Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code | Baudrillard | Blask I 23 Code/Baudrillard: the code has become an essential part of modern societies. >Code, >Reality, >Modernism, >Society. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Dependence | Simons | I 293 Dependency/Simons: dependency is always in relation to something, e.g. logical: proposition A cannot be true without proposition B being true, e.g. functional: gas pressure, volume or temperature are functional, e.g. ontological: this whiteness of this paper. >Propositions, >Truth. I 294 Def general function/logical form/Simons: a depends as F in respect to G of b iff a cannot be F without b being G. Easier: necessary: if a is an F, then b is a G. I 294 Ontological Dependency/Simons: ontological dependency exists between objects (unlike other dependencies). It is a must de re, e.g. like an essential part. >de re, >Essence, cf. >de dicto. I 296 Ontological Dependency/Simons: e.g. the largest satellite of Jupiter cannot exist if Jupiter does not exist. However: it is wrong to say that Ganymede could not exist without Jupiter. Solution: let us assume a scope. Against: the dependence Ganymede's of Jupiter is instead a conceptual dependence. It could not be described as a moon of Jupiter if Jupiter did not exist. Conceptual: e.g. there is no husband without a wife. I 296 Def weak, rigid dependency/Simons/(s): y is not necessary, but if x exists, then it is ((s) that is not superimposed by self-dependency.) I 297 Generically Dependent/generic function/Simons: e.g. humans cannot exist without carbon atoms but it does not matter which carbon atoms are part of the human. I 300 Def rigid dependency/Simons: e.g. a smile is not only dependent on one face, but from his/her face. Conceptual rigid dependence: e.g. the species: twin, fiancee, partner, riverside > Independence/Simons. I 302 Dependency/strongest form/Simons: the strongest form of dependency is that of an object that is an essential part of another. I 303 Def strong rigid dependency/Simons: strong rigid dependency excludes cases where objects have significant parts as cases of dependency. An object is dependent, if it requires the existence of something that is not part of it. E.g. a heartbeat is not part of the organism - similar to Husserl's foundation: if an "a" can only exist in a broader unit, which connects it with a Âμ. Def moment/Simons: if "b" consolidates "a" or vice versa, "a" is a moment of "b". I 305 Def accident/Simons: a moment which is always dependent on its foundation is an accident. I 306 Def substrate: the substrate is then the basis for an accident, e.g. at events: "is not part ..." or at continuants: "is never part...". Accident/Simons: e.g. a smile is an accident of the face, or e.g. a headache, or e.g. a thought is an accident of its bearer, e.g. the instantiation of a quality of an object is an accident of the object(!) that it qualifies ((s) so it is not accident of the property). E.g. relational accident: weddings, or e.g. football matches. I 309 Dependency/Simons: accident: an accident excludes, i.e. the dependency of predecessors. Moment: the moment is the one of necessary essences and essential parts. Human: a human could be an accident of the universe at the most. Vs: then the universe would be necessary, then it would be more a description than a name. Solution: the dependence of the human on the environment is generic and not rigid. Human: a human could be an accident at most, because of certain processes in his/her inner side. Substance: substance must not be, in this sense, "absolutely independent". Solution: everything from which the substance is modally and temporally, rigidly dependent, is a part of it, that means it is a weak self-contained unit. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Empiricism | Sellars | I XXI/XXII SellarsVsLogical empiricism: the special wit in his criticism is that the experiences of the protocol leading people, that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi-theoretical, postulated entities of an everyday world view. >Content/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Description/Sellars. I 54 Elementary word-world connections exist between "red" and red, physical objects and not between "red" and a presumable class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpirism). This does not mean that private feelings are not perhaps an essential part of the development of these associative connections. >Language community, >Language use, >Observation language, |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Essence | Simons | I 258 Essential/Simons: what exists, exists essentially. But it does not exist necessarily. Solution: assuming that e.g. whatever is a human, must be a human. Essential/Simons: essential means "relatively necessary". It is essential for Cicero that he exists. Necessary/Wiggins: necessary should distinguish these cases. >Necessity/Wiggins, >Necessity de re/Wiggins. I 261 Trivially essential/Simons: e.g. to be colored if red, e.g. to be self-identical, e.g. to exist, e.g. "to be like that 2 + 2 = 4" is trivially essential. Essential attributes: essential attributes are no "mere facts" ("brute facts"), but an object has them by virtue of the fact that it belongs to a certain type. It is not accidental for an object of a given type, that it has the characteristics which underlie the type. >Attributes, >Features/Frege. I 284 Normal/essential/middle course/Simons: "normal part of a normal thing of a type" is the middle course between simple and essential part. This is often forgotten by philosophers ((s) they take type as the fundamental concept but no formal theory). Normality: perhaps starting from wellformedness. Woltersdorff: e.g. music piece, performance. SimonsVs: this does not work because of transitivity of identity. >Transitivity, >Identity. