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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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| Many-Worlds Interpretation | Kanitscheider | II 122 Many-worlds-interpretation/coincidence/existence/life/Kanitscheider: Brandon Carter 1974(1) Suggestion: to accept an ensemble of worlds in which a real subset has a life-favorable tuning of the constants. The fact that our world belongs to the knowable subset is then logically necessary, otherwise we could not make such a consideration. ((s) Reversal: many worlds instead of a one-off coincidence. The anthropic principle works in reverse). Kanitscheider: This reduces the astonishment that we exist. Cf. >Anthropic principle. Many worlds/Epicurus(2): There are countless worlds, some similar to ours, some dissimilar. After all, atoms are not built for one world, nor for a limited number of worlds. Nothing stands in the way of the assumption of an infinite number of worlds. II 123 Many worlds/Giordano Bruno(3): It is a general, empty, immeasurable space in which countless globes float like this one. Space is infinite because there is no reason or possibility to limit it. Many worlds/Huygens(4): (1629 - 1695): "Principle of Plenitudo" as justification. Nature harbors unlimited potential, one would restrict its creative power too much if one only assumed one world. Many worlds/tradition/Kanitscheider: In traditional theses, very different ideas are assumed, some of these worlds are presented as alien planets, but always with a causal connection among these "worlds". Many worlds/modern cosmology/Kanitscheider: causal decoupling is assumed here. Among other things, because of infinite distances. >Causality. Many worlds/laws of nature/George Gamov(5): One could assume that the fundamental laws of relativity, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics apply to all worlds, but the natural constants have different values. >Natural constants. II 124 Some of these worlds are perfectly imaginable, while others, which are logically possible simply because they contain no internal contradictions, elude our imagination. Many worlds/Kanitscheider: Which processes take place in worlds with any but constant legal structure can hardly be determined. But you can override individual laws in a thought experiment. Eg second law suspended: anti-entropic worlds already have such bizarre properties that we probably cannot understand them properly. Empiricism/observation/Kanitscheider: Even in very close areas there are zones that are inaccessible to measuring devices for physical reasons. E.g. the interior of the sun. We will never observe it directly. >Quantum mechanics, >Measuring. II 125 Many worlds/Kanitscheider: If there was a proof from the principles of physics that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are the only ones that make our world possible, the matter would have been superfluous. But there is no such proof whatsoever. Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: Whether the one-world hypothesis is the simplest depends on the respective theoretical situation. For example, in chaotic inflation, where quantum fluctuations in high-dimensional superspace represent the natural state of reality, a single world would be a difficult assumption. Many Worlds Interpretation/EWG/Everett(6)(9)/Wheeler/Graham: here the wave function contains all possibilities of states in superposition. Quantum cosmology/Kanitscheider: The traditional separation of measuring device, observer and object cannot be maintained here, since there is no outside. >Quantum mechanics. Everett/Wheeler/Graham/EWG: This thesis now proposes that the state vector (the geometric counterpart of the wave function in Hilbert space) never collapses. Instead, splitting up into parallel worlds. >Wave function. II 126 Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: In view of the many-worlds interpretation, one can ask which quantum mechanics of measurement should be considered simpler: 1. The one that works with an acausal, discontinuous, untimely, indeterministic collapse process, or 2. The one that is based on a more comprehensive reality, but also on a deterministic, causal, continuous, dynamically describable measurement process. >Simplicity. Elementary particle physics/today/Kanitscheider: Everything that is not forbidden actually occurs. So decays that do not violate the conservation laws. >Conservation laws. Many Worlds/Sciama(7): The theory means no violation of Occam's razor if one interprets this as the lowest number of restrictions that are compatible with the observational material. Cf. >Conservativity. II 127 Einzigigkeit/Leibniz(8): Metaphysical justification: there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God. >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Cf. >Possible Worlds. 1. Brandon Carter (1974). Large Number Coincidence amd the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. In: M.S. Longair (Ed): Cosmological Theories in Confrontation with Cosmological Data. In: International Astronomical Union Symposium Nr. 63. Dordrecht. pp.291-298. 2. Diogenes Laertius: LEben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Buch X, 45, 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner. 1967. S. 243f. 3. Giordano Bruno: De L'infinito universo et mondi. Zitiert nach: A. Koyré: Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1969. 4. Ch. Huyghens;: The Celestial Worlds discovered: or, Conjectures concerning the inhabitants, planets and productions of the worlds in the planets. London 1698. 5. George Gamov: Mr. Tompkins seltsame Reisen durch Kosmos und Mikrokosmos. Braunschweig: Vieweg 1980. 