Disputed term/author/ism  Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Answers  Hintikka  II 143 Uniqueness condition/Wquestions/response/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a whoquestion (ambiguous, see above) is that (8) must imply (7): (6) Who is the man over there? (7) I know who the man is over there. E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook. (8) I know that the man there is Sir Norman Brook. Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG). II 144 Problem: we need an additional premise. E.g.: (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x). (Nonmirrored quantifier, perceptually) "I know who Norman Brook is." II 217 Answer/Hintikka: what counts as a conclusive answer? E.g. suppose someone responds "d". This is only conclusive if it provides the desired information, i.e. it makes it possible to tell the other truthfully: (5) I know that d has killed Ackroyd. Definition conclusive/conclusive answer/Hintikka: an answer is conclusive iff. (5) implies (4), for example: (5) I know that d has killed Ackroyd. (4) (Ex) I know that (x killed Ackroyd). Problem: normally the implication is valid, but it can be because "d" (on different occasions) does not refer to the same person. Knowledge/logical form: my knowledge that one or the other killed Ackroyd means that I have enough information... II 218 ... to exclude worlds (event developments), where one or the other (!) did not kill Ackroyd. Additional premises: I still need the information that one and the same person is the murderer in all my knowledge worlds. That is, that d takes out the same individual in all the worlds. That is, that there is an individual x such that in all these worlds d = x. (6) (Ex) I know that (d = x). This only provides a conclusive answer. Short: (7) I know who is d. N.B.: this criterion can be generalized. I 219 Question/answer/Hintikka: problems that have not been solved yet: (i) In addition to searching for a particular piece of information, the question implies restrictions on possible answers. (ii) The problem of logical omniscience remains. (iii) (1) can be expressed in other words: (8) (x) (x killed Ackroyd > (Ez) (z = x & I know that (z killed Ackroyd) ((s) universal quantification!) Everyday translation: i.e. the speaker does not only want to be aware of the identity of exactly one person who killed Ackroyd, but of all persons who ((s) killed Ackroyd). (iv) What are the conditions in the case of complex questions? II 220 (V) There are good answers that do not meet the criterion of coherence. How can partial information be defined which is provided in such cases? (vi) Representations such as (4) and (8) require that quantifiers and epistemic operators (e.g. "I know that") are transitive from each other so that they can be put into a linear order. Can this fail? II 221 Menon's Mystery/Menon/Platon/Socrates/Hintikka: II 222 Problem: it is a problem that a question can only be answered if the questioner already knows the answer. Solution/Hintikka: the "already" is deceptive: it is part of the answer to provide the accompanying information, so that the questioner can say afterwards truthfully, (13) (Ex) I know that (= x) Answer/Hintikka: a Wquestion has two functions: A) to answer the question and B) to provide supplementary information showing that the reply itself is conclusive. N.B.: i.e. that the questioner knows what the answer expression refers to after the answer has been given. II 223 Questions/answers/Hintikka: thesis: the semantics of questions and answers is fundamentally different from the semantics for (normal) isolated sentences. II 228 Additional construction/individuals/introduction/Menon/Hintikka: the Menon Dialogue shows how new individuals (or constructions) are introduced into the discourse. Here, e.g. extension of a smaller square to a double the size. >Questions, cf. >Commands. 
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 
Arbitrariness  Field  I 24 Identity/Identification/Field: in many areas, there is the problem of the continuous arbitrariness of identifications.  In mathematics, however, it is stronger than with physical objects. I 181 Solution: Intensity relations between pairs or triples, etc. of points. Advantage: that avoids attributing intensities to points and thus an arbitrary choice of a numerical scale for intensities. III 32 Addition/Multiplication: not possible in Hilbert's geometry.  (Only with arbitrary zero and arbitrary 1) Solution: intervals instead of points. II 310 NonClassical Degrees of Belief/Uncertainty/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary is a good reason to not assume classical degrees of belief.  (Moderate nonclassical logic: That some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded third party). III 31 Figure/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line.  That would be too arbitrary ("what line?").  What should be zero  what is supposed to be 1? III 32 f Hilbert/Geometry/Axioms/Field: multiplication of intervals: not possible, because for that we would need an arbitrary "standard interval". Solution: Comparing products of intervals. Generalization/Field: is then possible on products of spacetime intervals with scalar intervals. ((s) E.g. temperature difference, pressure difference). Field: therefore, spacetime points must not be regarded as real numbers. III 48 FieldVsTensor: is arbitrarily chosen. Solution/Field: simultaneity. III 65 Def Equally Divided Region/Equally Split/Evenly Divided Evenly/Equidistance/Field: (all distances within the region equal: R: is a spacetime region all of whose points lie on a single line, and that for each point x of R the strict stbetween (between in relation to spacetime) two points of R lies, there are points y and z of R, such that a) is exactly one point of R strictly stbetween y and z, and that is x, and b) xy PCong xz (Cong = congruent). ((s) This avoids any arbitrary (length) units  E.g. "fewer" points in the corresponding interval or "the same number", but not between temperature and space units. Field: But definitely in mixed products are possible.Then: "the mixed product... is smaller than the mixed product..." Equidistance in each separate region: scalar/spatiotemporal. III 79 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Scales Types/Scalar/Mass Density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which, due to its logarithmic structure, is "less arbitrary" than the scale for the gravitational potential. >Objectivity, >Logarithm. Logarithmic structures are less arbitrary. Mass density: needs more fundamental concepts than other scalar fields. Scalar field: E.g. height. >Field theory. 
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
Axioms  Hilbert  Berka I 294 Definition/Axiom/Hilbert: the established axioms are at the same time the definitions of the elementary concepts whose relations they regulate. ((s) Hilbert speaks of relationships, not of the use of concepts). >Definitions, >Definability, >Basic concepts. Independence/Axiom/Hilbert: the question is whether certain statements of individual axioms are mutually dependent, and whether the axioms do not contain common components which must be removed so that the axioms are independent of each other^{(1)}. >Independence. 1. D. Hilbert: Mathematische Probleme, in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935), Vol. III, pp. 290329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299301).  Thiel I 262 We consider the first three axioms of Hilbert: 1. There are exactly two straight lines at each of two distinct points P, Q, which indicate^{(2)} with P and Q. 2. For every line g and to any point P, which does not indicate with it, there is exactly one line that is indicated with P, but with no point of g. 3. There are three points which do not indicate with one and the same straight line. In Hilbert's original text, instead of points one speaks of "objects of the first kind" instead of straight lines of "objects of the second kind" and instead of the incidence of "basic relation". Thus, the first axiom is now: For each of two different objects of the first kind, there is precisely one object of the second kind, which is in a basic relation with the first two. Thiel I 263 If the axioms are transformed quantifierlogically, then only the schematic sign "π" (for the basic relation) is free for substitutions, the others are bound by quantifiers, and can no longer be replaced by individual names of points or lines. >Quantification, >Quantifiers. They are thus "forms of statements" with "π" as an empty space. >Propositional functions. They are not statements like those before Hilbert's axioms, whose truth or falsehood is fixed by the meanings of their constituents. >Truth values. In the Hilbert axiom concept (usually used today), axioms are forms of statements or propositional schemata, the components of which must be given a meaning only by interpretation by specifying the variability domains and the basic relation. The fact that this can happen in various ways, shows that the axioms cannot determine the meaning of their components (not their characteristics, as Hilbert sometimes says) themselves by their cooperation in an axiom system. Thiel I 264 Multiple interpretations are possible: e.g. points lying on a straight line, e.g. the occurrence of characters in character strings, e.g. numbers. Thiel I 265 All three interpretations are true statements. The formed triples of education regulations are models of our axiom system. The first is an infinite, the two other finite models. >Models, >Infinity. Thiel I 266 The axioms can be combined by conjunction to form an axiom system. >Conjunction. Through the relationships, the objects lying in the subject areas are interwoven with each other in the manner determined by the combined axioms. The regions V .. are thereby "structured" (concrete and abstract structures). >Domains, >Structures (Mathematics). One and the same structure can be described by different axiom systems. Not only are logically equivalent axiom systems used, but also those whose basic concepts and relations differ, but which can be defined on the basis of two systems of explicit definitions. Thiel I 267 Already the two original axiom systems are equivalent without the assumption of reciprocal definitions, i.e. they are logically equivalent. This equivalence relation allows an abstraction step to the fine structures. In the previous sense the same structures, are now differentiated: the axiom systems describing them are not immediately logically equivalent, but their concepts prove to be mutually definable. For example, "vector space" "group" and "body" are designations not for fine structures, but for general abstract structures. However, we cannot say now that an axiom system makes a structure unambiguous. A structure has several structures, not anymore "the" structure. Thiel I 268 E.g. body: the structure Q has a body structure described by axioms in terms of addition and multiplication. E.g. group: the previous statement also implies that Q is also e.g. a group with respect to the addition. Because the group axioms for addition form part of the body axioms. Modern mathematics is more interested in the statements about structures than in their carriers. From this point of view, structures which are of the same structure are completely equivalent. >Indistinguishability. Thiel: in algebra it is probably the most common to talk of structures. Here, there is often a single set of carriers with several links, which can be regarded as a relation. Thiel I 269 E.g. relation: sum formation: x + y = z relation: s (x, y, z). In addition to link structures, the subject areas often still carry order structures or topological structures. Thiel I 270 Bourbaki speaks of a reordering of the total area of mathematics according to "mother structures". In modern mathematics, abstractions, especially structures, are understood as equivalence classes and thus as sets. >N. Bourbaki, >Equivalence classes. 2. Indicate = belong together, i.e. intersect, pass through the point, lie on it. 
