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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Each/All/Every | Hintikka | II 40 Everyone/all/none/ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow that the domain of our quantifiers is also extended to non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. everyone's lover - e.g. no one's lover. Both are obviously possible. But unlike Meinong's round square. E.g. "the envy of all" - e.g. "the one who is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first. Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is not a solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" is only possible with existent objects. ((s) That is, we must allow here non-existent or possible objects (possibilia).) Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gains the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also see Non-Existence/Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. II 106 Quantification/quantifier/ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: on the whole, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man. (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: Montague explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which ones they actually are. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Domain/Hintikka: the domain determines the logical order. Quantifier/quantification/every/he/Montague/Hintikka: e.g. (14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy. (15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy. Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) can not precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: so we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Nobody, Some | Frege | II 93 Nobody/some/Frege: "nobody" and "some" are 2. order functional expressions. >Levels, >Description levels, >Function, >"Someone". |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Nobody, Some | Geach | I 115 Nobody/Geach: "nobody" indicates no empty class, nor a name. - Otherwise the situation is no better than e.g. for Polyphemus. >Classes, >Names, >Empty set, >Predication/Geach, >Non-existence, >Fiction, >Description, >Quantification, cf. >Someone/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Nobody, Some | Hintikka | II 40 Everyone/all/nobody/ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow the domain of our quantifiers to be extended to non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. "everyone's lover", e.g. "nobody's lover". Both are obviously possible. But unlike Meinong's round square. E.g. "the envy of all", e.g. "which is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the former. Every/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is no solution to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" go only via existent things. ((s) That is, we need to allow non-existent or possible objects (possibilia) here. >Possibilia. Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gained the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (See also Non-Existence/Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: every non-existent object is in its own world. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Ontology | Hintikka | II 40 Ontology/existence/non-existence/Hintikka: if we allow the range of our quantifiers to be extended for non-existent objects, the most urgent question is: Where are these non-existent objects? E.g. "everyone's lover", e.g. "no one's lover". Both are obviously possible but unlike Meinong's round square. >Non-existence, >Round square, >Logical possibility. E.g. "the envy of all", e.g. "which is envied by everyone". N.B.: both are incompatible. The former must love the latter, but the latter cannot be loved by the first. Everyone/all/nobody/Hintikka: it is no solution here to claim that "everyone" or "nobody" only goes via existent objects ((s) that is, we must allow non-existent or possible objects (>possibilia)). Meinong/Hintikka: Meinong gained the power of his arguments from the fact that we have to allow non-existent objects here. (Also >Terence Parsons). Non-existence/non-existent objects/localization/possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: any non-existent object is in its own world. >Possible worlds. II 88 Ontology/thing/subject/object/Hintikka: the ontology of most philosophers is upside down. This is because they seek independent objects as building blocks. II 89 HintikkaVsTradition: solid objects are not the building blocks of our world. Instead, we are dealing with mass points which result in the objects as solutions of differential equations. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism, >Space-time. Geometry/Hintikka: for the same reason, geometry is more fundamental than quantum theory. Space/time/Kant/Hintikka: Kant, therefore, is right because of another reason, as our analysis shows: space and time are fundamental because the objects are formed in them. ((s) Because of the sometimes not closed curves, something is not an object in a possible world (here = time segment), but in another one). Space/time/Hintikka: the conceptual precedence of space and time also has other consequences: it shows that the expression "possible world" is inappropriate: II 90 Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression "possible worlds" presupposes that space-time is divided. II 90 Object/thing/identification/identity/individuation/space time/Hintikka: space time is still just a means of identification. What determines the result of the identification is the triple of the functions f, g, h. This function specifies the totality of the motions of the mass points in our model. They are the hard core of identification and individuation. Matter/Hintikka: identification and individuation are based on material reality. >Identification, >Individuation. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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