6. B. S. DeWitt: The Everett-Wheeler-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In: C. DeWitt/J.A. Wheeler (eds.): Bettelle Rencontres, 1967, Lectures in Mathematics and Physics. New York: W.A. Benjamin 1968, S. 318-332 7. D.W. Sciama: The Anthropic Principle and the non-uniqueness of the Universe. In: F. Bertola/U. CUri (eds.): The Anthropic Principle. Cambridge: UP 1993, pp. 107-110. 8. G.W. Leibniz: Monadologie. Hamburg: Meiner 1976 § 53. 9. Hugh Everett (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Reviews of modern physics. Vol. 29, 1957, S. 454–462 |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Time | Deutsch | I 243 ff There is no flow of time, but the idea of it is highly reasonable. Even subjectively, "now" does not move through time. - Motion: nothing can move from one moment to another. If something exists in a certain moment, then it always exists. Moment: the snapshots of the observer are not successively in the present. They are not successively aware of their presence. They are all conscious, and subjectively they are all in the present. Objectively there is no present. - We also do not perceive time as flowing or transitory. - ...that the universe changes over time. But it does not move through time. I 250 There is nothing that can move, stop or flow. Since there is no time outside of it, it is not coherent to imagine that it can be changed or that it exists in several versions. Moment: a certain moment does not change. Therefore it cannot become present, or stop being present, because these would be changes. Flow of time: if we say when something happened, we do not need a "flow of time" any more than we need a "flow of space" if we say where something happened. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Change, >Processes, >Space-time, >Space-time points. I 265 In the multiverse, snapshots have no "time stamps". Other times are merely special cases of other universes. "Other moments in our universe" differ from "other universes" only from our point of view. >Quantum mechanics. I 265 Future: relative to an observer, the future is indeed open and the past is fixed. I 279 Does an acceleration lead into the past, if a deceleration would lead into the future? No. The outside world would only appear to be slowing down. Even if the brain was working at infinite speed, the outside world would appear to be frozen at a certain moment. I 284 Time machine: would be a place, not a vehicle. >Time travel. I 299 But here, changing the past is no different from changing the future, as we always do. Gribbin III 236 Time/Deutsch/Gribbin: if time "flows", we would need a second type of time, which idles, as the "now" passes from one moment to the next - and a third to measure this time, and so on. Gribbin III 236 Time/Deutsch: there is no difference between snapshots from different times and from different worlds - past and future would be special cases of Everett's worlds. >Many Worlds Interpretation/Everett. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Gribbin I John Gribbin Schrödinger’s Kitten and the Search for Reality, London 1995 German Edition: Schrödingers Kätzchen und die Suche nach der Wirklichkeit Frankfurt/M. 1998 Gribbin II John Gribbin In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat, London 1984 German Edition: Auf der Suche nach Schrödingers Katze. Quantenphysik und WIrklichkeit München 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Everett, H. | Putnam Vs Everett, H. | I (i) 225/226 Many Worlds Interpretation/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Everett/Putnam: should restore the "perspective of God." The universe evolves deterministically, there is no "reduction of the wave packet" (no "collapse of the wave equation"). Putnam: as a philosopher I am fascinated by that as a cultural phenomenon. I (i) 228 The space-time structure is the one of relativistic physics (hence it is so attractive for cosmologists). The logic is classical logic. Only problem: the whole speech of the "many worlds" is just a picture. I (i) 251 Another problem: how the concept of probability is to interpret if all the worlds are "equally possible". I (i) 229 PutnamVsMany worlds interpretations/PutnamVsEverett: requires signals that are faster than light. But instead of considering a "conflict between realism and locality", I'd rather go back to Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation. Realism/Quantum Mechanics/Putnam: although the debate in the past decade has been staring at the locality and Bell's Theorem, you look at these things best as the technical background of the problem. Paradox is the result, the need to recognize a cut between observer and system. I (i) 229/230 This seems paradoxical, because the old dream of the independent reality must be abandoned. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Everett, H. | Wheeler Vs Everett, H. | John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 229 Many worlds interpretation: 1957 by Hugh Everett. There are now three "Many Worlds Theories". Basic thought: before any decision is made, the universe divides itself into as many copies of itself as are necessary to realize every possible choice. III 230 N.B.: the cat was in reality either dead or alive before opening the box. There was no overlay of states! It is impossible for inhabitants of different universes to communicate with each other. III 231 Many Worlds Interpretation/WheelerVsEverett: Weak point: the number of universes expands extremely quick. Advantage: it needs neither an intelligent observer nor a measuring device "outside the system" to collapse the wave function. John Gribbin: In Search of Schrödinger's Cat, Munich, Zurich 1991 VII 260 WheelerVsEverett: too much metaphysical luggage. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 |
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