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 
CarnapSentence  Schurz  I 214 Carnapsentence/CS/C (T)/Schurz: (Carnap 1963^{(1)}, 965) had the idea to supplement the Ramseysentence by the following analytic theorem: ((s) elsewhere: "Carnap conditional"): C(T): R(T) > T Everyday language/(s): the Carnapsentence states: if the Ramseysentence is true (i.e. if the theoretical entities exist), the theory follows from it. Carnapsentence/(s): the meaning characterization of the theoretical terms that C(T) provides says: the ntuple of TT (τ1,...τn) I 215 denotes an ntuple (X1,...Xn) of entities satisfying the theoretical assertion T(X1,...Xn), provided there is such an ntuple of entities. Theoretical Terms/meaning/Theory/Carnap/Schurz: This brings the thesis that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the theory itself to its logical concept. Ramseysentence/Carnapsentence/Schurz: The conjunction of the two is Lequivalent with the theory itself. I.e. II R(T) u C(T) <> T Carnapsentence/Schurz: C(T) Limplies no nontautological empirical theorem! I.e. E(C(T)) = E(0). Therefore the Carnap theorem is analytic. Analytic/Synthetic/Carnap/Schurz: Thus Carnap has divided global theories into a synthetic part (Ramseysentence) and an analytic part (Carnapsentence). But this is still not possible with respect to the individual axioms and theorems. >Ramseysentence. Carnapsentence: does not provide a meaning characterization for individual Theoretical terms, but only one for all of them together. And it provides only a partial meaning characterization of Theoretical terms. Definition/Theoretical terms/Carnapsentence/Schurz: For a full meaning characterization in the sense of an explicit definition, the extension of the Definiendum in all Possible Worlds would have to be uniquely determined by the extension of the Definiens Terms. However, the Carnap Theorem fixes the extension only in those Possible Worlds in which there is exactly one ntuple of entities (X1,...Xn) satisfying T(X1,...Xn). If there are more than one, the reference is ambiguous, if there is no such ntuple at all, the Theoretical terms are denotational. Then the theory is wrong. >Theoretical terms. 1. Carnap, R. (1963) "Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories". In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle, pp. 958965. 
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 
de dicto  Logic Texts  Read III 127 Initial problem: Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion. Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina." "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven". Re III 128 Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example. Re III 129 QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements. But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism. >Essentialism. Re III 130 Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote  "7" and "9" is now embedded  so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle  statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true "  the scope is limited. >de re. 
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II HoyningenHuene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973  German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995  German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 
Decision Theory  Lewis  V 307f Decision Theory/DT/Lewis: partition/division)/Lewis: is a set of propositions, of which exactly one applies in each world (or each Xworld)  provide the most detailed specification of the present actions (options) of the actor. Decision theory: says which options are rational. >Proposition/Lewis. Rational choice: delivers the greatest benefit expected. Maximum benefit: if V(A) is not surpassed by any V(A™). Problem: how do you find out that A applies. That one is living in the world A (= Proposition)?. Important argument: it is in your power, to make the news yourself. That is, you find out what they like best by producing it. V 309f NonCausal Decision Theory/Newcomb’s Paradox/NP/LewisVs: favors the rejection of small goods as rational  although this later choice does nothing to change the previous state, which favors the evil. Newcomb's Paradox: requires a causal decision theory. >Newcomb's paradox. V 315 Noncausal decision theory: only works, because the beliefs of the actor allow it to function  ... + ... Partition of propositions (sets of possible worlds), expected benefits. >Propositional Attitudes.  Schwarz I 66 Decisionmaking procedure/Lewis: the >modal realism ((s) maintaining the existence of possible worlds) is not a decisionmaking procedure to answer questions about possible worlds. Decisionmaking procedure/Schwarz: E.g. is not used by behaviorists either: he simply says that statements about mental properties are reducible to statements about dispositions. >Behaviorism, >Disposition. E.g. mathematical Platonism: does not need decisionmaking procedure for arithmetics. >Platonism. 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 335 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 
Derivability  Hilbert  Thiel I 97 Derivability/Hilbert/Thiel: the methods used for the proof of the nonderivability of a formula from others by means of given derivation rules have been given for the first time by Bernays in the Hilbert school. They were first published by Bernays in his postdoctoral thesis on the proof of the independence of axiom systems of classical propositional logic. Neither of these axioms is to be derived from the others. Classic: ~~p > p effective: p > ~~p I 102 Axiomatic derivations of logical sentences were unrivaled up to the twenties in this form, then alternative procedure calculus of the "natural concluding" were developed, whose rule usually bring exactly one logical symbol into a conclusion chain or eliminate. The actual kind of mathematical approach is closer than the axiomatic approach. >Natural deduction, >G. Gentzen, >Derivation, >Axioms, >Axiom systems, >Calculus, >Logic. 
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 
Descriptions  Cresswell  I 184 Description/Quantification/Cresswell: definite and indefinite descriptions are not quantifiers  the bond is in the depth structure. >Quantifiers, Deep structure, E.g. if you offer each boy a job, some boy will refuse it  "it" signals no variable bound by "a job", however quantification in depth. >Quantification. II 47f Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: according to Russell e.g. (24) BELIEVE (a, x) u x e . β . L) is possible, because "The planet which is called "Phosphorus"" can occur outside the range of the modal operator. >Scope, >Modal operator, >Names, >Morning star/Evening star, >Theory of descriptions/Russell. II 48 N.B: this allows us to talk about the thing that is actually called "Phosphorus" and ask what happens when it is not called like this. ((s) Out of reach of the modal operator: allows unambiguous reference to the thing). II 140 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a particular description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier, e.g. "Someone" problem: E.g. "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". >Someone/Geach. Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts  A) (narrow range) "the person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent with "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is in a sense necessarily true. B) (wide range) it is true that the person next door could also have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). >Narrow/wide, >Exactly one, >Necessity, >Contingency. II 149 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Kripke/Cresswell: Kripke per Russell with regard to descriptions  not only with regard to names. >Descriptions/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. 
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 
Descriptions  Kripke  I 78 ff You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation. I 94 Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper" E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counterexample: "Volcano". I 94f It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. I 93ff Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. I 112f Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length  description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master. Cf. >Standard meter. I 115 Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. >Identity/Kripke. I 117 QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery  (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description  the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. I 25/26 Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning. I 36 Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water). Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman)  it is a hidden proper name.  III 353 Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6))  this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. III 369 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y)  is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination. >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori. 
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 
Descriptions  Prior  I 124 Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the soandso φs" b) "X thinks that the soandso φs" in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist  in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. >Truth value, >Nonexistence, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 148 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φs". >Names, >Singular Terms. Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φs" b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φs, ψs." >Predication, >"Exactly one". a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." Prior: thie is a solution for the nonexisting. Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the onlything thatφs and not ψs.". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..". Markings: useful: "the φre does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. I 152 ChampagneExample/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there".  If it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman  attribution does not require proper identification  it is only required that it is "the only ...". >Descriptions/Russell. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Element Relation  Lesniewski  Prior I 163 Epsilon/Classes/Individual/LesniewskiVsRussell/Prior: "ε" constant for the relation between classes  Ex "a ε b": "The a is b" or "There is exactly one a and every a is b". In Russell there are of course such forms, but the form "x ε a" has not this meaning! >Principia Mathematica, >"Exactly one". L: "a = b" : "the a is the b" this does not correspond to the Def class identity/Russell: "the a "s coincide with the b "s". >Coextension, >Identity. But identity in Lesniewski is also not quite the same as individual identity in Russell. >Identity/Russell. Prior I 165ff Epsilon/Lesniewski/Prior: also higherlevel: "f ε g": e.g. "the unit classofclassesof f is contained in the classofclasses g". >Classes, >Sets, >Set theory, >Inclusion. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Empty Set  Prior  I 63 ~ Empty set/Prior: creates only the logical construction identity between unicorns and Pegasi.  A logical structure is not any sort of entity. ((s) There is only one empty set, so it is unlike anything.  And it makes unicorns and Pegasi not comparable because it has no elements). >Relations, >Objects, >Abstract objects, >Abstractness, >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 63ff Empty set/Prior: solution: to say that there is exactly one null class, is simply: for a φ: nothing φs and for each φ and ψ, nothing φs and nothing ψs. Then whatever ψs,φs and whatever ψs, φs  related: relationinextension. Relation in Extension/Prior: two digit predicates can be associated in the same way with Relation in Extension. E.g. both: being father and mother of is not the same as both: being greater than and less than. But the corresponding "relationsinextension" are the same. Because you can say that for an x and a y, if x is both father and mother of y then x is also bigger and smaller than y and vice versa, because both implications are just empty. >Implication. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Equality  Meixner  I 170 Def Equinumerousness/Frege/Meixner: f is a property that is equinumerous with the property g, =Def for at least one twodigit relation R applies: 1) Every entity that has f is in the relation R with exactly one entity that has g 2) If entities that have f are different, so are entities with g 3) inverse of 1: every entity that has g. Number: can then be defined noncircularly: x is a natural number =Def x is a finite number property. Number/Meixner: conceived as a property they are typeless functions. >Numbers, >Definitions, >Definability, >Relations. 
