Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | Frith | I 125 Behavior/learning/algorithm/Frith: there are also algorithms to learn what exactly needs to be done to get a reward. I 126 TD-Algorithm/machine/learning: (TD = temporal difference): this algorithm allows to determine the correct action sequence (also an actor-critic model). >Learning, >Models. Criticism: the critic comments on the change in value before and after the action (temporal difference). So a path is found that leads to the reward. >Before/after, >Trial-and-Error. Value/associative learning: the value has no exact match in the real world. Only in the model. >Association. I 127 Associative learning/Frith: associative learning constructs a world map in the brain. I 129 For example, the gripping opening of the hand opens up more for a cherry when an apple is nearby. Brain: the brain automatically prepares action programs, in relation to objects in the environment. I 130 Map/brain/Frith: there is only one "world map" in the brain, not a series of maps. The map itself has no memory. It is like looking at the world through a kaleidoscope. An incorrect prediction changes the pattern and replaces the old one. >Map-example. Cultural Relativism/VsFrith: one could argue that the mind is constantly adapting itself to a culture that is the work of many brains. >Cultural relativism. FrithVsVs: this fails to see the difference between conscious and unconscious processes. >Consciousness, >Unconscious. Consciousness/Virginia Woolf: e.g the novel "The Waves": here the consciousnesses are described in complete isolation from each other. But the reader will be familiar to everyone. I 224 Imitation/Frith: there is a compulsion to imitate other people. For example, students who are dealing with a "senior vocabulary" are slower. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Causality | Carnap | VI 10 Essence/Carnap: "Essence problems": For example, problems of identity, dualism of psychic and physical, intentionality, causality: all of them lead to metaphysics. VI 229 Causality/Carnap: only statements about "before/after" are possible. Science: only determination of conditions. A cause is no state. Causality: form: attribution of state variables (the temporal differential coefficients of a state variable). >Essence, >Knowledge, >Metaphysics, >Intentionality, >Dualism, >Attribution. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Self- Reference | Luhmann | Baraldi I 163f Self reference/Luhmann/GLU: there are systems that relate through every of their operations to themselves: Social, psychological, organic systems that can observe the reality only because of this self-contact. Self-reference is present when the operation of the observation is included in what is referred to. >Observation/operation/Luhmann. Self-reference is neither analytic nor characteristic of a transcendental subject: the subject of the system theory is neither the human nor the subject. >Analyticity, >Subject/Luhmann, >Systems theory. Self-reference is not a tautology. - It does not refer directly to itself - e.g. if self-reference refers to a process: there is the distinction before/after. >Distinctions. --- Reese-Schäfer II 163 Blind Spot/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the failure of observation in all situations in which action must be taken or decided by you. - Action for security is certainly necessary and possible, but not as scientifically secured action. - Here, the system theory has its limits. >Blind spot; cf. >Circle. --- AU Cass 4 Def self-reference/Luhmann: message: "What is in the system?". - Def external reference: information (past or external system states). Self-reference/external reference: hence there is the distinction between what a system can distinguish as the environment, and what an observer might see as environment. >Environment/Parsons, >System/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Structures | Luhmann | Baraldi I 184 Structures/Luhmann/GLU: unlike autopoiesis (sic): structures are permanent. - They serve the selection of relations. >Autopoiesis. Also, the selection of selections. - Structures do not consist of elements. - (Element: of systems: without duration). >Events/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 5 Structure/System Theory/LuhmannVsTradition: The structures only work at the moment and for the duration, when the system operates. Tradition: assumed, structures are the enduring, processes pass. Structures are expectations in relation to connectivity of operations. >Operation/Luhmann. If the structure concept defines expectations, the subject/object distinction is insignificant. Cf. >Subject/Object-Problem. --- AU Cas 5 Structure/Luhmann: a system can choose from many structures. - E.g. Language: is not limited to one sentence. - The operations of the system require structures. - Subsequently both are dependent on each other. >Language/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 14 Structure/tradition/Luhmann: earlier, structures were considered as something permanent. - Structuralism/Levi-Strauss: new: there will be a cognitive, analytical