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Chisholm | Simons I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: results from his commitment to mereological constancy - SimonsVsChisholm. >Mereology, >Parts. Chisholm: E.g. table stump + plate - a particular table can only be built from this stump and this plate. I 273 Superposition/Simons: superposition of the parts guarantees not the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum - which also leads to interrupted existence. ChisholmVsSimons: this interrupted exististence sees Chisholm as a problem. But he is only committed to the adoption of essential parts - e.g. not to glue instead of nails, etc. Simons thesis: there must be an essential part. Cf. >Essence. For the terminology of mereology see >Peter Simons. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Events | Lewis | V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Inequalities | Diamond | Acemoglu I 53 Inequalities/Diamond, Jared/Acemoglu/Robinson: Inequality in the modern world largely results from the uneven dissemination and adoption of technologies, and Diamond’s thesis does include important arguments about this. Geographical factors/Diamond, >Geographical factors/Acemoglu. For instance, he argues, following the historian William McNeill, that the east–west orientation of Eurasia enabled crops, animals, and innovations to spread from the Fertile Crescent into Western Europe, while the north–south orientation of the Americas accounts for why writing systems, which were created in Mexico, did not spread to the Andes or North America. AcemogluVsDiamond, Jared: Yet the orientation of continents cannot provide an explanation for today’s world inequality. >African countries/Acemoglu. Continental inequlities/AcemogluVsDiamond: It should also be clear that Diamond’s argument, which is about continental inequality, is not well equipped to explain variation within continents—an essential part of modern world inequality. For example, while the orientation of the Eurasian landmass might explain how England managed to benefit from the innovations of the Middle East without having to reinvent them, it doesn’t explain why the Industrial Revolution happened in England rather than, say, Moldova. In addition, as Diamond himself points out, China and India benefited greatly from very rich suites of animals and plants, and from the orientation of Eurasia. |
EconDiam I Peter A. Diamond National debt in a neoclassical growth mode 1965 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Minimalism | Logic Texts | Read III 49 Minimalism/Wright/Read: 1st Thesis: the claim that truth is not a substantial property, can not explain essential parts of the concept of truth, in particular, that it differs from justified assertibility. 2nd Thesis: truth goes beyond assertibility by being stable (once true, always true), and absolute (without degrees of justification). >Deflationism, >Assertibility, >Truth. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Modalities | Simons | I 253 Mereology/modal/modality/Simons: we need modality in the mereology. We also need a definition of "necessary part" and a modal definition of "sum" (because it is less intuitive than "organism"). Dependence: a) ontological dependence: an object cannot exist without another existing, b) functional dependence: functional dependence consists between characteristics of objects which form a whole. >Functional dependence, >Ontological dependence, >Dependence. I 264 Modal Part/Simons: e.g. a class of counterparts might be considered a whole with different modal components. >Counterparts. Modal Parts: modal parts are possible in various possible worlds. >Parts, >Cross world identity. I 268 Modality/metaphysics/metaphysical/nature/necessity/Simons: a given atom could not have other particles. They are essential parts (components). On the other hand: the given particles could have belonged to another atom. It is not essential for them to be part of this atom, i.e. to be "given". >Essential parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Necessity | Simons | I 269 Necessity of origin/organism/Kripke: (1972(1), 312ff, 1980(2), 110ff): thesis: an organism could not have descended from another cell of origin as it actually did (Simons pro). But the zygote is still no permanent essential part because it dies early. Phase-sortal/McGinn: e.g. "child" and "adult" are accordingly also zygotes. >Sortals. I 270 Solution/Simons: it is essential for the organism, that it follows from sexual reproduction and that it has its zygote as an initial spurious part. However, it is unclear whether the brain is an essential part (> Brain Transplant, see also Identity/Parfit, >Body/B. Williams). I 295 Necessary Existence/Simons: necessary existence is only possible with abstract objects: e.g. universals, numbers, etc. Problem: if something exists necessarily, everything else depends on it. >Existence. 1. Kripke, S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 2. Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Norms | Policy of the United States | Levitsky I 17 Norms/Policy of the United States/Levitsky/Ziblatt: The American separation of powers is supported by two basic norms that we take for granted: mutual respect, or in other words, agreement that competing parties regard each other as legitimate rivals, and restraint, that is, politicians should exercise their institutional prerogatives carefully and with tact. Levitsky I 18 The erosion of our democratic norms began in the 1980s and 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s. When Barack Obama became president, many Republicans in particular questioned the legitimacy of their Democratic Party rivals, and they had abandoned restraint in favor of a strategy of winning at all costs. Levitsky I 118 Constitution/USA/Levitsky/Ziblatt: If it was (...) not the constitution drafted in Philadelphia in 1787 that protected American democracy for so long, what was it? Levitsky I 119 In our view, the development of strong democratic norms is an essential part of this. All successful democracies are based on informal rules that are not laid down in the constitution, but are widely known and respected. In the case of American democracy, this is a decisive factor. Levitsky I 120 There are unwritten rules everywhere in American politics, from the functioning of the Senate and the College of Elected Representatives to the format of presidential press conferences (2). But two norms are particularly important for the functioning of a democracy: mutual respect and institutional restraint. Levitsky I 124 Institutional restraint: [The] norm decisive for the existence of democracies is what we call institutional restraint (3). Levitsky I 125 Where the norm of restraint is strong, politicians, even if they are legally allowed to do so, do not make full use of their institutional prerogatives because this would jeopardize the existing system (4). 1. See Gretchen Helmke/Steven Levitsky (Ed.), Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore 2006. 2. A classic representation of the norms or traditions of the US Senate is: Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1960. 3. 33Wir haben diesen Begriff von Alisha Holland übernommen; siehe Alisha Holland, »Forbearance«, in: American Political Science Review 110, Nr. 2 (Mai 2016), S. 232-246; dies., Forbearance as Redistribution. The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America, New York 2017; vgl. auch Eric Nelson, »Are We on the Verge of the Death Spiral That Produced the English Revolution of 1642–1649?«, in: History News Network, 14. Dezember 2014, http:// historynewsnetwork.org/article/157822 4. Whittington, »The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States«, S. 106. |
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| Purposes | Minsky | I 142 Purpose/means and ends/rationality/brain/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: How do we connect the things we have with the goals we want to achieve? The answer: We have many ways! Each use or purpose may suggest some corresponding way to split things up — and in each such view there will seem to be some most essential parts. These are the ones that, in such a view, appear to serve the goal directly; the rest will seem like secondary parts that only support the role of the main parts. >Description/Minsky. Even when we simply put something on a table, we're likely to employ several such descriptions at the same time — perhaps in different sections of the mind. The quality of our understanding depends upon how well we move between those different realms. In order to translate easily from one of them to another, we must discover systematic cross-realm correspondences. However, finding these is rare. Usually, the situation is like that we found for chairs and games: each description-element in one world corresponds to a hard-to- describe accumulation of structures in the other world. What is remarkable about the body-support concept is how often it leads to systematic cross-realm correspondences. >Creativity/Minsky. Our systematic cross-realm translations are the roots of fruitful metaphors; they enable us to understand things we've never seen before. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Reductionism | Avramides | I 96 Reductionism/Grice/Avramides: the real bone of contention between reductive and anti-reductive Griceans is the profound epistemic asymmetry - (that thoughts could be known without language). For symmetry/asymmetry: >Terminology/Avramides. Both, reductionism and anti-reductionism are agains superficial epistemic aymmetry: Def Superficial Epistemic Asymmetry/Radical Interpetation/Avramides: Thesis: that we can solve the problem of Radical interpretation by understanding the foreign language through firstly learning the beliefs and intentions ((s) without language, because the psychological concepts are more fundamental). >Avramides on Grice, >Thinking without language. I 96 DavidsonVsReductionism: of the semantic on the mental. - Without knowledge of the language beliefs cannot be verified. The method of radical interpetation (RI) fails: you cannot first establish foreign beliefs and intentions. >Radical interpretation. I 112 Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. I 127f Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: Thesis: the image of the reductionism of the objective mind is wrong. - It goes back to its distinction between superficial and deep epistemic asymmetry. I 130 Avramides