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 
Events  Lewis  V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed  or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions.  Hence we can use propositions here  e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description  in a set of possible worlds  But the proposition is not identical to the event  Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions  which almost never exist  E.g. "Death of Socrates" is nonrigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens  Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do  If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events  but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions  counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions  the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events.  Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions.  The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals.  (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions  more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence  is no quick entity  name ultimately uninteresting  probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties  a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region  always contingent  no event occurs in every possible world  an event happens in exactly one (whole) region  E.g. scattered region: sports championships.  E.g. annual event: not an event  an event does not repeat itself  and does not happen in different spacetime regions.  The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens  to each event corresponds a property of regions  such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens  Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (spacetime region)  E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time  there are hardly any conditions for eventness  maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds  similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another.  E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a subregion that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts.  E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect.  They are not causally dependent  nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La"  but not of "Larr" (overlapping).  The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles  Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect  partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine  Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs  in simple cases yes. V 261 Nonevent/Causal story/Lewis: Nonevents cannot be determined as something isolated  they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a nonevent! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis. 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 335 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 
Existence  Tugendhat  II 33ff Existence: "There are examples"/Quine = statement about our whole world.  Tugendhat: Ex "There are lions", "The devil does not exist" are not statements about lions and devils, but about the world. >Existence/Quine. I 106 Existence: The sentence "The devil exists" has in reality the form: "There is one and only one object which is devilish". >Existence statements, >"Exactly one". Negation: If I say: "There is no object which is devilish", I have no consciousness of a nonexistent object. >Nonexistence, >Negation. This is true for all objects in space and time, but not for the space and time places themselves. One can say "think that the highway does not pass 200 meters from here", but one cannot say "think that there is no place 200 meters from here". >Space, >Spacetime. 
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 
Existence Statements  Wittgenstein  Hintikka I 72 Wittgenstein goes further than Frege: individual existence is inexpressible, only by existential quantifier (higherorder predicate)  but possible situations are considered possible (Tractatus). >Possibility, >Levels. I 126 Disjunction/disjunctive/existence/existence theorem/expressions/inexpressibility/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since existence of a single thing (particular, object) is not expressible: disjunction plus existential quantifier for types. >Existential quantification, >Quantification.  Tetens VII 137 The Present King of France/Russell/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: solution: as an existence sentence it is not meaningless:  "there is exactly one object x, x is the current King ...."  then the sentence is just wrong  error: to interpret it as a predication:  logical form: Fa  in this case the object would have to exist, so that the sentence can make sense. >Sense, >Senseless, >Nonexistence. 
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 193032, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 193035 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch  Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “LogischPhilosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logicophilosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus  Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 
Functions  Quine  V 111 Judgment Function/Quine: instead of multivalent logic: if e.g. "It is a mouse" nor "It is a squirrel" is neither alleged, the conjunction is rejected. But: e.g. "It is mouse/"It is in the kitchen": here the conjunction will be left open if none of the parts is claimed or denied. Cf. >Multivalued logic. X 17ff Function/Quine: can be interpreted as relations. E.g. the "square of" can be explained as the relation {xy: x = y²} between square and root. But not every relation is a function  it is crucial that we can speak of the R of x if there is one at all: "the square of n". Def "Func R": stands for "R I ^R ‹ I" or "∀x∀y∀z[(xRz ∩ yRz)> x = y]" (identity). This means that no two things are in relation R to the same thing. Nonfunction: even if R is a nonfunction, it is convenient to say that exactly one thing is in relation R to a thing x. x is then the argument of R. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Identification  Geach  I 139f Identification/Reference object/Intentionality/Geach: Problem: E.g.: "Someone made a derogatory remark about an unnamed person. Mrs. Supanich claims to be that person." E.g. "Ralph is the person x so that it was the will of the testator that x should inherit his business." Def Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if any name can be used ("A rose, whatever its name may be, would smell lovely.") Def nonShakespearian context/Geach: is given if not every name can be used because of opacity. E.g. inheritance example: Shakespearian. E.g. "Ralph was (one person that) expressly from the testator..."  (here any name can be used).  Even nonextensional contexts can be Shakespearian: E.g. "It is logically and chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus." (But not when instead of "Caesar" a description is used). We also do not want quantification on "possible names". >Someone, >Reference, >Identification, >Name, >Description, >Context, >Quantification. I 145ff Intentionality/Identification/Intensional object/Geach: E.g. a fraudster buys a car under a wrong name: Problem: The correct name cannot be assigned. Solution: identification over time  then ad hoc name possible: "A" (Existential generalization, "Existence interoduction"). >Existential generalization, >Temporal identity. E.g., "Hutchinson" is not the same person as __ and the plaintiff believed that __ wanted to buy her car.  N.B.: wrong: "Hutchinson is the Person x and the plaintiff believed of x that he wanted to buy her car" (then the plaintiff would have lost). ((s) Identification not with "the buyer", then the purchase would have been achieved  but in case of misidentification: then there was no purchase.) I 148f Identity/Intentionality/Intensional objects/Geach: Problem: de re "in relation to someone .."  "... >de re. Hob and Nob believe that she is a witch". This presupposes that one and the same person is meant.  This is the same problem as "There is a horse that he owes me" (which horse?). >Intensional objects. The CobHobNob case. To refer to indeterminate things often means to refer in an undefined way to something specific.  Problem: Quantification does not help: "Hob thinks a witch has blinded Bob's mare and Nob wonders if she (same witch) killed Cob's sow." The range of the quantified sentence part seems to be fully within the earlier dependent context, on the other hand it covers something of the later context.  This cannot be represented in a logical schema at all. Problem: Anaphora: "she" or "the same witch" is tied to an antecedent: "the only one ..." Best solution: Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch which is F, blinded Bob's mare, and Nob wonders if the witch who is F has killed Cob's sow. ((s) additional property F). N.B.: the sentence is true if a suitable interpretation of the property F is true. ((s) Otherwise the sentence is false because of the nonexistence of witches.) >Nonexistence, >Predication, >Attribution. cf. the logical definition of >"Exactly one". 
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 
Identity  Evans  I 315f Identity / Evans: trivial criterion: e.g."to be the same as a". Frank I 512 temporal identity / Evans: Does not just follow from description, but "The subject of the hypothesis recalls it, therefore, it is the same person". Frank I 539 Temporal identity / Evans: "I" spans past and present, but this is based on a capacity of the subject  that leads to a new way of bust  there must be exactly one thing the act of the imagination is about. >Temporal identity. 
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 
Impredicativeness  Poincaré  Thiel I 324 Impredicativeness/Paradoxes/Poincaré: Poincaré believed with this that the decisive criterion had been found: illegitimate, "nonpredicative" conditions are those that contain such a circle. >impredicative/Russell. At first, it seemed sufficient to require expressions for the relation between element and set that in "x ε y" the second relation term y should belong to exactly one step higher than x (>type theory), thus the requirement that each permissible expression should be formed not only "predicatively" itself (i.e. not impredicatively) but also all arguments occurring in it must meet this condition, to form a >"ramified type theory". 
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 
Individuals  Millikan  I 272 Def property/selfidentity/sameness/Millikan: the identity of the properties of an individual is determined by natural opposition to these properties, based on that individual. >Identity. Def Individuals/selfidentity/sameness/Millikan: the identity of an individual is defined by the fact that it naturally has the qualities it has. The identity of an individual is determined by the rejection of contradictory properties. A selfidentical individual has exactly one property from each property domain, whereby the property domains are mutually exclusive. >Properties. 
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 1891967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 
Information Value  Norvig  Norvig I 629 Information value/AI research/Norvig/Russell: One of the most important parts of decision making is knowing what questions to ask. Tests are often expensive and sometimes hazardous (both directly and because of associated delays). Their importance depends on two factors: whether the test results would lead to a significantly better (…) plan, and how likely the various test results are. Example: (…) an oil company is hoping to buy one of n indistinguishable blocks of oceandrilling rights. (…) exactly one of the blocks contains oil worth C dollars, while the others are worthless. The asking price of each block is C/n dollars. (…)a seismologist offers the company the results of a survey of block number 3, which indicates definitively whether the block contains oil. How much should the company be willing to pay for the information? With probability 1/n, the survey will indicate oil in block 3. In this case, the company will buy block 3 for C/n dollars and make a profit of C −C/n = (n − 1)C/n dollars. With probability (n−1)/n, the survey will show that the block contains no oil, in which case the company will buy a different block. (…) the company should be willing to pay the seismologist up to C/n dollars for the information: the information is worth as much as the block itself. The value of information derives from the fact that with the information, one’s course of action can be changed to suit the actual situation. One can discriminate according to the situation, whereas without the information, one has to do what’s best on average over the possible situations. Def Information value/Norvig: (…) the value of a given piece of information is defined to be the difference in expected value between best actions before and after information is obtained. >Multiattribute utility/AI Research, >Decision networks/Norvig. Norvig I 631 Nonnegative value of information: can [information] actually have negative expected value? Intuitively, one should expect this to be impossible. After all, one could in the worst case just ignore the information and pretend that one has never received it. This is confirmed by the following theorem, which applies to any decisiontheoretic agent: The expected value of information is nonnegative. >Software agents/Norvig. Agents/AI/information value: A sensible agent should ask questions in a reasonable order, should avoid asking questions that are irrelevant, should take into account the importance of each piece of information in relation to its cost, and should stop asking questions when that is appropriate. All of these capabilities can be achieved by using the value of information as a guide. Norvig I 639 The theory of information value was explored first in the context of statistical experiments, where a quasiutility (entropy reduction) was used (Lindley, 1956^{)(1)}. The Russian control theorist Ruslan Stratonovich (1965)^{(2)} developed the more general theory presented here, in which information has value by virtue of its ability to affect decisions. Stratonovich’s work was not known in the West, where Ron Howard (1966)^{(3)} pioneered the same idea. His paper ends with the remark “If information value theory and associated decision theoretic structures do not in the future occupy a large part of the education of engineers, then the engineering profession will find that its traditional role of managing scientific and economic resources for the benefit of man has been forfeited to another profession.” To date, the implied revolution in managerial methods has not occurred. Recent work by Krause and Guestrin (2009)^{(4)} shows that computing the exact nonmyopic value of information is intractable even in polytree networks. There are other cases  more restricted than general value of information—in which the myopic algorithm does provide a provably good approximation to the optimal sequence of observations (Krause et al., 2008)^{(5)}. In some cases  for example, looking for treasure buried in one of n places – ranking experiments in order of success probability divided by cost gives an optimal solution (Kadane and Simon, 1977)^{(6)}. 1. Lindley, D. V. (1956). On a measure of the information provided by an experiment. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 27(4), 986–1005. 2. Stratonovich, R. L. (1965). On value of information. Izvestiya of USSR Academy of Sciences, Technical Cybernetics, 5, 3–12. 3. Howard, R. A. (1966). Information value theory. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC2, 22–26. 4. Krause, A. and Guestrin, C. (2009). Optimal value of information in graphical models. JAIR, 35, 557  591. 5. Krause, A., McMahan, B., Guestrin, C., and Gupta, A. (2008). Robust submodular observation selection. JMLR, 9, 2761–2801. 6. Kadane, J. B. and Simon, H. A. (1977). Optimal strategies for a class of constrained sequential problems. Annals of Statistics, 5, 237–255. 
