutional quantification, one can actually explain the truth conditions for them by numbers by speaking only of number signs and their insertion. Problem: if numerals are to serve their purpose, they must be as abstract as numbers. Expressions, of which there should be an infinite number, could be identified by their Goedel numbers. No other approach leads to a noticeable reduction in abstraction. Substitutional quantification: forces to renounce the law that every number has a successor. A number would be the last, but the substitutional quantification theorist would not know which one. It would depend on actual inscriptions in the present and future. (Quine/Goodman 1947). This would be similar to Esenin Volpin's theory of producible numbers: one would have an unknown finite bound. V 191 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be used are abstract entities as are the numbers themselves. V 192 NominalismVsVs: one could reduce the ontology of real numbers or set theory to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for substitutional quantification on the basis of Goedel numbers. >Goedel Numbers/Quine. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. It is not about the high estimation of the concrete and disgust for the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the rejection of most transcendent numbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are human work". QuineVs: but even that is not possible, we saw above that the subsitutional quantification over classes is basically not compatible with the object quantification over objects. V 193 VsVs: one could also understand the quantification of objects in this way. QuineVs: that wasn't possible because there aren't enough names. You could teach space-time coordination, but that doesn't explain language learning. X 79 Validity/Sentence/Quantity/Schema/Quine: if quantities and sentences fall apart in this way, there should be a difference between these two definitions of validity about schema (with sentences) and models (with sentences). But it follows from the Löwenheim theorem that the two definitions of validity (using sentences or sets) do not fall apart as long as the object language is not too weak in expression. Condition: the object language must be able to express (contain) the elementary number theory. Object Language: In such a language, a scheme that remains true in all insertions of propositions is also fulfilled by all models and vice versa. >Object Language/Quine The requirement of elementary number theory is rather weak. Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: speaks about positive integers by means of addition, multiplication, identity, truth functions and quantification. Standard Grammar/Quine: the standard grammar would express the functors of addition, multiplication, like identity, by suitable predicates. X 83 Elementary Number Theory/Quine: is similar to the theory of finite n-tuples and effectively equivalent to a certain part of set theory, but only to the theory of finite sets. XI 94 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine/Harman/Lauener: ("Words and Objections"): e.g. translation of number theory into the language of set theory by Zermelo or von Neumann: both versions translate true or false sentences of number theory into true or false sentences of set theory. Only the truth values of sentences like e.g. "The number two has exactly one element", which had no sense before translation, differ from each other in both systems. (XI 179: it is true in von Neumann's and false in Zermelo's system, in number theory it is meaningless). XI 94 Since they both serve all purposes of number theory in the same way, it is not possible to mark one of them as a correct translation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Opacity | Opacity, philosophy: also opacity of the reference. A problem with propositions (meanings of uttered sentences related to a speaker) is that one cannot be certain that one knows what an utterance refers to. E.g. in an empty room is a blackboard with the inscription "I am hungry". See also intensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, reference, inscrutability, quotation. |
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| Ostension | Quine | Quine VII (d) 67 Ostension/Pointing/Quine: is always ambiguous because of temporal vastness. Our setting of the object does not show us yet which summation of current objects (stadiums or totality) is intended. Problem: adding "this river" presumes the concept of river. Problem: "This" must also refer to something else, which is the same in the different cases. Problem: we only know that a and b belong to the constituents. Solution: learning through induction. Problem: spatial expansion cannot be separated from temporal, because we need time when pointing. Pointing becomes superfluous in the course of science - which leads to the question of how much depends on the language. >Pointing/Quine. XII 56f Ostension/Direct/Pointing/Quine: Problem: 1) how much of the environment counts? 2) how may an absent thing differ from the one that is shown to still fall under the stated term. Shifted ostension: E.g. pointing to the fuel gauge. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. E.g. to an inscription to explain a letter. Shifted twice: Goedel number for an expression. 1) inscription of formula 2) Goedel number as a proxy for it >Goedel Numbers/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Pointing | Quine | V 70f Pointing/indicative/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: how do we know which part of the area is meant, how do we recognize pointing as such. Solution: Sorting out the irrelevant by induction. Also amplification without a pointing finger or deletions with pointing finger. X 24 Indicative Pointing/Ostension/Language Learning/Quine: both the learner and the teacher must understand the appropriateness of the situation. This leads to a uniformity of response to certain stimuli. This uniformity is a behavioural criterion for what should become an observation sentence. It also makes it possible for different scientists to check the evidence for each other. >Language Learning/Quine, >Stimuli/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine. XI 182 Note: Pointing/indicative/Ostension/Quine/Lauener: difference: between direct and shifted ostension: Def shifted Ostension/Quine/Lauener: if we refer to a green leaf to explain the abstract singular term "green", we do not mean the perceptible green thing, because the word does not denote a concrete entity. >Ostension/Quine. XII 47 Pointing/Ostension/Color Words/Gavagai/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: for example the color word "sepia": can be learned by conditioning or induction. It does not even need to be said that sepia is a color and not a form, a material or a commodity. However, it may be that many lessons are necessary. >Colour/Quine. XII 56 Def Direct Ostension/Pointing/Quine: the point shown is at the end of a straight line on an opaque surface. Problem: how much of the environment should count? Problem: how far may an absent thing differ from the object shown to fall under the term declared ostensively? XII 57 Def Shifted Ostension/Pointing/Quine: For example, pointing to the fuel gauge instead of the fuel itself to indicate how much is still there. ((s) But not that the fuel gauge is still there). Example shifted: if we point to an event (token) and mean the type. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. For example, point to an inscription to explain a letter. Double shifted: e.g. Goedel number for an expression. (1st inscription of the formula (of the expression), 2nd Goedel number as proxy for it). XII 58 The shifted ostension does not cause any problems that are not already present in the direct version. VII (d) 67 Pointing/indicating definition/Ostension/Identity/Quine: is always ambiguous because of the temporal extension! Our setting of an object does not tell us yet which summation of current objects is intended! When pointing again either the river or river stages can be meant! Therefore, pointing is usually accompanied by pronouncing the words "this river". But this presupposes a concept of river. "This river" means: "the river-like summation of momentary objects that this momentary object contains". VII (d) 68 Pointing/Ostension/Quine: the spatial extension cannot be separated from the temporal extension when pointing, because we ourselves need time for pointing at different places. VII (d) 74 Ostension/Pointing/objects/universals/Quine: how does pointing to space-time objects differ from pointing to universals like square and triangle? VII (d) 75 Square: each time we point to different objects and do not assume an identity from one opportunity to another. The river, on the other hand, assumes this identity. Attribute/Quine: the "squareness" is divided by the shown objects. But you do not need to assume entities like "attributes". Neither the "squareness" is pointed to, nor is it needed for a reference to the word "square". The expression "is square" is also not necessary if the listener learns when to use it and when not to use it. The expression does not need to be a name for any detached object. VII (d) 76 Pointing/concrete/abstract/Quine: general terms like "square" are very similar to concrete singular terms like "Cayster" (the name of the river) concerning the east version. With "red" you do not need to make a distinction at all! VII (d) 77 In everyday language, a general term is often used like a proper name. >General Terms/Quine. V 70 Pointing/Quine: is useful to introduce the anomaly. Conspicuousness/Quine/(s): should explain why from the multitude of stimuli certain stimuli are overweighted or how shapes are recognized against a background. V 89 Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then you could still ask. "The same what? V 102 Pointing/General Terms/Quine: Problem: unique showing requires special care in some situations. Example "this body is an animal": here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it could be that only the hull is perceived as an animal. V 103 At the beginning we did not talk about sentences like "This body is Mama", because we have to assume a general mastery of the "is" in the predication of duration. This requires a stock of individually learned examples. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Propositions | Foucault | II 128ff Statement/Proposition/Discourse/Foucault: There is no general, independent, neutral statement. Proposition: An alphabet, construction rules or transformation rules of a formal system are required. Then one can define the first proposition of this language completely, but not the statement. There is no statement that requires no others. No first statement. Statement/Foucault: is that which places the units of meaning in a space in which they multiply. Statement: must have material existence. Also time and space. Cf. >Inscription/Goodman. Problems: Does each repetition form a new statement? Translation? Identity? >Statement, >Translation, >Repetition, >Identity, >Rules >Utterance. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Satisfaction | Goodman | Definition satisfaction/Goodman: "Satisfied" = "is denoted by" "has as fulfillment object" = "denotes" "fulfillment class" = extension >Terminology/Goodman. III 139 f Extension/Goodman: the extension of a word is not both its pronunciations and the objects - the extension is always based on a system. >Extensions. III 140 Satisfaction/Goodman: satisfaction requires no special agreement; whatever is denoted by a symbol, it fulfills it. In principle, compliance is connected with an inscription. In a given system, many things can fulfill a single inscription, and the class of these things constitutes the fulfillment class of inscriptions in this system. >Systems. Of course, the fulfillment class does not normally fulfill the inscription itself - its elements do. III 141 Inscription/Goodman: we call inscriptions without a satisfaction object "vacant". A vacant inscription belongs as much to the system as any other and it can be just as big and black. It deficit is more semantic, not of syntactic nature. An object which does not fulfill an inscription, has no description in the system. In Object-English, for example, no object and no set of objects fulfills only one predicate. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Sentences | Tarski | Horwich I 136 Sentence/Tarski: here: classes of inscriptions of the same shape - not physical things. >Inscriptions. Tarski does not work with Propositions. Horwich I 109/110 Senetence/name of sentence/Tarski: "X is true" is not grammatically correct, if we replace "X" with a sentence. It must be the name of a sentence. - It must be because at this position in the sentence there is a noun.(1) >Names of sentences, >Description levels, >Levels. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Signs | Quine | V 160 Sign/Interpretation/Quine: must not simply be reinterpreted, otherwise each string can have any meaning - N.B.: but terms can very well be reinterpreted. ((s) not signs). >Interpretation, >Meaning. VII (c) 53 Meaning/Sign/Quine: it is unsatisfactory to say that a significant sequence is simply a series of phonemes that are uttered by a speaker of a chosen population. We do not only want the expressed sequences, but also those that may yet be expressed. IV 396 Sign/Locke: ...but for two reasons we also need signs, which in turn stand for ideas: for the exchange of our thoughts and for their recording. These are the words. Behind them stand the ideas, as it were, as guarantors of meaning. Without them, words would merely be sounds. Words: are representatives of ideas. IV 397 QuineVsLocke: one should stick to what is true for everyone when openly observed. Language is also not something private, but something social. IV 398 Language: is a social skill acquired through the observation of social use. The externalisation of empiricism leads to a behavioural approach to meaning. (Behaviorism). V 165 Infinite/Name/Signs/Quine: Problem: which signs should we use when we need infinitely many as insertions for the number variables? One cannot say that every sign is a physical object, because then they run out soon. Wrong solution: to say that these signs are forms (as classes of inscriptions). Because these are again physical realizations of forms and there is not enough of them. Form/Quine: (to denote infinitely many natural numbers) here also not in the sense of analytical geometry, so that a form would become a class of classes of pairs of real numbers, because it does not help to explain the numbers by means of number signs, which are themselves explained by means of real numbers. >Infinity, >Numbers, >Denotation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Syntax | Quine | VII (a) 15 Syntax/Quine: their rules are meaningful in contrast to their notation. VI 69 Syntax/translation/indeterminacy/Quine: many of my readers have mistakenly assumed that uncertainty also extends to syntax. There was a subtle reason for this: in word and object(1) (pp. 107, 129 136) it says: VI 70 that also the specific apparatus of reification and object reference, which we make use of, is subject to indeterminacy. To this apparatus belong the pronomina, the "=", (equal sign) the plural endings and whatever performs the tasks of the logical quantifiers. But it is wrong to assume that these mechanisms belonged to syntax! >Equal sign, >Quantifiers, >Pronouns, >Indeterminacy. VI 97 Spelling/Quine: resolves the syntax and lexicon of each content sentence and merges it with the interpreter's language. It then has no more complicated syntax than the addition sign. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press VII (a) 15 Syntax/Quine/Goodman: their rules are meaningful as opposed to the notation itself. XI 114 Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be regarded purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) This is not truthful). XI 116 Lauener: it is a mistake to think that the language contributes the syntax but the theory contributes the empirical content. Therefore, one cannot say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: Mathematics is more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. XII 58 The problem of the inscrutability of the reference reaches much deeper than that of the indeterminacy of the translation: e.g. protosyntax. >Inscrutability. Protosyntax/Uncertainty/Quine: the language here is a formalized system of proof theory of the first level, whose subject area consists only of expressions, i.e. of character strings of a certain alphabet. Expressions: are types here, not tokens! (no occurrences). Each expression is the set of all its occurrences. (Summarized due to similarity of inscriptions). For example, the concatenation x^y is the set of all inscriptions that consist of two parts. These parts are tokens of x and y. Problem: it can happen that x^y is the empty set ((s) the combination does not occur) although both x and y are not empty. XII 59 The probability of this problem increases with increasing length of x and y! N.B.: this violates a law of protosyntax that says: x = z, if x^y = z^y. Solution: then you will not understand the objects as sets of inscriptions. But then you can still consider its atoms, the single characters as a set of inscriptions. Then there is no danger that the set is empty. ((s) Because the atoms have to be there, even if not every combination). N.B.: instead of interpreting the strings as sets of inscriptions, they can be regarded as a (mathematical) sequence (of characters). Character String/Expression: is then a finite set of pairs of a sign and a number. Vs: this is very artificial and complicated. Simpler: Goedel numbers themselves (the characters disappear). Problem: Question: How clear is it here that we have just started to talk about numbers instead of expressions? The only thing that is reasonably clear is that we want to fulfill laws with artificial models that are supposed to fulfill expressions in a non-explicit sense. XIII 199 Syntax/Quine: "glamour" and "grammar" were originally one and the same word. XIII 200 Later, the meaning also included magic. Grammar: (in the narrower sense) said which chains of words or phonemes were coherent and which were not. Always related to a particular language. Grammar: (wider sense): "The art of speaking" (in relation to the established use). >Grammar. Syntax/Quine: for the narrower sense we do not really need the word "grammar", but "syntax". It is about which character strings belong to the language and which do not. Problem: this is indefinite in two ways: 1. How the individuals are specified (formally, by components or phonemes) and 2. What qualifies them for the specification XIII 201 Recognizability is too indeterminate (liberal). Problem: ungrammatical forms are used by many people and are not incomprehensible. A language that excludes these forms would be the dialect of a very small elite. Problem: merely possible utterances in imaginable but not actual situations that are not themselves linguistic in nature. Solution: Def ungrammatic/William Haas/Quine: a form that would not make sense in any imaginable fictitious situation. Rules/Syntax/syntactic rules/Quine: are abstractions of the syntactic from long practice. They are the fulfillment of the first task (see above) to recognize which chains are grammatical. XIII 202 Solution: this is mainly done by recursion, similar to family trees. It starts with words that are the simplest chains and then moves on to more complex constructions. It divides the growing repertoire into categories. Parts of speech/Quine: there are eight: Nouns, pronouns, verb, adjective, adverb, preposition, conjunction, sentence. Further subdivisions: transitive/intransitive, gender, etc. But this is hardly a beginning. Nomina: even abstract ones like cognizance (of) and exception (to) are syntactically quite different, they stand with different prepositions. Recursion/syntax/Quine: if we wanted to win the whole syntax by recursion, it would have to be so narrow that two chains would never be counted as belonging to the same speech part, unless they could be replaced in all contexts salva congruitate. >Recursion. Def Replaceability salva congruitate/Geach/Quine: preserves grammaticality, never returns ungrammatical forms. VsRecursion/Problem: if speech parts were so narrowly defined, e.g. Nomina, which stand with different prepositions, they would then have to be counted among different kinds of speech parts. And these prepositions e.g. of and to, should not fall into the same category either! Then there would be too many kinds of speech parts, perhaps hundreds. Of which some would also be singletons ((s) singletons = categories with only one element). Solution: to give up recursion after having the roughest divisions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Terminology | Goodman | I 88 Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.) 