Thesis: deep epistemic symmetry does not include ontological symmetry (despite Davidson). Mind/Avramides:The right (subjective) image of the mind requires the semantic and the psychological to be understood on the same level. >Meaning theory. I 128 Summary/Antireductionism/Avramides: is the right about how we can understand propositional attitudes - Reductionism: is right about what propositional attitudes are. I 166 AvramidesVsReductionism: overlooks the fact that we have to characterize behavior semantically at some point. Normal evidence is the only means to maintain the thesis that semantic and psychological concepts are on the same level. I 168 The dispute over reductionism is about epistemic, not ontological questions. >Epistemic/ontologic. I 166 Grice: Thesis: the psychological is an essential part of the semantic. Reductionism/Avramides: the reductionism denies that! Thinking without language: if we attribute it, the semantic and the psychological may not be very interdependent. Solution/AvramidesVsReductionism: behavior is observable even with speechless creatures. - This forms part of our concept of the psychological. >Animals, cf. >Animal language. I 167 Manifestation/Avramides: it would be wrong to say that it must be more complex if the attributed thoughts are more complex. More complex is rather a linguistic behavior. >Compositionality, >Complexity. The reductive Gricean accepts deep epistemic asymmetry - the antireductionist denies it. >Terminology/Avramides. VsReductionism: with that he has nothing more to do with interpretation and understanding. Graeser I 128 AvramidesVsReductionism/Graeser: reductionism disregards the intimate connection between the psychological and the semantic and ultimately does nothing to contribute to the clarification of the mind and the thoughts. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Reference | Allen | Perler/Wild I 334 Reference/Language/Allen: Thesis: Reference is older than other peculiarities of language. Colin Allen und Eric Saidel Die Evolution der Referenz in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005 Perler I 334 Reference/Language/Allen: Thesis: Reference is older than other language peculiarities. --- I 336 Reference/Animal/Language/Allen/Saidel: the representatives of the separation of humans and animals want to show that the alleged reference of animal signals are evaluated by criteria which are not applicable to the referential use of the human language. And precisely a criterion that even the homo javaniensis would fulfill: but that again is not fulfilled by modern human languages: stimulus specificity! N.B.: animal reference is to be confirmed by presence of the speaker, while for the human reference the absence is characteristic! --- I 337 I 338 If an implicit definition is necessary in language learning, does ontogenesis then repeat phylogenesis? Do animals have a block world language (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, PU)? And would that be a first step in the development of human language? --- I 339 Animal/Species/Reference/Allen/Saidel: E.g. Seyfarth, warning calls from long-tailed monkeys offspring must be confirmed (repeated) by adults so that they are taken seriously by others. --- I 341 Reference/Language/Animal/Allen/Saidel: to what extent can the reference be extended to absent objects? Three types: 1. mimetical reference: the signal looks very similar to the referent. Dawkins/cancer: essential part in animals: --- I 342 Try to use the muscle strength of others for your own goals. --- I 343 2. Substitutive reference: Signals act as substitutes for their referents. They trigger the same reaction as this, but with a different cognitive mechanism. Numerous in birds and mammals. Reference to absent things. --- I 344 This also works even if it is limited to a block world language. 3. Conceptual reference: occurs when signals can refer to external conditions without normally triggering reactions that the referents themselves would trigger. E.g. the description of a beautiful sunset is not informative, but presents the speaker as a romantic. --- I 345 Substitutive and conceptual reference require the ability to make an arbitrary connection. It is often not ecologically advisable to wire such a connection firmly. --- I 345 Reference/Allen/Saidel: Thesis: Reference to behavior is both phylogenetic and ontogenetically more fundamental than reference to objects. --- I 346 Movements are already observed by small children more attentively than static things. --- I 347 E.g. long-tailed monkey: here is a warning call "grunting of an animal, which goes on open terrain". It would be a mystery if this were limited to objects. There is no single object presented with it. --- I 348 E.g. long-tailed monkeys: Mistakes in warning calls typically occur when harmless birds are quickly rushing down from the sky. So move before object. |