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 
Interpretation  Dworkin  Bocker I 598 Interpretation/Right/Laws/DworkinVsHart/Dworkin: Dworkin's interpretation model excludes strong judicial discretion. Rather, according to him, judges must presume that exactly one answer is the right one, even in difficult cases. This reply shall indicate the rights which a party to a dispute actually possesses. ((s) Rights are not "granted" by the judge  see also the distinction "detective"/"projectivistic"/Wright). DworkinVsHart: extralegal standards must not play a role in this. Solution/Dworkin: instead of rules ((s) in the case of Hart's secondlevel rules) principles must be applied. >Principles/Dworkin. DworkinVsHart: for Dworkin, to be and to shall play with necessity in the interpretation of the law, because according to Dworkin the law is continuously interpretative, i.e. has to get along without a conventionalist anchor point. Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 
Knowledge  Chisholm  I 63 Knowledge/Antiquity/Chisholm: knowledge requires an identity between the knowing and the known object  Chisholm dito primary form of reference requires identity: selfattribution. >Selfattribution. I 142f Knowledge/Cognitive theory/Chisholm: from pondering what is more sensible: trust cognitive abilities until objections are present. epistemically clear: if unquestioned by unjustified (weak) epistemically acceptable: more rational than the contrary. I 146 Epistemic Principle 6: something is epistemically clear if it is epistemically acceptable. Epistemic Principle 7: in selfpresenting property: if clear and considered, then evident  then contact with reality. I 148 Epistemic Principle 8 Principle of perception: if epistemically clear, then beyond reasonable doubt that subject perceives something which is F when properties are mutually supportive themselves, then evident that subject is something w. what F is  (but not as F, e.g. thief)  therefore not de re. >de re, >de dicto.  II 89 Immanent knowledge/Gombocz: is only believed knowledge and not a known knowledge like with a transcendent being. Mediate minimal knowledge: W1) justified by exactly one truth that it is true  indirect ignorance: of less than one truth. Minimal Knowledge: a person knows that he/she believes at least one truth is justified. II 92 Socrates: "I know that I know nothing: common sense: he knows much more: e.g.: the name of his wife, etc. Vs: there is no Gettierjustification for that (bona validitate, not only bona fide). It is about that he believes his proposition justified, whether he knows them or not. Wolfgang L. Gombocz. Maxima. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 
Morphemes  Lyons  I 172 Def Morpheme/Lyons: units that cannot be further classified for distribution: Example "un" "accept" "able". >Distribution/Lyons. I 184 Def Morpheme/Lyons: most authors: define the morpheme as the smallest unit of grammatical analysis. (Often, however, the word is also regarded as the smallest unit. Both, however, are not completely universal features). >Words, >Syntax, >Grammar. Morpheme: must be distinguished from the phonological or orthographic form. Morpheme: Is (other than the sound or the character) a distributional unit. >Distribution/Lyons. Decomposition: of words: is a gradual, nonprincipled matter. Fixed segmentation: e.g. boys, jumped, jumping, taller, I 185 Nondefined segmentation: E.g. Some plurals: men, children, mice, sheep. E.g. Strong verbs: went, took, came, run, cut, E.g. Irregular comparatives and superlatives: better, best, worse, worst Solution: there is a certain orthographic relationship between man and men and between mouse and mice. Problem: Example bad  worse, Example go  went. These cannot be segmented. Solution: Distribution, the Morpheme as a distributional unit: I 186 Analogy: One can say that bad differs from worse as tall differs from taller. Bad: worse: worst = tall: taller: tallest Tradition: would say that these adjectives cannot occur in the same group of sentences, i.e. cannot qualify the same nouns. Today: Distribution: the different adjectives (here: also comparatives) do not have the same distributional distribution. >Distribution/Lyons. N.B.: then we can see morphemes as a distribution feature, and thus as a component of the adjective. ((s) taller is used in a context other than tall and must therefore have a feature that tall does not have and vice versa. And the same must apply to bad and worse). >Adjectives. First of all, then: A : B : C = D : E : F Then segmentation in factors: Ax : bx : cx = ay : by : cy Def Morpheme/Lyons: Morphemes are then the distributional factors or components of the words. Distribution: of a word: is then the product of the distribution of the morpheme it consists of. I 187 Morpheme/Lyons: is not itself a word segment! It has no position within the word! Def Morph/Lyons: if a word can be divided into segments (these are not the morphemes!) then these segments are called morphs. >Terminology/Lyons. E.g. bigger: has two morphs: {big}, {er}. (Also Morphemes). Notation: Morphs: curly bracket. Irregular verbs/morpheme/morph/solution/Lyons: then we can say that e.g. went, that cannot be broken down into more morphs, consists of the two morphemes {go} and {ed}. (Morpheme/((s): is therefore an abstract component of meaning  Morph/Lyons: a unit that can ultimately be found phonologically or orthographically in the word.) Def Allomorph/Lyons: a certain morpheme can be represented by different morphs (in different environments). I 188 E.G. Plural morpheme of English: {s} is represented by the allomorphs /s/, /z/ and /iz/. I 191 Def Insulating Language/Lyons: (also "analytical") (according to the 19th century classification system): is a language whose words are unchangeable, e.g. Vietnamese, then there is no distinction between word and morpheme. This also applies to Chinese, with some restrictions. Def Agglutinating/Language/Lyons: here the words are mostly composed of a sequence of morphemes, each morph representing a morpheme. I 192 E.g. Turkish: Plural. {ler} Possessive morph: {i} (be, you, etc) Ablative morph: {den}. They always retain their phonological identity. Besides: In a word, each morph represents exactly one morpheme. Def Inflecting/Language/Lyons: an inflectional language is present when words can only be arbitrarily and inconsistently broken down into morphs, whereby there is a variety of allomorphs, Example Latin: domus (nominative, singular) domi (genitive, singular) I 193 Tradition/Lyons: introduced the terms declination and conjugation because of the difficulty of decomposing Latin words into morphs. I 194 Latin: there is no correspondence between the word segments and the morphemes. Even if we segment domus, domi etc. into the morph dom (or the allomorph dom domo) and segment a series of "endings", we could not say that a part of us (or s) represents {singular} and another part {nominal} etc. Instead: we would have to say that they represent it at the same time. I 196 Morpheme/Morph/Lyons: the relationship between them is not purely grammatical. For example, Latin words can be divided into distributional factors just as well as Turkish words. Inflecting/Agglutinating: the difference is not in the grammatical structure, but in the way in which the smallest grammatical units are represented in phonological or orthographic form. 
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 
Nominalism  Armstrong  II (b) 34 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals. II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals. II (c) 97 Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals!  Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties.  Instead: "exact similarity"  Causation: principle: "The same causes the same"  ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident!  ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same)  principle: "the identical causes the identical" II (c) 97 Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication  MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept. 
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 
Nominalism  Place  Armstrong II (b) 34 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals. Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals. Armstrong II (c) 97 Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals!  Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties.  Instead: "exact similarity"  Causation: principle: "The same causes the same"  ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident!  ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same)  principle: "the identical causes the identical" Armstrong II (c) 97 Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication  MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept. 
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 
Number of (Amount)  Hilbert  Berka I 121 Def Number of/amount/(German: "Anzahl")/extendend function calculus/Hilbert: extendend function calculus: here also formulas are possible, which do not depend on any variables, which represent thus certain statements, for these one has to determine their correctness or falsehood. >Truth values, >Truth. Def number of: a number is not an object, but a property. The individuals to whom a number belongs to as a property cannot be the counted things themselves, since each of the things is only one, so that a number that is different from one could not occur at all. >Properties, >Predicates, >Objects. Correct: for example, it is a property of the predicate "being continent of the earth", which is true for exactly five individuals. Numbers/Hilbert: numbers also appear as qualities of predicates. Definition of a definite number/Hilbert: individual predicate function. In the extendend function calculus: here it will be possible to include the number theory into the logic. The numbers 0, 1, 2 are the functions 0 (F), 1 (F), 2 (F), etc.^{(1)} >Numbers, cf. >"Exactly One". 1. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann: Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik, Berlin, 6. Aufl. Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1972, §§ 1, 2. 
