Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 125 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquaintance | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 79 f Acquaintance/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: 1) you need to be familiar with the reference of "a", "R" and "b" - 2) and also with the logical form to distinguish aRb from bRa - 1) concrete objects - 2) logical form. >Logic. WittgensteinVsRussell: eliminates the logical forms, which can be expressed by general propositions - we do not need experience in logic - Tractatus: thus the logical forms get great weight. Hintikka I 315f Language/Acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: Russell has to show how his (phenomenological) language of acquaintance can be applied to physical objects. >Phenomenology. Wittgenstein: has to show, in turn, how a physical language can speak about our immediate experiences. >Experience. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| All | Wittgenstein | IV 80 "All"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5.521 - I separate the term "all" from the truth-function. >Truth functions, cf. >Totality. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Arbitrariness | Wittgenstein | II 230 Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: number systems are arbitrary. - Otherwise a different notation would correspond to different facts. II 231 Of course you can give sense to new sentences and symbols. - That is why the conventions are called arbitrary. >Conventions, >Symbols, >Sentences, >Sense. II 236 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Law/Physics/Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: E.g. perturbations: it is arbitrary whether we declare our laws to be right, and say we just do not see the planet, or whether we call the laws incorrect. - If we say that a planet must be nearby, we define a grammatical rule. >Grammar, >Rules, >Laws. II 238 The laws of logic, such as those of the sentence of the excluded third are arbitrary! - In fact, we often use contradictions. - E.g. I like it and I do not like it. >Contradictions. --- VI 115 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Grammar/Rules/Purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: E.g. the rules of cooking are not arbitrary, because they are defined by the purpose of cooking. - On the other hand: Grammar: is not defined by the purpose of language - only the grammatical rules constitute the meaning. - Therefore, they are not committed to any meaning. >Meaning. - ((s) Grammar/Wittgenstein: = logic). --- IV 31 Not Arbitrary/Tractatus: the sign of the complex does not dissolve arbitrarily. - E.g. aRb. >Signs, >Complexes. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Assertibility | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 85 Language/Kripke's Wittgenstein: Tractatus: Meaning = truth condition. >Meaning, >Truth conditions, >Kripkes Wittgenstein. Problem: if we do not have a fact, we have no meanings anymore! >Facts, >States of affairs, >Nonfactualism. Wittgenstein, late(1): skeptical solution: assertibility conditions instead of truth conditions. >Truth conditions. IV 119f Kripke: the skeptical solution is logically independent of the hyper-skeptical thesis (of the impossibility of language in general) Stegmüller IV 96 Assertibility Conditions/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: this is about assertibility conditions of statements regarding obedience of rules. - But it would be wrong to set as right what seems right. Solution: compliance (namely prior to the rule, not rule prior to agreement). >Rules, >Rule following. 1. L. Wittgenstein. Philosophische Untersuchungen § 138-242. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Atomic Sentences | Popper | I 117 PopperVsWittgenstein/Tractatus: any "meaningful sentence" should be logically reducible to ’elementary propositions’. All meaningful sentences are "images of reality". His sense criterion thus coincides with the demarcation criterion of induction logic. This fails due to the problem of induction. The positivist radicalism destroyed metaphysics and natural science: the laws of nature are not logically reducible to elementary empirical propositions. >Protocol sentences, >Atomism, > Elementary Sentences, >Induction/Popper. After Wittgenstein’s criterion of meaning even the laws of nature are meaningless, i.e. not true (legitimate) sentences. This is not a distinction but an identification with metaphysics. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atomism | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 25 Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. Hintikka I 175 Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. I 176 Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. --- II 138 WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. II 157 Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. --- IV 14 Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ad IV 36ff Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/use: internal/external. >Mention, >Use, >Representation, >Logical constants, >Facts, >Signs. --- VII 122 Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. >Truth values, >Truth functions. VII 124 Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space. >Laws of Nature. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Authors/Titles | Chisholm | R. Chisholm I R. Chisholm: Die erste Person, Frankfurt, 1992 II Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R. Chisholm, Graz 1986 Marian David: Das Problem des Kriteriums und der comon sense Heiner Rutte Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis Alfred Schramm: Ein Dilemma für Chisholm "Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung" Werner Sauer Über das analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm Wolfgang Gombocz: Maxima (Wissen) Johannes Brandl Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen Leopold Stubenberg Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie (Brentano) Wilhelm Baumgartner Vom Bemerken (Brentano) Klaus Hedwig Berntano und Kopernikus Peter Koller Ethik bei Chisholm Kevin Mulligan/Barry Smith A Husserlarian Theory of Indexicality Peter Simons Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? (Brentano/Wittgenstein) III Erkenntnistheorie Graz 1977, 2004 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Authors/Titles | Wittgenstein | L. Wittgenstein I Hintikka/Hintikka Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein, Frankfurt/M, 1996 II Wittgenstein Vorlesungen 1930-35, Frankfurt 1989 III J.R. Flor Der frühe Wittgenstein J.R. Flor der späte Wittgenstein in: Hügli(Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 Der junge Wittgenstein -Der späte Wittgenstein) IV Wittgenstein Tractratus, Frankfurt 1960 V Chris Bezzel Wittgenstein zur Einführung Hamburg, 1988 VI Joachim Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 VII H. Tetens: Wittgensteins Tractatus, ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Bible | Spinoza | Höffe I 234 Bible/Spinoza/Höffe: (...) in chapters 1-15 of the Theological and Political Tractatus(1), Spinoza recognizes "neither a supernatural light" nor "an external authority”. He rejects any expertocracy of the knowledge of faith or salvation, so that any impartial reader, without being a Bible scholar or philosopher, can properly understand Scripture and then come to the insight that the Bible ultimately teaches nothing else than what mere reason alone can see: In order to become happy or to be saved, one only needs to practice justice and charity. >Theology/Spinoza, >Reason/Spinoza, >Bible criticism. 1. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 1-15 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Bible Criticism | Spinoza | Gadamer I 184 Bible Criticism/Bible/Hermeneutics/Spinoza/Gadamer: The actual problem of understanding obviously breaks open when the question of reflection arises in the effort to understand the content: How does he come to his opinion? For it is clear that such a question poses a strangeness of quite different species and ultimately means a renunciation of common meaning. >Understanding, >Sense, >Hermeneutics. Spinoza's Bible criticism is a good example of this (and at the same time one of the earliest documents). In Chapter 7 of the "Tractatus theologico-politicus"(1), Spinoza develops his method of interpreting Sacred Scripture on the basis of the interpretation of nature. From the historical data one must infer the meaning (mens) of the authors - to the extent that in these books things are told (history of miracles as well as revelations) that cannot be deduced from the principles known to natural reason. Even in these things, which are in themselves incomprehensible (imperceptibiles), everything that matters can be understood, notwithstanding the fact that the Scripture unquestionably has a moral sense as a whole, if we only recognize the spirit of the author "historically", that is to say, by overcoming our prejudices, we can think of no other things than those that the author could have in mind. Gadamer I 185 Euclid would not be interpreted by anyone as to mean that the life, studies and customs (vita, studium et mores) of the author were to be taken into account, and this also applied to the spirit of the Bible in moral matters (circa documenta moralia). Just because there are incomprehensible things (res imperceptibiles) in the narratives of the Bible, their understanding is dependent on the fact that we determine the understanding of the author's meaning from the whole of his writing (ut mentem auctoris percipiamus). And there it indeed does not matter whether what is meant corresponds to our insight, for we only want to recognize the meaning of the sentences (the sensus orationum), but not their truth (veritas). This requires the elimination of all bias, even the bias caused by our reason (all the more so, of course, by our prejudices).(§ 17). Gadamer I 185 Gadamer: The "naturalness" of the understanding of the Bible is thus based on the fact that the insightful (German: "Einsichtige") can be seen and the undiscerning (German: "Uneinsichtige") becomes "historically" understandable. >Bible. 1. Spinoza: Theologisch-politische Abhandlung. Berlin 1870 Höffe I 238 Bible Criticism/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza is also an “enlightener” regarding the critical analysis of the Holy Scriptures. Historical-critical biblical scholarship was already well advanced at that time, so that Spinoza's method, compared with Calvin's, for example, is not new. What is new, perhaps even revolutionarily new, is the political mandate given to the hermeneutics of the Bible: It must submit to the political goal of peace, which in turn must be philosophised in the service of freedom. To this end, Spinoza undermines the authority of the learned theologians and declares every person free to interpret Sacred Scripture for himself - provided the person fulfils a political condition: that his interpretation strengthens obedience to (secular) law. For otherwise neither insurrections nor civil wars can be cut short. VsRevelation: To the extent that Spinoza engages with the content of the Holy Scriptures, it takes away the rank of a timeless revelation from their basic idea. Rather, the scripture consists primarily of pictorial speeches that are directed at the imagination and the capacity of the contemporaries of the time. Insofar as the texts are merely pictorial speeches, a further-reaching hermeneutics, a second-level exegesis, seeks out their hidden subtext, the rational core. According to Spinoza, it is moral and only moral: the commandments of Scripture are meant to guide to righteousness, namely to justice and charity. Religion/Spinoza: Here, religion appears as a means of moral cultivation of people, which results in a perfecting tolerance: Whoever, like Spinoza, commits religion to the moral cultivation of man can remain faithful to his or her own religion and denomination, while at the same time recognizing those of others, for their differences have become irrelevant. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Bivalence | Dummett | II 103 Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth. - And that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences. - It goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be. >Decidability. II 103f Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice. III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions. - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances...". >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means. Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. >Redundancy theory. III (b) 74 Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence. III (b) 76 Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value. Cf. >Multi valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Bivalence | Simons | Chisholm II 184 Tractatus/Simons: in the Tractatus it is shown that a workable language cannot be perfectly bivalent. >Tractatus, >Atomism, >L. Wittgenstein, >Everyday language. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Causality | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 101 Experience/Causality/Cause/Border/Wittgenstein: all causal laws are reached through experience, therefore we cannot ascertain the cause of experience! If you give a scientific explanation, you describe an experience. >Experiences. II 123 Causality/Wittgenstein: is actually a description of a style of investigation. For the physicist, causality stands for a way of thinking. >Physics. IV 105 Causality/Law/Law of Nature/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6:32 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law 6.321 law of causality is a generic name. E.g. as in mechanics. >Natural laws. IV 108 6:36 If there were a law of causality, it might be: There are laws of nature but it turns out that you cannot determine this. IV 109 6.362 What can be described, can also happen, and what is excluded by the law of causality, cannot even be described. >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Change | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 103 Change/object/substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the objects are retained. - That is the substance of the world. - Changes are changes from a possible world to another. ((s) This is not about physical motion). - ((s) WittgensteinVsLewis)/LewisVsWittgenstein) - the simple objects are non-temporal. - ((s) not its configurations) - ((s)> Wittgenstein per S4, not pro S5: see > S4/S5; > Systems), >Substance. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Classes | Wittgenstein | II 343 Number/Class/Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein: Frege's Definition: Class of classes. A number is the class of all equal classes. Intension/Class/Quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: the two believed they could handle the classes intensionally because they thought they could transform a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why were they so keen to define the number? >Numbers. II 354 Measuring: For example, numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement, the other a calculation. >Measurements. Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that we cannot get a general view of. II 355 It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment. II 355 Classes/Assignment/Wittgenstein: Difference: Assignment in Russell's and in the usual sense: 1. by identity 2. how to assign cups and saucers by stacking. In the second case, it does not mean that they cannot be assigned in any other way. Could the same be said about Russell's assignment? No, here no other allocation could exist, if that is not given. What I want to draw attention to is not a natural phenomenon, but a matter of grammar. >Grammar. II 358 Allocation/Number Equality/Wittgenstein: the requirement that an actual allocation must be made to declare two classes equal in numbers is worrying. II 367 Classes/Wittgenstein: we must not forget that we do not always talk about the same phenomenon when we talk about two classes containing the same number of elements. >Elements, >Sets. How do you know if some pieces will disappear while they are being counted, or if others will not break? II 419 Classes/Power Equality/Number Equality/Class Equality/Wittgenstein: Question: whether the classes must actually be assigned to the paradigm to have the same number, or whether this only needs to be possible. What is the criterion of existence of the possibility of their assignment? II 431 Classes/Numbers/Wittgenstein: when it is said that you can just as well calculate with the classes as with the rational numbers, actually no substitution has taken place. The calculation is simply done with the rational numbers. II 436 Class/Method/Wittgenstein: we must distinguish between a class of coin tosses and a method (rule). >Method, >Rules. - E.g. irrational number: is defined by a method - it is a process - the square root of two is not an extension but a special rule to produce a fraction. IV 93 Classes/Sets/Tractatus: 6,031 The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics. This is because the generality we need in mathematics is not the random one. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Cogito | Wittgenstein | VII 91 Cogito/Tractatus: the "I think" that accompanies all my references to the world, is recognized by nothing what is content in a reference. I/Tractatus: the I shrinks at the end together so that it is the subject of a thought. But that is not part of the content. >Content, >I, Ego, Self. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Colour | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 117 Color/Color Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: red cannot be defined. >Definitions. I 165 Color/Color Words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if colors were only represented by different names, that would be all the incompatibility - (no contradiction, no logical incompatibility) - on the other hand: if it is real functions that the points in the field of vision project on the color space (Wittgenstein pro), then there is real logical incompatibility .- "Red" and "green" as mere names are not contradictory - but they are when it comes to one single point - "(form of thought: Third) - (Hintikka: not explicit in Wittgenstein). >Contradictions, >Names. I 191/192 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The "colors" are not things that have certain properties so that you could easily look for colors or imagine colors that we do not know yet." I 323 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not want to let the differences between the individual experience of colors disappear. - On the contrary: public language must adapt to the nature of these experiences. I 324 It is not about "publicly used", but about "accessible for the public" - E.g. Robinson: must behave in a certain way for us to say that he plays a language game with himself. >Language Game. I 349 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is impossible to drive a wedge between physical and phenomenological color attribution... I 343 ...nor between pain and pain behavior. >Behavior. I 276ff Color/Color Words/Color Concepts/Color Theory/Experience/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at the end, we may delete the color experiences from our statements. I 377 The experiences, however, can be deleted just as little as pain - Color experience is, however, not about spontaneous expressions like sensations - WittgensteinVsPsychological Color Theories - VsEffect Theories of color - color tables are neither linguistically nor behavioristically bound. I 378 But our color words are not based on tables - (that would be like trying to put the rules above the language game)... I 379 ...nor on memories. I 380 Because of their privacy, our notions cannot be used in public language games. I 381 Solution: people simply follow certain language games - this is conceptual, not psychological - in the case of "red" we choose the image that comes to us while listening - (Philosophical Investigations/PI). I 383f Color/Color Words/Impression/Expression/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: We live in a world of impressions - (E.g. color impressions) - but we can only speak of them with reference to physical colors - Representation (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 280): if the painter gives a representation in addition to the image, by what right do we call both a representation? >Sensory impressions, >Representation. I 385 Although colors have a clearer structure than feelings, there is no essential difference between sensation concepts and color concepts. >Concepts. --- II 30 Colors/Color Words/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the fact that we can speak of greenish blue, but not of greenish red, is part of grammar - not psychology - Therefore, the entire color octahedron is not part of psychology. >Grammar. II 60 We need something additional to the color word "green". II 114 Color/Color Words/Grammar/Rule/Idea/Wittgenstein: it would be useless even to try to imagine red and green at the same time at the same place - on the other hand: useful: imagining to lift a man with one hand. II 118 MooreVsWittgenstein e.g. (see above) ...red and green... is a rule for "and". >Rules. II 212 Color/Notion/Wittgenstein: in color words it is essential that we envision a mental image - but this is not a mental act that animates a symbol. >Symbols. II 269 Color/General/Wittgenstein: the many instances of red have nothing in common - there is no thing that is common to all numbers. >Numbers. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Wittgenstein | Tugendhat I 163 Complex/Wittgenstein: E.g. not: "a red circle consists of redness and circularity". Tetens VII 75 Complex/Image Theory/Tractatus: the complex characters "aRb" do not say that a stands in relation R to b, but that "a" stands in a relation to "b" (!(s) quotation marks) says that aRb. (Here no quotation marks) (3.1432) - ((s) resolution of the sign into its component parts: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relationship on the level of reality). >Relations, >Representation, >World, >Picture theory. Hintikka I 53 Mean period/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: relations and properties to the objects. Philosophical Grammar (Philosophische Grammatik): "This is the root of the bad expression: the fact is a complex of objects. >Objects, >Facts. Example "Here it is said that an ill person is compared to the combination of two things." Hintikka: such a far-reaching change of opinion is so unlikely that one should assume that the Tractatus rejects the equation of "objects" with individuals or individual things. I 68 Tractatus: renounces all complex logical forms conceived in the sense of independent entities, there is nothing left but the forms of the objects (there are no forms corresponding to complex logical propositions). I 68 Thing/complex object/Terminology/Wittgenstein: a complex object is just a thing. We know the complex objects from the point of view and know from the point of view that they are complex. I 138 ff Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences. Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic substitutes. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. I 148 et seqq. Truth Function/Tractatus/Hintikka: Main thesis of the Tractatus: (a.o.) "The proposition is a truth function of the elementary sentences". Wittgenstein/Hintikka: must therefore prove that truth-functional operations (to form complex sets of atoms) have no influence on the image character. Wittgenstein II 39 Complexity/Wittgenstein: since an infinite number of special cases belong to a general sentence, it does not make it more complex than if only three or four special cases were belonging to it. A sentence with four special cases is probably more complex than one with three, but in an infinite number of special cases it is a generality of a different logical kind. II 314 Simple/Simplicity/Complex/Composite/Sense/meaningless/Wittgenstein: Suppose you are asked whether a drawn square is composed or simple, i.e. whether it consists of parts or not. II 315 Example "Is this uniformly white object composed or simple?" The answer is "it depends." III 139 Elementary Theorem/Wittgenstein/Flor: The term elementary theorem is important as an absolute term. Otherwise we deal with ambiguity. What occurs in one context as a simple theorem could be complex in another context. This would also mean that intentional connections between sentences could no longer be excluded. III 142 There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex. IV 31 Complex/Tractatus: 3.3442 the sign of the complex does not dissolve arbitrarily even during analysis. IV 86 Complex/Tractatus: 5.5423 perceiving a complex means perceiving that its components relate to each other in such or such a way. This explains why a drawn cube can be perceived as a cube in two ways. Puzzle: here we really see two different facts. VII 75 Complex/Mapping theory/Image theory/Tractatus: not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in relation R to b, but that "a" is in relation to "b" ((s) quotation marks!), says that aRb. (No quotes here!) (3.1432). ((s) Resolution of the sign into its components: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relation on the level of reality). >Atomism, >Atomic Sentence. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Concepts | Wittgenstein | II 32 Concept/Logical Form/Wittgenstein: E.g. "thing", "complex", "number" are not concepts, but logical forms. Concept/Wittgenstein: can be expressed as a propositional function - Number: is a pseudo concept - must occur within the brackets - e.g. (Example number). Fx. >Numbers. False: (e.g.).x is a number - wrong: (e.g.).x is a thing - AF: f() = () is a human. But not: f () = () is a number! II 34 Pseudo Concept: e.g. "color", "primary color": it draws a limit to language - Concept: e.g. red: draws a line in language. >Colours, >Language. II 39 Point: (in maths) not a concept. II 254 Concept/Meaning/Experience/Wittgenstein: the fact that a thing corresponds to a concept is not an empirical fact. - In a sense, it must always have corresponded to it. - ((s) but our concepts are like rules) - ((s) therefore correspondence is not a natural fact) >Correspondence, >Representation, >Experience. On the other hand: correspondence with a pattern is an empirical fact. II 255 Rules: do not follow from the concept, but are constitutive for it - the rules are also not included in the concept - a symbol connected to a concept is just another symbol. >Symbols. --- IV 46 Formal Concepts/Function/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4,126 formal concepts - (e.g. numbers, name) - cannot be represented by a function - each variable is the sign of a formal concept. >Signs. IV 46f Pseudo Concept/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: e.g. object - the variable name x is its real sign - correct use: "(e.g.) ..." - otherwise pseudo-sentences are formed - Pseudo-sentence: -there are objects- correct sentence: e.g. -there are books - Pseudo-sentence: to speak of the number of all objects. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Constitution | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Constitution/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza(1) starts with the foundations of law and state, shows that it is neither possible nor necessary to transfer everything to the highest authorities, and draws some political doctrines from the state constitution and history of the Hebrews. He declares that the law in spiritual matters, including the decision on external religious worship, is the exclusive prerogative of the highest authorities, and ends with the argumentation goal of the entire treatise: that in a free state not everyone is allowed to act as one wants, but that one is allowed to think what one wants and say what one thinks. >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza. Chapter 16(1), which is fundamental for the philosophy of law and state, breaks with the traditional Aristotelian Stoic-Thomist theory of natural law, which extends into the Spanish late scholasticism. >Natural justice, >Aristotle, >Stoa, >Thomas Aquinas. Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Validity claims. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N. Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this, a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with one’s ability to enforce one’s right. >Law, >Rights, >Freedom, >Society. SpinozaVsRationalism: Spinoza, a rationalist who is methodologically uncompromising in ethics, surprisingly rejects any recourse to ratio here. Thus, Höffe I 236 within his metaphysics he gives priority to content-related naturalism over methodical rationalism. >Rationalism. The state treaty necessary for overcoming the state of nature is only valid under considerations of usefulness. >Contract Theory/Spinoza. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus 2. Ibid., Chap. 16 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Content | Wittgenstein | Wright I 278 Content/Contents/Wittgenstein: all substantive has softened. There are no relevant facts. Wittgenstein I 204 Content/Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the sentence "no object is red and green at the same time" is true for logical reasons but not for reasons of content. Brandom I 133 Content/Tractatus/Brandom: content needs not to be representational: e.g. logical vocabulary has content, but stands for nothing. Not every move in a language game represents something. >Representation, >Language game. Wittgenstein IV 20 Indoor/Outdoor/Tractatus: 3.13 The sentence includes everything that belongs to the projection, but not what is projected. IV 21 So the possibility of the projected, not this itself. The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it. The sentence contains the form of its meaning, but not its content. >Form, >Meaning. VI 213 We all too easily conclude that sentences that are undoubtedly fixed are sentences whose content is known. >Sentences. Example 1 + 1 = 2 can one really say that one "knows" the like? >Mathematics, >Knowledge. Thesis: if doubts are excluded, the use of the term "knowledge" is inappropriate. >Doubts, >Moore's Hands, >Skepticism. VII 85 World/Subject/Status/Position/Power/Tetens: analogously: I cannot look over my own shoulder when looking at the world. I, as the subject of my perception, do not appear as part of the world I perceive. I as a subject am not content, not object of perception. >Perception, >Circular reasing. VII 86 Subject/Tetens: I can never completely catch up with and objectify myself as a subject. I fall out of the content as a subject. >Subjects. VII 91 Subject: shrinks to what has the thought - but not as part of the content of the thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Continuants | Chisholm | II 176 ff Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant. >Mereology. Continuants are subject to flow of their parts - most parts are not necessary - no mereological essentialism. >Parts. Solution: ens sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. ens sukzessivum: President of the United States - (Simons:this is ontologically dubious). - ens sukzessivum is modally analogous to non-negative situations. >Situations: For the terminology of mereology cf. >Peter Simons. II 178 Problem: entia sukzessiva must not have any negative parts. II 179 Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization. Also see >Perdurantism, >Endurantism. Simons, Peter. Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Contract Theory | Spinoza | Höffe I 236 Contract Theory/Treaty/Spinoza/Höffe: The state contract necessary to overcome the state of nature is only valid under utility considerations. >Constitution/Spinoza, >Social contract. A categorical commandment such as the requirement to remain eternally faithful is foolish for Spinoza. In order to be able to expect loyalty to the treaty, more harm than good must therefore follow from the breach of the treaty, which endangers the political stability required for the establishment of a state. While Hobbes does not grant absolute sovereignty to the monarchy in principle, but for pragmatic reasons, according to Spinoza it belongs to democracy alone(1). >Democracy, >Th. Hobbes. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Conventions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 192 Convention/Phenomenology/Physics/Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only conventionalism Wittgenstein allows refers to the choice between different phenomenological entities and this is based on the thesis that both phenomenological entities he mentions are secondary in relation to the physical objects. I 264 How do you know someone has a toothache when they hold their cheek? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, i.e. we have reached the conventions. These "conventions" are exactly what Wittgenstein calls "criteria" in other parts of this discussion. They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of the term "toothache". "To use a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. Of course, I do not identify my feeling by criteria, but I use the same expression. I 303 Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the name relationships are conventional, but the essence of the names is not. "In logic we do not express what we want, but the nature of natural signs expresses itself." The non-conventional element of language: "But if we transform all those signs (occurring in a sentence) into variables, there is still such a class. But this does not depend on any agreement, but only on the nature of the sentence. It corresponds to a logical form of a logical archetype." Symbol/Everyday Language/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in everyday language there are all kinds of senseless connections of symbols. In order to maintain the reflection concept, these must be excluded by conventional rules. The nature of our symbols alone does not eliminate them by itself. II 27 Learning/Wittgenstein: we learn/teach the language by using it. The language convention is communicated by combining the sentence and its verification. Def "Understanding"/Wittgenstein: means to be guided by language convention to the right expectation. II 35 Conventions/Wittgenstein: presuppose the applications of language - they say nothing about its applications. For example: that red differs from blue from red from chalk is verified formally, not experimentally. II 75 Convention/Wittgenstein: assessing belongs to (learning) history. And we are not interested in the story here if we are interested in the moves of the game. Learning, >Language Learning/Wittgenstein. II 181 Observation Concepts/Theory/Criterion/Wittgenstein: what is understood in a theory as the reason for a belief is a matter of convention. II 230 Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: Number systems are arbitrary - otherwise a different spelling would correspond to different facts. II 231 Of course you can give meaning to new sentences and symbols - that is why the conventions are arbitrary. II 238 Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the Excluded Third (SaD) and the Contradiction to be excluded (SvW) are arbitrary! To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression. IV 26 Sentence/Tractatus: 3.317 the determination of the values is the variable. It is the specification of the sentence whose common characteristic is the variable. The fixing is a description of these sentences. The fixing will only deal with symbols, not their meaning. Convention: it is only essential that it does not say anything about what is described. