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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average Utility | Rawls | I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Principles | Rawls | I 4 Principles/Society/Rawls: 1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice. 2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so. I 7 Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. I 10/11 Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. >Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice. >Justice/Rawls. I 41 Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria(1). >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism. Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role(2). >H. Sidgwick. Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism. >Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences. RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles. >VsUtilitarianism. I 43 Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits. I 62 Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. I 63 The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. I 64 Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. I 83 Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. I 89 I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. I 116 Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). I 250 Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all. Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it. I 253 Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. I 302 Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms. 2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,... I 303 .... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. >Equal opportunities. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured. I 446 Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls. 1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31. 2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Utility | Edgeworth | Rawls I 170 Benefits/Politics/Edgeworth/RawlsVsEdgeworth/Rawls: the argumentation of Edgeworth (F. Y. Edgeworth 1888(1), 1897(2)) can be modified to justify almost any political norm. Edgeworth thesis: under certain reasonable assumptions, it is rational for self-interested parties to agree with the principle of utility in assessing social policy, because the political process is not a competitive market. That is why, according to Edgeworth, we need the Utility Principle as a criterion. He seems to think that in the long run, the policy of maximizing benefits will prevail in order to generate the greatest benefit for each individual. Appropriate application on tax legislation and property regulation should bring about the best results from everyone's point of view. RawlsVsEdgeworth: the error is that the assumptions required for this are extremely unrealistic. (Here, I use an argument against Edgeworth from I. M. D. Little 1957(3): We must assume that the impact of decisions on political processes is not independent and can therefore never be very large, because otherwise they would not be independent. In order for the various benefits to be distributed randomly, people would either have to live for a very long time and change their positions by chance, or there would have to be a legislative mechanism guided by the average principle which distributes the benefits equally in the long term. However, society is not a stochastic process that takes place in this way. 1. F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, London, 1888, pp. 52-56; 2. F.Y. Edgeworth „The Pure Theory of Taxation“, Edonomic Journal, vol 7, 1897. 3. I. M. D. Little, Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1957. |
EconEdge Francis Ysidro Edgeworth Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences London 1881 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mill, J. St. | Mackie Vs Mill, J. St. | Stegmüller IV 209 VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (even U.) concedes that utilitarian theories often fail due to the vagueness and diversity of conceptions of justice. Mill: still, the utility principle has the same sanctions available as all other moral norms. MackieVsMIll: that is empirically false: violationy of the common good upset us far more than violations of special rules of justice. Rule-Utilitarianism: more indirect than U.: two stages: (Austin): IV 210 1. The benchmark of our rules should be usefulness 2. The benchmark of our actions should be the rules. Puts the rules far more to the fore and draws on utility only to justify the rules. These rules do not need to be explicit. VsRule-Utilitarianism: all problems of utilitarianism return on a higher level of abstraction. IV 211 Utilitarianism/Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for each individual, then general happiness is a good for the totality of all people. Utilitarianism/MackieVsMill: the alleged proof sneaks in ineligible premises. The entirety of human kind is falsely treated as a psychological subject. Humanity never has a choice. (IV 225) IV 212 Fallacy: from "everyone" to "all". In addition, in the transition from the individual to society, instead of subjectivism an objectivism of values (Wertobjektivismus) is introduced. IV 263 Morality/ethics/Mill: Thesis: believed in a gradual change of human nature toward "universal human kindness". J. F. StephenVsMill: that's "transcendental Utilitarianism": a person animated by "impartial charity" might behave in a Stalinist way. Anything can be used to justify violence. Mackie dito. IV 264 Morality/ethics/Mackie: must refer to anthropological conditions: different ideals require general (common) principles. IV 265 The rejection of objective values includes rejection of objective rights. Consequence: special rights cannot be deduced a priori from general reasons. IV 269 MackieVsMill: his utilitarian concept of justification is shaky: the "principle of non-intervention" would be better justified differently: IV 270 via the conception of the good for human kind. Good/MackieVsMill: 1. not everyone is able to always correctly assess their own good. 2. Mill's principle is too weak. Ex. freedom of thought, freedom of speech. Both cannot be justified by Mills principle alone! Mackie: instead, we need a "principle of legitimate intervention." |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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