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 
Number Theory  Quine  IX 81 Elementary Number Theory/Quine: this is the theory that can only be expressed with the terms "zero, successor, sum, power, product, identity" and with the help of connections from propositional logic and quantification using natural numbers. One can omit the first four of these points or the first two and the fifth. But the more detailed list is convenient, because the classical axiom system fits directly to it. Quine: our quantifiable variables allow other objects than numbers. However, we will now tacitly introduce a limitation to "x ε N". Elementary Number Theory/Quine: less than/equal to: superfluous here. "Ez(x + z = y)"  x ε N > Λ + x = x.  x,y ε N >{x} + y = {x+y}. IX 239 Relative Strength/Proof Theory/Theory/Provability/Quine: Goedel, incompleteness theorem (1931)^{(1)}. Since number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems IX 239 (in reality, all the Goedel numbers of theorems) of an existing set theory can be defined in that same set theory, and different things can be proved about it in it. >Set Theory/Quine. Incompleteness Theorem: as a consequence, however, Goedel showed that set theory (if it is free of contradiction) cannot prove one thing through the class of its own theorems, namely that it is consistent, i.e., for example, that "0 = 1" does not lie within it. If the consistency of one set theory can be proved in another, then the latter is the stronger (unless both are contradictory). Zermelo's system is stronger than type theory. >Type theory, >Strength of theories, >Set theory, >Provability. 1.Kurt Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. In: Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik. 38, 1931, S. 173–198, doi:10.1007/BF01700692 II 178 Elementary number theory is the modest part of mathematics that deals with the addition and multiplication of integers. It does not matter if some true statements will remain unprovable. This is the core of Goedel's theorem. He has shown how one can form a sentence with any given proof procedure purely in the poor notation of elementary number theory, which can be proved then and only then if it is wrong. But wait! The sentence cannot be proved and still be wrong. So it is true, but not provable. Quine: we used to believe that mathematical truth consists in provability. Now we see that this view is untenable to mathematics as a whole. II 179 Goedel's incompleteness theorem (the techniques applied there) has proved useful in other fields: Recursive number theory, or recursion theory for short. Or hierarchy theory. >Goedel/Quine. III 311 Elementary Number Theory/Quine: does not even have a complete proof procedure. Proof: reductio ad absurdum: suppose we had it with which to prove every true sentence in the spelling of the elementary number theory, III 312 then there would also be a complete refutation procedure: to refute a sentence one would prove its negation. But then we could combine the proof and refutation procedure of page III 247 to a decision procedure. V 165 Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Numbers/Quine: Dilemma: the substitutional quantification does not help elementary number theory to any ontological thrift, for either the numbers run out or there are infinitely many number signs. If the explanatory speech of an infinite number sign itself is to be understood again in the sense of insertion, we face a problem at least as serious as that of numbers  if it is to be understood in the sense of referential quantification, then one could also be satisfied from the outset uncritically with object quantification via numbers. >Quantification/Quine. V 166 Truth conditions: if one now assumes substitutional quantification, one can actually explain the truth conditions for them by numbers by speaking only of number signs and their insertion. Problem: if numerals are to serve their purpose, they must be as abstract as numbers. Expressions, of which there should be an infinite number, could be identified by their Goedel numbers. No other approach leads to a noticeable reduction in abstraction. Substitutional quantification: forces to renounce the law that every number has a successor. A number would be the last, but the substitutional quantification theorist would not know which one. It would depend on actual inscriptions in the present and future. (Quine/Goodman 1947). This would be similar to Esenin Volpin's theory of producible numbers: one would have an unknown finite bound. V 191 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be used are abstract entities as are the numbers themselves. V 192 NominalismVsVs: one could reduce the ontology of real numbers or set theory to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for substitutional quantification on the basis of Goedel numbers. >Goedel Numbers/Quine. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. It is not about the high estimation of the concrete and disgust for the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the rejection of most transcendent numbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are human work". QuineVs: but even that is not possible, we saw above that the subsitutional quantification over classes is basically not compatible with the object quantification over objects. V 193 VsVs: one could also understand the quantification of objects in this way. QuineVs: that wasn't possible because there aren't enough names. You could teach spacetime coordination, but that doesn't explain language learning. X 79 Validity/Sentence/Quantity/Schema/Quine: if quantities and sentences fall apart in this way, there should be a difference between these two definitions of validity about schema (with sentences) and models (with sentences). But it follows from the Löwenheim theorem that the two definitions of validity (using sentences or sets) do not fall apart as long as the object language is not too weak in expression. Condition: the object language must be able to express (contain) the elementary number theory. Object Language: In such a language, a scheme that remains true in all insertions of propositions is also fulfilled by all models and vice versa. >Object Language/Quine The requirement of elementary number theory is rather weak. Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: speaks about positive integers by means of addition, multiplication, identity, truth functions and quantification. Standard Grammar/Quine: the standard grammar would express the functors of addition, multiplication, like identity, by suitable predicates. X 83 Elementary Number Theory/Quine: is similar to the theory of finite ntuples and effectively equivalent to a certain part of set theory, but only to the theory of finite sets. XI 94 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine/Harman/Lauener: ("Words and Objections"): e.g. translation of number theory into the language of set theory by Zermelo or von Neumann: both versions translate true or false sentences of number theory into true or false sentences of set theory. Only the truth values of sentences like e.g. "The number two has exactly one element", which had no sense before translation, differ from each other in both systems. (XI 179: it is true in von Neumann's and false in Zermelo's system, in number theory it is meaningless). XI 94 Since they both serve all purposes of number theory in the same way, it is not possible to mark one of them as a correct translation. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Numbers  Meixner  I 170 Def Equinumerousness/Frege/Meixner: f is a property that is equinumerous with the property g, =_{Def} for at least one twodigit relation R applies: 1) Every entity that has f is in the relation R with exactly one entity that has g 2) If entities that have f are different, so are entities with g 3) inverse of 1: every entity that has g. Number: can then be defined noncircularly: x is a natural number =_{Def} x is a finite number property. Number/Meixner: conceived as a property they are typeless functions. >Numbers, >Definitions, >Definability, >Relations. 
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 
Objectivity  Field  I 272f Def Objectivity/Mathematics/Gyro/Putnam/Field: objectivity should consist in that we believe only the true axioms. Problem: the axioms also refer to the ontology. >Axioms, >Ontology. I 274 Objectivity does not have to be explained in terms of the truth of the axioms  this is not possible in the associated modal propositions. >Modalities, >Propositions. I 277 Objectivity/mathematics/set theory/Field: even if we accept "ε" as fixed, the platonic (!) view does not have to assume that the truths are objectively determinated.  Because there are other totalities over which the quantifiers can go in a set theory. >Platonism, >Quantifiers, >Set theory. Putnam: further: there is no reason to keep "ε" fixed. FieldVsPutnam: confusion of the view that the reference is fixed (e.g. causally) with the view that it is defined by a description theory that contains the word "cause". II 316 Objectivity/truth/Mathematics/Field: Thesis: even if there are no mathematical objects, why should it not be the case that there is exactly one value of n for which An  modally interpreted  is objectively true? II 316 Mathematical objectivity/Field: for it we do not need to accept the existence of mathematical objects if we presuppose the objectivity of logic.  But objectively correct are only sentences of mathematics which can be proved from the axioms. >Provability, >Correctness. II 319 Mathematical concepts are not causally connected with their predicates. E.g. For each choice of a power of the continuum, we can find properties and relations for our set theoretical concepts (here: vocabulary) that make this choice true and another choice wrong. Cf. >Truthmakers. II 320 The defense of axioms is enough to make mathematics (without objects) objective, but only with the broad notion of consistency: that a system is consistent if not every sentence is a consequence of it. II 340 Objectivity/quantity theory/element relation/Field: to determine the specific extension of "e" and "quantity" we also need the physical applications  also for "finity".  III 79 Arbitrariness/arbitrary/scalar types/scalar field/mass density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which is, because of its logarithmic structure, less arbitrary than the scale for the gravitational potential  ((s) > objectivity, > logarithm.) Logarithmic structures are less arbitrary. Mass density: needs more basic concepts than other scalar fields. Scalar field: E.g. height. >Field theory. 
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
Objects (Material Things)  AI Research  Norvig I 449 Objects/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Physical objects can be viewed as generalized events, in the sense that a physical object is a chunk of space–time. For example, USA can be thought of as an event that began in, say, 1776 as a union of 13 states and is still in progress today as a union of 50. We can describe the changing properties of USA using state fluents, such as Population(USA). A property of the USA that changes every four or eight years, barring mishaps, is its president. One might propose that president(USA) is a logical term that denotes a different object at different times. Unfortunately, this is not possible, because a term denotes exactly one object in a given model structure. (The term President(USA, t) can denote different objects, depending on the value of t, but our ontology keeps time indices separate from fluents.) ((s) Cf. >Four dimensionalism/Philosophical theories). Norvig I 450 Solution: only possibility is that President(USA) denotes a single object that consists of different people at different times. >Beliefs/AI research, >Objects of thought/Philosophical theories, >Objects of belief/Philosophical theories, >Description logic/AI research. 