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Correspondence Theory | Searle | III 163 Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory. >Realism/Searle, >Realism. III 211 Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways in which sentences refer to facts. And this verb is "corresponding" among others. Correspondence theory/Searle: the correspondence theory is not an attempt to define "true". III 211 Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Austin. Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated. III 212 It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (This goes back to the Tractatus image theory.) >Fact, >Picture theory. III 215 StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities. >Fact/Strawson. III 216 Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory. III 217 These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory. III 220 Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation. Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege, was used by Quine against modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument. III 230 Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant. III 235 Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Definitions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 228 Sense Data/Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing out, the legacy of the Tractatus "Showing", can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data. But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. how to show the state of California? (>Definition, >indicative definition.) Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this: I 229 "Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?" >Understanding. The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity. For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences. And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by an indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PI §§ 9,38). >Explanation. I 329 Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein:...Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. This point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. II 44/45 Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein: it just adds something to the symbolism - it does not lead beyond the symbolism - a set of symbols is replaced by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols is given in turn, via symbols. >Symbols. II 73 Definition/Wittgenstein: a definition is nothing more than an indication of a relevant rule - (s) context: e.g. negation.) >Negation. II 116 Calculating/Wittgenstein: the tables of multiplication are definitions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Deflationism | Field | I 91 Deflationism/knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist. I 108 VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel - MA: "possibly A" - I 110 Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. I 113 Deflationism/Field: deflationism does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement. Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A. II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central for meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: does not need truth conditions. II 108 Deflationism/Field: Main point: that the deflationism does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. II 114 Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that deflationism does not have to make the choice between facts. Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. II 116 Deflationism/Gavagai: for deflationism there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. II 117 Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic ascent. II 118 Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. II 119 Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the truth conditions p", or not. II 127 VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist or not a fascist". 2. It cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success) 3. It cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse 4. It cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages 5. It gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true") 6. It cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa 7. It cannot explain learning. --- Ad II 260 Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For deflationism, it is senseless to ask why "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Democracy | Spinoza | Höffe I 236 Democracy/Spinoza/Höffe: While Hobbes does not grant absolute sovereignty to the monarchy in principle, but for pragmatic reasons, according to Spinoza it belongs to democracy alone. However, democracy is "not bound by any law". Freed from all legal constraints, it amounts to a democratic absolutism, in contrast to the constitutional, legal and constitutional democracy that prevails today. Consequently, Spinoza does not speak of citizens, but of subjects. These are subject to the orders of a supreme power that is free from all over-positive criticism and correction: the subjects have "nothing other than to recognise law, except what the supreme power declares to be law"(1). >State, >Governance, >Constitution, >Violence, >Obediance, >Law. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 16. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Demonstration | Wittgenstein | Rorty VI 147 Indicative Definition/demonstrate/language/Wittgenstein: indicative definition presupposes that in the language a lot has been prepared already, demonstrating is insufficient without language to single out something. (Dennett pro, SearleVs, NagelVs). --- Hintikka I 95 Tell/demonstrate/logical proper name/Russell/Hintikka: "this" cannot be pronounced, only mentioned. - ((s) >mention / >use) - ((s) not pronounced in absence.) - ((s) The object can therefore not be mentioned.). >Logical proper name. I 102 We can only point to the objects of acquaintance. I 102 Demonstrate/tell/Tractatus/acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: we can only point at the objects of acquaintance - ((s) > Logical proper names; these have to be distinguished from >Demonstratives). I 193 Indicative demonstration/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: cannot provide a criterion of continuous identity. - This is why not anything that can be demonstrated is an object. I 228 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: sense data can only be defined by demonstrating. - Problem: must the demonstration itself be understood? - Hintikka: the listener must probably already know the logic state of the defined entity. - "there"/"this": if, at all, to introduce by ostension, then the demonstration must be quite different in this case. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein hesitates long before he drops the indicative definition. - An alternative to the concept of meaning and attribution of meaning is hard to find. - Demonstration/Wittgenstein: basic concept: binary relation of naming. (by a name) (WittgensteinVs). I 231 Middle period: successful indicative definition can provide rules for the use. >Rules --- II 34 Demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. "this is green" does not provide information about a connection between green and reality. - "This" is used as an equal sign. II 88 Language/rule/indicative definition/Wittgenstein: E.g. This is gray can either a) be a sentence or - b) a rule or a definition of language use. II 256 Ostensive definition/demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. one shows someone a red square with the words "that is red". - Then it may be that he calls squares red in future. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descriptions | Wittgenstein | II 80 Description/sign/reality/reality/world/Wittgenstein: these are signs, which we describe - in addition we need no connection to reality - otherwise we would need something in turn that connects these connections with reality - regress. - ((s) See also VsDerrida.) --- III 148ff Human/Description/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: impossible: to describe the human as a thinking, willing subject - only a description of thoughts, feelings and humans. --- IV 35 Description/Tractatus: (4023) describes the object according to its external properties - Sentence: (4023) describes reality by its internal properties. - (> Interior/exterior). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Emotions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 355 "The emotional language games are based on games of expressions of which we cannot say they are lying." >Language games. Hintikka: the simple fact that there are language games with correctable moves makes the distinction primary/secondary necessary. I 356 A child could learn a secondary language game by misleading adults about your feelings. This is in contrast to the introduction (the teaching) of a primary language game with pain expressions. I 359 When one says: "Evidence can only make the authenticity of the emotional expression probable", this does not mean: instead of certainty, only probability, but only the type of reasoning is different; it is related to the character of the language game. >Evidence, >Certainty. I 370 Propositional Attitudes/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the view criticized by Wittgenstein states that each propositional attitude is characterized by a special feeling or other special private experience. And that it is precisely these experiences that we mean by our statements about belief etc...>Propositional attitudes. I 372 At other points Wittgenstein speaks completely realistically of feelings, states of consciousness etc. only here, with the propositional attitudes it is about something completely different. III 148 Human/Description/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: as far as it can be described, it is a series of facts. However, it cannot be said that there is an inner connection between a person's thoughts, feelings and desires, not even between a person's actions and what we normally call the consequences. In describing a person, there will be no description of a thinking or wanting subject, soul or ego. It would only be descriptions of thoughts, feelings and humans. VI 97 Emotions/Wittgenstein/Schulte: are, for their part, facts. They can be described quite objectively and are in no way suitable to give value to what they refer to. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Equations | Wittgenstein | II 97 A priori/Wittgenstein: expressions that look a priori must be explained. Just as the same expression can be theorem or hypothesis, the same expression can also be equation or hypothesis. We have to distinguish. >a priori,>Identity, >Explanation. An equation is necessary. It is a rule of grammar and therefore arbitrary (sic). Error: since it is true that mathematics is a priori, it was believed that there must also be metaphysics a priori. Equation/Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: 2 + 2 = 4 is a hypothesis in physical space and requires verification. It cannot happen in the field of vision. Four drops of rainwater in two groups of two can only be seen as four drops, while in the physical world they can converge to form one large drop. II 354 WittgensteinVsRussell: but how do we know that they are assigned to each other? One cannot know this and therefore one cannot know whether they are assigned the same number, unless one carries out the assignment, that is, you write them down. II 354 Moreover, Russell's equal signs can be eliminated, and in this case the equations cannot be written down at all. >Equal sign. Difference: Measuring: e.g. numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement, the other a calculation. Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that cannot be overlooked. II 355 It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment. II 409 Def Fundamental Theorem of Algebra/Wittgenstein: according to which each equation has a solution is completely different from the theorem of multiplication: 26x13=419. It seems to be an isolated theorem which has no similarity to the latter. When we ask whether every algebraic equation has a root, the question has hardly any content. II 424 If we keep doing the math, it is a matter of physics. The mathematical question refers to the whole equation, not to one side! Identity/Meaning/Sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 The essence of the equation is not that the sides have different meanings but the same meaning. >Intensions, >Meaning. The actual essence is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions that the equal sign connects have the same meaning, as this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. VI 118 Equation/Math/Wittgenstein/Schulte: equations are pseudo-propositions. They do not express thoughts but indicate a point of view - from which you look at the terms in the equation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Ethics | Wittgenstein | IV 112 Ethics/value/Tractatus: 6.422 Ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. So the question of the consequences of the action must be unimportant - at least the consequences should not be events - because something must still be correct with this question - Solution: reward and punishment must lie in the action itself. >Actions, >Use, >Language game. --- VII 27 Sense/Tractatus/Tetens: controversial thesis: that only descriptive sentences would make sense. - Ethics: Problem: normative sentences are meaningless. >Sense. --- VII 111 Will/good/evil/ethics/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: (absolutely) good or bad will can only change the boundaries of the world - not the facts, not what can be expressed by language - solution: also in every other possible world the absolutely good/evil would be good or evil - therefore we cannot talk sensibly about the ethical. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Events | Hintikka | II 81 Event/Hintikka: an event cannot be moved in space time. That is, that events can only be identified if the worlds have a common history. >Identification, >Individuation, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity. Event/cross-world identification/Hintikka: an event is relative to a propositional attitude. For this we need a better foundation of the theory. Identification/space-time/KripkeVsHintikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: both admit (for various reasons) that space-time continuity does not always have a precise meaning. SaarinenVsHintikka: the identity of individuals, which occur in several worlds, is not always well-defined for all in this possible world. Hintikka: dito: in belief contexts it may be that an individual is identified under one description, but not under another. This must also be the case, otherwise we would be, in a sense, omniscient again. Possible worlds: we must also be careful to assume a "common reason" from all possible worlds. We certainly do not share a part of space-time, but part of the facts ((s) epistemic rather than ontological). World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/substance/Hintikka: in Wittgenstein, the world is the sum of the facts, not of the objects: to a shared space-time this would only be by additional assumptions. Cross-World Identification/Hintikka: cross-world identification seems lost when we are dealing only with a set of facts ((s) epistemic) and a common space-time is missing. II 82 Re-Identification: re-identification of physical objects is necessary to get to the cross-world identification later. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Excluded Middle | Millikan | I 229 Law of the excluded middle/"not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: the sentence of the excluded middle does not apply to simple representative negative sentences. E.g. besides the possibility that a predicate and that its opposite is true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that is precisely the possibility that the sentence does not have a certain Fregean sense. >Fregean sense, >Negation, >Existence, >Nonexistence. "P or non-p": only makes sense if "p" makes sense. Negation: its function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to say that the sentence has no sense. Sense/Millikan: whether a sentence has meaning, cannot be known a priori. >Sense, >a priori/Millikan. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his error in the Tractatus, was to believe that when everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a sense, then the negative sentence is a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalistic belief that one might know the difference between sense and non-sense a priori. >Rationalism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Existence | Wittgenstein | Chisholm II 181 Existence/Wittgenstein/Simons: we cannot claim of an atom that it exists - Atomism/SimonsVsWittgenstein: linguistic analysis cannot show that there are atoms. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences, >Existence statements. --- Hintikka I 71 Name/existence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a name cannot occur in the connection "X exists" - if red did not exist, one could not speak of it - subject/existence/general: one cannot say "There are objects" like one can say "There are books "- unity: it is nonsense to talk of the "total number of objects". >Wholes. I 73 Existence/necessary/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since "possible existence" makes no sense, we need to regard every existing thing as necessary existent. - But this is only transcendental - of course the objects do not really exist necessarily - or the necessity is not expressible. - It follows that one must also interpret the possible facts constructed of the same objects. I 92f Existence/name/object/description/Russell/Hintikka: pointless: to say "this exists" - also with everything that is designated - against: useful for descriptions. Acquaintance: also provides the reference - so that even complex logical forms are objects of acquaintance - WittgensteinVsRussell: instead actual objects (and their connections). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Existence Statements | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 72 Wittgenstein goes further than Frege: individual existence is inexpressible, only by existential quantifier (higher-order predicate) - but possible situations are considered possible (Tractatus). >Possibility, >Levels. I 126 Disjunction/disjunctive/existence/existence theorem/expressions/inexpressibility/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since existence of a single thing (particular, object) is not expressible: disjunction plus existential quantifier for types. >Existential quantification, >Quantification. --- Tetens VII 137 The Present King of France/Russell/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: solution: as an existence sentence it is not meaningless: - "there is exactly one object x, x is the current King ...." - then the sentence is just wrong - error: to interpret it as a predication: - logical form: Fa - in this case the object would have to exist, so that the sentence can make sense. >Sense, >Senseless, >Non-existence. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Experience | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 342 Private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: from Wittgenstein does not follow that there are no private experiences - HintikkaVsAnscombe - Wittgenstein: the essence of private experience is that everyone has his own - but that he does not know whether the other has the same - > Beetle-example: see "privileged access".) II 82 Experience/Wittgenstein: is not differentiated by predicates from what is not experience - it is a logical term - not a term such as "chair" or "table". II 101 Experience/causality/cause/border/Wittgenstein: one can get to all causal laws by experience - that is why we cannot find out what the cause is for the experience - if one provide a scientific explanation, one in turn describes an experience - therefore, no sentence can deal with the cause of >sense data. II 261 Experience/rule/Wittgenstein: both is easily confused: experience: that this is blue because - matches the pattern. - In contrast rule: the statement that both match, is a rule that I set up. --- IV 87 Experience/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: (according to 5552) shows the "how", not the "what" - 5634 no part of our experience is also a priori. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Expressions | Wittgenstein | II 52 Expression/Wittgenstein: the projection rules are expressed by projecting. - The intention is expressed by intending. >Intentions, >Rules, II 55 One cannot express what cannot be different at all. - So we will never reach the most fundamental. - This is the limit of language. - Essence: therefore one cannot say about the world what is essential to it, since this could not be negated. >Negation, >Essence. II 64 Sentence/express/Wittgenstein: the sentence is not expressed in the sense in which e.g. weeping is an expression of pain. >Pain. --- IV 24 Definition term/terminology/Tractatus: 3.31 each part of the sentence, which characterizes its sense, I call an expression (a symbol) - expression is all for the sense of the sentence essential, what sentences can have in common with each other. >Symbols, >Words, >Sentences. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Exterior/interior | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 15 Wittgenstein/Hintikka: 1. Language as a universal medium: thesis: it is not possible to look at the language from an outside - meaning relationships are required - 2. inexpressibility of semantics: thesis if true, every logical semantics (model theory) is impossible. - But semantics at all is not impossible. >Semantics, >Model theory, >Meaning. --- IV 35 Description/Tractatus: (4023) describes the object according to its external properties. Sentence: (4023) describes reality by its internal properties. >Levels, >Description levels, >Circular reasoning. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Facts | Searle | III 44ff Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition. Fact/Austin/Strawson: a fact is what is said, not something that is testified about. III 212 Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something. III 219 Strawson: facts are not complex things or groups of things. Fact and statement are not two independent entities and facts are not language independent. Facts are not what statements are "about". Frege: a fact is a true statement (StrawsonVs, AustinVs). Strawson: they are not identical, because they play different roles: facts are causal statements, not statements. III 214 Facts are "internal accusative" for true statements (spurious relation). III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact can only be formulated but not named. III 215 Searle: facts are not true statements. A fact has a causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. >Truth makers. III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition. III 219ff Fact/Strawson: a fact is that what is said, not something that is testified about. ((s) Like Brandom). >Fact/Brandom. SearleVsStrawson: a fact is not a true statement. A fact has causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. ((s) Like Austin). >Fact/Strawson, >Fact/Austin. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an object identified independently of facts! >Fact/Wittgenstein, >State of affairs/Wittgenstein. Otherwise one approached the traditional substance (VsWittgenstein, Tractatus). Quantification via objects is misleading. It is better to say: "there are examples". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Facts | Wittgenstein | Wright I 278 Content/content/Wittgenstein: all content has become soft. No relevant facts. --- Chisholm II 175 Fact/Wittgenstein/Simons: no object. (Like Russell). >Object. --- Wittgenstein II 31 Fact/thought/world/Ogden/Richards/Russell: Thesis: relation between sentence and fact is external. - WittgensteinVsRussell: it is internal. >Relations, >Complex. II 83 Individuals/Wittgenstein: only events. - Facts are individuals. >Individuals. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts - positive and negative relate to the form of sentences and not to the facts. >Negation. II 391 Facts/Wittgenstein: always contain something temporal, mathematical facts or sentences do not. --- III 148 Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: between facts there can be no relationships. - (Because there is no link between elementary propositions). - An object can appear in several facts. - But neither a fact nor an object can change. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences. --- IV 16 Negative fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: non-existence is a negative fact. - 2:06. >Non-existence. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Forms | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 74 Definition form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 20141 the possibility of its occurrence in facts is the form of the object. >Object. I 139 Form/Sentence/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in elementary proposition all logic operations are already included - because "fa" says the same as "(Ex)fx.x = a" - that is, we do not need a concept of identity - argument and function are already all logical constants. >Logical constants, >Logic, >Quantification, cf. >Content. I 145 The only logical constant is that what all sentences have in common. --- IV 13 Form/Tractatus: the possibility of its occurrence in facts is the form of the object - 20141 - the object is simple. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Freedom | Spinoza | Höffe I 233 Freedom/Spinoza/Höffe: [Hobbes shares with Spinoza] the view that the state is not only authorized to decide on genuinely secular matters, but also on matters of religion. >State, >Religion. SpinozaVsHobbes: 1) On the one hand, [Spinoza] seeks even more consistently a naturalistic theory of the state, free of all normative remnants, which provocatively equates law and power. 2) Liberalism/SpinozaVsHobbes: On the other hand [Spinoza] takes an uncompromisingly liberal turn. >Liberalism. [Thus] it says in the Theological and Political Tractatus(1): "The purpose of the state is in truth freedom.” >Freedom, >Trade, >Economy. 3) SpinozaVsHobbes: In the name of the freedom of citizens, Spinoza rejects Hobbes' treaty of submission and denies the secular sovereign the jurisdiction over religious matters. >Th. Hobbes, >Rule/Hobbes, >Order/Hobbes. Once again he advocates a restriction of public power: In a free state, everyone is free to think what one wants and can say what one thinks. In terms of institutional theory, Spinoza argues for a mutually controlling network of bodies in which as many individuals as possible should be involved. >Institutions. Höffe I 235 Because (...) theology or faith and philosophy are both clearly different and complement each other without any problems, "the freedom to philosophize", as already the extended book title of the tract (1) explains, can be admitted without impairment of faith. >Religious belief. Höffe I 236 In overcoming theological and political prejudices Spinoza pursues two goals. He wants to fend off the then life-threatening accusation of atheism, but above all he wants to defend "the freedom to philosophize" against the two then most powerful authorities, the religious community and the state. >Prejudices/Spinoza. Spinoza: (...) "not only can freedom be granted without harm to piety and peace in the State, but it cannot be abolished without at the same time abolishing peace in the State and piety"(3). Höffe: One could continue: The freedom of philosophy even allows openly professing atheism. However, there is no question that the time was not ripe for this continuation. Distinction between freedom of action and freedom of philosophy: the sovereign has the right to decide on all actions, because in obedience to reason everyone has "decided once and for all to transfer the right to exercise one’s live according to his own judgement, to the sovereign"(1). To act differently at one’s own discretion is considered nefarious; Spinoza does not provide for a right of resistance. On the other hand, one was not obliged to "judge and think in this way" (ibid.). >Obedience, >Thinking. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 20 2. B. Spinoza, Tractatus politicus 3. Tractatus theologico-politicus |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Functions | Wittgenstein | II 332 Function/arithmetic/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell believed one could not talk about the number 3 independently of each function - the number would be a property of a function. >Numbers. WittgensteinVsRamsey: the construction of a relation does not depend on finding a phenomenon. >Relations. --- IV 68 Operation/Tractatus: (5.25) not the same as function: function cannot be its own argument, but rather an operation - operation: E.g. logical sum, logical product, negation. >Negation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| God | Thomas Aquinas | Holz II 106 God/Thomas Aquinas: God is not the mirror of all things, but things are a mirror of God - but the recognition of a thing in the mirror is speculative recognition- Descartes: God cannot deceive because of his perfection. --- Geach I 318 Relationships/God/Human/World/Aquinas/Geach: human relations: are "real" (within the world). Divine relations to humans: are not "real". - E.g., 1. "God rules the world" 2. "The world is ruled by God" - both are logically equivalent. And both are true according to Thomas Aquinas, but only the second is a "real" relation according to him (because only secular things can enter into real relations) - this is Thomas Aquinas' "deep understanding that the way our mind works must not be the way, as things are". AquinasVsWittgenstein: that is, that our mind is not necessarily a "mirror of the world" (Tractatus). >Tractatus, >L. Wittgenstein, >World, >World/Thinking, >Reality, >Mirror/Rorty. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| God | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 374 God/Divine Viewpoint/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if God looked into our heads, he would find the feelings, but not the reference. Hintikka: in the examples where he cannot see anything, it is about meaning. (>Intentions), >World, >Limits. II 110 Example 1/3 = 0.333... here there are no certain sets of numbers after the decimal point, and even for a higher being they could not exist. II 407 The claim that God overlooks the entire extension of π has no meaning at all. The only criterion of existence is the actual proof, if there is any proof. IV 114 God/Tractatus: 6,432 The nature of the world is completely indifferent to the higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. >Religious belief. VII 115 God/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: Diary notes during the time of Tractatus: The world is given to me, i.e. my will approaches the world from outside as something finished. Therefore we have the feeling that we are dependent on a foreign will... In a certain sense we are dependent and that on which we are dependent, we can call God". (1969, p. 166f), Wittgenstein orally: "I am not a religious person, but I cannot help it: I see every problem from a religious point of view" (according to Maurice O'Connor Drury, (Malcolm 1993(1), Rhees 1987(2), p., 121)). 1. Norman Malcolm: Wittgenstein: A religious point of view? Routledge 1993 2. Rush Rhees, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Portraits und Gespräche, Frankfurt/M. 1987. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| I, Ego, Self | Wittgenstein | Frank I 38ff I/Wittgenstein: Object-use by means of external characteristics: To erroneously believe a bump on the forehead - subject-use: immediately, no criteria, no self-identification no error possible. - Genitive subjectivus: Statement of the person, not about people - no characterization, no error. >Incorrigibility, >self-identification. Frank I 43 I/Wittgenstein: "I have a toothache" and "He has a toothache" are not values of a common propositional function. - "I have a toothache" denotes no owner. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 --- Hintikka I 99 Nature/property/possession/Wittgenstein: de facto, but not essential relationship. The relation of possession is not part of the essence of objects. One of these objects is also the empirical ego. In this sense, Wittgenstein says: "The solipsism coincides with pure realism". >Solipsism. --- Wittgenstein II 226 I/WittgensteinVsDescartes "I" has no outstanding position among the words - it is simply used in the language practice. >Use, >Practise, >Language. --- Wittgenstein IV 91 I/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5631 there is no sense in which in the philosophy can be talked non-psychologically about the ego - the philosophical ego is not the human - not the body - 5.64 it shrinks to a point - to this point reality is coordinated - the subject is the limit of the world - with that it can be shown that solipsism is correct. - But it is not impossible to say it. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Identity | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 22 Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) it is agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. >Facts, >States of affairs. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322) I 140 Note Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. --- Wittgenstein I 364 Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. >Language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence. >Evidence. --- Wittgenstein II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. >Rules. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign. --- II 338/339 Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing? What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity. II 416 WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. --- IV 103 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. >Equations. --- VI 179 Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. VI 183 Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. >Criteria. But for my pain? There is no criterion! >Pain. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Infinity Axiom | Wittgenstein | IV 83 Infinity axiom/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5534 would be expressed in the language in that way that there would be infinitely many names with different meanings. >"Not enough names..." Solution: if we avoid illusionary sentences (E.g. "a = a" E.g. "(Ex) x = a") (this cannot be written down in a correct term notation) - then we can avoid the problems with Russell's infinity axiom. >Infinity. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Inflationism | Field | II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content. >Truth conditions. Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory. >Deflationism. Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition. >Verification conditions. Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism. II 126 Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white). >Homophony. II 114 Deflationism: can assume facts. >Facts, cf. >Nonfactualism. Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p". II 126 Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks. >Language dependence. Inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts). II 220 Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy. >Indeterminacy, >Translation. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: Inflationism needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald". Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositionally. >Compositionality. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intensions | Wittgenstein | II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. >Set theory. II 416 Intension/extension/Mathematics/Wittgenstein: in everyday language intension and extension are not interchangeable - E.g. I hate the man in the chair - I hate Mr. Schmitz - on the other hand in mathematics: here, there is no difference between "the roots of the equation x² + 2x + 1 = 0 and "2"- in contrast difference: counting bodies ((s) extension, also writing down) is something different than to determine them with a law ((s) intension) - Wittgenstein: law and extension are completely different - ((s) >Physics). >Equations, >Mathematics. --- III 136-139 Elementary PropositionVsIntension - (protection of formal logic) - intension/meaning/Tractatus/Flor: irrelevant - it is always about extension. >Extension, >Meaning, >Propositions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Language | Wittgenstein | Rorty III 40 Wittgenstein: naturalizes consciousness and language, in which all questions about relations to the universe are transformed in causal questions. (Also Ryle and Dennett). >Causality, >Causal relation, cf. >Naturalism. --- Rorty VI 134 Language/Wittgenstein: You cannot find a method with which it is possible to step between the language and the object. >Reality, >World, >Perception. --- Hintikka I 22 Language/ontology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one cannot specify in the language, how many objects there are. - These are given by name. - ((s) one can well give a list - Wittgenstein: The existence of an object cannot be expressed - only through the use of the name in the language. >Use, >Names. I 41 Language relativism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Could a lion talk, we would not understand him." (I 323 Hintikka: a lion has other sensory data) - Hintikka: in mathematics, there is no "common behavior". - In different systems different sentences are true and false. >Truth values. I 190 Basic physical language/explanation/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "metaphysics" - (> Large typescript) - Instead: phenomenology is grammar. - E.g. one should not decide whether two red circles on a blue background are two objects or one. - Each transcription must depend on the one of the first sentence. - Uncertainty about the grammar - Hintikka: a) the objects are the colors - b) the objects are the spots. - Both phenomenological. - Both are secondary to the language of physical objects and their properties. - Wrong question: how many objects are there. >Grammar, >Metaphysics. WittgensteinVsPhenomenology: this wanted to decide how many objects there are. I 255 Language/Wittgenstein/Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242/Hintikka: language is not a calculus. - It has no concrete defined rules - not that the rules were vague - but the question arises only in the context of language games. >Language game, >Rules. --- II 60 Language/signal/Wittgenstein: E.g. resolution characters in music: is a signal in the strict sense. - Language does not consist of signals. - A signal must be explained. - In the same sense as colors. - In addition to the color word "green" we still need something extra. II 226f Language/Wittgenstein: there are actually no gaps in our language - even if there are not enough words to describe the changes of the sky. - It is also not a shortage of our vision that we cannot count the raindrops. - Also impossibility can be expressed - E.g. that an object would be simultaneously green and red - solution: it is excluded by arbitrary convention. --- VI 74 Language/Tractatus/Schulte: language disguises the thought - from the outer form one cannot infer the form of thought - it can be formed according to quite different purposes. VI 116 Language/purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: one can do anything with the language, but none of these purposes determines the nature of language. Not even such a thing as understanding or "expression of thoughts". >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Thoughts. --- Tetens VII 74 Language/facts/Tractatus/Tetens: Question: Could there also be an irreducible sign for each fact? Then no two fact-signs would have common elements (e.g. words). - Problem: then it could not be shown that an object is found in several situations. >Facts, >Signs. VII 75 Logic: would be impossible. ((s) No conclusions, no syllogisms)> fine-grained/coarse-grained. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Laws | Wittgenstein | Popper I 117 Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein (oral communication, Schlick, I 136): "Instructions for the formation of statements". >Natural laws. --- Kursbuch 8 IV 98 (German) Infinity/Law/Wittgenstein: only finite series determine the course of the law. >Rules, >Rule following, >Infinity. II 35f Infinity/Wittgenstein: "infinite" is not an answer to the question "how many? The word "all" refers to an extension, but it is impossible to refer to an infinite extension. Infinity is the property of a law, not an extension. >Extensions, >Intensions, II 101 Experience/Causality/Cause/Border/Wittgenstein: all causal laws are reached through experience, therefore we cannot find out what is the cause of experience! If you give a scientific explanation, you describe an experience. >Experience. II 236 It is arbitrary whether we declare our laws right and say that we simply do not see the planet, or whether we call the laws wrong. Here we have a transition between a hypothesis and a grammatical rule. II 237 Hertz's mechanical theory replaces the three Newtonian laws with a single new one. But this is not a new mechanism. However, this is a new part of mathematics. II 238 Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the excluded third and the one of the contradiction to be excluded are arbitrary! To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression. >Conventions, >Logic. II 417 Determining the number of bodies by law is something completely different from counting them. >Measurements, >Descriptions. IV 105 Causality/Law/Natural Law/Tractatus: 6.32 the causality law is not a law, but the form of a law. 6.321 "Causality Law" is a generic name. For example, as in the mechanics. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Limits | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 19 Limit/language/Wittgenstein is shown by the impossibility to describe a fact, without repeating the corresponding sentence - Hintikka: = thesis of linguistic relativity. I 22 The relationship between name and object cannot be expressed in language - not even the concept of existence - only presentable by the use of the name. >Use, >Words, >Names. I 36 Limit/language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: important: inner limit: the ability of what can be expressed in language about the language. - E.g. When I say that language can be extended, I must say what I mean. >Meaning (Intending). I 86f Limit/world/object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the world as the whole of objects and the with that given limit would be inconceivable, if not also relations would belong to the objects. >Object. --- II 56 Limit/language/Wittgenstein: E.g. expectation, fulfillment must have a shared expression - e.g. "red" must occur in the appropriate sentences. Limit/expression: this shared can in turn not be described by a sentence. II 68 A symbolism cannot explain itself. - Only by another symbolism - a single symbol can be explained, but only by another symbol. - (> Regress). --- VI 89 Logic/limit/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic will not be given a limit through the use of the language, of course. - It is, so to speak, the common framework of my and your language. >Logic, >Language, >World. --- Tetens VII 78 Limit/image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Tetens: Problem: a picture cannot display its form of image. (2,172) - Problem: for this it would have to be outside its form of presentation. (2174)) - this also applies to sentences - sentence: cannot represent what he has in common with reality - or he would have to set up himself outside the logic. VII 81 Language/Limit/Tractatus/Tetens: with sentences about the language, we end up with "meta-levelled" tautologies - E.g. instances of the Talski-schema. - (E.g. ((s) meaning postulates that are uninformative). >Tautologies, >Levels, >Description levels, >Circular reasoning, >Meaning postulates. VII 82 Logic/existence/Tractatus/Tetens: but the logic cannot tell what the case is, otherwise it would exclude options. - ((s) so the logic would have to exclude logical possibilities). (See 5.61). VII 85f Subject/limit/world/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: Although self-reflection is possible, I always add something what I cannot catch up with: the way in which I think at the moment about the world. - Therefore, I exist as a subject in the world not like the objects - with a thought about the world I still win a property additionally. VII 89 Accuracy of solipsism: does not show itself in the content, but in the completion of the higher-level thought. VII 91 Subject: shrinks to what the thought has - but not as part of the content of thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Logic | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 138 Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. >Logical constants, >Representation. I 205 Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. --- II 160 Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important. >Sentences, >Words, >World, >Symbols. II 238 Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below. >Signs, >Use. II 328 The sentence of the excluded third is universal. II 327 Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. --- VI 85 Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). VI 89 Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. VI 118 Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show: Explanation/Wittgenstein). --- IV 101 Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell: > Ostension/Wittgenstein). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Logical Constants | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 139 Logical Constants/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the structural elements, often referred to as logical constants, and which are the main tool for creating complex sentences from simple ones, are not necessarily needed. I 140 Logical Constants/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: were there is composition, there are argument and function, these are already all logical constants. >Compositionality. Tractatus: 5,441 "Here it becomes clear that "logical objects" and "logical constants" (in the sense of Russell and Frege) do not exist. For: "all results of truth operations with truth functions are identical, which are one and the same truth function of elementary propositions. II 79 Sheffer Stroke/notation/Wittgenstein: makes the internal relation visible. - WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing style does not make clear that p v q follows from p.q. >Sheffer stroke. VI 95/96 Logical Constants/Elementary Proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: new: priority of a sentence-system compared to single sentences - formerly VsLogical constants - (do not connect any objects, this is still true for Wittgenstein) - but wrong: that the rules have anything to do with the internal structure of sentences. New: they form part of a broader syntax. V 70 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "logical objects" or "logical constants" in Russell's sense do not exist. IV 71 Logical Constants/Tractatus: 5.441 this disappearance of the apparent logical constant also occurs when "~(Ex) . ~fx" says the same as "(x).fx" or "(Ex).fx.x =a" the same as "fa". IV 79 Logic/Symbol/Sign/Sentence/Tractatus: 5.515 Our symbols must show that what is indicated by "v" "u", etc. (logical constants) must be propositions. (Logical Form). >Propositions, >Symbols. IV 80 "p" and "q" requires even the "v","~" etc.! If the sign "p" in "p v q" does not represent a complex sign, then it cannot make sense on its own. But if "p v p" makes no sense, then "p v q" cannot make sense either. >Sense, >senseless. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Logical Form | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 80 Logical Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the objects are constitutive of the logical forms of atomic sentences - the complex shapes are not independent objects - form of the object: what is a priori true of it - determines the connectability -> Compositionality. --- IV 25 Logical Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: we get it when we transform all arbitrary characters into variables - it depends only on the nature of the sentence, not arbitrariness - this class corresponds to the logical form. --- Tetens VII 133 Predication/Logical Form/Tractatus/Tetens: a) "the object A has the property F " ((s) predication), Fa) - b) "any object with property F, also has the property G" ((s) Universal quantification (x) (Fx> Gx)). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Logical Space | Logical space: is the designation by L. Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for a set of independent (atomic) sentences that are connected with the truth value true or false. Some of these sentences will represent facts or elements of facts. These facts can be conceived as possible worlds and localized as points in the logical space. |
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| Meaning (Intending) | Wittgenstein | McDowell I 52 If we say that we mean that this is so, we do not stop somewhere before the fact: but we believe that this or that is so and so. Nagel I 69/70 The Meaning is a process which accompanied these words. For no process could have the consequences of meaning. According to McGinn I 108 Meaning/Wittgenstein: note § 16: the mistake is to say that meaning consists in something. Hintikka I 38/39 Meaning/Knowledge/Wittgenstein: but when one says: "How should I know what he means, I only see his signs? so I say: How should he know what he means, he also only has his signs". >Knowledge. "Language can only be explained by speech, so language cannot be explained." (Ms.108, 277f.) I 266 Meaning/Criterion/Wittgenstein/late: Philosophical Investigations § 146 and § 190: "One can now say how a formula is meant, which transitions are to be made. "What is the criterion for how a formula is meant? For example, the way in which we constantly use them, how we were taught to use them. >Criteria. I 266/267 It is fundamentally wrong to believe that Wittgenstein used a single "critical relationship" that establishes the link between the meaning and the "criterion" represented by the word. In late philosophy, the term "criterion" suffers the same fate as the term "calculus" or even the term "grammar": it becomes dependent on the language game. >Language game. II 212 Meaning/Wittgenstein: "did you mean what you said?" Or, "what did you mean?" Two different uses of "mean". All kinds of things can justify the claim that you mean what you say, but none of these things need to be a mental process that accompanies the words. II 317 Imagination/Intention/Meaning/Wittgenstein: it is a deception to believe that what is meant is produced in the mind of the other through an indirect process: through the rule and the examples. III 220 Understanding/Wittgenstein/Late/Flor: for this, it is enough to be able to use a word correctly in a given situation. No mental state or psychic process. (The same applies to meaning). >Understanding. IV 39 Image/Picture/Similarity/Describing/Meaning/Truth/Negation/Reversal/Tractatus: 4.062 Can't one communicate with false sentences as before with true ones? No! If by "p" we mean ~p, and it behaves as we mean it, then "p" is true in the new understanding and not wrong. 4.0621 But it is important that the signs "p" and "~p" can say the same thing, because it shows that nothing corresponds to the sign "~" in reality. >Reality. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Measurements | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 77 Measuring/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Suppose you use a pole to find out whether the bottom of a river is sandy or muddy. This pole cannot be used in the same way to find out how the pole itself is made. On the other hand, it is easily possible to use the pole to find out whether it can be used to reach the ground at all. >Circular reasoning. I 176 "...when I apply a scale to a spatial object, I apply all scale lines at the same time." I 216 ff Comparability/World/Picture/Measuring/Verification/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: One cannot compare a picture with reality if one cannot measure it against it. You have to be able to put the sentence onto reality. >Reality. I 218 Measuring/Wittgenstein: The scale must always be in the same room as the measured thing. Only the sentences of a physicalistic language can be compared with facts and therefore also represent them. II 29 Measuring/Wittgenstein: Sentence: e.g. "apply the scale three times to G, and you will get the height of G". Then the existence of G and also that of the scale belongs to the sentence. The height of G, on the other hand, is not part of the sentence. II 184 Def Time/Wittgenstein: is what is measured with a clock. >Time. If we know several measurement methods that do not contradict each other, we do not require a specific method to explain these words. But test methods give different meanings to the expression "have the same color" . II 236 Measuring/Wittgenstein: "Greenwich's scale is actually one foot long" there is no point in saying that. It is a definition. Example: Originial Meter. II 238 Measuring/Scale/flexible/Wittgenstein: For example, we could also call all the values read at different temperatures the real length. To the objection that "I like it and I don't like it" which is not a case to which "contradiction" applies, corresponds the objection that a scale is useless unless it is rigid. However, in some cases elasticity may be desired. II 354 ...besides, Russell's equal signs can be eliminated, and in this case the equations cannot be written down at all. Difference: Measuring: e.g. numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement, the other a calculation. >Calculus. Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that cannot be overlooked. II 355 It is a damaging prejudice to believe that we are dealing with an experiment when using strokes. II 333 Pattern/Meter/prototype metre/Scale/Measurement/Wittgenstein: the pattern does not belong to the application, but to the language - the existence of the metre measure does not guarantee that there is something that is one metre long. Setting the scale is a decision, not a discovery. II 367 Measuring/Wittgenstein: it is also when I am asked whether two pieces of wood are of equal length, and then I put them on top of each other and answer yes. You might ask if I know that nothing happened to them when they were measured. The answer is that talking about equality is no longer relevant if any method of establishing equality is rejected! II 368 If you claim the equality of lengths, it means that you say something about the method of investigation. >Method, >Comparisons. II 437 Root/Construction/Wittgenstein: For example, the diagonal is turned to the number line. Without the construction √2 is not the length. This length is not an approximation. It has nothing to do with measuring by a meter. III 231 Prototype metre/Wittgenstein/Flor: precisely because it is a paradigm - a means of creating the language game, it is not something that is produced in the language game. >Language game. VI 148 Measuring/Wittgenstein/Schulte: one is to describe the measurement method, another is to find the results. But what we call "measuring" is determined by a certain consistency of measurement results. VI 165 Scale/Measuring/Tractatus/Schulte: the image is linked to reality: it reaches to it. It is like a measure of reality. Only the outermost points of the scale lines touch the object. Thesis: a system of sentences is applied to reality like a yardstick. But I apply all scale lines at the same time. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Models | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 129 Wittgenstein/Tractatus: the sentence is an image of reality, the sentence is a model of reality as we think it is. (4.01). >Picture theory. VII 62 Model/Tractatus: We take pictures of reality. (2.1) These pictures are models (2.12). >Picture (image), >Picture (mapping). VII 66 Model/Tetens: the model has certain characteristics and relations in common with the corresponding objects in the world. >World, >Reality, >Similarity. VII 69 Model/Tractatus: the model itself is a part of reality and therefore consists of facts. Hence: (2.141) the picture is a fact. Mapping/Form/World/Tractatus: the "form of the mapping" is the possibility that things relate to each other like the elements of the image (2.151) Model/Tetens: exists if they behave in exactly the same way. Problem: at first, model and reality have nothing to do with each other. Solution: Assignment rule. (2.1513 – 2.1515) VII 72 Model/Tractatus/Tetens: For example, the relationship between record and score is a model for the relationship between language and reality. >Language. VII 78 Model/Tetens: there are also higher level models, e.g. for the ratio of a construction model to the original. This shows a limit of mapping. >Limits. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Mysticism | Wittgenstein | McGinn I 115 Magical theories rather play a subliminal role than an official role: approaches to Wittgenstein: A philosophical contemplation (The brown book, 263 ff): one could almost imagine that the naming was performed by a strange sacramental act, and that this is a magical relationship between the name and the thing. Cf. >Magical thinking. It is a common theme in Wittgenstein, that meaning triggers strange and occult ideas, The Tractatus is rather a place for magic ideas, of which Wittgenstein moves away later. Wittgenstein III 133 Philosophy/Wittgenstein: thesis: the most important of philosophy is to distinguish the meaningful and logically sayable from the unspeakable. What can be said is unimportant to human existence. The mystical is not what the world is, but that it is! VII 21 Pointing/Saying/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein refuses to say that there is nothing that cannot be meaningfully described. >Description, >Senseless. Solution/Tractatus: there is "inexpressible" that "shows itself". This is the "mystical" (> Tractatus 6.522). Cf. >Circular reasoning. VII 25 Whole/World/Tractatus/Tetens: the expression "the whole reality" means the world "within the limits of my language". This can be logically displayed in a meaningful way. The rest is not nothing, but can only be shown. Whole/Tractatus: "the feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical" (6.45). >Wholes. VI 106 Golden Bough/Frazer/Wittgenstein/SchulteVsFrazer: the book suffers from the weakness of presenting ritual and magical customs as if they were based on pseudo-scientific theories. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Natural Justice | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Natural justice/Aristotle. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N.Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with his ability to enforce his right.(1) >Freedom, >State, >Society, >Individuals, >Community, >Law, >Rights. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Natural Laws | Wittgenstein | Hempel I 98ff Law of Nature/Wittgenstein: because they cannot be verified completely, they are not statements but only instructions for the formation of statements. >Statements, >Law statements. --- II 99 Laws of Nature/causal necessity/Wittgenstein: the laws of nature are not outside the phenomena - they belong to the language and to our description of things - when ones discusses them, one cannot ignore how they manifest themselves physically. II 131 Justification/laws of nature/Wittgenstein: laws of nature can be justified, rules of grammar not. >Rules, >Grammar, >Justification. II 163 Law of Nature/law/Wittgenstein: 2. Law of Thermodynamics/Wittgenstein: it is not clear a priori that the world continues to lose its order over time. It is a matter of experience. II 164 However, it is not a matter of experience, that it must come to an equal distribution of nuts and raisins, if one whirls them. That something happens with necessity, there is no experience. That one presupposes another force to explain the separation. (For example, specific weight). Laws of nature/Hertz/Wittgenstein: Hertz has said where something does not comply with his laws, there must be invisible masses, to explain it. WittgensteinVsHertz: this statement is neither right nor wrong, but it can be practical or not. Hypotheses like talking of "invisible masses" and "unconscious mental events" are standards of the expression. >Hypotheses. Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: we believe it has to do with a law of nature a priori while it is a standard of expression: E.g. So like saying "Actually, everyone is going to Paris, II 165 Although some do not arrive, but all their displacements are preparations for the trip to Paris." --- IV 109 Law of Nature/explanation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6,371 laws of nature are not explanations of natural phenomena - Tractatus 6,372 So they stay with the laws of nature, like the older with God. IV 105 Law of Causality/Law of Nature/Tractatus: 632 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. >Causal laws. IV 108 Causality/form/show/say/Tractatus: 636 if there were a law of causality, it might be: "There are laws of nature". But one cannot say that, it turns out. >Causality, >Causal explanation. --- Tetens VII 122 Civilization/WittgensteinVsCivilization/WittgensteinVsModernity/Tetens: believes he can explain everything and thinks all important is explained once the facts are scientifically explained in principle. It is an illusion that the world is explained when we know the laws of nature. >Explanation. VII 123 Definition laws of nature/Tractatus/Tetens: are the truth functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. Neither through logic nor through the laws of nature. The laws of nature also not explain natural phenomena. (> Tractatus 6.317). VII 124 The laws of nature are also not the last. That is the logical space, the space of all possible distributions of truth values to the elementary propositions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Necessity | Wittgenstein | I 73 ff Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity! >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Possible worlds. I 157 Necessity/Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to Wittgenstein, such logical necessities can always be recognized by the logical form of the sentences concerned. This is represented by purely notation-bound characteristics. "It is the special characteristic of the logical propositions that one can recognize only by their form that they are true." All necessary connections are ultimately tautologies. This sheds a new light on "image theory". I 165/166 Color/Colour Word/Necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colour incompatibility means a violation of Wittgenstein's idea that purely logical needs are the only necessities is now being put in a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of the color terms (or the correct notation). Is a) each individual color represented by a single-digit predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical kind. b) Dots in a color space: then the incompatibilities of the different colors do not cause any non-logical necessities. (Wittgenstein is certainly not familiar with this alternative from Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of colour space. However, one cannot live up to this concept if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates . II 79 Necessity/necessary/Wittgenstein: a necessity in the world corresponds to an arbitrary rule in language. II 134 Necessary/Necessity/Physics/Logic/Wittgenstein: we use the expression both in logic and in physics, because there is a certain analogy between them. II 168 The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". VI 124 WittgensteinVsNecessity/Schulte: the necessity of the logical "must" is only agreement. VI 169 Necessity/Wittgenstein: not for objects, only for terms - not for colours (that there is necessarily still a level between them) but for the representation system (agreement). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Negation | Millikan | I 221 Not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: Thesis: "not" is an operator who operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the sense of the entire sentence. >Operator. Negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences cannot have non-existent facts as the real value. Reason: Negative facts do not have causal forces that could play a role in a normal explanation. Negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. E.g. "not-p" is called "the fact that -p does not exist" In a similar way, Wittgenstein has understood it as well. >Fact. N.B.: we had said above, that existence sentences are not representations. Image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but understood sentences of the form "x does not exist" are understood in this way as to map a non-existent fact. Then the variable "x" in "x does not exist" does not go via names of single objects (objects, elementary objects) but via representations of possible states (possible facts). >Picture theory. Meaning/Non-existence/Negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning ((s)> Non-Existence/Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology it means that they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time, he could claim that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. N.B.: that made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: could we not maintain at least half of this equivalence? The from "not-p" to "that -p does not exist"? >Equivalence. MillikanVsWittgenstein: No, not even this we can do. If Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that -p does not exist," then that would mean for my position that negative sentences do not map world states and are not representations. Millikan: instead, they would represent linguistic facts, "not-p" would then be an icon, but it does not represent, whereby a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Protoreferent/Millikan. "p" would not be a representative of "not-p" but a protoreferent. Question: would "not-p" be an icon of which the "p is false" ((s) linguistically) explicitly represented? Vs: then "not" would be no operator anymore! Not/Negation/Operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: i.e. The mapping rule for "not-p" is a function of the mapping rule for "p". 1. If "not" is not an operator, it might happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p," but still the sense of "not-p" absurd. 2. If "not-p" says "that -p does not exist", "not-p" must also be true if some variant in "p" is not fully determined, i.e. has no adapted meaning. E.g. "Pegasus was not a winged horse" e.g. "The present king of France is not bald" would be true sentences! 3. Certainly, it is the case that "'p' is false" at least maps (icons) that "p" has no real value. Correspondingly, "x does not exist" maps then the fact that "x" does not have referents. N.B.: if "not-p" says "that -p does not exist" it still maps a negative fact. > Facts/Millikan. I 224 Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: Thesis: negative sentences, whose opposites are normal representative sentences, must themselves represent positive facts. >Prepresentation, >Sentence. I 224 Negation/stabilization function/not/representation/Millikan: what is the stabilization function of "not" in normal representing sentences? It is not needed to "erase" the rest of the sentence. "Erase": sometimes occurs, but then it is called "Sorry" or "I did not mean that". Negation/"not": its function is not to produce no believe. That would not be a function. Eigenfunction: of "not" is relational. That is, it is a (mathematical) function of the eigenfunction of the sentence without "not". Sentence: has the function of producing a belief. Likewise, a sentence with "not" has to produce something that has a potential benefit. Negative sentence: perhaps it should eliminate a false belief? But that would be similar to "does not exist" works. >Existence, >Nonexistence. I 224 Negative sentence/"not"/imperative/Millikan: an imperative like "bring no dirt into the house" has very well a positive function. E.g. if you do it anyway, it is not done with an excuse "I did not want it". For the command was not, to do it without purpose. Not sufficient: "I did not intend it". Correct: I intended not to do it. Not sufficient: "I did not know I did it" Correct: you have to know that you do not do it. Not/imperative: here the usage is not parallel to the function of "does not exist". I 257 Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence maps a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Negation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 150 Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation. II 51 Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. II 51 Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use. II 72 Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table). II 74 Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. II 75 Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. >Chess. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. >Facts. II 114 A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. >Thoughts/Frege. II 221 Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. >Picture theory. II 234 Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. >Generality. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions. Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so: E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room". >Disjunction. Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation. E.g. "I like it and I do not like it". II 239 Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application. >Use, >Signs. E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover? II 276 Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. >Symbols. II 282 Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent. The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification, > semantic ascent). II 288 Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. >World, >Reality. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean. >Meaning (Intending). II 289 Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid. II 290 Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. >Understanding. --- IV 79 Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Non-Existence | Hintikka | II 37 Non-existent objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. >Possibilia. HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka/thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically). >Model theory. Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid? >Fictions. Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. >Relevance. II 38 Ontology/language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on the ontological status? >Ontology. Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels. N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional! Model Theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot. Acceptance/acceptability/inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic. Singular Terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms requires us to use an existential generalization. And thus also requires a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. > II 39 Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed.) >Existence statements. II 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because Montague assumes the domain of individuals to be constant). Individual Domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. Problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for". ((s) That is, that both are looking for the same unicorn). >Objects of thought, >Cob/Hob/Nob exmaple/Geach. Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual? |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Numbers | Wittgenstein | II 32 Number/Wittgenstein: not a concept, but a logical form. II 283 Numbers/cardinal/Wittgenstein: that there are infinitely many cardinals, is a rule that one sets up. II 343 Number/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege: a number is a property of a property. - Problem: E.g. for blue-eyed men in the room. - Then the five would be a property of a property - to be a blue-eyed man in the room - e.g. to express that Hans and Paul are two, they would then have a property in common, which not exactly belongs to the other. - ((s) each would have the property to be different from the other.) - Solution/Frege: the property of being Hans or Paul. II 344 Number/Wittgenstein: are not merely signs. - One can have two items of the form three, but only one number. - ((s) WittgensteinVsFormalism). >Formalism. II 360 Number/Definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: numerical equality is a prerequisite for a clear correspondence. - Therefore, Russell's definition of the number is useless. - ((s) Because it is circular reasoning if you want to define number via illustration). II 361 Definition/Wittgenstein: instead of a definition of "number" we must figure out the rules of usage. >Rules, >Use. II 415 Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is a property that is common to all triads. - ((s) Frege: classes of classes - does Frege not mean objects with classes (instead of properties)?). II 416 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. - E.g. Extension: it would be a tautology to say, ABC is three. - In contrast, meaingful: to say, in this room are three people. >Functions, >Extensions, >Sets. --- IV 93 Definition number/numbers/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 6,021 - the number is the exponent of an operation. Waismann I 66 Def Natural numbers/Wittgenstein: those to which induction can be applied in proofs. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Object | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 34 Object/Wittgenstein: assumes that we only recognize an object, if we are able to think a thought about this object. Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. >">Private language. --- Hintikka I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one of the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus includes the notion that what he calls "objects" does not includes any relations and properties. - Wittgenstein verbally: "to the objects also belong the relations". >Relations. I 55 Indestructibility of objects/Hintikka: - ""Red" cannot be destroyed." I 57 Individuals: Relationships with zero argument places (Tractatus 5.554). >Individuals. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation - Everything that is, can only be described by names, another provision is not possible - neither it is nor that it is not - so the language is an interweaving of names. I 99 Object/property/possession/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. possession is not essential for an object - not even for E.g. my hand - not even for my visual space. It is only subjectively perceived - because the objective space is constructed on its base. - ((s)> extrinsic property). - (PB VII 71, 99f) - so it may be useful to give a hand during repeated use a name. >Names. I 106 Object/acquaintance/Fraud/error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: thesis: because one can be fooled, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects - ("Illusion Argument"). >Acquaintance. I 181 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: even the simplest objects Wittgenstein's are structured. - ((s) (see above) They have a logical form, formed by their possible occurrences in states of affairs.) >States of affairs. I 223 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (average period): improper items: color spots in the visual field, tones etc. - actual objects: elements of knowledge. >Knowledge. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Objectivity | Habermas | III 27 Objectivity/Habermas: an assessment can be objective if it is made on the basis of a trans-subjective claim to validity which has the same meaning for any observer and addressee as for the subject itself. >Validity claims, >Truth, >Correctness, >Truthfulness, >Intersubjectivity. Validity: Claims of this kind are truth and efficiency. >Efficiency. III 30 Objectivity/Realism: for the "realistic" approach, the world as the epitome of what is the case, is objective. >Facts, >Facts/Wittgenstein, >World/Wittgenstein, >Tractatus. III 31 Objectivity/Phenomenology: for the "phenomenological" approach, it is first necessary to determine the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. >Phenomenology, >Community, >Language Community, >Objectivity, >Objectivism/Husserl. Rorty I 417 (According to Rorty) Habermas' thesis: scientific research is both, limited and allowed by inevitably subjective conditions. >Subjectivity, >Science. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ontology | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 73 Ontology/Possible Worlds/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the objects remain the same - no matter how different a world is in relation to our actual world. ((s) See also the distinction S4/S5; see systems. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka; contains no functions as basic concepts. - Hintikka: because of Wittgenstein's interpretation of identity. See Identity/Wittgenstein, Functions/Wittgenstein, >Objects, >Identity, >Concepts, >Possible Worlds. I 30 Grammar/Hintikka: in a logically analyzed language, the grammar corresponds to ontology. >Grammar. I 73 et seqq. Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity. Necessity/Wittgenstein. I 123 Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein's basic ontology is the same as the one by Frege. As far as the connectives are concerned, there is complete agreement. That Wittgenstein invented the truth functions is often falsely claimed. I 124 Heijenoort/Hintikka: proves the truth functions of Frege as implicit. The sentence is the expression of his truth conditions. Because of his thesis of the inexpressibility of semantics, he does not establish a theory of truth functions. Ontology/Negation/Hintikka: ...this means that the negation is ultimately eliminated from the ontology and semantics of the Tractatus. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka: another objection is that Wittgenstein's Tractatus ontology contains no functions among the undefined elements (in contrast to properties and relationships). Hintikka: the reason is probably his interpretation of the identity in the Tractatus, which makes it difficult to identify functions in the usual way as relations whose last relation is clearly determined by the choice of the other values. III 142 Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: must consist of an absolute determination of what is conceivable and possible. VI 63 Tractatus/Schulte: no systematic representation of an ontology, or treatise on logical syntax. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Operators | Wittgenstein | IV 68 Operation/Tractatus: (5.25) is not an equal function: a function cannot be its own argument, but an operator can be - Operation: e.g. logical sum, logical product, negation. >Logical constants, >Negation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Ostension | Wittgenstein | Graeser I 58f Meaning/Wittgenstein: "What is meaning?", "What is length?" "What is the number one?" Here we cannot point to anything, although we should point out something - Problem: "nominalization": makes us look for a thing. >Definitions, >Definability. Hintikka I 228 Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing/showing - legacy of the Tractatus "showing" - can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data. But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. >Learning. Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: Example: How to show the state of California? (>Definition, >Indicative definition.) Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this: I 229 "Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?" The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity. For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences. And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PU §§ 9,38). >Explanation. I 237 Ostension/Pointing/Indicative Definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one and the same gesture can serve for a person's name, the name for a mass term, a number word, etc. - therefore showing cannot connect to reality. It is just a calculus. It is at most, a connection between written or spoken language on the one hand and sign language on the other. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Phenomenology | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 108 HusserlVsMach/PhenomenologyVsPhenomenalism/Mach: only measured things exists. Cf. >Phenomenalism. I 156 ff Phenomenology/atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: many authors: because of the required independence of the sentences, the Tractatus cannot be interpreted phenomenologically. - Problem: if "this is red" and "this is green" exclude each other, they are no longer independent - therefore phenomenological predicates cannot be Tractatus-objects. ((s) for independency of sentences see >Atomism.) I 199ff Phenomenology/color/color terms/color words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the Tractatus-idea to conceive the color-incompatibility as matter of logic, has a clear resemblance to what one might call a phenomenology of colors - the logic that we take from the experience, has nothing to do with facts, but only with meanings. >Colour. WittgensteinVsMach: pro "grammatical" phenomenology. >Grammar. Objects/Tractatus: nothing but the meanings of the names. I 201 Phenomenology: here it is all about possibility, that is, about the sense, not the truth. I 202 The goal to understand the phenomena remains after changing the base language - but there can be no phenomenology as science anymore. >Understanding. I 204 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: no intermediate thing between logic and science - the temptation to it comes from E.g.: "If I add white, the colorfulness reduces" - that cannot be a physical sentence and also not a logic one. I 215 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: E.g. the description of a complex form as pieces of a circle is much easier. - ((s) idealization, instead of attempting to fulfill the phenomena.) I 222 WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: Phenomenological objects do not seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers - they do not behave logically like real objects. >Quantification. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Picture Theory | Picture Theory: When discussing the picture theory it comes to the question, to what extent a sentence is image of a fact, a situation or a section of the world. How should the sentence parts correspond to parts of the world? Is there such a correspondence at all? - See also Relations, Map Example, Tractatus, Wittgenstein, Russell, Picture. |
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| Picture Theory | Rorty | I 323 f VsPicture Theory/VsImage Theory/VsTractatus/language/Rorty: Putnam/Goodman: a non-intentional theory of language can not explain learning and understanding of the language. >Understanding, >Language acquisition. Wittgenstein late: ditto. I 326 Also non-intentional relations are theory-dependent. >Theory dependence. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Picture Theory | Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. --- Hintikka I 67 Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter... I 68 ...then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation. - ((s) The relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter. - This is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus. - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. I 127 Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. I 131 Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 132f ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics. - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. >Correspondence theory. I 134/35 Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. >Truth, >Truth conditions. I 135 Can be described as theory but not expressed. (structural equivalence, isomorphism). I 141 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. I 161 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). >Reflection, >Picture. I 183 Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection, VsWiderspiegelung. I 184 Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) > Phenomenology/Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. >Ordinary language. --- III 144 Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it. >World, >Reality, >Thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possibility | Wittgenstein | II 31 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence. II 139 Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists. >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Sense. II 167/168 Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. >Experience, >Necessity. The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". II 228 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture. >Picture. II 229 For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another. II 235 Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense. II 359 Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness. >Logical possibility. II 362 Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment. IV 19 Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible. 3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like. >Conceivability/Chalmers. IV 20 3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space. IV 20 Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected. IV 21 So the possibility of the projected, not this itself. The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it. IV 81 Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. >Contradictions. VI 113 Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate. Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense? Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate. >Use, >Convention. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Possible Worlds | Bigelow | I 138 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: a possible world e, in which a sentence a is true, is then defined as the maximum consistent set containing a as an element. >Modalities/Bigelow. Possible world/(s): Possible worlds are then completely described in all details, nothing is unmentioned and no detail is described contradictory. N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: the wit is that then every non-theorem in any possible world is wrong. It will be wrong in a maximum consistent extension. There will be a maximum consistent extension in which the sentence is wrong, i.e. a world in which it is wrong. Theorem: is then a sentence that is true in all possible worlds. And that is what a completeness theorem is supposed to show. >Completeness. Maximum Consistent Extension/Bigelow/Pargetter: a consistent set of sentences is extended by adding either a or ~a if it does not become inconsistent as a result. The extension is maximally consistent if a (or ~a) was the last sentence that could be added. >Maximum consistent. ((s) there may be many extensions depending on whether an individual is described differently in the sentence added. This provides equivalence classes. I 206 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a maximum consistent property that includes all the things and properties of a world. World/Properties/Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do the previous theories in philosophy history look like, in which one tried to describe the world as an aggregate of properties? E.g. Wittgenstein, Tractatus E.g. Carnap, The logical structure of the world. .... >L. Wittgenstein, >Tractatus, >R. Carnap, >Properties, >Facts, >Circumstances, >World, >Reality, >Ontology, >Atomism. Bigelow/Pargetter: we could consider the space-time points as the last individuals of the world. Each of them can either have a certain property or not. >Space-time points. Then we can construct sets of ordered pairs ‹assigned, x› Democritus' world/Terminology/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: that is how Cresswell called worlds constructed from such points. (Cresswell 1972(1), 1973(2)) >M. J. Cresswell. That is roughly the same as Russell's logical atomism. An n-digit predicate, followed by n individuals. >B. Russell, >Predicates. Atomism: we should assume that such atomic sentences are logically independent of each other. >Atomism. I 207 If it is only a question of whether a point is occupied or not, the corresponding sentence set will surely be consistent. Book: a complete "book of the world" would not be a world, but only a representation. Properties: then arise from books as follows: instead of the atomic sentences, we form longer sentences from combinations of descriptions of points by ordered pairs. This simply leads to a longer book. I 208 Points: instead of them we could also take waves, or elementary particles. Properties: instead of the property of a space-time point to be occupied we could also choose properties such as charge, mass, and so on. From these we can make sequences: ‹P^1, P2,... x› this represents a point with several properties. Mass: is of course a determinable (see above).), i. e. we still need real numbers to indicate the proportion that determines the D-able. >Determinates/determinables. Therefore, we are dealing with a sequence that relates an individual to its properties: ‹r1, r2,... x› wherein ri is a real number. Def possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: a lot of such sequences... {‹r1, r2,... x›, ‹r' 1, r' 2,... y›,... }} I 209 ...then represent a possible world (which is much richer than a Democritical world). >Democritus. 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1972). The world is everything that is the case. Australasen Journal of Philosophy 50, pp.1-13. 2. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). ogic and languages. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker | I 17 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of actually existing worlds there are better ways how the world might have been. I 14 Possible Worlds/Time/Stalnaker: there are many analogies between times and worlds. >Actualism. Actualism: actualism corresponds to presentism. Def presentism/(s): only the present exists and only the current point in time. Four-dimensionalism/Stalnaker: four-dimensionalism corresponds to modal realism. >Four-dimensionalism. Def modal realism/(s): modal realism means that other worlds exist literally. Representative: a representative is David Lewis. >Modal realism, >David K. Lewis. Stalnaker: very few are realists in terms of possible world and times, but most are realists in terms of space. >Realism, >Space, >Time. I 27 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of something like "I and my surroundings" we assume a way how the world is, that is a property or state. >States, cf. >Situations. Important argument: properties may exist uninstantiatedly. >Instantiation. I 38 Possible Worlds: a possible world is no thing of a certain kind, nor an individual. A possible world is that to which truth is relative or what people differentiate in their rational actions. >Possibility, >Actions. I 52 Possible world: r: it is pointless to ask whether possible worlds satisfy certain conditions, e.g. is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? This is pointless, the answer will always have the form of a necessary sentence: P-or-not-P. - But doubt about that will be a doubt about the content of the sentence and not doubt about a possible world. The same applies to the problem that you might not believe a necessary truth. Possible worlds/conditions: it is pointless to ask whether a possible world meets certain conditions. Possible world/necessary/Stalnaker: if it is true, e.g. that water is necessarily H2O or e.g. that there are unattainable cardinal numbers, then these assertions express exactly this proposition, and the sentences that express these propositions tell us nothing about the nature of possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Kripke. Stalnaker: therefore it is impossible to characterize the entire range of all the possibilities. For then we would know the way how the range of all possibilities is different from that how it could be -> Wittgenstein: you should remain silent about things that you cannot talk about (Tractatus). StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not help, because pointing also must have a content - therefore Ramsey says: "What you cannot say, you cannot whistle either". I 84/85 Possible worlds/Stalnaker: possible worlds are not just an exercise of our imagination, but part of our actions, e.g. scientific explanations. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Predicates | Wittgenstein | II 80 Predicates/Wittgenstein: the use of predicates is always misleading in logic, since it indicates different "types" of terms, etc., which are differentiated by predicates, for example: "formally confirmed", "internal relations". The description by predicates must have the possibility that it is different! II 82 Experience/Wittgenstein: is not distinguished by predicates from what is not experience. It is a logical term, not a term like "chair" or "table". >Experience, >Reality, >Properties. II 157 Individual/Atom/Atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to come across the basic elements ("individuals") through the logical analysis. Russell believed that in the end subject-predicate sentences and double-digit relations would result. >Objects, >Individuals. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken idea of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. >Atomism. II 306f Predicate/WittgensteinVsRussell: For example "man" should not be used as a predicate - otherwise the subject would become a proper name. "Man" as a predicate: at best for a disguised woman. >Proper names. II 307 "Man" as a predicate cannot be denied to its bearer. Hintikka I 64 Colour predicates/Colour Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at first glance, their incompatibility violates Wittgenstein's principle of independence from elementary propositions. I 65 Hintikka: but from the logical simplicity of the colours does not follow that they do not have a "logical form" that allows only some connection possibilities and others do not. The problem is only to design an appropriate symbolism that reflects the scope. I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: a predicate of higher order is articulated only by the existential quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: Many philosophers think that this is only a technical implementation of the older idea that existence is not a predicate. I 156 et seqq. Phenomenology/Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there is often the view that a phenomenalistic or phenomenological interpretation of the Tractatus is made impossible by the phenomenon of color incompatibility and also otherwise by any other apparent dependence between simple phenomenalistic predicates of the same kind. (HintikkaVs) Colours/Predicates/Colour Incompatibility/Hintikka: In this view, "red" and "green" cannot refer to simple objects, because otherwise the two elementary propositions "this is red" and "this is green", which are mutually exclusive, would not be independent of each other. But this is not possible according to 2,062: "The existence or non-existence of one fact cannot be taken as an indication of the existence or non-existence of another. >Existence, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 170 Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein understands form as something that can be illustrated by a suitable logical notation. For example, the difference between a two-digit and a one-digit predicate. In 5.55 ff Wittgenstein argues that such differences in form cannot be predicted a priori. >a priori. I 172 Colour/colour words/Colour concepts/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is clear that he insists that colour attributions have no subject-predicate form. >Colour. VI 70 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Schulte: are not ordinary sentences, they are characterized by the fact that they cannot contradict each other. (Tractatus4.211). 1. This is the first time said that they do not contain any logical particles, otherwise they would have to contradict each other! 2. Their components do not have any complexes, otherwise it would be possible to derive an objection. >Complex, >Contradiction. Accordingly, there are no predicates ("table", "left of") in elementary propositions! What does remain? "The elementary proposition consists of names." (Tractatus 4.22). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Predication | Wittgenstein | Tetens VII 133 Predication/Logical Form/Tractatus/Tetens: a) "The object a has the property F" ((s) predication), Fa) - b) "To each object, to which belongs the property F, also belongs the property G" ((s) universal quantification (x) (Fx> Gx)). >Quantification, >Universal quantification, >Existential quantification. Hintikka I 126 Is/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the "is" of predication is treated as in Frege and Russell, while the "is" of identity disappears and the "is" of the existence quantifier is traced back to truth functions. More precisely: in the Tractatus the existence of types of objects is expressed by the existence quantifier and this is then attributed to the disjunction. In contrast, the existence of a specific object cannot be articulated. >Existence statements. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Prejudice | Spinoza | Höffe I 233 Prejudices/Spinoza/Höffe: [Spinoza] grants the public authorities the right to issue generally binding decisions, but with regard to the personal conduct of life he recognizes an alternative to philosophy in the approach to happiness (beatitudo) or salvation (salus). Höffe I 234 the moral certainty of the biblical prophets(3), for which again no scholarly interpretation is required (... )are is enough. To achieve this simple insight, however, one must undertake the arduous task of overcoming theological and political prejudices. In the more extensive first part, chapters 1-15 of the Theological and Political Tract(2), Spinoza recognizes "neither a supernatural light" nor "an external authority”. >Bible/Spinoza, >Bible Criticism/Spinoza. He rejects any kind of expertocracy of the knowledge of faith or salvation, so that every impartial reader, without being a Bible scholar or philosopher, can understand Scripture properly and then come to the insight that the Bible ultimately teaches nothing else than what mere reason alone can see: In order to become happy or to be saved, one only needs to practice justice and charity. SpinozaVsOrthodoxy: According to Spinoza, the greatest theological prejudice in terms of content is the view that any deviation from church orthodoxy is a crime that the secular authorities must punish. According to Spinoza, however, prophecy together with piety on the one hand and natural reason on the other, i.e. theology and philosophy, are two separate but coexistent areas (...) >Theology/Spinoza. >Religion, >Freedom, >Community, >State. 1. Spinoza, Tractatus politicus, Chap 2. 2. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap 1-15 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Proper Names | Searle | II 288 Names/Searle: names presuppose any other representation. They have no explicit intentional content.< >Intentional content. II 291 ff Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: Kripke exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. He overweights parasitic cases and presupposes an omniscient observer. Meteorology baptizes future events. >Causal theory of proper names. II 291 ff Names/Mill: names have no connotation, only denotation. Frege: the meaning of a name is detected by description. >Descriptions, >Connotation. II 292 Names/SearleVsKripke: a causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention. The causal chain is not pure, self-descriptive. Baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise a successful reference is explained by successful reference (circular). >Speaker intention. II 311 Names/meaning/reference/Searle: e.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is". We speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries. >Description/Kripke. E.g. swapped spots: identification: "the spot that causes the experience". Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." Wolf II 168 Names/Searle: the meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true. We cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle (Strawson ditto). >Bundle theory. Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name. Solution/Zink: localisation. >Zink. Searle V 145 Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Names/Mill. V 145 There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance. Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. V 245 Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description, we must unfortunately assume substances. From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties. Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning. - SearleVsWittgenstein. V 247 Names/Mill: names have no sense. FregeVsMill: e.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar. This is not more informative than Everest = Everest. FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects. Identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. V 256 Names/SearleVsFrege: names are not entirely clear, e.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description. SearleVsKripke: names are not rigid, otherwise they are like logical equivalents. Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function. >Predication, >Ostension. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Proper Names | Wittgenstein | Wolf II 14 Bundle theory/names: proposed by Wittgenstein and Searle > Essential properties; >Bundle theory/Kripke. Wolf II 150 Names/Wittgenstein: I use the name N with no fixed meaning - Philosophical Investigations §79. --- Hintikka I 302/303 Name/Object/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: as long as the links between language and the world are unanalyzed name-relations, the possible connections of the symbols are determined only by their own nature - by their own nature - name-relations are conventional - but the nature of the signs states itself - if we transform signs into variables, they are only dependent on the nature of the sentence -> logical form.