2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense. 3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts. 4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically. 5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols. --- III 128 Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions. Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign. III 128/129 Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica. Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy"). There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas. Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation. Definition Notation: 1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong). 2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible. 3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous. Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character. Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class. III 133 Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed. Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation. Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks. Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions. On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other. III 213 Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation. Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated. III 232 ff Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts. Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores. Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones. Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive. III 76ff Def scheme: a scheme implicit set of alternatives. III 128 Def symbolic scheme: a symbolic scheme consists of characters. >Symbols. III ~ 140 Def symbol system: a symbol system is a symbol diagram, which is correlated with a reference region. III 76 A description does not work in isolation, but in its belonging to a family. III 195 The text of a poem, a novel or a biography is a character in a notation scheme. As a phonetic character with comments as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to an approximately notational system. >Systems. III 195 As a character with objects as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to a discursive language. >Satisfaction. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Texts | Benjamin | Bolz II 23 Text/Benjamin: the text is not important in terms of a historical point of view in relation to its author. Text: Two Spheres: "Scripture" "Inscription"(1) 1. Sphere: work/authority 2. Sphere: unsettles the authority: The relation to the subject is meaningless, like any inscription. >Writing, >Inscriptions, >Authorship. Bolz II 24 The work itself gets a chance to speak.(2) Work Character > Model character. Bolz II 26 Text/Benjamin: New forms: Flyers, brochures, magazine articles, posters: Only this prompt language is adequately effective in the moment.(3) 1. Necessity of new art forms 2. Integration of proletarian life and language forms 3. The journalistic monopoly of the newspaper. These moments have to be recalled together in such a way that the decomposition of the traditional forms by the mass media is recognizable precisely as the prerequisite of new forms. "Theological" dialectics in the relationship of "deepest humiliation" and "restoration".(4) >Theology/Benjamin. 1. W. Benjamin, Briefe. Herausgegeben und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Gershom Sholem und Th. W. Adorno, Frankfurt/M. 1966/1978, Br. 220. 2. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 688. 3. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd IV S. 85 4. Ebenda. |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Universals | Quine | I 72 Disposition: stimulus is here no single event, but universal. Not two similar ones, but repetition of the same. Universal: the same, not two of a kind! -> Disposition and subjunctive make universals indispensable. Unrealized entities: universals - not individual things. (otherwise we would need infinite classes of duplicates). > Possible worlds/Quine, > counterparts. I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. I 286 Intensional abstraction: "dogness", "cake baking", "erring". I 332 Sentence = universal - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change of the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p". I 414 Object: accept that what singular terms denotes as values - (But singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 423 Unrealized possibilities: the various possible hotels at the corner: no identity by position! - At most as universals. --- II 220 Universals/Quine: must be included in ontology: E.g. some zoological species are mutually fertile - Frege’s ancestors - Kaplan: "Some critics admire nobody but each other". Numbers, functions (also in physics). --- VII (a) 10ff Universals/Names/Quine: tradition cannot argue that predicates such as "red" would have to be the name of universals: being a name is much more special than having a meaning - "Pegasizes" is not an attribute (Universal) but a predicate (term). --- VII (d) 73 Universals/Quine: E.g. "Red": is the biggest red thing in the universe - even if it is distributed - E.g. income groups: each is a thing distributed in space and time which consists of various stages of different people - problem: distinction between spatio-temporal and conceptual distribution: E.g. graphic figure can be interpreted as consisting of more or less numerous triangles or squares - that is why universals are no concrete facts. VII (d) 75 Universals/Quine: must be accepted as abstract entities, because names must always be substitutable (Frege, substitution principle). --- VII (f) 117 Universals/Quine: a theory which deals only with objects can be rephrased in a way that it refers to universals - E.g. length of bodies instead of bodies - e.g. concrete: Inscription - abstract: notational form. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Writing | Ricoeur | II 25 Speaking/Writing/Ricoeur: (...) the transition from speaking tow writing has ist conditions in the theory of >discourse (...), especially in the dialectic of event and meaning (...) >Discourse/Ricoeur, >Dialogue/Ricoeur. Writing/Plato/Ricoeur: [Plato criticized] writing as a kind of alienation (...). Writing/Ricoeur: What happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse (...). The semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by the dialectic of event and meaning. Moreover, it may be said that this dialectic is made obvious and explicit by writing. Writing/text/Ricoeur: What happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse (...). The semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by the dialectic of event and meaning. Moreover, it may be said that this dialectic is made obvious and explicit by writing. II 26 Writing/Derrida: To hold - as Jacques Derrida(1) does - that writing has a root distinct from speech and that this foundation has been misunderstood due to our having paid excessive attention to speech, its voice, and its logos, is to overlook the grounding of both modes of the actualization of discourse in the dialectical constitution of discourse. RicoeurVsDerrida: I propose instead that we begin from the schema of communication described by Roman Jakobson in his famous artcle, "Linguistics and Poetics."(2) Jakobson: To the six main "factors" of communicative discourse — the speaker, hearer, medium or channel, code, situation, and message—he relates six correlative "functions": the emotive, conative, phatic, meta-linguistic, referential, and poetic functions. Ricoeur: Taking this schema as a starting point, we may inquire into what alterations, transformations, or deformations affect the interplay of facts and functions when discourse is inscribed in writing. >Media/Ricoeur. II 28 (...) does the problematics ot fixation and inscription exhaust the problem of writing? In other words, is writing only a question of a change of medium, where the human voice, face, and gesture are replaced by material marks other than the speaker's own body? When we consider the range of social and political changes which can be related to the invention of writing, we may surmise that writing is much more than mere material fixation. [The] political implication of writing is just one of its consequences. To the fixation of rules for reckoning may be referred the birth of market relationships, therefore. the birth of economics. To the constitution of archives, history. To the fixation of law as a standard of decisions, independent from the opinion of the concrete judge, the birth of the justice and juridical codes, etc. Such an immense range of effects suggests that human discourse is not merely preserved from destruction by being fixed in writing, but that it is deeply affected in its communicative function. Literature: [When] is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary'stage of spoken language[,] [t]hen writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. II 29 The best way to measure the extent of this substitution is to look at the range of changes which occur among the other components of the communication process. The relation writing-reading is no longer a particular case of the relation speaking-hearing. With written discourse, (...) the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text and the mental intention of the author gives to the concept of inscription its decisive significance, beyond the mere fixation of previous oral discourse. II 30 Meaning/intending: What the text means now matters more than what the author meant when he wrote it. >Intentional Fallacy/Wimsatt, >Literature/Ricoeur. 1. Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénoméne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967); L'écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967); De la grammatologie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967); „La Mythologie blanche," Rhétorique et philosophie, Poétique, 5 (1955); reprinted in Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972), pp. 247-324. 2. R. Jakobson, „Linguistics and Poetics“. In: T. A. Sebeok (ed.), Style in Language (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1960), pp. 350-377. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intuitionism | Poincaré Vs Intuitionism | Wessel I 236 PoincaréVsIntuitionism/VsConstruktivism/Wessel: (Poincaré calls the intuitionists pragmatists): "The pragmatist should take the position of the extension, the Cantorian that of comprehension (compréhension). The objects, however, are there before the inscriptions, and the set itself would exist if there was no one who would undertake to organize it." I 237 Intuitionism/Logic/Wessel: the intuitionists reject not only the concept of the actual infinite, but they also believe that they have to limit logic: Brouwer: the law of excluded third only applies within a certain finite main system, since it is possible to come to an empirical confirmation here. BrouwerVsLogic: as foundation of mathematics. Instead: vice versa! I 238 (s) It is about the practice of the mathematician, therefore the limits of the constructive possibilities are not random or can be overcome easily by logical considerations.) Constructivism/Brouwer/Heyting: examines the construction as such, without inquiring after the nature of the objects, e.g. whether they exist! Law of Excluded Third/Intuitionism/Heyting/Wessel: (a) k is the biggest prime number such that k-1 is also one; if there is no such number, k = 1 (s) "the only prime that is adjacent to another". (b) l is the biggest prime such that l-2 is also one; if there is no such number, l = 1. Wessel: k can really be determined (k = 3), while we do not have any methods to determine l. This leads to the rejection of the law of excluded third: for if the sequence of prime twins was either finite or infinite, then (b) would define an integer. Intuitionism/Logic/Logical Operators/Wessel: because certain laws of logic do not apply here, the different logics are various complexes of operators. But the intuitionists have the same claim, to comprehend the meaning of "and", "not", "or" in the everyday language. Def Conjunction/Intuitionism/Wessel: p u q can be claimed exactly then when both p and q can be claimed. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Ryle, G. | Schiffer Vs Ryle, G. | I 266 Meaning Theory/M.th./Schiffer: some of them offer a reductive analysis of semantic terms, but that does not work. I 267 We learn more about our cognitive apparatus, if we ask why our m.th. fail. We also learn something if we only try a concept analysis. E.g. if we try to complete the following scheme, which is impossible: "x presents in y gdw ..." But:. SchifferVsRyle: "Analytical" connections between concepts do not bring us much further. It would be nice if we knew everything about the conceptual roles of our semantic and mental terms, but I do not see how we could find out more. M.th./Schiffer: some philosophers see it here just as their task to give an "explanation" rather than a conceptual analysis or meaning analysis of semantic concepts. E.g. M.th./Semantics/Devitt: (Devitt 1981,68): the problem of semantics is given in part by human speech behavior. The main problem of semantics is to explain the semantic terms that occur in the semantic theory. What is it for an inscription to have meaning? Why is this sound sequence true?. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Various Authors | Lycan Vs Various Authors | Cresswell I 104 Def Inscriptionalism/Terminology/Cresswell: Thesis: that sentences about propositional attitudes can be analyzed as a relation between persons and linguistic units ((s) sentences or propositions > Relation Theory/SchifferVs)). 1. BoerVs Inscriptionalism/LycanVs Inscriptionalism: (Boer and Lycan, 1986, Lycan 1986, Appendix): Indirect Speech/Cresswell: the theory I want to discuss is this: "saying" means a relation between a person and a class of sentences. They do not have to belong to the same language. I 113 Relation Theory/Belief/Cresswell: if so, my argument is of course not applicable, because I have nothing against the thesis that the meaning of "believes" relates a person to a meaning. CresswellVsInscriptionalism: only Vs propositional attitude as relation to linguistic things, thus things that have meaning. (CresswellVsRelation Theory). |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Niominalism | Meixner, U. | I 87 Nominalism/Meixner: the thesis: that all entities are individuals, that universals are "mere names". For the nominalist, however, these words must then be concrete sound events or concrete inscriptions. For its part, the word "word" may not designate a type object. (also called "ontological individualism"). Radical Nominalism/Meixner: thesis: that all entities are actual individuals. Most Radical Nominalism/Meixner: thesis that all entities are actual physical individuals. Materialism/Meixner: would like to represent the most radical nominalism, but it turns out that only a limited nominalism can be represented. I 88 Reconstructive Nominalism: thesis: all entities, individuals and the basic individuals (BI) are physically, but simultaneously: 1. Most individuals (also the basic individuals) are not up to date. 2. All sets via basic individuals are also individuals (honorary "physical"). Then universals can be regarded as individual-like entities. a) Variant of Carnap: Basic individuals as individuals. b) David Lewis: baisc individuals on the contrary equated with maximum consistent individuals. (sets of properties). (see Chapter XI.3 below). |
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