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 
One (Number 1)  Prior  I 61 Def "exactly one"/logical form/Prior: to say that precisely an individual fs is to say that as for some x, x φs and for every x and y, if x φs and y φs, then x is the same individual as y. >"Exactly one". Only with "φing" instead of "F" (predicate). >Predicates, >Predication, >Properties, cf. >Pegasus example, >Nonexistence/Russell. Property/predicate/Prior: this uses "φing" (digit verbs) instead of "F" (property). But also "Property to φ ’ but" the property of the ()ing forms not a noun of a verb, but is part of the whole functor. " ..is The same as .. "or the functor:" whatever ()s, ()s ". >Functors. This is not a property, otherwise there was a false equivalence: "property that is applied to anything" could then falsely equate mermaids and Pegasi. Cf. >Unicorn example., >Equivalence. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Paradoxes  Poincaré  Thiel I 322 Russell's Antinomy/solution: an attempt to avoid the Russellian paradox would be to say instead of "all" always "all, which". So now the suspicion is centered on "all". >Russell's paradox, >"All", >Universal quantification. Poincaré saw this suspicion confirmed and claimed: Conditions such as "~ (x ε x)" are unsuitable to determine a set, for they require a circulus vitiosus. >Sets, >Set theory, >Classes, cf. >Outermost class, >Circularity, cf. >Selfreference. He did not get to this diagnosis with the help of the Russellian antinomy, but with the antinomy constructed by Jules Richard: I 323 Richard's Antinomy: The totality E of all the decimal fractions which can be defined by a finite number of words (from the letters of a finite alphabet). Also, the totality E of the decimal fractions is countable. But then we can define a new decimal fraction d by the rule: Is the nth number of the nth decimal fraction of E 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, so the the corresponding number of d is 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,1,1. Since, by definition, d differs from the nth decimal fraction from E at the nth place, and this applies to an arbitrary n, d is different from every decimal fraction from E, and therefore does not belong to E. On the other hand, d must lie in E because we have defined it with finitely many words, and E was the totality of all such decimal fractions. Solution/Poincaré: he generalized the solution provided by Richard himself that E can be correctly explained only as the totality of not all but the decimal fractions which can be defined with a finite number of words without already introducing the concept of the totality E itself. >Definition, >Definability, >Introduction. BuraliForti/Poincaré: Poincaré transferred this explanation also to other antinomies e.g. the antinomy of BuraliForti: of the "set Ω of all ordinals". They can only be applied correctly to the set of all ordinals which can be defined without the introduction of the set Ω. (Otherwise, Ω + 1 always results). Thiel I 324 Poincaré: believed that he had found the decisive criterion: illegitimate, "nonpredicative" conditions are those that contain such a circle. >impredicative/Russell. At first, it seemed sufficient to demand of expressions the relation between element and set that in "x ∈ y" the second relation term y should belong to exactly one step higher than x (simple > type theory), thus the requirement that every permissible expression should be formed not only "predicatively" (i.e. not impredicatively), but also all arguments occurring in it must satisfy this condition, to lead to a "ramifieded type theory", (ramified hierarchy). VsType Theory: Its complications included not only the fact that such a theory must also consider orders in addition to types, but also the more than annoying fact that now, for example, the upper limit of a nonempty set of real numbers (whose existence is presupposed in all continuity considerations in classical analysis) is of higher order than the real numbers whose upper limit it is. The consequence is that one can no longer quantify simply via "all real numbers", but only via all real numbers of a certain order. This is unacceptable for the field mathematics, and a huge obstacle to the "arithmetic program" of classical basic research. Especially for the logicism which follows. >Logicism. I 325 Poincaré's analysis carries even further than he himself presumed. E.g. (1) (1) is wrong With the variant "the only sentence numbered on this page is wrong". Or in the form of "I lie (now)". one accepts the necessary empirical regressions on book pages and "now", this leads to formal contradictions. The "liar" is weaker, originally in the letter of the apostle Paul to Titus, verse 12 of the first chapter. Luther: Z "One of them always said, their own prophet: the Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, and idle bellies." A <> "All Cretans lie (always)" Synonymous with the statement: "for this statement applies: if it is made by a Cretan, its opposite is true."  I 326 K(A) > ~A (>separation rule: A, A > B >> B I 92) According to the separation rule, the statement ~ A becomes a true statement. This implies, however, that A is false, while we have derived this demand from the assumption that A is true. Since this is only assumed hypothetically, the reasoning (also I 315 ZermeloRussell's antinomy) shows, with reference to the reductio ad absurdum: (A> A)> A, that A is indeed false. This does not lead to any formal contradiction, if there is a Cretan who makes at least one single true statement, A is then simply wrong. Nevertheless, Poincaré would dispute the admissibility: the definition of the abbreviation sign A is a universal statement, in which the variability range of the quantifier consists of all propositions, and therefore also contains the statement A itself, A is therefore impredicatively defined and therefore inadmissible. The applicability of the Poincaré criterion comes unexpectedly because the liar antinomy, due to the occurrence of metalogical terms such as "true" and "false" belongs to another, actually nonmathematical, type of conclusions that Peano classified as "linguistic". 
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 
Proper Names  Lejewski  Prior I 167 Preliminary remark: Extensionality/Prior: Philosophers who are not extensionists believe that Russell's individual names cannot exist. They therefore find the complications acceptable. >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Singular Terms, >Real Names/Russell. Prior I 167 Names/Lejewski: for him, names can be either singular or empty, but not plural. "Non plural names": can be logically complex (normal names cannot). >Complexity, >Simplicity. For this purpose, a special functor with its own axioms is used. For example, this functor could be the Lesniewskian individual identity, the form "a = a" which is true if "a" is applied to an object, and false if not. >Reference, >S. Lesniewski. Name/Aristotle: can be singular or plural, but not empty! If complex names are introduced here, you must make sure that the composition is not empty. For example, even if "a" and "b" have applications, "a and b" need not have any. >Aristotle. If "Socrates" is not plural, it does not follow that "Not Socrates" is also not plural. For example, there could be a million NotSocrates. Solution/Lejewski: introduces a "definition frame": only allows names like "He, the only one who is not Socrates." N.B.: nevertheless, the verb "is not Socrates" can be applied to many objects. Cf. >"Exactly one", >Predicates, >Predication, >Generality, >Generalization. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Propositions  Geach  I 168 Proposition/GeachVs: a proposition is no abstract entity.  Propositions are here only used under protest: the following is generally accepted about propositions: (i) any unambiguous statement expresses exactly one proposition (ii) synonymous propositions have the same meaning (iii) a "thatclause" denotes what is expressed by "p" (iv) "The proposition that p" and the "thatclause" "that p" are synonymous terms of the proposition (v) "The proposition expressed by Qp", whereby Qp is a quotation of p, denotes  the same proposition as "the proposition that p". One does not need (iv) to understand that "that p" can always be replaced by "the proposition that p" From the above theses follows that every oratio obliqua is always translatable into oratio recta  James considers the proposition that is expressed by "There are Marsmen ...", with dread. GeachVs: but this cannot stop us to simply abbreviate: "has this fear". But this is not a criterion for synonymy. >Synonymy, >Criteria. l 174/5 Necessary/Proposition/Geach: if the thatclauses are designations of abstract entities, then these abstract entities cannot be propositions. >Thatclauses. Reason: reciprocal strict implication is not an identity criterion for propositions. >Opacity. But: it is a sufficient condition in the modal logic for the replaceability salva veritate of subsets. We would therefore have a criterion for the identity of such entities, which are designated by such subsets.  But there is no need for such "designata". I 176 Proposition/Geach: cheap metaphysics: easy to ask: "But what are propositions" like "But what are numbers?" The reference e.g. to know the identity of a number means to be able to identify numbers and to keep them apart  and that means, vice versa, to know the truth conditions of a sentence. >Metaphysics. We could make a theory of propositions without knowing what propositions actually are  but reciprocal entailment for propositional equality does not work as a criterion for identity. ((s) Because it is intensional). >Intensionality, >Extensionality, >Identity. I 255 Definition Proposition/Terminology/Geach: something that is put forward to be considered  (no assertion, a suggestion!)  "sentence" is actually grammatical. I prefer "Proposition".  Propositions need not be asserted. 
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 
Scope  Castaneda  Frank I 178 Range,scope, advanced/of descriptions/Russell: "there is only one .."  "if ...". >Descriptions, >Range, >Identification, >"Exactly one", >One, cf. >Quantification. HectorNeri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Selfconsciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130157 
Cast I H.N. Castaneda PhenomenoLogic of the I: Essays on SelfConsciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 
Scope  Logic Texts  Read III 127f Improper names/Quine: (= descriptions). Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. >Name, >Description, >Rigidity, >Substitution. Improper names: they lead to more complex forms: e.g. "There is one greatest among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina".  e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven." Russell: here, only 7 is a real name. Therefore, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical. >Indistinguishability, >Leibniz principle, >Identity. QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that no new constituent will correspond to them in the new formulation.  Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic.  Read III 133/134 Scope/Descriptions/Possible World/Read: Narrow scope: the description refers to different objects in different possible worlds  wide scope: the same object in different possible worlds  real names: always large scope. >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms, >Proper names. 
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II HoyningenHuene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973  German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995  German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 
Similarity  Armstrong  II (b) 34/35 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place): then similar property (as particulars) means all exactly similar properties. Universals (Armstrong): many particulars with the same properties. Universalrealist: takes for each class exactly one universal. Martin I 72 Similarity/equality/property/Martin: Thesis: We need to rethink the ordinary exact and inexact equality between objects (these need a way, in relation to which they may be the same). Instead: similarity between properties. II (c) 97f Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of various universals for every similarity which is not exact! >Multiplication of entities. MartinVsArmstrong: similarity is ontologically the fundamental concept. 
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 
Similarity  Place  Armstrong II (b) 34/35 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place): then similar property (as particulars) means all exactly similar properties. Universals (Armstrong): many particulars with the same properties. Universalrealist: takes for each class exactly one universal. Martin I 72 Similarity/equality/property/Martin: Thesis: We need to rethink the ordinary exact and inexact equality between objects (these need a way, in relation to which they may be the same). Instead: similarity between properties. Armstrong II (c) 97f Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of various universals for every similarity which is not exact! >Multiplication of entities. MartinVsArmstrong: similarity is ontologically the fundamental concept. 
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 
Substitution  Logic Texts  Read III 127f Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions)  Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. Improper names: lead to a more complex form: for example, "there is one greatest orator among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina."  e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven." Russell: here only 7 is a real name. >Description. Hence, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical. QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that in the new formulation no component corresponds to them.  Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. 