- Meaningless connections must be prohibited by the convention - they are not excluded by the symbols themselves - so that the reflection is maintained - late : VsReflection - late: VsName-Relation. Hintikka I 22 Names/existence/border/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in a logically formed language all names must denote something. But one cannot specify how many objects there are. >Denotation, >Ontology. I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: to the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus counts the notion that what he calls "objects" does not include any relations and properties. Hintikka: the terminological counterpart of this error is: names are logically singular terms, so that predicates (including symbols for relations) cannot fall within that definition (falsely). I 60ff Signs/relation/name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: not the complex sign "aRb" says that it is in a certain relation to b, but that "a" stands in a certain relation to "b", says aRb. (3,1432) (quotation marks sic) - But Wittgenstein wants something else: The number of names that appear in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to Tractatus as the number of objects in the situation illustrated by the sentence. But about which situation it is, is not determined, however, solely by the name of a and b. Copi: (wrongly) thinks that Wittgenstein through the phrase "in certain respects" basically abstracts from relation-signs and performs an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). >Existential generalization. I 71 Names/existence/Wittgenstein: "I want to call 'name' only what cannot stand in the connection "X exists". And so one cannot say "Red exists" because, if red did not exist, it could not be talked about it. >Existence statements. Names/existence/Wittgenstein: the existence of an object is seen from the fact that its name is used in the language. For the logical rules of inference is then a well-formed language to be presupposed that the individual constants are not unrelated. >Individual constants. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation. Everything that actually exists, can only be described with names, another determination is not possible. Neither it is, nor it is not. So the language is also an interweaving of names. I 127 Elementary proposition: does not consist of a series of names for individual things that are held together by additional links, but it consists of a series of "names" for objects that belong to different but matching logic types. I 149 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false." >Sense. --- II 84 Name/Meaning/Wittgenstein: the meaning of the words "Professor Moore" is not the owner - 1. the importance does not go for a walk - 2. the same words also appear in a sentence like E.g. "Professor Moore does not exist" - meaning is set within the language - by explanations. II 88 Number/Wittgenstein: the numbers in a pattern book are the names of the patterns. II 365 Name/object/Wittgenstein: between the two there is no real relationship. >Object. --- VI 71 Name/elementary proposition/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the names of the elementary proposition are fundamentally different from the nature of proper names. They are primitive signs that cannot be defined closer by any definition - but they can be explained by explanations - explanations are sentences that contain primitive signs - unlike a code elementary propositions do not obey appointment rules. VI 172 Names/WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: late: the owner is not the meaning of the name. --- IV 22 Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the name means the object. (3.203). >Proper names. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Properties | Frege | II 74 Properties/Frege: properties will be predicated by a concept. A concept may fall under a higher one (> numbers), >Non-existence. Something can simultaneously be property and feature, but not of the same thing! A feature of a concept may be the property of an object. I 76 Def Property/Frege: I call the concepts, under which an object falls its properties. "Property of" is the inverse of "falls under". E.g. numbers Instead of saying, "2 is a positive number," and "2 is an integer" and "2 is less than 10", we can also say: "2 is a positive integer less than 10." Here, being a positive number, being an integer, and being less than 10 appear as properties of the object 2 and at the same time as a feature of the concept. (The difference between feature and property is not that between concept and object). Stalnaker I 181 Distinction object/properties: pro: Tractatus/>Wittgenstein - pro: >Kripke - Vs: >Searle/>Dummett/>Frege. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Propositions | Russell | Horwich I 54 Proposition/Russell: is a complex entity with components: E.g. Smith is taller than Brown: Smith, Brown, the relation taller than - E.g. Brown is smaller than Smith: is therefore equivalent, but is different in all three components! - Letter to Frege: the mountain literally appears in the proposition - Cartwright: thoughts/Frege: are not the same as Russell’s propositions - they do not contain their objects - ((s) ."...but their sense"). Horwich I 56 Proposition/Russell/Cartwright: how can a proposition be wrong if it consists of the components and the nature of their connection? - Solution/Russell: another quality. CartwrightVs: which had already been rejected. Horwich I 59 Proposition/Principia Mathematica(2)/Russell: φ x (requires function) - Propositional function: φ x^ - not ambiguous - the values are all propositions of the form j x. >Propositional function. Horwich I 60 I.e. the symbol φ (φx^) must not express a proposition as does indeed, if a is a value for φ x^ - indeed j(jx^) must be a symbol that expresses nothing, it is pointless - (neither true nor false) - E.g. -the function- is a human is a human. >Levels/Order. Horwich I 60f Proposition/propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The symbol (x).j x shall always express the proposition φ x, i.e. the proposition that claims all values for φ x^. Horwich I 61 This proposition presupposes the function j x^, not just an ambiguous value of the function - the assertion of φ x, where x is not specified, is different from that which claims all values for φ x^, because the former is an ambiguous assertion, and the latter is not ambiguous in any sense. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 2. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russell I 125 Proposition/Function/Extensional/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: functions of propositions are always truth functions - a function can only occur in a proposition by means of its values. (see above extensional). >Truth function, >Extension. Consequence: all functions of functions are extensional. E.g. A believes p is not a function of p - (Tractatus 19-20). ((s) VsRussell: (see above) > Waverley, functions are equivalent, but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott - ((s) being believed is not a function of the believed object) - ((s)> extrinsic properties, extrinsic) - ((s)> Function of a function of higher level). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Propositions | Wright | I 56 Wright: Tractatus/Wittgenstein: object and proposition are formal terms. >Tractatus. I 283 Proposition/individuation/Wright: in contrast to the relation between a sentence and its meaning the content of a proposition individuates this. Proposition is individuated by the content - sentence is not individuated by content. >Individuation, >Propositions, >Sentences. A proposition could not be that proposition, unless it would be made true by this state of affairs. >Truthmakers, >States of affairs, >Facts. A state of affairs could not be that state of affairs, unless it would make this proposition true. ((s) different with the sentence: it is more dependent on the formulation) ((s) difference sentence/proposition: a sentence is (rather) bound to time and place, a proposition is not). >Timelessness. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Protocol Sentences | Hempel | I 99 ~ Protocol Sentences/Hempel: compared to protocol sentences even singular assertions have the character of hypotheses. >Hypotheses. I 100 It follows: CarnapVsTractatus: the truth/falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements (because they are indeed hypotheses). The significance criterion is too narrow. Then also protocol sentences are no longer unassailable. >Significance. I 102 Schlick: protocol sentences are not completely without basic sentences, otherwise they lead to relativism. >Relativism. I 104 SchlickVsCarnap/VsNeurath: the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by protocol sentences sufficiently leads to absurd results, if the idea is absolutely true, protocol sentences are declined. There are obviously many different systems of protocol sentences - according to Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. I 105 Carnap: we learn through conditioning how to bring forth true protocol sentences, e.g. how to properly read meters, etc. I 106 In the new form of Carnap's theory, protocol sentences are even more radically stripped off their base character: they lose their irrefutability. Popper: statements of all forms may occur as protocol sentences. I 107 In the end they are superfluous. Cf. >Observation sentences, >Observation language. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Proxy | Wittgenstein | VI 119 Formalism/Proxy/Sign/Symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege: Frege: characters are either mere blackening or a sign of something. Then this is what they represent, their meaning. Wittgenstein: false alternative. - E.g. Pieces: represented nothing. Solution: use like in the game instead of representation of something. ((s) use is more than mere blackening and less than representation of an object - Wittgenstein: Formalism is not entirely unjustified. >Formalism. Hintikka I 52 Terminology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Tractatus: thing: particular, name, linguistic proxy for particulars. (Very suitable proxy). I 138 et seqq. Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences. >Complex, >Compositionality. Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic proxies. >Atomism. II 66 Thinking/Substitute/Wittgenstein: is there not a proxy "in mind"? This thought is errorneous and causes a lot of damage; it divides thinking into two separate parts, the organic (essential) and the non-organic. There is no mental process that cannot be symbolized. We are only interested in what can be symbolized. >Symbols. Thinking/Thought/Wittgenstein: the thought is autonomous. Example "Schmidt is sitting on the bench". You would think three things are in his mind, as a proxy. There's something true about that, too. But what guarantee would we have that they represent anything at all? What is given in my thinking is present and essential! Everything else (which is represented) is irrelevant. That is why thinking is complete in itself. And what is not given in my thinking cannot be essential for it! The thought does not point beyond itself, we believe that only because of the way in which we use symbols. II 84 Meaning/Wittgenstein: is defined within the language by explanations. >Explanation, >Meaning. The expression "the meaning of" is misleading, as it suggests "proxy for" or "substitute". >Substitution. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Psychology | Wittgenstein | II 194 Art/Beauty/Wittgenstein: in what sense is the aesthetic investigation a matter of psychology? Pain and joy do not belong on the same scale! >Pain. The scale from "boiling hot" to "ice-cold" is also not a degree scale. These are differences of the kind. II 195 Psychology/Aesthetics/Wittgenstein: while we are interested in causal connections in psychology, in aesthetic examination they are precisely what we are not interested in! This is the main difference. Causality/Terminology/Wittgenstein/(s): Wittgenstein gives reasons here, not causes. II 196 Cause/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the reasons for satisfaction you give have nothing to do with psychology. It is a juxtaposition of things like in court. Psychological reasons would not be aesthetic reasons. It would not be reasons, it would be causes. One reason to claim that would be to make a hypothesis. As far as the means to make a door that is too bulky on the upper end more pleasant resembles a means against headaches, it is not a question of aesthetics. II 197 Psychology/Freud/Wittgenstein: E.g. correlation between the position of the fetus, and our sleep. Although this looks like a causal connection, it is not, because here we cannot perform a psychological experiment. Freud's explanation does the same as an aesthetic explanation: it brings two factors together. >Causal relation, >Causality. II 197 Psychology/Joke/WittgensteinVsFreud: confusion between reason and cause. Laughter has a reason - otherwise consent to the analysis would be no way to find out the cause. Cause/Physics: is not about consent - also causes of laughter can be detected, but not by consent, but by experiment. for aesthetic investigation consent is also needed. II 200 Psychology/Wittgenstein: my examination is not psychological, although a sentence is dead in a certain sense until it is understood. If there was no understanding of the signs, we would not call the signs language. II 30 Colours/Wittgenstein: the colour octahedron is used in psychology. In reality, however, it does not belong to psychology, but to grammar. We can speak of a greenish blue, but not of a greenish red, etc. >Colour. VI 203 Psychology/Wittgenstein/Schulte: (1945, 49): attempts to classify psychological terms: experiences, emotions, beliefs. VI 205 They are terms of everyday life. >Everyday language, >Language games. IV 41 Def Epistemology/Tractatus: 4.1121 is the philosophy of psychology. >Epistemology. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Qualities | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 113 Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence. Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson). I 202 Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience. I 202 ff Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed. I 203 But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added. Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong. Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only. These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world. According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory". Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience. II 138 Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots: 1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences. 2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent). III 141 Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object! The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts. III 142 There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quantification | Prior | I 37 Non-nominal quantification/Prior: e.g. "whoever" from "who", "where ever" from "there", "somehow" - correspond to adverbs. E.g. "it s something I m not" - an adjective and not a noun. Tractatus: (Also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 134) "this is the way things are". >"sentence variable". I 38 Higher quantification/sentence variable/Wittgenstein/Prior: "Things are such" does not tell even how things are but "things are somehow" is doing it! - To the extent of the logically true "for some p, p". - so you can translate "x is coming": "for some x,x is coming". Higher quantification: over non-nouns,"non-nominal quantification" >Second order Logic. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Quantifiers | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 15 ff Language as a universal medium/LUM/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium (LUM) does not include the impossibility of semantics at all. It is just not possible to articulate. For example Frege has the opinion that the meaning of quantifiers cannot be appropriatly expressed linguistically. >Circular reasoning, >Levels, >Description levels, >Semantics. I 57 ff Object/property/relation/Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Hintikka: additional proof that Wittgenstein ascribes relations and properties to the objects should be the treatment of names. According to the opinion criticized by Hintikka they must stand on the same level. >Object, >Properties. If there were no categorical distinction between Wittgenstein's objects all quantifiers would necessarily have the same area and any fixing would be impossible. Here, as so often, it is revealing what a philosopher does not know what he says: Quine has said that it shows which entities the philosopher lets apply, once he expresses his willingness to quantification. So Wittgenstein says: I 58 "One can describe the world completely by completely generalized sentences, i.e. without assigning any name from the outset to a certain object. To then arrive at the customary way of expression one simply has to after an expression: "There is one and only one x, which..." And this x is a. I 104 ... Precisely because of this timelessness of simple objects their substantiality is not affected by the instability or even the rise and fall of the temporal objects, these changes do not affect the range of Wittgenstein's quantifiers. I 124 Second Order Logic/Frege/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: quantifiers of higher level are accepted by both without any hesitation. >Second Order Logic. I 153f Quantifiers/logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since existence in the Tractatus is inexpressible, it is something a priori. - ((s) then there are no quantifiers.) - E.g. Wittgenstein: if there are Schmitz and Meier in the room, they are necessarily there. - In contrast, Russell: with him the classes of objects are determined by our lexicon, our grammar. - ((s) about it is quantified.) - Wittgenstein: instead: disjunction. >Disjunction, >Grammar. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Reason | Spinoza | Höffe I 234 Reason/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza takes (...) a "third way" between rationalism and the rejection of reason(1). In contrast to the rationalist principle "sola ratione", through reason alone, and the principle of "sine ratio", which is skeptical of reason, without reason at all, he advocates an address-dependent Höffe I 235 “as well as”, which can be interpreted differently. The "as well as" can be understood as realistic, as appropriate for the time, or as elitist: According to Spinoza, few people are capable of philosophy to the point where reason alone is enough to lead a virtuous life. Cf. >Emancipation, >Freedom, >Governance, >State, >Order. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 15 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Redundancy Theory | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 159 Wittgenstein: Truth is a shallow concept: "It is true that A" means exactly the same as "A". (Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory). >Truth. IV 54 Wittgenstein per redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442) a proposition cannot possibly say of itself that it is true. >Paradoxes, >Circular reasoning. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Reference | Wittgenstein | Putnam III 201ff Reference/Wittgenstein: e.g. "my brother in America" - a tendency to present a picture - we suggest that reference is not causal. We do imagine more than an experience of thinking. >Picture, >Picture theory. Putnam: refrencec is not causal: we can also refer to future things (then causal reference to a type "future generations"). Putnam III 205/6 Instead of knowledge by acquaintance/description there are just different ways of reference (causality is irrelevant). >Acquaintance, >Knowledge, >Descriptions. Tetens VII 81 Language/Border/Tractatus/Tetens: sentences about the language are on a "meta-level" tautology e.g. instances of the Tarski scheme. Tetens: in the end all we have left is to carry out the act of referring to facts. We cannot ensure this through ever more sentences and surpass them. We cannot leave our language. How the reference succeeds is shown in the execution of the statements. Saying/Pointing/Tractatus/Tetens: have a double face. >Ostension. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Wittgenstein | IV 29 Russell's paradox/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: instead of "F(F(u))" we write "(Eφ):F(φu).ψu = Fu". - (Solution). >Paradoxes. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Sense | Wittgenstein | II 3 Sense/useful/useless/Wittgenstein: when it make sense to say: "There are four primary colors", it must also make sense to say: "There are five primary colors." See also II 113, II 167, II 372. II 59 Sense/fraud/error/Wittgenstein: what allows us to judge the world correctly, also allows us to misjudge it. >Judgments. II 69 Sense/nonsense/useful/useless/Wittgenstein: E.g "This sound is red" is not wrong, but nonsense - to name something a color is to say that it obeys certain grammatical rules - limit: I cannot say, sounds would have properties that do not belong to the colors, because then I would have to say sensibly that colors have properties that they do not have. - ((s) I would have to be able to deny it.) - E.g. "colors are not loud". - Sense and nonsense have nothing in common- meaningless word combinations are not part of the language - grammar sets the limit. II 171 Sense/Wittgenstein. We can talk of "sense" without giving the expression a clear meaning. II 402 Rule/sense/Wittgenstein: E.g. the command "replace seven by zero" makes no sense, except that it specifies a rule. - ((s) rules do not need to give sense beyond that). >Rules. II 412 Proof/sense/Wittgenstein: nonsense: to say, only the evidence gives the question a sense. - Correct: the evidence provides a possibility to respond. - With that it gives the question a sense. - ((s) Third, intermediate instance.) --- III 144 Sense/Show/Tell/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: the phrase is used, to express the idea - on the other hand, the sense can only be specified by specifying the truth conditions or repeating the sentence. --- VII 27 Sense/Tractatus/Tetens: controversial thesis: that only descriptive sentences made sense. - Ethics: Problem: normative statements are meaningless. >Meaning. --- I 22 Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) His agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be claimed linguistically. (Tractatus 6.2322). I 149 Picture Theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false. >Picture theory. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Sentences | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 53 Simple sentence/elementary proposition/Atomic sentence/Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Hintikka: a sentence of the form "(Ex, y, R).xRy" is unanalysable. >Atomic sentence, >Atomism. I 128 Sentence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most important thing that can be said about these sentences is indeed their truth conditions. When are they true? >Truth conditions. 3.1432: the sentence "aRb" is then true if the relationship in the world, which corresponds to the "R" ... if the complex matches the configuration of the objects that is represented by these three linguistic entities (named). > Mapping/Sellars. More general: 3.21 The configuration of simple punctuation corresponds to the configuration of the objects in the situation". 4.024 To understand a sentence means to know what the case is, if it is true. Hintikka: this gives rise to several very interesting questions: I 128/129 1. Wittgenstein has a different expression for the relationship between the elementary proposition and the fact that is represented by it. "The sentence is a picture of reality, the sentence is a model of reality as we imagine it." (4.01) "The sentence is a picture of reality, because I know the represented situation by it, if I do not understand the sentence." Hintikka: the picture relationship that helps to understand the sentence (elementary proposition) is exactly the same as the relationship which makes the sentence true. 2. Picture/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the "pictures" in the Tractatus are actually not very pictorially. They are rather what mathematicians call "isomorphic representation" or illustration. Picture/sentence/sign/Wittgenstein: "It is obvious that we perceive a sentence like "aRb" as a picture. Here the sign is obviously a likeness of the signified." Picture/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it may be that the whole picture theory of Russell's Principia Mathematica(1) has been excited. I 130 3. It is apparent that the isomorphism condition makes hardly any sense as long as the entities of different logical types, individuals, properties or relationships are not represented in the language by expressions of the same type: individuals by individuals, relations by relations, etc. I 287 Picture/sentence/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: late: the sentence is no longer a picture of the world - but a provision for the preparation of images - also not a base of unique name relations anymore - a language game always links several expressions with the world. I 292 Tractatus: picture relation prior - later: only from language games. >Language games. I 294 Sentence/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: for a sentence, there is no ostensive definition - instead the structure must be articulated - this is not about a similarity - the sentence is a picture without resemblance. - That it is a picture of something that is in the intention. I 298 WittgensteinVsTractatus: "conformity with the form" was a mistake. >Picture theory. I 301 To the sentence belongs everything that is part of the projection. But not what is projected. - ((s) So also the provision). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- II 44 Sentence/Wittgenstein: every expression that can be negated meaningfully is a sentence. II 232 Sentence/Wittgenstein: there is no general concept of the sentence - they do not all have something in common - instead family resemblance. >Similarity. --- VI 117 Apparant-sentences/Tractatus/Schulte: are nonsense, because they indicate formal terms such as "object", "sentence" or "number" and others not trough variables, but claim to use "actual" term words. - (Admittedly Wittgenstein uses them permanently because they help to get insights) - they are nonsense because the formal term is already given with the object - one cannot introduce both at the same time. - E.g. "1 is a number" (4.12721). >Circular reasoning. --- IV 21 Sentence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the meaning is not yet contained in the sentence - but the form of its sense - but not its content. >Meaning, >Content. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Solipsism | Nagel | I 53 Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Nagel: the truth of solipsism can not be pronounced, but still shows up in the fact that the world is always described in my language. - In this language, I can not truly say that the world is my world, because that is wrong in my language. >Solipsism/Wittgenstein. Nagel: if there were no subjective thoughts, they would still have to be thought by anyone. >Thoughts, >Thinking. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Solipsism | Wittgenstein | Nagel I 53 Wittgenstein, Solipsism: The truth of solipsism cannot be uttered, but is still shown in the fact that the world is always described in my language. In this language I cannot truly say that the world is my world, because that is wrong in my language. Nagel: but all this is said in my language, and this shows that the world is my world in a deeper sense, although exactly this cannot be said. --- Hintikka I 96ff World/Tractatus/Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: question whether Wittgenstein's world is not irretrievably egocentric. Finally, the sense data means my sense data. >Sense data, >World. I 97 Saying/Showing/Wittgenstein: 5,562 (entirety of all objects, limit of the world).. "question to what extent solipsism is a truth, what solipsism namely means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself." Hintikka: if we interpret the objects of the Tractatus as objects of my acquaintance, then Wittgenstein's cautious solipsism gets not only understandable but almost predictable. I 98 Solipsism/Tractatus/Hintikka: is not metaphysical here, he does not depend on that the objects are assigned to any specific subjective awareness-dependent status. It is about their phenomenal condition, so that I can refer them to my language. Nevertheless, what he considers as solipsism, has a specific content. Realism/solipsism/Hintikka: however, the realism is right in its assertion that this "reduction to the acquaintance" has no impact in terms of the metaphysical reality of the rest of the world. I 99 World/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: The relationship with me is not essential to the objects. "the ordinary way of speech could make a ((s) false) appearance as if the relationship with the owner of the hand would be something that is in the nature of the hand itself." ..therefore it might be useful, to give a hand a name during repeated use. (Philosophical Remarks VII. 71, 99f). --- II 132 Appearance/appear/seem/Wittgenstein: "It appears to appear" cannot be said. Solipsism and behaviorism are opposed to each other. >Behaviorism, >Appearance. II 172 WittgensteinVsSolipsism: if it is logically impossible that someone else has a toothache, then it is just as impossible for me. II 172/173 Solipsism/Wittgenstein: does not want a notation, in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego disappears. II 178 Temporal solipsism/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell E.g. the world was created five minutes ago. - This is not meaningless because there is a criterion - similar like in measurements. - E.g. "Every time there is no white rabbit sitting there." >Criteria. II 180 "Only the present is real": Problem: this pretends to give a picture that is in contrast with another picture. - But that does not succeed. --- VI 88 Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Schulte: to put my solipsistic position into words, I would have to be able to reach beyond both boundaries, of the world and the language - "My" is not opposed to "that". - Here we see that solipsism coincides with pure realism. >World, >Language, >Limits. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Space | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 90/91 Language/object/phenomenological/Wittgenstein/early/Hintikka: in the early Wittgenstein the language is based on the visual space and deals with immediately given phenomena. We can see that in the writings of the middle period. I 179 Space/field/absolute/localization/individuation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there must be absolute points in visual space, otherwise one could not tell if a spot remains in the same place or not - that is, points in visual space have a logical form - (1931) - Hintikka: therefore they can be Tractatus objects. >Objects, >Things. I 99 Subjective/subjectivity/Wittgenstein: "..another does not see the objects in the same way as I do. Does this mean that the visual space, I am talking about is mine? So that it is subjective? No: it has been merely seen subjective here, and it is opposed to an objective space, but which is only a construction, with the visual space as a base "(VII 71, 100). I 110 ff Subject/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Question: if the objects of the Tractatus are really objects of acquaintance (direct experience) why has Wittgenstein never mentioned this? >Acquaintance. I 111 Tractatus 2.0131 "the spatial object must lie in the infinite space. (A point in space is an argument location). Although the spot in the visual field does not need to be red, but it must have a color, it has, so to speak, a color space around it. >Colour. I 167 ff Space/Space terms/logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the same incompatibility (incompatibility as of the color terms) is also raised by the space concepts). The same color spot cannot be located at different places of the space. Wittgenstein: But that is no problem. The space is for him a form of spatial objects. (Tractatus 2.0251: "Space and time are forms of objects".) I 179 Space/visual space/absolute/location/individuation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there must be absolute points in the visual space, otherwise you could not tell if a spot remains in the same place or not - that is, points in visual space have a logical form - (1931) - Hintikka: therefore they can be Tractatus objects. >Absoluteness. I 215 Visual space/seeing/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the visual space has its independent reality - it itself has no subject - it is autonomous. --- II 36 Infinite divisibility and space/Wittgenstein: it has been asserted that space is not infinitely divisible. However, regarding the possibilities of the experiment one cannot prove anything. II 39 Search/explore/invent/Wittgenstein: a space is not searched for - searched are things in space. - The room is everything, which one must be certain about in order to ask a question - what you look for, must be fully describable. - On the contrary: logical discovery: different from finding something in the space. - If we could describe this, we would have already found it. II 89 Space/visual space/Wittgenstein: a) visual space: here it is pointless to say something would look like, as if it were further away than the moon - b) physical space: here it makes sense - if we saw how the moon gets smaller, we could not say that it goes away in the visual space, but in the physical - this is a distinction between sense-data and physical object - but useful in both spaces: that A of B is equidistant from C. - We do not need a theory to bring our knowledge of sense data with beliefs about objects in compliance - additionally, what we mean when we say "the penny is round" could also mean that it looks elliptical. - Visual space: here, a circular piece canot look straight - physical space: here it can look straight. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Space Time | Hintikka | II 81 Space Time/identification/KripkeVsHintikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: Kripke and Quine argue (for different reasons) that space time continuity does not always have a precise meaning. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Centered worlds, >Identification, >World lines. SaarinenVsHintikka: the identity of individuals, which occur in several worlds, is not always well-defined for all these possible worlds. Hintikka: ditto: it may be in belief contexts that an individual is identified under a description, but not under another description. This must also be the case, otherwise we would be omniscient again. Possible Worlds: we must also be careful to adopt a "common reason" from all possible worlds. We certainly do not share a part of the space time, but part of the facts. World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/substance/Hintikka: in Wittgenstein, the world is the sum of the facts, not of the objects: for a shared space time this would only be by additional assumptions. Cross-world identification/Hintikka: the cross-world identification seems lost when we are dealing only with a lot of facts ((s) epistemically) and a common space time is missing. II 82 Re-identification: re-identification of physical objects is necessary first to get to the cross-world identification later. II 90 Possible worlds/Hintikka: the expression possible world presupposes that a space time is shared. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Spinoza | Adorno | XIII 89 Spinoza/Adorno: Spinoza is the extreme opposite to an idealistic thought which does not antithetically oppose thinking and being, but reflects this antithesis once more in itself. >Idealism, >B. Spinoza. Order/Spinoza/Adorno: Spinoza has the one - as Kant would have said - dogmatic presupposition that everything follows from a principle. He himself did not derive this presupposition further, but referred it to the axioms and definitions. He could then simply formulate the identity theorem so that the order of ideas and the order of things would be the same. >Reality/Spinoza. XIII 246 Spinoza/SpinozaVsHobbes/Adorno: Spinoza's unfinished late work, the "political treatise"(1), was a direct response to Hobbes's anti-rationalist and thus anti-systematic impulse. >Rationalism. Hobbes/Adorno: Spinoza is nevertheless one of the great system-forming constructive philosophers of this time. >Th. Hobbes. 1. B. Spinoza. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| State (Polity) | Spinoza | Höffe I 232 State/Spinoza/Höffe: Since the individual can hardly pursue [his self-preservation] alone, he gets involved in society and organizes himself in the state. The more his government strives for peace and freedom, the more stable the state is, because otherwise the citizens can expect indignation. There is one thing, however, that man cannot cede to the state, since it cannot be restricted anyway: the freedom to think. >Freedom/Spinoza, >Peace, >Society, >Community. State Goal: [Thus] it says in the Theological-Political Tractatus(1): "The purpose of the state is in truth freedom.” In terms of institutional theory, Spinoza [in the Political Tractatus(2)] argues for a mutually controlling network of committees in which as many individuals as possible should be involved. Freedom: [Spinoza] grants the public authorities the right to issue generally binding decisions, but with regard to personal conduct he recognizes an alternative to philosophy in the approach to happiness (beatitudo) or salvation (salus). For this alternative of a life based on religious faith does not need Höffe I 234 certainty. Rather, the moral certainty of the biblical prophets(3) is sufficient, for which again no scholarly interpretation is required. The Holy Scriptures teach "only very simple things". That is foremost the obedience to God which is manifested in a life of justice and love(4). >Prejudices/Spinoza, >Constitution/Spinoza. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 20 2. B. Spinoza, Tractatus politicus 3. Ibid., Chap. 2 4. Ibid., Introduction |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| States of Affairs | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 160 Wittgenstein/State of Affairs: even questions the "state of affairs": once we have seen that there are a variety of circumstances that can lead to the expression "he understood instantly", we will be healed by the urge to invoke to an independent conceivable "state of affairs", by which such a statement could be made true. --- Chisholm II 166 State of Affairs/Wittgenstein: no fact - it is between facts in abstraction from their existence and complexes - an atomic proposition is true if a corresponding complex exists. Cf. >Facts/Wittgenstein. --- Wittgenstein VI 70 Definition state of affairs/Tractatus/Schulte: combination of objects (entities, things). That things behave in a certain way, is a definition fact. - State of Affairs: corresponds to elementary proposition - fact: corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions. ---- Hintikka I 67ff State of Affairs/object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: 2:03 In the state of affairs the objects hang together like the links of a chain. 2.031 In the state of affairs, the objects behave to each other in a certain manner. Image theory/image theory/Wittgenstein/early: if the sentence is a linguistic counterpart to the state of affairs, then: I 68 "Mind, that connection is no relation, but only the existence of a relation." I 73 ff Existence/ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages in Tractatus an ontology of possible state of affairs. According to Wittgenstein it has little sense to speak of a possible existence. That is, that we must regard the actual objects as if every one would exist necessarily. >Sense, >Senseless, >Necessity. Of course, Wittgenstein does not believe that he could say that objects exist necessarily. In this lies for him the transcendence of objects and this forms, according to him, the core of the transcendental logic (6.13). Nevertheless, it is clear that Wittgenstein actually makes the important, but not expressible condition of necessary and necessary completed existence of objects. Result: not only all the actual state of affairs, but also all kinds of state of affairs must be considered as if they were composed of the same objects. Possible world/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 2022 "It is obvious that even one of the real, yet so different worlds must have something - a form - in common with the real world. 2023 "This fixed form consists of the objects." --- Wittgenstein III 141 Definition State of Affairs/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: combination of simple objects without quality features. The state of affairs is completely independent. Example: In the Tractatus there is neither an example for a state of affairs nor for an object. With the account of all objects in proportion to their positions - all situations are covered. All worlds. >Situations, >Possible worlds, >Complex. III 142 There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex. Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: must exist in the specification of an absolute determination of the thinkable and possible. Picture Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: an elementary proposition represents a state of affairs in that it has the same logical form. Each element in the picuture corresponds to one and only one element of the state of affairs shown in the picture. The elements of the elementary proposition, the names correspond to certain objects of the state of affairs. The name is representative for the object. (Proxy). >Proxy, >Representation. The configuration of the picture elements corresponds to the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs. By a mere grouping a state of affairs cannot be established. Such grouping is not true or false. III 149 Sense/Showing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: because all state of affairs are a part of all possible worlds, the sense of the world itself cannot be a state of affairs, a part of the possible world. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Substance | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 69 ff Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: phenomenological objects (objects of immediate experience) are also included. >Objects, >Phenomenology, >Experience, >Ontology. 2.021 Objects are the substance of the world 2.024 The substance is what exists independently of what is the case. 2.0271 The object is the fixed, the existing, the configuration is the changing, the volatile. I 74 Substance/Tractatus/Hintikka: ("Objects: substance of the world...") Important: this kind of substantiality has nothing to do with the permanence or transience of the objects in the actual course of events. 2.025 Wittgenstein claims that the objects are form and content and not only substance of the possible world, but also its form. (logical form). When a philosopher thinks about logical form today, he probably thinks first and foremost of the possibilities of making complex sentences out of simple sentences. >Atomic sentences, >Atomism. I 102 ff Substance/Object/World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: how is it possible that objects of acquaintance to which we can only point, function as an existing, solid form of the world? What can be less existing, firm and consistent than the sense data, which in Russell's writings are regarded as prime examples for the objects of acquaintance? >Acquaintance. Substance/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: so the problem of substantiality remains. Solution: a completely different kind. All talking about permanence is relative to any postulated transformation or change. What change is Wittgenstein planning? The change from one possible world to another! This has nothing to do with the durability of the objects in time. Cf. >Perdurantism, >Endurantism. Hintikka I 104 Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not because Wittgenstein's objects would be indestructible, they are substance-like but because they are the meanings of our simplest expressions. The expressions whose meanings cannot be described but only exhibited. It is logically incorrect to point to an object "this does not exists". Not because it would be indestructible. - Also not unchangeable - different: if they were composed. Therefore, the objects that make up the substance, are simple objects. VI 73 Substance/Tractatus/Schulte: the simple objects form the solid form of the world, its substance. They contain the possibility of all circumstances. Schulte: there are three interpretations here: 1. realistic objects, "real" atoms, in turn invariable 2. objects are sensory data, 3. the nature of the objects is to be understood only in dependence on the function of the expressions denoting them. >Sense data. Tetens VII 48 Definition Substance/Tractatus/Tetens: the substance of the world is the set of all logically possible worlds: ((s) So it is identical with the logical space). - Tetens: what remains the same in these worlds: the set of objects. The facts change. ((s) = configurations) - actual world: the possible world whose facts are facts. N.B.: therefore the world is the totality of facts. - Fact: possible fact. >Possible worlds. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Tautologies | Wittgenstein | IV 56 Tautology/Tractatus: 4,466 Sentences that are true for every situation, can never be any combinations of signs - otherwise they could only correspond to certain combinations of objects. >Object, >Things, >Correspondence, >Representation, >Signs, cf. >Logical truth, >Logical necessity. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Terminology | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. I 91 VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". I 162f Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". I 217 Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. I 337 Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. I 338 Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. I 246 Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. I 266 Definition expulsion game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro). >use/Tugendhat, > truth conditions/Tugendhat, >Meaning/Tugendhat. I 276 The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Theology | Spinoza | Höffe I 234 Theology/Spinoza/Höffe: As a (biblically immanent) interpretation of religious texts theology is responsible for faith, which in turn commits to obedience to God and to a piety determined by justice and charity. >Bible, >Bible criticism, >Hermeneutics. Reason: Natural reason, on the other hand, depends on knowledge, which in turn is committed to eternal truth. >Reason. One can also speak of a double obedience: there against the revealed God, here against the one natural truth. >Obedience. Because both duties of obedience are equal, but different, neither of them is at the service of the other. Neither must reason be abused as the handmaid of theology, nor faith as the handmaid of reason(1). >Reason/Spinoza. 1. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 1-15 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Thinking | Black | II 94 Thinking/Black: not to be covered with "various linguistic clothes". - If a thought is supposed to be "too profound for words", we have to ignore it - VsClothing Model: would lead to regarding all speaking as the encoding process and hearing as decoding. II 97 Wrong: "Think before you speak" - Vs Cl.I.Lewis: meaning very well comes into existence through communication (otherwise we ge a "Clothing Model"). >Communication. However Black Thesis: thinking without language is possible - E.g. imagining chess positions. Cf. >Psychological theories on language and thought, >Chess. II 98 The speech current does not need to be accompanied by a parallel stream of mental events - the spoken language needs no mental correlate to be meaningful. >Speaking/Ricoeur. II 100 It is hardly possible to distinguish between thoughts and linguistic representation. II 119 But: Language/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4.002: Language disguises the thought - in a way that one cannot infer the shape of the clad thought from the outer shape of the dress. (BlackVsWittgenstein). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Thinking | Chisholm | I 51 Thinking/Price: below the level of thought: "Accepting propositions", arises very often. I 52 ChisholmVsPrice: Pondering: I consider myself as someone who travels in the one direction, afterwards as someone who ... - Ascription of properties rather than a proposition. - The property is the content. >Content, >Attribution. I 120 Thinking/Descartes: perception as well: I see, therefore I am. --- II 263ff No explanation by language but by the objects themselves. II 265 Action/rest: action is not auto-semantical, not ascribed to the things themselves - analysis of thought before speech analysis - language "expression of thought" - hence reason is the criterion of speech. >Language and thought, >World/Thinking. Language/thought/Brentano: explanation not by language but presentation of the subject. II 266 Rest: because it lasts, its experience requires a change. Simons, Peter. Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Thinking | Wittgenstein | II 45f Plan/Wittgenstein: Thinking means to operate with plans - the thought needs no interpretation - the plan needs an interpretation - the rules of interpretation of a plan do not belong to the plan itself - science: like building a house - philosophy: like tidying. Cf. >Interpretation, >Planning. II 46 Thinking/Wittgenstein: is a symbolic operation - analog: E.g. digestion: a) characteristic of a human being - b) chemical process - Definition thinking: interpretation of a plan - Telepathy: could only be interpretation of symbols - at the same level as language. II 50 Thinking/Language/Wittgenstein: we think with the help of the sign. To think of a thing means to think of a sentence in which it occurs - the occasion does not belong to thinking - but the words do - one sentence is a mechanism - not a bunch of individual parts. >Words, >Signs, >Objects, >Picture theory. II 67 Thinking/Wittgenstein: no "representative in the mind" - the thought is autonomous - it does not point beyond itself - we only believe that because of the way we use symbols - there is no mental process that cannot be symbolized - we are only interested in what can be symbolized. >Symbols, II 105 Thinking/Language/Wittgenstein: Thinking not possible without language. >Language and thought, >Language. --- IV 108 Thinking/Tractatus: 6.361 in the way of expression by Hertz one could say: only legitimate connections are conceivable. >Conceivability. --- VII 10 Thinking/expression/limit/Tractatus/Foreword/Wittgenstein: not the thinking, but the expression is a drawn limit. >Expressions. VII 12 Kant/Tetens: knowledge: the frontier of knowledge can be crossed in both directions - sense/nonsense/Wittgenstein/Tetens: this limit cannot be exceeded. VII 82 Language/thinking/Tractatus/Tetens: what we think must be logically possible. (See Tractatus 4.031). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Thoughts | Wittgenstein | II 214 Idea/Wittgenstein: is not something that is communicated by the words. >Ideas. Hintikka I 239 Hintikka: his basic ideas are based on the insight that language cannot be transcended in language and thoughts cannot be transcended in thinking. ... "The thought is a symbol". >Symbols. II 45 Def Plan/Wittgenstein: Thinking means operating with plans. The thought is not the same as the plan, because the thought needs no interpretation, the plan, on the other hand, does. >Planning. II 59 Thinking/World/Border/Wittgenstein: what is "common" to thought and reality must be articulated through the expression of thought. You cannot express it in another sentence. II 66 Thinking/Thought/Wittgenstein: the thought is autonomous. Example "Schmidt is sitting on the bench". You would think three things are in his mind, as a proxy. There is something true about that, too. But what guarantee would we have that they represent anything at all? What is given in my thinking is present and essential! Everything else (which is represented) is irrelevant. That is why thinking is complete in itself. And what is not given in my thinking cannot be essential for it! The thought does not point beyond itself, we believe that only because of the way in which we use symbols. >Proxy, >Symbols. II 186 Unconscious thoughts, conscious thoughts: the word "thoughts" is used differently depending on which of these adjectives precedes it. >Unconscious. II 214 Thought/Wittgenstein: that a thought is communicated by words, and that it is different from the words, is a superstition. III 134 Tractatus/Core Sentences: 3. The logical picture of facts is the thought. 4. The thought is the meaningful sentence. >Sentences, >Sense. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Time | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 221 Time/WittgensteinVsTractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comparisons between language and the world must take place in time. - Thus, the non-temporal Tractatus items are questionable. >Comparisons, >World. --- IV 108 Time/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6.3611, we can only compare processes with each other, not one process over time. >Measurements. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Truth Conditions | Dummett | II 72 Truth Conditions/Dummett: Truth conditions are assumed to be given. - But only for each type of speech act. - A theory of >force must then distinguish between question, command, etc. Being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct). II 95 Truth Conditions/Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger. - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (the truth conditions for the attribution of skills are needed). II 100 Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know them if you cannot tell when they are satisfied. --- III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: An explanation of sense has to be given by truth conditions. - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: Under which circumstances is a sentence true... >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that "P is true" means. Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained. >Meaning. VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. III (c) 122 Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! Problem: the truth conditions are not always recognizable, even if met. Solution: to think that something is true requires only knowledge of the truth conditions, not knowing whether they are fulfilled. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Truth Predicate | Wright | I 29f Truth predicate/Wright: two characteristics are necessary: 1. prescriptive and descriptive norm, determined by practice. Definition descriptive normative (predicate): then if the choice of a move through doers is actually guided in that they follow the judgment or not. Definition prescriptive normative: if the choice within the practice must be guided in this way. Definition Deflationism: the T-predicate is with respect to any assertoric (assertive) practice of positive regulatory nature, both prescriptive and descriptive. >Truth predicate. Prescriptive: every reason to think that a sentence is T, can be made a reason to state this sentence. Descriptive: the practice exactly looks as if it would look like when the assertoric moves would be deliberately chosen. >Assertibility/Wright. I 32 The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate moves must be confirmed by the actual assertoric practice. >Practise. I 55 Tractatus/Wittgenstein: object and proposition are formal concepts. >Tractatus, >Proposition, >Objects. I 56 Minimalism: Wittgenstein's proposal causes that each predicate that has certain very general characteristics, is qualified as a truth predicate. This also works for pluralism. >Minimalism/Wright. I 180 Content/Wright: must comply with discipline and surface syntax (for example, conditional, negation) of a discourse. The so secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes). >Content/Wright. I 221f Definition truth predicate/Wright: a predicate that is enough for a small amount of basal principles (platitudes among other things on assertion and negation). >Assertions, >Negation. These characteristic features are the only ones which are essential for truth. However, they are not sufficient to motivate an intuitive realism regarding a discourse. >Discourse. >Realism, >Sufficiency. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Variables | Prior | I 30 Number variables/Prior: variables are no names. E.g. if exactly 3 things φ and exactly 4 things ψ, then more things are φ than ψ. Then "3" is no name but an inseparable part of the verb operator "Exactly 3 things __". >Names, >Operators, >Predication, >Is, >Equality, >Equations, >Sets, >Set theory. I 33 Bound variables/Quine: bound variables can only stand for names. So for things, not for sentences. >Bound variables, cf. >Names of sentences, >Quantification, >Objects. QuineVsFrege: names are not for sentences, only for things. - E.g. "For a φ, φx" is the only way to read this, that there is at least one thing, so that x "does" this thing. >Sentences, >"Stand for", >Names/Frege, >Sentences/Frege. Quine himself does not do that but he has "ε" for "is element of". >Element relation, >Is, >Predication. I 35 Bound variable/name/Prior: E.g. open sentence "x is red-haired": what is x? >Open sentences/propositional functions. It depends on how we stand for" understanding: a) x is for a name, such as "Peter" (Substitute) b) or object Peter PriorVsQuine: bound variables can also stand for sentences: "J. believes that p" (anything), then stands for a sentence. ad I 93 (external): Sentence variable/Wittgenstein: Tractatus: The term presupposes forms of all sentences in which it can occur - Tractatus 3.312: It is therefore represented by the general form of the sentences which it characterizes - Wittgenstein: namely in this form the expression will be constant and everything else can be variable - sentence variable: Aristotle's innovation "a" for a whole sentence. I 148 Bound variables/Prior: bound variables represent logical proper names. "For an x: 1. x φ-s, 2. nothing else than x φ-s and 3. it is not the case that x ψ-s". I 164f Bound variable/PriorVs some American logicians: not any bound variable stands for a name. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Wholes | Wittgenstein | Tetens VII 25 Whole/world/Tractatus/Tetens: "whole reality" means the linguistically representable - the rest is not nothing, but can only be shown. >World, >Reality, >Totality, >Pointing, >Representation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| World | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 100 World/happy/unhappy/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: affected by Moore/Bloomsbury Circle: ethics: the moral status of an action is determined by its consequences. - Presentation of "valuable experience". - Hintikka: then the world with such experiences is another than a world without. Cf. >Ethics. --- Wittgenstein II 123 Language/world/Wittgenstein: we have the idea that the language would be held within limits by the world. - ((s) The world causes that statements are true or false.) - But not that the meanings change. - Otherwise a new fact could cause that the statement that it represents, should be read, because of new meanings, as if it would not have occurred. - ((s) This shows that truth and meaning must be distinguished.) >Truth, >Meaning, >Reality, >Causation. II 138 World/Wittgenstein: totality of facts, not of things: Description - not a list. >Wholes, >Totality, >Facts. --- III 149 World of the happy/unhappy/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: I am my world: the way in which the world reveals itself to me, also indicates how I am without the facts being different by a whit. --- VI 69 Tractatus/world/Schulte: the world of the Tractatus is ordered according to That-senteces. >That-clauses, cf. >Propositional attitudes. --- VII 19 World/description/properties/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: Problem: the world must have the properties, without which it could not be described by statements - Statements: must obey the logic - therefore the logical structure conditions of our statements are also the conditions of possibility of the described world itself - (6.13). >Statements, >Descriptions, >Properties, >Possibility. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| World/Thinking | Wittgenstein | III 144 Language/reality - thought/world: the actual relationship between language (thought) and reality cannot be part of reality itself. Reason: an image A must have the same shape as the state of affairs S that is now a picture B, which should reflect the relationship between A and S as a picture ratio, so it would also have to have this form. But then it would either only be identical with A, or it would be the image of another state of affairs of the same shape. E.g. a painter can paint a different painter, who paints a tree. But how could you picture the mere fact that the painter paints the tree? The picture shows a painter, who paints a tree. But which hyphens in the painting form this situation? >Picture (image), >Picture (mapping), >Picture theory. Therefore it is said in the Tractatus: a sentence shows its meaning. (>Pointing/telling/sense/seeing: Ostension/Wittgenstein, Picture theory/Wittgenstein). It is not possible for an imaging elementary proposition to map the sense of the elementary proposition. This is not to be confused with our possibility to express what is stated by a sentence. --- Rorty IV 41 Language/world/Wittgenstein/Rorty: according to Wittgenstein any idea that we can get from an independent reality has to remain within the limits of our way of life - NagelVsWittgenstein: (with Kripke): Wittgenstein cannot be reconciled with realism - ((s) but Nagel as Wittgenstein: we cannot enter the world of the bat. Cf. >Bat example. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Anscombe, E. | Wittgenstein Vs Anscombe, E. | Hintikka I 163 ff Hintikka: The problem of color incompatibility is solvable. Color/color terms/color terms/logic/AnscombeVsWittgenstein: argues what is not accepted by WittgensteinVsAnscombe that, provided red and green are objects, we know which is their logical type. --- I 164 Color words/color terms/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: incompatible does not mean contradictory: (red/green). E.g. "This patch is red" and "This patch is green" are incompatible, but this incompatibility is not logical, in the sense that it is indicated by the notation (but: see below: 4). Also it does not reduce to a truth-functional contradiction. (Contradiction is for Wittgenstein a precisely defined term in the theory of truth functions (4:46)). "It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time, is a contradiction. Hintikka: but here it is not about the status of colors, but about the status of the color attribution. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein has ever believed color attributions such as "This is red" would have subject predicate form. Wittgenstein: from the use of these forms (meant here are grammatical sentences) we cannot draw, at most vague, conclusions. --- I 165 Sentence/form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. "This lecture is boring", "The weather is nice" are only seemingly sentences of the same form. They have nothing to do with each other. HintikkaVsAnscombe: their argument loses its strength with that: this is about someone who makes very different conditions. Hintikka: if you make other conditions, the situation is obviously quite different: Example: Assume that the general concept of color in the language not to be reproduced by a class of color predicates but by a function c which maps points of the visual space in a color space. The logical incompatibility would then be mirrored by the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. Then, the two sentences are logically incompatible! Due to their logical form a function cannot take two different values for the same argument. Wittgenstein claims even emphatically that attributions of different qualities of perception are essentially clear, that is, can be represented by real functions. --- I 165/166 Color/color words/neccessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colors incompatibility means a breach against Wittgenstein's notion that purely logical necessities are the only necessities, is now moved into a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of color terms. (Or the correct notation). Is a) every single color represented by a predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical type. b) points in a color space: then the incompatibility of various colors cause no illogical necessities. (Wittgenstein is this alternative (but certainly strange to Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of the color space. However, this concept fails to satisfy if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates --- I 341 ff Pain/private experiences/Cartesianism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most surprising thesis of this chapter is probably the thesis of Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, so the assertion that there are really private internal event-like experiences like pain and other such sensations according to Wittgenstein. It is undisputed that the language must be based on a public language game, one is divided what must follow for the private feelings. Implies the neccessity of a public framework that these experiences themselves are now objects, events, or anything not private? That this follows, is represented by many philosophers. e.g. --- Hintikka I 342 Anscombe: "If a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition." Since private ostensive definitions are impossible there can probably be no personal item acording to this view. HintikkaVsAnscombe: but this implication does not apply. Of course we cannot say that sensations and the like are private in our language according to Wittgenstein. But that is not what this is about, this is just one of the consequences of inexpressibility of semantics. Actual question: are the philosophers right who claim that there are no private events according to Wittgenstein? No. PU § 272 provides a counter-example: "The essence of the private experience is actually not that each has its own example, but that no one knows whether the other also has this or something else. So it would be possible, although not verifiable, that one part of humanity has a sensation of red and the other a different one." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Aristotle | Simons Vs Aristotle | I 241 Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: the primordial matter fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) the substrate of change (change) and b) the carrier of properties. VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure, that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real. Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together. Primordial Matter/Simons: the primordial matter may well have its own special characteristics. Pro Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler. Diversity/tradition/Simons: diversity was explained by the combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This can already be found in the Tractatus. Foundation Stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): foundation stones are colorless. Simons: but the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars, but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal) or if they are accidentally real (Tractatus 2.0233). I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happen to it ((s) its life story!). SimonsVsFour Dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block. Universal Realism/Simons: universal realism could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics. Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary. Whole/Wholeness/Simons: the whole appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German Philosophy Between The World Wars). I 292 Whole/Aristotle/Simons: the whole seems to require inner relations towards a sum. Inner Relations/whole/Aristotle: e.g.: continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter. This includes species and genera. SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mention the most important relation: causation. Husserl/Simons: Husserl discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name. Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: the "pregnant whole" is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>Foundation/Husserl, Foundation/Simons). Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: a foundation can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD). Substance/tradition/Simons: the substance is (sort of) ontologically independent. Ontological Dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is ontological dependent. I 318 Independence/ontology/Simons: where independence is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) - as such many times in philosophy (rather theology) - is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: the substance is a very weak form of independence. Def primary: primary ist, what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it. SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Armstrong, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Armstrong, D. | Arm III 41 WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Tractatus: laws of nature cannot be explaining principles for observed phenomena. (6.371). |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Atomism | Wittgenstein Vs Atomism | II 138 WittgensteinVsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there are elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives infinity as a number, and assumes there is an infinite number of sentences. 2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) They must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent). --- II 157 Particular/Atom/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get to the basic elements by logical analysis ("individuals"). Russell believed, in the end subject-predicate sentences and binary relations would arise. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Augustine | Wittgenstein Vs Augustine | I 272 Language/world/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: we reformulate epistemologically: how can an observer recognize the semantic base-links between language and reality? What is the mode of existence of the semantic relationships between language and the world? WittgensteinVsAugustine/Hintikka: learning the language is not the fact that one acquires a number of different names for different entities, (also VsTractatus) but that one learns the language games. There is next to it no other medium in which they exist. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Austin, John L. | Strawson Vs Austin, John L. | Ayer I 296 StrawsonVsAustin: surely we use the word "true" when the semantic conditions described by Austin are met. But by using this word, we do not say that they are met. Searle III 211 Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: (Debate over 40 years ago. It is generally agreed that Strawson won this debate.) Strawson: the correspondence theory must not be cleaned, it must be eliminated. III 212 It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of the facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth constitutes a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic structures. (Traces back to the copy theory of the Tractatus). Strawson II 248 Speech act theory/StrawsonVsAustin: if he was right that we ascribe the predicate "true" substantially to speech acts it should be possible to "reduce" assertions about the truth of statements in a not to speech acts related sense on assertions about the truth of speech acts. Austin: you can make different statements with the same proposition. Strawson: you can also make the same statment with different propositions. II 249 Example about Jones: "He is sick." to Jones: "You are sick." (Even different meaning). Def "true"/Strawson: fallacy: we could say that different people then make the same statement if the words they use in their specific situation must either preserve all or lead all to false statements. But if we say that we use "true" to clarify the expression "the same statement". II 252 Fact/"to make true"/world/Strawson: but the said fact is not something in the world. It is not an object! By this it is of course not denied that there is something in the world about which a statment of this kind is, to which it relates, which it describes and which corresponds to the description. StrawsonVsAustin: he seems to overlook the fact that "fact" and "thing" belong to completely different types. The thing, the person, etc., to which the statements refer are the material correlate of the referring part of the statements. The condition or property is the pseudo physical correlate. The fact is the pseudo physical correlate of the statement as a whole. II 253 Fact/Strawson: is closely associated with "that"-propositions. Facts are known, be asserted, believed forgotten, overlooked, commented, notified or noticed. Facts are what statements assert; they are that of which something is asserted! It is wrong to equate facts with true statements. Nevertheless, their roles overlap. Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: he believes a statement and a fact are something in the world. II 254 E.g. but I cannot think of any occasion in which I would neglect the difference between the fact that my wife Mia bore me twins (at midnight) and what I say (10 minutes later), namely that my wife bore me twins. Correspondence/Austin: there is no theoretical limit to what could be truthfully said about the things in the world but there are very significant practical limits to what people can actually say about them. Statement/fact/StrawsonVsAustin: but what could better correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? Of course, statements and facts correspond. They are made for each other. If one removes the statements from the world one would also remove the facts from the world. But the world would not be poorer by this. By this you do not get rid of the world of which something is asserted. (> World/Strawson). A symptom of Austin's uncertainty is his preference for the terms "situation" and "issue". Neither situations nor issues (just as facts) can namely be seen or heard, but rather are summarized or detected at a glance. II 255 Fact/Strawson: e.g. to be worried by a fact is not the same as to be as frightened by a shadow. It means to be worried because.... II 256 World/Strawson/Strawson: why should we insist that only things and events are part of the world? Why can we not also ascribe situations and facts to the world? Answer: the temptation to talk about situations in a way that is appropriate for things and events, is overwhelming. StrawsonVsAustin: Austin does not resist it: he smuggles the word "feature" as a synonym for "fact" in. Justification: maps are not in the same way "true" as statements because they are not entirely conventional, photographs not conventional at all. II 260 StrawsonVsAustin: when he says that the relationship between a statement and the world is purely conventional then there are two confusions between: a) the semantic conditions and b) what is asserted. It is as absurd to say that someone who confirmed a statement confirmed that semantic conditions are fulfilled as if to say that the speaker would have said that. II 261 Conditions/use/Strawson: by using a word we do not say that the conditions are fulfilled. StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking: how do we use the word "true"? he asks When do we use it? II 267 StrawsonVsAustin: "exaggerated" is not a relation between a statement and some of these different things in the world. (Too simple). II 268 Then the difficulties of correspondence occur again. Austin would not say that it e.g. corresponds to a relation between a glove and a hand that is too big. He would speak of a conventional relationship. But the fact that the statement that p, is exaggerated, is not conventional in any sense! (It is perhaps the fact that 1200 people and not 2000 were there. The criticism of an exaggeration requires a previous statement. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism. Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Darwin, Ch. | Wittgenstein Vs Darwin, Ch. | Putnam V 148/149 Wittgenstein: (lectures and discussions) WittgensteinVsPsychoanalysis "myth", admired Freud's mind. WittgensteinVsDarwin: "In a statement, the most important to me is, that it works, that we can predict something from it." The physics is related to the engineering. ~ "People are convinced by extremely meager reasons". Vollmer I 290 WittgensteinVsDarwin: (Tractatus 4.1122) "has not more to do with the philosophy than any other hypothesis of natural science." |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Davidson, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson/Aristotle: practical syllogism causes are reasons - WittgensteinVs: Causes not empirical but recognizable through language skills. --- Davidson II 84 All such arguments assume that between reason and act exists such a tight logical-conceptual relation that reasons and actions cannot be understood as two distinct events. Only as numerically different, they could stand in a cause-effect relationship. This would, however, be prevented by the deductive relation. --- II 85 DavidsonVsWittgenstein ("Actions, Reason and Causes") This is false solution: Essential for the relationship is that the agent performs the action because he had reasons. One can also have a reason and not act according to that reason. What interests us is the reason for which the agent did x, not any arbitrary reason. As long as this "because" is not explained, the actual explanation performance of explanations of reasons is not exhausted. This deficit is only avoidable if we assume that "rationalization is a species of causal explanation". --- Dummett I 111 Turning to the language: Wittgenstein's Tractatus principle of analytic philosophy: the only way to the analysis of thought leads via the analysis of language. Davidson always presupposes a theory of meaning, WittgensteinVsDavidson: avoids in his later writings, the formation of a general theory of meaning, because he thinks that any attempt at a systematic explanation of language cannot help but to squeeze various phenomena in a single form of description: distortion. But also Wittgenstein believes that the goal of philosophy is to get us in a working order by overview of the functioning of language and thus on the structure of our thoughts to correctly recognize the world. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Dualism | Ryle Vs Dualism | Pauen I 82 Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance. I 84 RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events. Ryle I 226 ff Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them. I 228 We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while. The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts? Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine? I 229 Questions of this kind are not a mystery! I 230 In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide). Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Formalism | Frege Vs Formalism | Brandom I 606 FregeVsFormalists: How can evidence be provided that something falls under a concept? Frege uses the concept of necessity to prove the existence of an object. Brandom I 609 Free Logic: "Pegasus is a winged horse" is regarded as true, although the object does not exist physically. It can serve as substituent. FregeVs. (>Read). Brandom I 620 Frege: Pegasus has "sense" but no "meaning". FregeVsFormalism: Important argument: it is not enough merely to refer to the Peano axioms, identities such as "1 = successor to the number 0" are trivial. They do not combine two different ways of picking out an object. Solution: Abstraction: it is necessary to connect the use of the expressions of the successor numbers with the already common expressions. Frege I 130 Equation/Frege: you must not put the definite article on one side of an equation and the indefinite article on the other. FregeVsFormalism: a purely formal theory is sufficient. It’s only an instruction for the definitions, not a definition as such. I 131 Number System/Expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning cannot be fixed arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already unchangeable before the definitions, but it is determined by these. ((s) Contradiction? Anyway, Frege is getting at meaning as use). Number i/Frege: it does not matter whether a second, a millimeter or something else is to play a role in this. I 132 It is only important that the additions and multiplication sentences apply. By the way, i falls out of the equation again. But, E.g. with "a ´bi" you have to explain what meaning "total" has in this case. It is not enough to call for a sense. That would be just ink on paper. (FregeVsHilbert). Bigelow I 182 Consistency/FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert/Bigelow/Pargetter: Existence precedes consistency. For consistency presupposes the existence of a consistently described object. If it exists, the corresponding description is consistent. If it does not exist, how can we guarantee consistency? Frege I 125 Concept/Frege: How can you prove that it does not contain a contradiction? Not by the determination of the definition. I 126 E.g. ledger lines in a triangle: it is not sufficient for proof of their existence that no contradiction is discovered in on their concept. Proof of the disambiguity of a concept can strictly only be carried out by something falling under it. The reverse would be a mistake. E.g. Hankel: equation x + b = c: if b is > c, there is no natural number x which solves the problem. I 127 Hankel: but nothing keeps us from considering the difference (c - b) as a sign that solves the problem! Sign/FregeVsHankel/FregeVsFormalism: there is something that hinders us: E.g. considering (2 - 3) readily as a sign that solves the problem: an empty sign does not solve the problem, but is only ink on paper. Its use as such would then be a logical error. Even in cases where the solution is possible, it is not the sign that is the solution, but the content. Wittgenstein I 27 Frege/Earlier Wittgenstein/Hintikka: ((FregeVsFormalism) in the philosophy of logic and mathematics). Frege dispensed with any attempt to attribute a semantic content to his logical axioms and rules of evidence. Likewise, Wittgenstein: "In logical syntax, the meaning of a sign must never play a role, it may only require the description of the expressions." Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that the Tractatus represents the view of the inexpressibility of language par excellence. The inexpressibility of semantics is merely limited to semantics, I 28 syntax can certainly be linguistically expressed! In a letter to Schlick, Wittgenstein makes the accusation that Carnap had taken his ideas, without pointing this out (08.08.32)! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Verificationism Vs Frege, G. | Field II 104 Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt. Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden. Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Gadamer, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Gadamer, G. | I 21ff Signs/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by notes (explanations). Notes are sentences which contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meaning of these signs has been detected (VsHermeneutic Circle/WittgensteinVsGadamer), 4.12 "To be able to represent the logical form, we would have to position us with the sentence outside the logic, that is, outside the world." --- I 22 Wittgenstein: the meaningful sentence comprises both the punctuation, as well as its "projective relation to the world". (3.12) The projection method is "the thinking of the sentence meaning". (3.11) |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Hintikka, J. | Saarinen Vs Hintikka, J. | Hintikka I 80 Querwelteinidentität/Querwelteinidentifikation/Hintikka: normalerweise halten wir einen großen Teil der Welt fixiert, wenn wir zwei Individuen identifizieren. Vergleichbarkeit/Hintikka/(s): so werden Alternativen vergleichbar. Um Alternativen zu verschiedenen Teilen vergleichbar zu machen, dehnen wir sie aus. Die Erweiterungen sollten einen Teil gemeinsam haben. Im Extremfall teilen sie ihre Geschichte. identisch: sind zwei Objekte (Individuen) wenn ihre Geschichte zusammenfällt. Das führ dazu, dass Querwelteinidentifikation teilweise reduziert wird auf Re-Identifikation. D.h. es wird zu dem Problem. Wie die Raumzeit zu einer gemeinsamen Grundlage zurückverfolgt werden kann. Vorteil: wir müssen nicht jede einzelne mögliche Welt (Möwe) berücksichtigen. I 81 Querwelteinidentifikation/Querwelteinidentität/Locke/Kripke/Hintikka: These: Verursachung spielt eine wichtige Rolle. Ereignis/Hintikka: kann nicht in der Raumzeit bewegt werden. D.h. dass sie nur identifiziert werden können, wenn die MöWe eine gemeinsame Geschichte haben. Ereignis/Querwelteinidentifikation/Hintikka: ist relativ zu einer prop Einst. Dazu brauchen wir noch eine bessere Fundierung der Theorie. Identifikation/Raumzeit/KripkeVsHIntikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: beide wenden (aus verschiedenen Gründen) ein, dass raumzeitliche Kontinuität nicht immer einen präzisen Sinn hat. SaarinenVsHintikka: die Identität von Individuen, die in mehreren Möwe auftreten, ist auch dann nicht immer für alle diese Möwe wohldefiniert. Hintikka: dito: in Glaubenskontexten kann es sein, dass ein Individuum unter einer Beschreibung identifiziert wird, nicht aber unter einer anderen. Das muss auch so sein, denn sonst wären wir wieder gewissermaßen allwissend. MöWe: wir müssen auch vorsichtig sein, einen „gemeinsamen Grund“ von allen Möwe anzunehmen. Wir teilen sicher keinen Teil der Raumzeit, sondern einen Teil der Tatsachen. ((s) epistemisch statt ontologisch). Welt/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Substanz/Hintikka: bei Wittgenstein ist die Welt die Summe der Tatsachen, nicht der Gegenstände: zu einer geteilten Raumzeit würde das nur durch zusätzliche Annahmen. Querwelteinidentität/Hintikka: scheint verloren, wenn wir es nur mit einer Menge von Tatsachen ((s) epistemisch) zu tun haben und uns eine gemeinsame Raumzeit fehlt. I 82 Re-Identifikation: von physikalischen Objekten ist zunächst nötig, um danach zur Querwelteinidentifikation zu gelangen. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Idealism | Wittgenstein Vs Idealism | IV 38 Logic/inner/outer/figure/show/public/form/Tractatus: 4.0411 if we wanted to express for example, what is expressed by "(x)fx" by putting an index before "fx": "Alg. fx" Wittgenstein: then we would not know what was generalized. E.g. if we wanted to show it by an index "a": "f(xa)" we would not know the scope of the generalization designation. E.g. introducing a mark in the argument places: "(A,A).F(A,A)" that would not suffice either, because we could not determine the identity of the variables. Seeing/WittgensteinVsIdealism/Tractatus: 4.0412 for the same reason the idealist explanation of seeing spatial relations through "spatial spectacles" is not sufficient because it cannot explain the multiplicity of these relations. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Kant | Wittgenstein Vs Kant | Brandom I 75 WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. --- Münch III 327 WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Kant I 12 I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. --- Kant I 13/14 The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. --- Kant I 14 WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." --- Putnam III 220 WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed. Wittgenstein II 35 There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. --- IV 109 Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Stalnaker Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stalnaker I 125 VsContingent Identity/Stalnaker: if it is possible that one thing would be two things, then there is an a that this thing in the possible world (poss.w.) is w1 and b and c in w2. Then the cross world identities b = a and a = c should both be true but the innerworldly identity b = c is wrong! (In w2). That precisely violates the transitivity of identity. Solution/Stalnaker: we have to ask in which poss.w. this statement is made. In w1 b = c is also true that means it is true in w1 that the individual that is b in w2 is identical to the one that is c in w2. That is no violation of the transitivity. Versus: From the perspective of w2: here b = c is wrong (see above). What about b = a and c = a? Those identify two individuals that are identical in w1 with an individual from w1. Problem: from the perspective of w2 the description "the individual that is identical to a in w1" is an unsuitable description. Hence: w2: from the perspective of w2 identity statements are either false, without truth value or ambiguous. Analogous to E.g. Russell is the author of Principia Mathematica – the author of PM is Whitehead - so Russell is Whitehead. (see above the counterpart relation has to be flexible, it may not require transitivity). I 184 Metaphysics/Kripke/Stalnaker: not all his metaphysical assertions are equally convincing. On the one hand a) is hard to deny that we can accept potentialities and opportunities for certain individuals reasonably, regardless of the manner in which the individual is specified on the other hand: b) is less convincing that Kripke denies some possibilities that individuals could have. StalnakerVsKripke: it is not convincing that Kripke does not allow on the one hand, that Shakespeare could have had other parents, on the other hand could have lived in another century. How should that be possible? KripkeVsVs/Stalnaker: would say that we are if we accept such things at all, we are confused. This counterfactual possibilities are not coherent. Possible worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: are not made to clarify metaphysical questions. Metaphysics/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke's metaphysical theses do not require his theories on reference and intentionality. Is it reversed that his causal theory requires his metaphysical image? Stalnaker: the metaphysical thesis about the identification of individuals on poss.w. is easy to separate from the theory that names are rigid designators whose reference can be found on causal interaction. I 181 Object/properties/thing/object/SearleVsWittgenstein/SearleVsTractatus/Stalnaker: (Searle was not directed at the time against Kripke, whose book was published later). Kripke/Stalnaker: but he also makes the metaphysical distinction between object and properties what Searle rejects. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 186 SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. --- Simons I 319 Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything. Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads). Solution/Simons: actually the two are already distinguished in the concept of dependence: Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7"). Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence (notation "7"). This has severe consequences: Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity. Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements? If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals: Whole/Leibniz: the whole ceases to exist if a part is lost. Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts. Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him, "always" means "real part". Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independent. That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (or first?) member. Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this: (1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts) (2) every part is essential (3) therefore each composite depends on its parts (4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts (5) but each chain of dependencies is founded (6) therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts (7) therefore, there are simple monads, atoms. SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. VsMereological Essentialism: 2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it? Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Principia Mathematica | Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica | II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity. II 352 Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned. II 353 The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down. II 402 Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. II 415 Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing. The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate. Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads. WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class? II 416 It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica(1), there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations") 2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs. WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one. --- IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. IV 73 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica(1) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic. 5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here. 5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity. People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and IV 74 lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth). Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations. IV 84 Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form "a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing. WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p" and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences. That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical. 5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there IV 85 would be things but these were not identical with themselves? IV 85/86 Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). IV 87 Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number. IV 98 Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. IV 99 Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Prior I 39 Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. I 40 The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.) Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx". But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ". Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur. E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander." logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__". ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies). Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property" logical form: "For a φ, φ __" "Σφφ". (Σ: there is a) Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order. Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's". Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols. That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems. E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..." "If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact. Symbolically: 1. CΠφNφxNψx. I 41 "If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong) 3. CΠφNφx. The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory. Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions). Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented: E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong. logical form: 1. CΠpNpNq by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?) 3. NΠpNp, Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself. And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2. RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order". VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom. By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again. Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification. Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements). E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form) Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences. Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves. E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc. RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between "p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters. Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Russell, B. | Carnap Vs Russell, B. | VI 164 Def visual objects/Russell: classes of their possible aspects. CarnapVsRussell: That’s possible, but we begin our constitution much further down! For the "unseen aspects" this is difficult, therefore we constitute the entire visual world at once, not any "experiences for unseen things." VI 247 CarnapVsRussell: realistic conception that manifests itself by him raising questions regarding whether an object still exists even when it is not observed. Thing in itself/Schlick: real, not given objects. Carnap: that makes them part of the recognizable objects. Wittgenstein I 202 ff Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed. I 203 But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added. Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong. Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class. These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world. Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory". Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap, this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Saussure, F. de | Wittgenstein Vs Saussure, F. de | I 162 Definition Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in no sense an image of its object. However, it can reflect its object in the sense that the possibilities of the connection of the name correspond with other names of the possibilities of the connection of its object with the appropriate objects. (Therefore, the choice of names according to Wittgenstein is in important respects not arbitrary.) (VsSaussure). |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Sense Data | Carnap Vs Sense Data | Wittgenstein I 202 ff Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed. I 203 But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added. Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong. Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class. These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world. Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory". Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: for Carnap this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Skepticism | Wittgenstein Vs Skepticism | IV 114 WittgensteinVsScepticism/Tractatus: 6:51 is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, if he wants to doubt where one cannot ask. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Tractatus | Wittgenstein Vs Tractatus | Tugendhat I 163 Tractatus/Tugendhat: naive object-theoretical position. Wittgenstein: "what the case, the fact is, is the existence of atomic facts", "the fact is a combination of objects". "In the facts objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain". (2.03). (Later discarded by Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein/late/self-criticism/VsTractatus: Philosophical remarks: "complex is not the same as fact I say of a complex, it is moving from one place to another, but not from a fact." "To say that a red circle consists of redness and circularity, or a complex of these constituents, is an abuse of such words and misleading." --- I 235 ff WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/WittgensteinVsTractatus/Hintikka. WWK, 209 f. "unclear to me in the Tractatus was the logical analysis and ostensive definition" ... "thought at this time that it is a connection between language and reality"... --- I 236 Sign/Meaning/Definition/showing/Waismann ("theses"): "We can give meaning to characters in two ways:. 1. by designation 2. by definition". --- I 237 Hintikka: deeper reasons: in the Tractatus the thesis of inexpressibility of semantics does not stop Wittgenstein from highlighting the role of the ostensive definition under the guise of showing. Through his move from phenomenology to the physical language it is impossible for him to indicatively define all his not further-back-tracable objects. One and the same gesture may be in the game when one indicatively defines a person's name, a color word, a substance name (mass terminus) a numeral, the name of a compass direction. The differences apparantly do not seem to belong to the area of the phenomenological, but to the ontology of everyday objects. Philosophical Investigations, PI § 28 For these reasons, Wittgenstein rejects for some time the idea that the ostensive explaining could establish a connection between language and reality. --- I 297 ff Image/agreement/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: is the vividness an agreement? --- I 298 Image/sentence/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/self-criticism: in the Tractatus I said something like: it was an agreement of the form, however, this is a mistake. Hintikka: this could give the wrong impression, that Wittgenstein abandoned the image thoughts. But that is a mistake. Image/Wittgenstein: the image can represent a possible state of affairs. It does not need to be an image of a de facto state in the world. A command is usually an image of the action that should be performed, but not necessarily an image of the actual completed act. (Also work drawing). What is the method of projection? --- I 299 "So I imagine the difference between sentence and reality is offset by the projection beams belonging to the image, the idea and which leave no more room for a method of application. There is only agreement and disagreement." "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality in grammar can be found in the language." --- II 138 Atomism/VsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there were elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives of infinity as a number, and assumes that there is an infinite number of sentences. 2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) they must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent). --- III 151 Tractatus/later self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein: he was dealing with two weak points: 1. that the descriptive language is so openly regarded as a model of the actual language. There are many unrecognized forms of speech. It may be questioned whether the meaning of an utterance can be understood regardless of the context. In addition, doubt, as to whether any meaningful sentence has one and only one logical form. 2. Problem of intersubjectivity disregarded. --- III 214 WittgensteinVsTractatus (self-criticism): discussions with Ramsey and the Italian economy scientist Piero Sraffa. SraffaVsTractatus: VsImage theory: Vs, that a meaningful sentence must be a projection of a state of affairs. Also denied that any meaningful sentence could be resolved into elementary propositions. From this critique emerged in 1929 30 Philosophical remarks (PB) 1932 34 Philosophical Grammar (PG) 1933 34 The Blue Book + The Brown Book Main work of the "Second Period": Philosophical Investigations (Philosophical Investigations). --- III 217 WittgensteinVsTractatus/Wittgenstein/late/Flor: that can be useful and clear in a specific situation, to give a vague question or a vague description or a vague instruction. --- VI 95/96 Logical constants/elementary proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: self-criticism: does now no longer assume that one would be able later to specify elementary propositions. In truth, we already have everything, namely at present. New: Priority of sentence system over the individual sentence. Previously: I believed that we have to do without the logical constants, because "and", "or", "not" do not connect the objects. (I abide by this). But I falsely believed that the elementary propositions would be independent from each other because I falsely believed the linking rules of logical constants could have something to do with the internal structure of sentences. In reality, the logical constants form rather just a part of a comprehensive syntax of which I did not know anything then." --- VII 148 Language/Tractatus/Tetens: language only serves one purpose here: to map facts. WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/VsTractatus/later Wittgenstein/Tetens: instead there is a variety of language games. To speak sensibly, we must take part in a complicated social life form with its diverse language games. --- VII 149 The philosopher must describe how we use the expressions in everyday language. --- VII 150 "... a picture holds us captive. And we could not get out because it was in our language, and it seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." (Philosophical Investigations, PI 82) Descriptive/normative/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein's ignores in the Tractatus the distinction between descriptive and normative sentences. He later calls this the "one-sided diet" ((s) only descriptive sentences). (Philosophical Investigations, PI p. 251, § 593) --- VII 152 Skepticism/philosophy/Wittgenstein/late: also the philosophers learned the words "error", "doubt", etc., from the everyday language, they have not been invented for the purpose of philosophizing. --- VII 153 Deception/Wittgenstein/late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything, then he uses the words in a way that he would never use them in everyday life. --- VII 154 Wittgenstein: E.g. one cannot say that one his mistaken about something in his joy. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tractatus | Verschiedene Vs Tractatus | I 106 Object/VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus/Hintikka: many philosophers claim that Wittgenstein never became clear about the metaphysical status of simple objects. Hintikka: as the object of experience they have semantic status, not yet metaphysical status. Russell/Moore/Hintikka: for them, the objects of acquaintance are defined as objects of direct experience. So-called > Illusion argument: with its help the two succeed in drawing the conclusion, which in their opinion is sufficiently justified, that the objects of direct experience (acquaintance) cannot be equated with physical objects. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka: another objection states that Wittgenstein's Tractatus ontology among the undefined elements contains no functions (as opposed to properties and relationships). Hintikka: the reason is probably his interpretation of the identity in the tractatus which makes it difficult to identify functions in the usual way as relations whose last relation is clearly determined by the choice of the other values. |