Allen I Colin Allen Eric Saidel "The Evilution of Reference", in: The Evolution of Mind, C. Allen and D. Dellarosa Cummins (Eds.) Oxford 1998, pp. 183-203 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Symbolic Communication | Deacon | I 334 Symbolic communication/Deacon: there has never been a proto-language with simpler structures than e.g. the distinction between subject and predicate, which deals with symbols instead of pure indices at all. >Index/Deacon, >Symbol/Deacon. These forms were present from the very beginning, when symbolic communication was born. Deep structure: there are no characteristics for it so it that would be effective beyond language boundaries, such as sentence position, melody or specific words. >Deep structure, >N. Chomsky, >VsChomsky. It is therefore reasonable that Chomsky should withdraw from Darwinian explanation. I 335 Language/Brain/Deacon: the specific neuronal processes necessary to overcome the attention threshold depend on processes taking place in the prefrontal cortex. Here we have a common ground between individual brains and a point of attack for Baldwin's evolution. >Baldwin's Evolution, >Evolution/Deacon. I 353 Symbolic communication/evolution: symbolic communication has developed over 2 million years. It was not always the case that speaking is the essential part of everyday communication and the transmission of our language to children, as is the case today. >Communication, >Language development. I 354 Non-verbal communication may have been in competition with verbal communication for a long time. Cf. >Gestures, >Animals, >Animal language. I 362 Symbolic communication/gestures/articulation/language/Deacon: due to the untrained vocal abilities of early humans, early symbolic communication should not have been just a simpler language, but should differ from language in many ways. Some authors suspected that early language such as chains of words were without specific syntax or grammar. DeaconVs: paradoxically, the limitation of the vocal apparatus may have resulted in a greater complexity of earlier languages. >Syntax. I 363 A smaller repertoire of sound differences leads to longer chains. Such languages are then more prone to errors. In addition, the short-term memory is used to a greater extent. In order to avoid errors, an increased level of redundancy is likely to have been appropriate. >Redundancy. I 368 Language development: it is a common mistake to infer primitive language from the primitive use of tools of early peoples. It is also problematic to infer anything from the lack of evidence. I 370 While stone tools were similar in different regions of the world (their use was universal) the early symbolic communication of distant peoples will not have been similar to the same extent. I 372 Neanderthals had a fully developed modern brain from a neurological point of view. I 373 The main reason for the decline of former peoples were introduced diseases, not cultural inferiority. The rapid changes in the paleolithic age do not correspond to biological changes. >Extinction. I 378 Why has symbolic communication developed? It was useful for coordination in hunting, sharing knowledge about tool use and much more. But none of them can serve as an explanation, since it always requires a certain symbolic communication. The first beginnings were probably only a small part of social communication and not better developed than the communication of modern apes. Problem: Learning symbols requires much more indirect association than what is normally used for associations in other organisms than humans. These more indirect associations are not of any use at all at first, and are therefore inefficient and detrimental to survival. >Association. I 378-381 From an evolutionary point of view, the most important information is that which the female can obtain about the abilities of the male and which the male is able to deliver to the female. It must be possible to exclude erroneous information and distinguish information from other behaviours. I 382 Communication between males must be more complex when it comes to assessing the strengths of a rival without risking a direct battle. I 384 Human Communication/Deacon: Thesis: The development of more complex (symbolic) means of communication is probably designed to regulate the unavoidable conflict between sexual reproduction and social cooperation. I 385 A special characteristic of human versus animal communities is the long-term sexual bonding. Weddings establish a greater number of rights and obligations within a community. Marriage rules determine who can or cannot marry whom. Most communities are aware of an incest prohibition. Cf. >C. Lévi-Strauss. I 388 Characteristic for human communities is a relatively stable mating of parents and at the same time care for the rearing of offspring within a larger social association. The reason why this is rare in evolution is that such structures tend to undermine themselves. I 392 Coexistence in groups and simultaneous male brood care can only be maintained if access to reproduction is limited and unambiguous, which is the case only in carnivorous communities. Replacement for nursing care is only provided by relatives. A special feature is that we humans are particularly poorly equipped to steer social behaviour through smells. I 396 Females must have a guarantee that their offspring will be provided with meat by males. The males have to be sure that they only care for their own offspring. I 397 The problem of setting up a social structure that makes this possible can be solved by using symbols. I 401 In the context of marriage rules, reciprocity and altruism are at stake. It must be possible to represent past and possible future actions. Indexical communication is not enough. However, quite simple symbols are enough. >Altruism. Abstract reference: Reference to the absent was practiced and achieved through ritualization. I 403 Abstractness: a problem that is particularly difficult to symbolize is peace or its creation. This is due to the high cost of possible deception. >Deception, >Peace. I 405 Negation: to distinguish war and peace, negation or symbolic representation of negation is used. In addition, one needs generalization in order to understand peace as the absence of all conflicts. >Negation, >Generalization. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Symbolic Reference | Deacon | I 43 Symbolic Reference/Deacon: Thesis: Symbolic reference is reserved for the human species only, while many animals have complex non-symbolic reference. >Reference, >Symbols/Deacon, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning. Grammar: Grammatical rules and categories are symbolic rules and categories. Syntax: syntactical structures are only physical regularities if they are not regarded as symbolic operations that need to be decoded. >Syntax. Language theories must therefore first explain symbolic references. >Regularities. I 44 The fact that linguists have not paid much attention to the symbolic reference is explained by the fact that grammar and syntax can be explained by comparing languages. The correlations of speech processes and brain functions can also be explained without a symbolic reference. Language acquisition: can be explained largely without relation to symbolic reference. >Language Acquisition. Animal/human/language/Deacon: but theories that explain the differences between human and non-human communication cannot do without relation to symbolic references. This also applies to theories that compare human and animal minds. >Animals, >Animal language. I 82 Symbolic reference/Deacon: remains intact even if one stimulus is erased by another, e. g. if the coupling between a signal and a subsequent event is interrupted. An index-like association would not survive this correction. Learning symbols/animals: if one of several learned characters is erased, this has virtually no effect on the association with other characters. This is quite different in the case of words. >Learning, >Language Acquisition. Words: unlike symbols, words are related to all other words of a language. >Words, >Word meaning. I 83 Symbolic reference/Deacon: arises from combinatorial possibilities and impossibilities. This is the difference to the simple correlation of signals with stimuli. Cf. >Signals/Deacon, >Signal Language. I 88 Symbolic reference/Deacon: no single symbol defines its reference. >Reference. Reference arises from the hierarchical relationship between the two levels of the sign-like (index-like) reference: a) no interaction or correlation between the elements, neither at the level of the objects nor at the level of the signs, merely association of sign and object. b) no interaction (correlation) on the level of the objects - but on that of the signs (meaningful patterns) >Meaning, >Meaningless, >Sense. Symbol: It is only at the third level that symbolic representation takes place: here there is interaction (or the distinction of meaningful and pointless patterns) on both levels: that of the objects and that of the signs. >Symbolic Representation. New: this makes logical and categorical generalization possible, which is not possible with the generalization of stimuli (stimulus generalization). Animal experiments: (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978; 1980 and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986): showed with monkeys that new symbols were classified relatively quickly in an already established scheme with different categories of meaning. In this context, an understanding of the functions of the relations between the signs obviously played a role. The attention of the animals was not only focused on the objects, but also on the signs and their relationship to each other. Categories: the ability to categorize and recognize logical relationships is an essential part of learning symbolic reference. >Categorization, >Classification. I 89 Symbolic learning: after learning the difference between symbols for edible and non-edible objects, the animals learned to sort the objects into different containers. Later on, they learned something new: they learned how to assign symbols for the respective objects to symbols for the respective containers. In doing so, they showed that they were able to make a symbolic generalization. >Understanding, >Animal/Deacon. I 322 Symbolic Reference/Brain/Deacon: Thesis: The emergence of the symbolic reference in our distant ancestors fundamentally changed the way natural selection processes changed the human brain since then. Ultimately, the use of language changed something that was reflected in the anatomy and structure of our brain. One could say, "The Word became flesh". >coevolution of language and brain. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Welfare Economics | Neoclassical Economics | 269ffWelfare Economics/Neoclassics: Welfare Economics is an essential part of the neoclassical paradigm. It makes use of methodological individualism and pursues an approach of marginal utility. It is orientated utilitarian, i.e. that the respective benefit estimation of the individuals is taken into account. (Bentham's welfare function (1)). W = W(y1, y2, ..., yn) Methodical Problem: the individual benefit estimates are in turn aggregated to a social welfare value. This cannot be founded on an individualistic basis. Mause I 270 Problem: this form of redistribution can lead to injustice if the individual pecuniary situation of individuals is not taken into account. Solution: one has to go back one step and use the general functional form of a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function. (2)(3) Welfare maximum: one condition for its achievement is Pareto efficiency. Def Pareto efficiency: exists when no member of society can be better off without putting another member worse. If this condition is not met, efficiency reserves must still be used. Another condition for an optimal fiscal policy: there must be no unused potential for exchange profits, i.e. that the individual goods are allocated to the consumers. Problem: there are theoretically infinitely many allocations that are Pareto efficient, but only one maximizes social welfare. Def First theorem of welfare economics: any market equilibrium produces Pareto efficiency during full competition and absence of external effects. Def Second theorem of welfare economics: each of these market equilibria can be achieved through an appropriate distribution of resources in the initial situation without loss of efficiency. (4) 1. Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate public economics, Cambridge, MA, 2013. 2. Bergson, Abram. 1938. A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 52 (7), 1938, S. 314– 344. 3. Paul A. Samuelson, The foundations of economic analysis. Cambridge, MA 1947. 4. Nicola Acocella, The foundations of economic policy: Values and techniques. Cambridge 1998 S. 72-77. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Gadamer, G. | Block Vs Gadamer, G. | Avra I 149 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/BlockVsLewis: no matter how functionalism characterizes input and output, it leads into the dilemma of being either chauvinistic or liberal. ((s) liberal: attributing mind to too many systems (e.g. vending machines)/chauvinistic: too few: E.g.: deny animals mind). I 150 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/VsLewis any physical characterization of inputs and outputs is inevitably chauvinist or liberal: E.g. assuming you were seriously injured and your only way to communicate with the outside world is through electroencephalogram patterns. If you find something exciting, it produces a pattern that the others interpret as a point, if it is a bit boring, a line. Now let us imagine, on the other hand, others communicate with you by creating electronic activity that leaves long or short afterimages in you. In this case, we could say that the brain itself has become a part of the inputs and outputs! (at the top we had determined variable realization as an essential progress, however). But: Block: if this point (of variable implementation) is correct VsMaterialism, it also applies to inputs and outputs, because the physical realization itself may be an essential part of the inputs and outputs. ((s) input output devices: receptors?). I.e. there is no physical characterization which refers on inputs and output of all and only mental systems. (Block 1980b, p.295). Conclusion/Block: any physical characterization of Inputs/Outputs is either chauvinistic or liberal. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Goodman, N. | Simons Vs Goodman, N. | I 108 Sum/extensional mereology/CEM/Simons: CEM, or extensional mereology, is based on a general existence of sums. This has found the most critics, including Rescher and Chisholm. ChisholmVsSum: it seems that it does not belong to the concept of part intrinsically or analytically, that there must be a sum that should otherwise contain all of these individuals and nothing else. I 109 Part: but somebody who refuses the sum-axioms does not refuse Lesniewski’s and Goodmans’ and others concept of "part". Individual: instead of it there is disagreement about the concept "individual". Individual/Goodman: an individual has a very technical sense for him: they must not be connected or causally connected as everyday things. They do not have to be "medium size dry". Any accumulation of individuals may be (subject to paradoxes) combined into an abstract quantity. Individual/Goodman: an individual is analogous to such abstract quantities and each cluster (collection) of individuals can be grouped to a sum-individual (here, however, without the threat of paradoxes!). The resulting thing does not have to be anything that can be found in the everyday world. SimonsVsGoodman: but that is only so far a good analogy as the existence of any desired composition is acceptable. We must distinguish: a) the existence of specific (not abstract) pluralities can be claimed, but not: b) the one of abstract pluralities which is just a mere reflection of the existence of a plural term, therefore merely a facon de parler. Goodman's sum-individuals seem merely correspond to the need for a reference for some arbitrary expressions. I 110 Sum/Goodman/Simons: Goodman could indicate that arbitrary sum individuals obey the extensional theory. They exist in which the identity in the equality of parts exists. Identity/SimonsVsGoodman: this general condition of the equality of all parts is itself questionable (see below). Sum/mereology/Simons: so far no one has been able to show that the acceptance of sums leads to contradictions (as Russell has shown it for certain sets). ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): stronger theories tend to lead to contradictions.) Simons: but even the strongest extensional mereology does not lead to contradictions. Theory/solution/Simons: not the theory is suspicious but its non-critical application to the world. Part relation/Simons: part relations may be different in different areas (for example, mathematics). One must not force them to a common denominator. Sum/Simons: what damage should they cause that does not already exist in the ontological assumption of corresponding "pluralisms"? I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: suppose we looked at any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then it comes to the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. I 284 "Normal part"/mereology/Simons: philosophers often forget that there is a middle way between a simple part and an essential part: that something is a "normal part of a normal kind". There is no formal theory of "normal mereology". Here are some informal remarks: Normality/Simons: one could start from the idea of a well-shaped thing of a kind. Normality/Aristotle: Aristotle called an object mutilated when it is connected but a prominent part is missing. Shapeliness/music/Nicholas WolterstorffVsGoodman/Simons: (Wolterstorff 1980, 56): he applied the idea of a normal or shapely thing of a kind to music pieces: it is non-well-formed if one or more of the normal parts are missing or are in the wrong place. Thus, the term is a little wider than Aristotle defined it. It allows us to say that a performance with an incorrect note is still a performance of the same piece. GoodmanVsWolterstorff: (Goodman 1969, 186f): we must not allow this because of the transitivity of identity: if a performance with a wrong note is identical, then at the end all pieces identical. I 285 Metaphysics/Goodman/Simons: metaphysics represents here a hard metaphysical line and adheres to bivalence and strict identity conditions. SimonsVsGoodman: the price for it is a distance from the everyday language. Solution/Simons: musical performance has no strict identity conditions. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 186 SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. --- Simons I 319 Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything. Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads). Solution/Simons: actually the two are already distinguished in the concept of dependence: Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7"). Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence (notation "7"). This has severe consequences: Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity. Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements? If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals: Whole/Leibniz: the whole ceases to exist if a part is lost. Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts. Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him, "always" means "real part". Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independent. That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (or first?) member. Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this: (1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts) (2) every part is essential (3) therefore each composite depends on its parts (4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts (5) but each chain of dependencies is founded (6) therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts (7) therefore, there are simple monads, atoms. SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. VsMereological Essentialism: 2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it? Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Pragmatism | Geach Vs Pragmatism | I 431 Geach: the performative analyses of the use of "good" have run aground: because, for example, questions and commands cannot be embedded as premisses in well-formed conditionals. Brandom I 432 VsPragmatism: if the essential part of calling something good consisted in an action, and not saying something, it could not reasonably be said, for example, "If this is good, then you should do it." That it is possible shows that "good" has a descriptive content which survives the elimination of the force when embedded. VsPragmatism: it cannot distinguish the two meanings of truth assertions: freestanding and embedded. Otherwise he would have to conclude: someone who is set to "if it is true that p, then it is true that p", is then also set to "if I assert that p, then it is true that p". A variant of the naturalistic fallacy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Theoretical Terms | Fraassen, B. van | I 81 Everyday language / theoretical terms / Fraassen:theoretical terms are an essential part of our mother tongue. They can not be re-translated into the language of our grandparents. E.g. microwave or VHF receiver. (Fraassen per). |
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| Psychology | Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 166 Grice: the Psychology is an essential part of the semantic. - Reductionism/Avramides: reductionism denies that. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Origin | Kripke, S.A. | Simons I 269 Necessity of origin / organism / Kripke: (1972, 312ff, 1980, 110ff): an organism could not have stemmed from another cell of origin than it actually did. Simons: assume we accepted that: do we then have substantial parts? Certainly not permanent essential parts, because the zygote (cell of origin of the organism) dies early in the development. When it divides. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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