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II HoyningenHuene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973  German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995  German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 
Terminology  Kripke  I 125 Schmidentical/Schidentity: there is artificial identity between the subject and itself. Kripke: that is quite alright and useful.  II 232f Russell Language/Kripke: the weak form of the Russell language: is like English. The only truth conditions by Russell are: the present king of France must exist in order for the sentence "The present king of France is bald" to be true. Medium form of Russell language: descriptions have Russell’s deep structure: there is exactly one... . Strong form of Russell language: has no descriptions, only there is exactly one... . Champagne e.g.: has the weak and medium form: here the speaker thinks (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are satisfied. Strong form: here the use could become the rule, because the definite article is prohibited. Since the phenomenon occurs in all three languages, there can be no argument that English is not a Russell language.  Newen I 97 Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: the Russell language contains only the attributive reading. (~ Homophone truth conditions). Contrast: D Language/Kripke: the D language includes a referential and attributive reading. KripkeVsDonnellan: e.g. "her husband is kind to her": here you need the referential and the attributive reading at the same time (not alternating). "He is nice, but he is not her husband". 
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 
Utilitarianism  Parsons  Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purposerational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. >Procedural rationality, >Actions/Parsons. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends").^{(1)} 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. >Purposes. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. >Autonomy/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. >Cultural values, >Institutionalization, >Internalization, >Lifeworld. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. 
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 
Utopia  Lenin  Brocker I 32 Utopia/PutinVsLenin/Lenin: Lenin's ideas are as far removed from the reality of today's Russia as never before. President Vladimir Putin distanced himself  exactly one year before the centenary of Lenin's revolution in 1917  from its statedestroying character, which would have destroyed the cohesion of the historic Russian empire. Brocker I 33 Political Parties/Lenin: At the centre of What is to be done? is the creation of a disciplined organization of a revolutionary party under the conditions of the autocratic Russia. ^{(1)} See also Political Parties/Lenin). 1. N. Lenin, Čto delat’?, Stuttgart 1902. Dt.: Wladimir I. Lenin, Was tun? Brennende Fragen unserer Bewegung, in: ders., Ausgewählte Werke in sechs Bänden, Bd. 1, Berlin 1986, 333541 (zuerst: Wien 1932). Jutta Scherrer, Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin, Was tun?, (1902) in: Brocker, Manfred, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. 
Lenin I Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin Die dringendsten Aufgaben unserer Bewegung Berlin 1986 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 
Disputed term/author/ism  Author Vs Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Compositionality  Schiffer Vs Compositionality  I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truththeoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truththeoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truththeoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truththeoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truththeoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counterE.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fullydeveloped natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an informationprocessing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum""sno""iz""pörpol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys BBox to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. 
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 
Davidson, D.  Quine Vs Davidson, D.  Davidson I 42 QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible. Davidson II 92 Quine: privileged access  Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "wellswept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology). II 97 An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences. II 98 Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique. QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same spacetime coordinates. Quine II 56 Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth. QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world". Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction. Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory. Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas. Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence. VI 57 Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own. VI 58 Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects. VI 59 "Common situations" are too vague for me. VI 62 Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves! VI 63 In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way. VI 136 Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms. VI 137 If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory). In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the fourcolor problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis. Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts. VI 138 Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true. VI 139 Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theoryneutral language in which both theories are formulated quoteredeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory. The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially. VI 140 It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true. XI 156 Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudoproblem. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 318 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 6879 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 4554 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 
Evans, G.  Peacocke Vs Evans, G.  I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a nonindexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a selfcentered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the selfcentered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, nonegocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of firstperson ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: qmemories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. SplitBrain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. 
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 
Field, H.  Putnam Vs Field, H.  Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no intertheoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification.  Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description".  Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our metalanguage, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth).  Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. 
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 27290 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177  194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen WittgensteinSymposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a readymade world, Synthese 51 (2):205228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 48398 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 3043 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 22342 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
Frege, G.  Prior Vs Frege, G.  I 50 Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument. The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0). But a number! The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values. Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals. Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else. Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true  absurd.) Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 21 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing". That is to correspond to the fact that 21 is not only "> 0", but the number 1! I 51 And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (31) 1 is the number 1, because 31 is the number 2. There are no different truths. PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false. Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid. But we have said above that sentences denote nothing. Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (Wittgenstein II 94): There is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning) Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless. We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each φ and each ψ if exactly one thing φs and no thing ψs, then more things are φing than are ψing. Def "more than". I 51/52 Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink". Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference! That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either). Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?). Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity." Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous. But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone! PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "the false thing". Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension". I 53 PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects). Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names. Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns. And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions) I 166 but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name). PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation. This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Frege, G.  Meixner Vs Frege, G.  I 170 Numbers/Frege/Meixner: special properties, i.e. finite number of properties of properties (i.e. functions). Notation of Meixner: F0 (should be 0) is the abbreviation of "01[01 is different from 01]". Def Equivalence/Frege/Meixner: f is a property equal to the property g, = Def is valid for at least one twodigit relation R: 1. each entity which has f stands for exactly one entity which has g, in the relation R 2. are entities that have f different, then also entities with g 3. inversion of 1: any entity having g. Number/Meixner: one could therefore define noncircularly: x is a natural number = Def x is a finite number property. I 171 Number/MeixnerVsFrege: then you could simplify: the default property used for the definition of 1 λ01[01 is identical to F0] is definitorically the same as the property λ01[01 is identical with 0]. Then you can simplify (which is a sign that numbers do not stand on ontologically safe feet): x is a natural number = Def x is a standard property for determining finite numbers then: f is 0 = Def f is a property that is equal to the property 0. Meixner: this is simpler, but also has the strange consequence that each natural number is exemplified by all its predecessors. I 172 FregeVsMeixner: Numbers are (saturated) objects, not properties. Each number is exemplified by an infinite number of entities. Number/Meixner: understood as property, they are untyped functions, i.e. they cannot be placed in any box of the form [] 
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 
Functionalism  Newen Vs Functionalism  I40 Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech. NS I 16 Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology. NS I 27 Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense. 
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 
Hume, D.  Searle Vs Hume, D.  II 101 Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle. II 102 Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow. II 103 Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself). II 104 Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.) II 156 Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience! SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power. II 170 Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world. II 171 I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume. II 173 SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity. II 174 There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the actioncausation. 
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 
Kamp, H.  Stalnaker Vs Kamp, H.  II 104 Possible worlds semantics//KampVsPossible worlds semantics/KampVsStalnaker: the approach is not rich enough to represent all differences. Kamp (1988)^{(1)} adopts an example by Barbara Partee: Example Pronoun/pronouns/anaphora/presupposition: (2) a. Exactly one of 10 balls is not in the bag b. It is under the sofa (3) a. Exactly 9 of 10 balls are in the bag b. It is under the sofa. Kamp: Suppose the discourse takes place in the same initial context. That means 1. statement: changes the context. 2. statement: is made in the changed context. II 105 Important argument: the first statements of the two pairs (2a) and (3) are truth conditionally equivalent. – that means they are true in exactly the same set of poss.w.. Context/possible world/poss.w./Kamp: if context are now sets of poss.w. and if assertions add only the truth conditional content to the context, the context will later be the same. But the contexts on the other side must surely be different in both cases because although (2b) and (3b) are the same sentence it must express different propositions in both cases. "In the second case it cannot refer to "the ball". KampVsPossible worlds semantics: if the sentences are truth conditionally equivalent no two different sets of poss.w. can be distinguished here. StalnakerVsVs: it is true that our abstract approach does not predict this difference, namely, because it says nothing about how pronouns function. Two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: is no meaning theory. StalnakerVsKamp: it is not correct that you have to conclude from the fact that the former contexts are identical that the later contexts are also identical. By this you ignore the first way how a speech act changes the context (see above II 102 above). That a statement was made at all is sufficient, together with any information that follows from it, along with a permanent background information on conventions. Thus one can distinguish two later contexts, relative to which (2b) and (3b) are interpreted. Pronoun/Stalnaker: "it" apparently requires a context in which a particular individual is prominent. II 106 Context/possible worlds semantics/StalnakerVsKamp/Stalnaker: solution: as long as the minimal assumption makes that information to determine the content may be relevant only if it is assumed by the speaker that this information is also accessible to the listener, we can be sure that the set of poss.w. that defines the presuppositions is sufficient to represent a context. An assertion changes the context already alone by the fact that it is made! (1) Kamp, Hans (1988): Comments on Stalnaker, Belief Attribution and Context. In Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (Eds.): Contents of Thought: Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. Tucson, University of Arizona Press. pp. 156181. 