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| Type Theory | Wittgenstein Vs Type Theory | II 439 Type Theory/Theory of types/WittgensteinVsRussell: f(a) = U's coat is red F(a) = U's coat has one of the colors of the rainbow φ(f) = Red is a color of the rainbow Question: Now, φ (F) has a meaning? ((s) This is not mentioned in this combination above). Russell: would say that "a color of the rainbow has the property to be a rainbow color" has no meaning, so that "f(f)" generally has no meaning. But if we now create a rule of grammar in order to exclude a replacement option (and exactly this does the theory of types, in order to avoid contradictions), then we must make the replacement rule dependendet exclusively on the characteristics of symbols. Replacement rule: if we introduce "f(x)" we must not give "f (f)" a meaning. E.g. Consider ~ f(f) = F(f) and the expression that is obtained by replacing "f" through "F": the property to not have oneself as a property that has itself in turn as a property. The root of the contradiction is that one considers a function to function of itself. ((s)> heterology). From ~ f(f) = F(f) results the contradiction F(F) = ~ F(F). Problem: arises when one declares a function to its function of itself. II 440 "f" in "f(x)" cannot be used as an argument itself. But why should this not occur as that which one presupposes, is not a sentence? It is not true to say that here the principle of contradiction has been violated, because that could only be the case if one was talking about sentences. Hardy said it would be unbearable to have real numbers of different orders. See his discussion, after which a sequence of real numbers belongs to another order, because it is defined by reference to a entirety whose barrier it is itself. An analog example is the maximum of a curve, which is defined as the highest points of all on this curve. IV 68 Operation/Form Series/Type theory/TT/Tractatus: 5.252 only like this the progression from member to member in a form series (from type to type in Russell) is possible. WittgensteinVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica(1) (PM), they have not given the possibility of this progression, but have made use of it repeatedly. 5.2521 The repeated application of an operation to its own result ((s)> recursion) I call its successive application ("O'O '=' a" is the result of a triple application of "O'ζ" to "a"). 5.2522 the general term of a form series a, O 'a, O'O'a ... I write: IV 69 "[a,x,O'x]". This expression in brackets is a variable. 1. member: beginning of the form series 2. member: The form of any member x of the series 3. member: Form of the immediate successor this x. (Successor: O'). IV 70 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "Logical objects" or "logical constants" in the sense of Russell do not exist. Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are not primitive signs, let alone that they do not signify any relations. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Various Authors | Bigelow Vs Various Authors | I 222 Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus assumption/Qualification/Qualified law/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if there are no other disturbances": 1) Problem: this threatens to let a law become a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move in this and that way, unless they do not." 2) Problem: The range of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing is included by it anymore. On the other hand it will be said that a law has no positive instances at all if one interprets it strictly. ((s)> Cartwright). Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the mystery can be solved by understanding how laws contain modalities. Def Laws/law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about possibilia. I 204 Property theory/World properties/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: contradictory predicates: do not correspond to any properties. E.g. round and square. I 210 Accessibility: such possible worlds are then not accessible for one another. One is nomically impossible from the standpoint of the other. VsProperty theory/VsWorld-properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is faced with the accusation of circularity, but we hope to resolve the objection. I 53 Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: stand in close logical relations: having a D-ate (determinate) entails having the corresponding D-able (determinable). I 54 But not vice versa! Having a D-able does not require possession of a certain D-ate! But it does require possession of some D-ate from the area. BigelowVsJohnson, World properties: but this could not explain the asymmetry. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 2nd order properties. Problem: our theory is still incomplete!. Problem: explaining why quantities are gradual. And this is not about whether objects are the same and different at the same time. New: The problem that we can also still say exactly E.g. how much they differ. Or E.g. that two masses are more similar than two others. Plato: Plato solves this with participation. Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution. Bigelow I 234 Natural necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Bigelow/Pargetter: Dramatic turn Vs Natural necessity! Also later Wittgenstein. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Various Authors | Hintikka Vs Various Authors | Hintikka II 136 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka Thesis: Wittgenstein’s image concept is little more than a particularly vivid formulation of the same idea that underlies the usual truth-condition for atomic sentences. Hintikka: structural equality is a truth condition for elementary propositions. II 137 False: in the most comments it is assumed that the image theory is a complete theory of language understanding. The difference lies in the completeness thesis that is attributed to Wittgenstein. What needs to be presumed so that the isomorphic relation appears as a complete explanation of language understanding? 1) No separate explanation required 2) The domain of all permissible compounds of names must match the entire domain of possible configurations of their objects. Otherwise one has to decide first whether the connection really exists. Wittgenstein makes both conditions in the Tractatus. HintikkaVsOther Authors: it is unfortunate if all three ideas are mixed up with each other. If the three were made to resemble each other, as many commentators do, the question of whether Wittgenstein abandons the picture theory later would lose its charm. Wittgenstein II 131 Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: Whenever a hypothesis is "always true", so that there is no falsification or verification, this hypothesis is meaningless: Eddington said: every time a light beam falls upon an electron, it disappears. Then you could also say, there is a white rabbit sitting on the couch sits, and every time I look it’s gone. WittgensteinVsEddington. Hintikka II 59 HintikkaVsCopi: Wittgenstein’s remarks on Def Reducibility Axiom (Russell)/Hintikka: the axiom states: that for any given property or relation of a certain type (higher lever) there is an equivalent predicative property or relation. It is not about the absolute existence or non-existence, but by the configurations. Therefore, the reducibility axiom cannot belong to the logic! II 60ff Character/Relation/Denote/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: Not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in a certain relationship to b, but the fact that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says that aRb. (3.1432) quotation marks sic!) But Wittgenstein is getting at something else: The number of names that occur in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to the Tractatus, as that of the objects in the situation represented by the sentence. What situation that is, however, is not determined solely by the names a and b. Copi: thinks (falsely) that Wittgenstein basically abstracts from the relation sign by using the phrase "in certain respects" and undertakes an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Black Vs Wittgenstein | Simons I 320 Atomism/BlackVsTractatus/BlackVsWittgenstein: "metaphysical prejudice": the thesis that not every existence is conditional. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Carnap Vs Wittgenstein | II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory). Hempel I 99/100 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora). CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose. CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences. Carnap II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora) |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Wittgenstein | Davidson Vs Wittgenstein | I (a) 6ff Many philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein: recognition of the mind of another person: difference in the way we recognize our own mind and how we recognize the one of another person. In the first case there is no evidence needed, in the second case: the behavior must be observed. (not own behaviour) Davidson: As regards the use of these concepts of the mental, I agree with this distinction. But: DavidsonVsWittgenstein: The description of our practice does not constitute a solution to our original problem. Our practice has never been in doubt. Two questions: 1) Why should evidence-based knowledge not have greater certainty? 2) boils down to: we have no reason to believe that we are dealing only with a single concept. Why should one believe the other one has the exact same mental states as he himself? Rorty I 230 Truth Function/ Wafu / extension / intension / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are characterized not in a particular way of reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality", do not in the intensional vocabularies this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional / intensional is not more interesting than between nations and people. She’s just apt to evoke emotions reductionist. Rorty I 230 Truth function/tr.-fnc./Extension/Intension/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies do not stand out by reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality" in a particular way in which intensional vocabularies do not do this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional/intensional is not more interesting than that between nations and people. It is only apt to evoke reductionist emotions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Frege Vs Wittgenstein | Dummett I 83 Understanding/Wittgenstein: Understanding no mental process, but ability (dispositional). - FregeVs: grasping a thought is an act of consciousness. And one that is directed towards something outside of the consciousness: (episodic). DummettVsWittgenstein: hard to see why absolutely no episodic sense of understanding should be possible, if E.g. you can be flabbergasted at the first hearing of a sentence. Wittgenstein VI 66 Tractatus/FregeVsWittgenstein/Schulte: Frege has, as Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, not understood a word of the Tractatus. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Wittgenstein | Sellars Vs Wittgenstein | II 318 Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. II 319 Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves. Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy). Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways: a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement. K depicts y. Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of: that p depicts y: II 321 Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards. Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to. Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model fact depicts fact. There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions. Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention. II 322 Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations. E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York. Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed. Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects? II 323 Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). II 324 One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Wittgenstein | Verschiedene Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 97 NeurathVsTractatus: (Carnap was the first to discover the implications of Neurath's ideas.) Neurath: Science is a system of statements consisting of statements of only one kind. Each statement can be combined or compared with any other. But statements are never compared with a "reality", with "facts". I 98 A separation of statements and facts is the result of a doubling metaphysics. Neurath VsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still eliminated: it is easily imaginable that the protocol of a certain observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one drops one of the two sentences. I 100 Protocol sentences can therefore no longer be regarded as an unchangeable basis. I 101 Neurath: we are not against a judge, but the judge is deductible. Stegmüller IV 76 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke: some defend Wittgenstein against Kripke: Kripke did not represent conceptual nihilism or meaning nihilism. IV 77 Stegmüller: But that is not what it is about: it is about the possibility of capturing meanings. But the concept of "meaning" becomes meaningless if people do not have the opportunity to grasp it! Not the grasping of objects is the problem, but the grasping of the intensional structures, the intention, the Fregesian sense, which precede the denotates. Stegmüller IV 152 GoldfarbVsKripke: the relation token/type is a special case of the "continuation of a series" and the "rule sequence". Goldfarb: this is not correct: 1. In order to determine whether two tokens belong to the same type, one simply has to be able to detect the perceptible similarity. 2. "Type" is not a sequence to be generated according to a rule, but an unordered set! Also not for the Platonist. GoldfarbVsKripke: the conditions of justification (conditions of assertiveness) do not replace the conditions of truth at all, but are only a trivial reformulation. Wittgenstein VI 167 Original Meter/Sense/Wittgenstein/Schulte: also here misunderstanding: one has said: VI 167/168 VsWittgenstein: even if the sentence "The original meter is not 1m long" is always wrong, it still makes sense! Schulte: but this does not agree with Wittgenstein's conception of "sense". ((s) To have meaning means to be able to be negated.). Schulte: the train must have a joke in the language game! Example: "The original meter is not 1m long" is not a valid move and it is also not a joke. VI 175 VsWittgenstein/Schulte: it confuses the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. Never taken seriously by Wittgenstein. Wants to overcome borders anyway, although such theories do not belong to his philosophy at all. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Place Vs Wittgenstein | Arm II 55 PlaceVsWittgenstein/PlaceVsArmstrong: the world should not be regarded as a "world of facts" (Tractatus). Situations/Armstrong: are localized in space and time. Spacetime itself is a "big situation". (II 33/34) Conceptualism/PlaceVsArmstrong: thus understood space and time would be abstractions. But these are only linguistic fictions. Ontology/Place: everything that exists are certain spatial relations between particulars. Also relations within particulars. And between situations. Space/Time/Place: are only abbreviations for spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal relations. Spatial Relations/Place: exist between particulars. Temporal Relations/Place: not between particulars, but between situations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Wittgenstein | Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein | I 55 CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. --- Hintikka I 133 ... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege. Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski) CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that). --- I 134 But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Stalnaker Vs Wittgenstein | I 52 Content/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Stalnaker: actually the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus had this notion of content and he simultaneously recognized the problem. ((s) content as a domain of all possibilities that can, however, not be distinguished from a domain - how the possibilities could have been different). Problem: the content of necessary truths and the characterization of the space of possibilities. Solution/Wittgenstein: "About what you cannot speak, you should remain silent". I 53 StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not really help, then: Showing/content/Stalnaker: showing also has a content or has to have a content. Just like saying. Showing/content/Ramsey: "What we cannot say, we also cannot whistle". (Ramsey 1929/1990:146). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Wittgenstein | Neurath Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 100 NeurathVsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still under elimination: it is easily conceivable that the protocol of a particular observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one of the two sets is dropped. Log sentences can thus no longer be regarded as immutable basis. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Wittgenstein | Millikan Vs Wittgenstein | I 221 not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining". Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs. b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence. Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist. Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities. negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value. Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation. negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way. Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations. projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts). Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"? MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can. When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations. Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference .Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"? Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator! Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p". 1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd. 2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements! 3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference. Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact. negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles. non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation. negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact. Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist". negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts). It is well known how such a thing is done: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does. I 223 This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known: 1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist." Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions. Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem: Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense! Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real. Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function. 2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value. real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function. Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves. I 229 "not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense. Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense. sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense. I 303 Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Newen Vs Wittgenstein | New I 94 Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles 2) Hintikka: points in the visual field 3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties 4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects. Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned I 95 to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed. (ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors. (iii) elementary propositions are logically independent. Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time. Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent. Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form. I 98 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties). I 99 Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red." Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names. Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised. 100 Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here. NS I 35 Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them. This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign. ((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.) NS I 36 VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change. NS I 37 Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293). Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community. One person alone cannot give meaning expressions. NS I 38 Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow. VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inflationism | Pro | Field II 104 Inflationism: Frege / Russell / Tractatus / Ramsey: truth conditions central for meaning and content - Vs: deflationism: No truth conditions, instead perhaps verification theory. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Atomism, Logical | Versus | Simons I 320 Atomism: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Leibniz monads - VsAtomismus: Aristotle: prima materia (continualism) BlackVsWittgenstein / BlackVsAtomism: - "metaphysical prejudice": the thesis that not every existence depends on something - SimonsVsatomism. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Property/Object | Pro | Stalnaker I 181 distinction object/ properties: per: Tractatus/Wittgenstein - per: Kripke - Vs: Searle/Dummett/Frege. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Essentialism | Chisholm, R. | II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: Thesis: Chisholm has inherited from Brentano a mereological essentialism with which I disagree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not as clear about facts as it seems. Self-criticism: confusion of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are overlaps between Brentano and the Tractatus. Simons I 2 Chisholm/Mereological Essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents mereological essentialism: thesis: no object can have other parts than it has actual. Vs: Problem: to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts essential). Solution/Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things are logical constructions of objects to which mereological essentialism applies. Solution/Chisholm: Thesis: the actual ones are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from unchangeable objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. Simons I 275 Mereological Essentialism/Intermediate Position/Chisholm/Simons: there is another one that Chisholm rejects: that some parts are essential and others are not. That is my position. ChisholmVsSimons: all parts are necessary. Simons: Thesis: some parts are essential (not necessary!). |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Philosophy | Ryle, G. | Tetens Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy / nonsense / logical grammar / Tetens: the thesis that philosophy comes from a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of the language, is to be found neither Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but at Ryle in his criticism Vs dualism, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969) . |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wahrheitsfunktion | Sellars, W. | II 314 Tractatus/SellarsVsWittgenstein: nicht alle Aussagen können Wahrheitsfunktionen sein. - Denn das lässt sich nicht mit der These vereinbaren, dass elementare Aussagen "logische Bilder" von Tatsachen sind. Problem: nicht alle außersprachlichen Sachverhalte lassen sich durch eine Aussage ausdrücken. - Daher kann es keine Abbildungsbeziehung sein. Paradox/Sellars: dass wir eine Abbildung erkennen können, aber weder aussagen noch denken Bsp (1) "S (in l) bildet aRb ab". a) die Aussage "aRb" kommt darin gar nicht vor b) sie kommt vor, aber (1) ist gar keine Aussage. (...+...) I 316 Problem: Tatsache/Gegenstand - Lösung/Sellars: Tatsache = Quasi-Gegenstand: sprachlich (nicht in der Welt). - Problem: Wahrheit - dann müsste auch die Welt zur Sprache gehören - absurd. |
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| Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: Thesis: the world has the same form as language has. Without the world itself being somehow linguistic in its structure, i.e. more reflection. Sellars II 318 Def Picture/Tractatus: Relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. Hintikka I 131 Hintikka Thesis: the "picture theory" is in reality an anticipation of the first condition of Tarski's truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 136 Picture Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka Thesis: Wittgenstein's picture conception is little more than a particularly vivid formulation of the same idea, which also underlies the usual truth condition for atomic propositions. VII 72 Model/Tractatus/Tetens: For example, the relationship between record and score is a model for the picture relationship between language and reality. This is the thesis of the picture theory by Tractatus. ((s) So not the score as a model of the symphony, but a model of a relation or an isomorphism). |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Wittgenstein | II 160 Logic / WittgensteinVsFrege: 1st, it is quite arbitrary, what we call the a sentence - therefore logic means for me something other than for Frege - 2nd VsFrege: all words are equally important - Frege: These "word", "sentence", "world "are more important - VII 14 Tractatus / Logic / Tetens: the thesis of the Tractatus: no one can stand outside the logic. |
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| Wittgenstein | VII 27 Sense / Tractatus / Tetens: controversial thesis: that only descriptive sentences made sense. Science / Tractatus: "the totality of true propositions" be the same as the "whole science". (4.11). |
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| Wittgenstein | I 25 Tractatusï·"These: alle logische Formen lassen sich aus den Formen von Gegenständen aufbauen. Unmöglich, das spezifische Wesen eines Gegenstands anzugeben, ebenso unmöglich, die logische Form eines Satzes anzugeben, denn die besteht ja aus den unausdrückbaren Formen einfacher Gegenstände. Wittgenstein These Theorie der Zurückführbarkeit aller logischen Formen auf die der einfachen Gegenstände plus These der Unausdrückbarkeit dieser Gegenstände selbst. I 134 Tractatus/Hintikka: These im Tractatus hat man es mit einer Vielfalt möglicher Tatsachen zu tun, so daß es eigentlich eine Modallogik ist. I 149 These 6 des Tractatus: daß sich eine beliebige Wahrheitsfunktion von Elementarsätzen wiedergeben läßt als das Resultat der wiederholten Anwendung einer spezifischen Wahrheitsfunktion, nämlich der gleichzeitigen Verneinung einer Reihe gegebener Sätze. 6. Die allgemeine Form der WaFu ist [p^, x^, N (x^)]. I 161 These die logische Form sei die Form der Wirklichkeit. These alle logischen Sätze lassen sich am Symbol allein erkennen. I 162 These wir können nichts Unlogisches denken. |
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| Wittgenstein | VII 27 Philosophy / science / Tractatus / Tetens: the two are separated. Philosophy is not a science. (4111) |
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| Wittgenstein | VII 23 Description / set / mold / Tractatus: for a sentence to describe the world, it must have something in common with the world. It has to share the "logical form". VII 70 logical form / Tractatus / Wittgenstein: is the form of reality. (2.18) |
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| Wittgenstein | I 15 1. Language as a universal medium: (SUM) Thesis: it is not possible to view language from outside. Meaning relations must be assumed. 2. Inexpressibility of semantics. (UDS) Thesis: if the view of language as a universal medium is correct, any logical semantics (model theory) is impossible. I 17 Language as universal medium/SUM/Hintikka: questions any model theory - representative: Frege, Quine, Wittgenstein: Thesis: semantics cannot be systematic - against: "language as calculus": metasemantic questions - semantics applied systematically. III 135 Language/Tractatus/Flor: Thesis: all languages that can be spoken and understood (German, Chinese, etc.) have the same logical structure and this structure can be found in the Principia Mathematica(1). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
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| Wittgenstein | Sellars II 313 Tractatus / Sellars: Wittgenstein: all statements in the technical sense are truth-functions of elementary statements. 1 statements are just that, which says that something is the case. 2 draws a sharp distinction between truth-functions and what he called "substantive functions" (5.44). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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| Wittgenstein | VII 13 Tractatus / ethics / Tetens: Thesis: the ethical forms the center of the book. |
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| Wittgenstein | Prior I 41 Wittgenstein / Tractatus / Ramsey: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of single sentences (singular statements). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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| Wittgenstein | I 55 Thesis of the inexpressibility of the existence of individual objects: e.g. "Red exists". (PI § 57 ff) It follows that Wittgenstein counts the colors as objects, and that the alignment of all objects in the Tractatus of properties would be less misleading than their alignment with individual things! |
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| Wittgenstein | Sellars II 317 Correspondence/Tractatus/Sellars: this is the 2nd type of "correspondence" one is looking for: Thesis: that elementary statements are configurations of proper names that represent configurations of objects. This means that statements are not lists of words. ... ultimately boils down to the thesis that any statement that contains at least one reference expression and one descriptive expression can be translated into an (invented) understandable language that contains equivalents for reference expressions, but not for descriptive expressions, but a special spelling of the reference expressions into which the descriptive expressions can be translated. Once again, the essence of "illustration" has proven to be a translation! |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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