element added: structures are also knowledge conditions. Subject of knowledge can also be science. Not everything can be connected to everything. Structures are often defined through expectations, but it would be better if that works differently - but how? - Expectations are too subjective. Cf. >Subjectivity. --- AU Cas 14 Structure/Luhmann: structures should not be assumed as unchangeable. - It is not just about the distinction before/after, but about the determination about processes. How to distinguish structure and process? Structure: is only real in the moment of use. Reality: only the operations themselves. >Reality/Luhmann, >Operation/Luhmann. So the system theory of the distinction between structure/process is taken out. - Advantage: then systems are not composed of two elements (structure and event). >Event/Luhmann. Structure: clarifies how an operation connects to the other. AU Cass 14 Structure/Luhmann: arises from the mixed requirements of specification and generalization. >Generalization, >Specification. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 |
| Time | Thorne | I 543 Time/Quantum Mechanics/Thorne: quantum gravity: dissolves time and space in their uniqueness. - No "before/after". - The space is like foam. - There is no particular curvature, or topology. >Space curvature, >Quantum mechanics, >Space, >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, |
Thorne I Kip S. Thorne Gekrümmter Raum und verbogene Zeit München 1996 Thorne II Kip S. Thorne Christopher Nolan The Science of Interstellar New York 2014 |
| Universe | Esfeld | I 231 ~ Block Universe/Esfeld: existence is not relative to time/place: but the objective relations before/after are. Existence contains only events, not things. An object has spatial, but not temporal parts. An event has both spatial and temporal parts. Esfeld: only objects can be at rest/in motion. >Ontology, >Events, >Objects, >Motion, >Continuants, >Temporal identity, >Parts. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Vectors | Bigelow | I 65 Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: a vector explains the positions of the object, not vice versa. Problem: this seems to require the assumption that a body could have a velocity without taking several positions. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the connection between velocity and positions is created so that the vector explains the change of position, not because it is defined by the change. >Definition, >Definability, >Explanation. Motion/location/change/position/change/status/Bigelow/Pargetter: although both are logically independent of each other, they are connected by physical laws. >Motion, >Change. Explanation/Theory/Explanation Direction/Bigelow/Pargetter: The theory of flux changes the direction of the explanation. >Flux/Bigelow. I 66 Independence/Explanation/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: logical independence must not be pushed to the point where there is no relevant link between the entities. (Here properties of the 1st and 2nd level). >Independence, >Dependence. I 67 Independence/Movement/before/after/Pre-history/Determination/Ockhamists/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: at the top of a parabola (trajectory of a projectile), the body moves horizontally, but this is not independent of the before and after. Flux/Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: considers the movement at this point as independent. There is at least one logical independence. Velocity/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be completely independent of 2nd level properties: e.g. transmission of velocities by impact. (+...) I 68 Consistency/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: after that, it is not even absurd to attribute a velocity of 0 to a body that does not move noticeably. Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, it is not logically necessary that a vector is linked to attributes that change over time. Change of location/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: when we look at the sequence of positions in time, the Ockhamists do not imply instantaneous velocity (entails). >William of Ockham, >Time. Malebranche/Change/Movement/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Ockhamist): according to Malebranche, God creates the object anew at every point. This is not a causal process. >Malebranche. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Structuralism | Verschiedene Vs Structuralism | Luhmann, Kass.14 VsStructuralism: one had objected that structuralism cannot talk about structural changes. ParsonsVsVs: but this is quite possible, one only has to distinguish between structures of processes and structural changes of processes. Structure/Parsons: it does not make sense to construct the concept of structure as unchangeable. One can consider how long structures should be assumed to be constant. Then we can ask questions concerning dynamics, e.g. economy, world politics, etc. It is not only about the distinction before/after, but about findings about processes. |
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