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 
Lesniewski, St.  Prior Vs Lesniewski, St.  I 43 Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of nonnominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects. Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first: Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them. Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences. Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question. E.g. if φx is read as "x is red", I 44 then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction) "Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx. To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object. Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate: (λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...") One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation. But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification. E.g. allquantification of higher order: a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx, i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then something results in either ψ or X. That's alright. Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first: b) C∏φΘφΘ() Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X". AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences. We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows: (A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx this turns the whole thing into: c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx. And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a). This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem. I 45 PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized: For c) gives us e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz) which can be instatiated to: f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y. From this, λconversion takes us back to a). Point: λconversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λabstraction is not bound to an individual variable. So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated. I 161 Principia Mathematica^{(1)}/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the allclass is not empty. Russell himself found this problematic. LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty. Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe. PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious: Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell). But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names! Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a wellformed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true. Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is wellformed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell. I 162 Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: socalled "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names. This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names. So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all. Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation. Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product! And we can construct a name that is logically empty. E.g. the composite name "a and nota". Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless. Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals. Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higherorder functors, etc.) Basic sentences are something like "x ε a". I 163 Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 
Montague, R.  Stechow Vs Montague, R.  I 44 Types/Stechow: Definition/Linguistics/Stechow: Example for definition of a definition using the semantic ranges defined by types: e.g. for an adjective and a prepositional phrase: "in". Logical Type/Linguistics/Stechow: is a semantic feature of a category symbol. Montague/Stechow: acts as if each syntactic category has exactly one logical type and therefore writes only the categories. He has made this popular. StechowVsMontague: but this is not possible, because a syntactic category does not only correspond to a logical type. Problem: for example, the nomina Fritz, student, father these probably have different meanings: Fritz: designates something of type e, student: type ep, father: Tap e(ep). Then there must also be three different noun categories for Montague. Since we only accept one noun category, we must already write the types in the lexicon. I 104 Intensional Functional Application/IFA/Intensor/Heim/KratzerVsMontague: the intensor can be replaced by the composition principle of the intesional functional application. (Intensional Functional Application): in the metalanguage it does what the interpretation of the intensor does. This makes the calculations simpler: for example Since Montague places a node before each argument, this saves a lot of money. 105 Extensional Functional Application/FA/Montague: with him you first have to dismantle the Intensor and then the FA Intensional Functional Application/Heim/Kratzer: merges both steps. 150 Lambda Abstraction/Stechow: can already be found in Frege (1884)! 151 Quantifying in/Montague/Stechow: Example Each rule consists of a syntactic and a semantic operation. Syntactic operation/Stechow: has always been very simple: just write side by side. Montagues syntactic operation f14,2 is much more complicated: take the first argument of the function (here "every linguist") and replace the first occurrence of the pronoun "him" in the second argument by this expression. The semantics of this rule is of course exactly the semantics of our quantifier relation. I.e. we apply the meaning of the quantifier to the meaning of the λabstract that we form from the second expression. VsMontague: Problem: there are infinitely many rules of quantifying in, one for each natural number. This is because we can choose any index for a pronoun. Lambda Calculus/Stechow: you can do almost anything with it. The original work does not contain semantics. (Lit: Lambek, 1958). 152 Type/Not/Stechow: cannot have the type (st)t, then it is a sentence adverb. Or (s(et)(et), then it is a VP modifier. ((s) > narrow range/>wide range). 
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) 
Perry, J.  Lewis Vs Perry, J.  Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the IRelation (IR) and the RRelation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the RRelation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the selfattributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >SelfAscription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 335 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 
Putnam, H.  Searle Vs Putnam, H.  Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is selfrespect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective firstperson phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a nonintentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by TwinSally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are selfreferential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. 
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 
Quine, W.V.O.  Frege Vs Quine, W.V.O.  Quine III 297 Numeral/Numbers/Quine: the singular terms as names for numbers can be constructed in the form of abstracts. E.g. Def 0: is the class of all and only those classes that contain no elements. "0" for "a^~(Ex)(x e a)". III 298 i.e. 0 is the class whose only element is the empty class. ((s) FregeVsQuine: empty class yes, but not as an element). ((s) 0 here without quotation marks, i.e. not numeral?). Def One/Numeral/Quine: 1 is the class of all classes a, each of which contains exactly one element y: "1" for "a^(Ey)(x)(x e a . ↔ . x = y)". Def "Two"/"Three"/"2"/"3"/Numeral/Quine: can then be explained by "1 + 1", "1 + 2", etc., as soon as we have a definition of "+" (plus sign). 
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Russell, B.  Strawson Vs Russell, B.  Wolf II 17 StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things.  Newen/Schrenk I 92 Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses (i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion) (ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition (iii) truth value gaps are allowed (iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. (v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties). Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use. Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference: Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand: Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value. Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied. E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophicallogical arguments for his thesis. Newen/Schrenk I 94 He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truthvalue gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him. Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier. Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential. Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer). Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...". In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential.  Quine I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps.  Schulte III 433 StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. "The common language has no exact logic" Schulte III 434 Kingxample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of nonexistence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences: 1. There is a king of France. 2. There are no more than a king of France. 3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. 2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence. 3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning.  Schulte III 435 Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. KingExample/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. KingExample: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game.  VII 95 Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person. There can also be more than one description in one sentence. VII 98 StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names  for example, "This"  are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing. This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. VII 99 KingExample/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. VII 100 Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology: "Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description). Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: (A1) sentence (A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence accordingly: (B1) expression (B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression. KingExample/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same. VII 101 Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson: Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times. Statement (proposition): ditto Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition). VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. VII 104 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or nonexistent. VII 105 Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. VII 106 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. VII 106/107 KingExample/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense. 2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one, StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim. 2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists. Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the nonexistence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson). Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object. VII 110 Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica^{(1)}: (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists". StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table VII 111 This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing. Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. VII 112 StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names). He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. VII 113 Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use). They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".) VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive. VII 123 Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..." StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..." Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table". VII 124 Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). VII 126 Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950  dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 120 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 
Russell, B.  Tugendhat Vs Russell, B.  Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: spacetime not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a spacetime order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. 
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 
Stalnaker, R.  Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R.  Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)^{(1)} Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)^{(2)}: then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things  for example in a completely symmetrical world  are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991^{(3)},1996^{(4)}, Lewis 1986e^{(5)}:36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, nonsemantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, contextdependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e^{(5)},42 48: for primary, 1969^{(6)}, Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978^{(7)}): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a^{(8)},38, 1994b^{(9)},296f). Newer terminology: Def AIntension/Primary Intension/1Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def CIntension/Secondary Intension/2Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def AProposition/1Proposition/CProposition/2Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a^{(10)},2004^{(11)}, Lewis 2002b^{(12)},Chalmers 1996b^{(13)}, 56,65) Def meaning_{1}/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975^{(14)},173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning_{2}/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "twodimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by metalinguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need AIntensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 
Various Authors  Evans Vs Various Authors  EMD II VIII Meta Language/Theory Language/Evans/McDowell: often mentioned conditions: 1) if S is meaningful and unambiguous, there is exactly one sentence of L which is registered for S. 2) if S is n times ambiguous, there are n different sentences of L which are registered for S. 3) if S has no meaning, there is no sentence of L which is registered for S. 4) If S entails another sentence S’, there is an effectively decidable relation which is valid between the sentence of L that is registered for S or for S’. Problem/Seuren: the 4th condition leads to a conceptual collapse!. EMD II VIII/IX E.g. "John is a bachelor" entails "John is unmarried". According to the semantic representation, the simple "bachelor" cannot be the same as the complex "unmarried man". Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: this whole thing can be challenged, not because it revives the controversial distinction analytic/synthetic or because the "conceptual collapse" would go on without end, but because we, if we got ourselves into it, would put ourselves into a position where we would be unable to do what we are doing. And that would be that we set up something that, if someone knew about it, would put him into a position to speak and understand a language. It would be unfair to imply that the theorists are unaware of the speaker listener competence. Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: he suggests to people that if they "broke through circle", it would lead to the impossibility of determining the meaning of sentences "outside the language", i.e. "without using language". Vs: there is a fallacy in that: surely we cannot determine meanings without using words. But it does not follow that if we specify the sentence meaning of S using the sentence S’. EMD II X we thus determine a relation between S and S’!. Solution: S is mentioned, and S’ is used. (Use/Mention, T sentence). E.g. (5) "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white does not constitute relation which has the sentence has to itself, but rather constitutes under these circumstances a semantic property of the sentence by using it. This is an exemplification, with which we may well express our belief that snow is white. 
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 
Disputed term/author/ism  Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Obectivity  Field, Hartry  II 316 Objectivity/mathematical/objects/Field: the reason that if there are no mathematical objects, the mathematical propositions they contain must be objectively wrong because they refer to nothing is weak. It is a common view that mathematical propositions that talk about mathematical objects seem (e.g. numbers), II 316 to not actually do this. Putnam/Hellman: Thesis: Such sentences can be seen as complicated assertions about possibility. (Putnam 1967, Hellman 1989). ((s)> Modal interpretation), see above). Field: Thesis: Even if there are no mathematical objects, why should it not be the case that there is exactly one value of n for which An (An = nth statement of A)  modally interpreted  is objectively true? II 316 Objectivity/Mathematics/Tradition/Field: Thesis: are objective standards of proof as a yardstick for the objectivity of mathematics. Then one can say that mathematics was not always objective (>Lakatos 1976). But since Frege's time proofs must be formalizable, so the problem is solved. II 317 "Extreme AntiObjectivism"/Field: Thesis: Correctness: can then be regarded as derivability of axioms. (It's not that extreme!). II 320 Def AntiObjectivism/Mathematics/Field: is simply the thesis that truth adds nothing more than another limitation: it is too easy to preserve! II 323 Objectivity/Mathematics/"Thoroughbred Platonism"/Balaguer/Field: (often unhappily characterized as "AntiPlatonism"): Thesis: There is not only a single universe of sets, but many different universes of sets existing side by side. One each, in which the thickness of the continuum is Aleph _{23}, Aleph _{817}, etc. II 331 Conclusion/Field: Thesis: It must be about mathematical objectivity and not about mathematical objects. This view is not original, it is already represented in Putnam (1975). II 337 Extreme AntiObjectivism: Thesis: If a proposition is undecidable under any candidate for our fullest theory, (this certainly applies to some propositions), then that proposition definitely has no particular truth values. 

Realism  Field, Hartry  Horwich I 405 Metaphysical Realism / / Field: three theses, not separated by Putnam. 1 MR1: the world consists of a set of mentalindependent objects. 2 mR2: there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. I 406 3 mR3/Field: truth involvea a kind of correspondence theory between words and external objects. 
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 
personal Identity  Perry, J.  Lewis IV 71 PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the Rrelation (> Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states) is not the same as the Irelation (between states of an individual) in this case (split). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are Ir, but because of the split not Rr. Perry thesis: every person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable to that time. It should be noted that persons can share stages: Splitting: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identitytot is somewhat counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 
narrow/wide  Russell, B.  Cresswell II 140 Descriptions/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a certain description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier such as "someone".  Problem: "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts: a) (close range) "The person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent to "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is necessarily true in a sense. b) (wide range) It is true that the person next door could have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). 
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 