Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Convergence | Gould | IV 329 Evolution/repetition/convergence/Gould: for example, flying has developed independently of each other in insects, birds, reptiles (perterosaurs) and bats. Although the aerodynamics are the same, the constructional solution is very different. Definition Convergences/Gould: convergences are generally agreed solutions that are not detailed repetitions. Highly adaptive forms that are easy to develop constantly evolve. Complex morphologies are rarely repeated without adaptive necessities. >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Convergence | Tipler | Gould IV 330 Convergence/Frank J. Tipler/G. F. Orenstein/Convergence/Gould: For example, the most famous of all convergences was refuted: the "pinhole camera eye" of vertebrates and squids. L. Ornstein (supported by Tipler): Thesis: There are common ancestors.(1) GouldVsOrnstein: that is not very convincing. Orenstein does not even mention the most important argument pro convergence: embryology. Squid eyes have developed from skin cells, the eyes of vertebrates are brain bulges. Ornstein refers to Haeckel's law "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", which was refuted around 1930. The law claims that the development of the embryo repeats the stages of adult precursors. Haeckel himself recognized too many exceptions. >E. Haeckel. 1. L. Ornstein: A biologist looks at the numbers. Physics Today, March, pp. 27-31. 1982. |
Tipler Frank J. Tipler The Physics of Immortality New York 1995 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Boyd, R. | Rorty Vs Boyd, R. | I 310 Def convergence/Boyd/Putnam/Rorty: reliability of a principle such as the following: one should examine in the light of the theoretical knowledge available, under which circumstances the causal assertions of the theory can plausibly go wrong, either because other causal mechanisms seem plausible, or because kinds of causal mechanisms already known come into conflict with the theory, namely in ways that theory can not foresee. Cf. >Reliability. Rorty: no one will have anything against that as long as Boyd does not claim we could explain why this principle leads to useful results only on the basis of a "realistic understanding of the relevant adjoining theories": I 311 Boyd: Suppose, we advise each time which theories are particularly likely to fail experimentally. And suppose further, our conjectures apply exactly where the realist would expect it. What other explanation than realism is then still possible? It certainly is not the mere effect of conventionally or arbitraryly acquired scientific traditions. If the world is not shaped by our conventions, which no empiricist would accept, then the reliability of this principle can by no means be merely a matter of convention. RortyVsBoyd: he confuses two meanings of "reliability of a method": a) the meaning, that a process is reliable in relation to an independent test (thermometer) with b) the meaning that a process is reliable, because one can not imagine an alternative to it. The examination of a new theory by old ones is not an optional procedure. How else could we verify it? Theory/Rorty: but a new theory is nothing more than a relatively minor change of a comprehensive network of convictions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Convergence Theory | Hacking Vs Convergence Theory | I 102 HackingVs convergence theory: maximum cumulative growth, no focus on convergence. The depth of understanding and also the range of explanations can even increase without convergence. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Convergence Theory | Tipler Vs Convergence Theory | Gould IV 330 TiplerVsConvergence: For example, the most famous of all convergences was refuted: the "pinhole camera eye" of vertebrates and squids. Orenstein (supported by Tipler): common ancestor! GouldVsOrenstein: not very convincing. Orenstein does not even mention the most important argument in favour of convergence: Embryology: Squid eyes have developed from skin cells, the eyes of vertebrates are brain protuberances! |
Tipler Frank J. Tipler The Physics of Immortality New York 1995 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P. | V 156 Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." >Incommensurability, >observation language. Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true. V 156/157 According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail. Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there. However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so. PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same. How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual? --- V 158 Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference. V 160 Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference. --- I (c) 83 Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. I (c) 84 Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.) |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Habermas, J. | Rorty Vs Habermas, J. | Brendel I 133 Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals. Brendel I 134 Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either. Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality. Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths. Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness. Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community. Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto). Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community. Brendel I 135 RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests. Rorty II (b) 50 RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism". II (b) 29 French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers, Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity." II (b) 43 Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. II (d) 94 Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence. II (d) 94/95 Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves. II (d) 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship. III 113 Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas). III 119 RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower. III 120 RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of 'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language". III 231 Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste". III 232 Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?" V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Putnam, H. | Wright Vs Putnam, H. | I 58 "Putnam's Equivalence"/(Wright): P is true if and only if P could be justified under ideal epistemic circumstances. Convergence Demand/Putnam: no statement that is justified under epistemic ideal circumstances can be asserted simultaneously with its negation. Wright: this is of course to be distinguished from the requirement for completeness: not all questions can be decided (quantum mechanics). Wright: it seems here that even ideal epistemic circumstances cannot be neutral in relation to negation. ((s) Example (s) If the location of the electron cannot be fixed, that is not a negative statement about this or any other location.) I 59 Negation/Minimalism: requires the usual negation equivalence: "It is not the case that "P" is true if and only if it is not the case that "P" is true. This does not work for quantum mechanics. WrightVsPutnam: the examples from quantum mechanics or mathematics (undecidability) are deadly for Putnam's approach. (Example generalized continuum hypothesis). It certainly does not even apply to empirical statements a priori that each of them would be decidable under ideal circumstances. I 60 (Thus confirmable or refutable). A priori/Minimalism/Wright: the minimum platitudes probably apply a priori. WrightVsPutnam: so if Putnam's informal explanation would be a priori correct it has to be like this to be correct at all - then it would have to apply a priori that also the negation of a statement that cannot be justified under ideal circumstances (electron) would be justified. Wright: exactly this cannot be the case a priori. WrightVsPutnam: erroneously a priori claim. But it gets even worse: the extension of the argumentation destroys any attempt to determine truth as essentially independent of evidence (>quantum mechanics/Putnam). Anti-Realism, Semantic/Evidence: in contrast to Putnam, may now be satisfied with a "one-way street": (EC, epistemic restriction): EC If P is true, then there is evidence that it is. Evidence/WrightVsPutnam: Truth is limited by evidence. This leads to a revision of logic. I 64 WrightVsPutnam: he must make intuitive revisions. I 66 Def Truth/Peirce: that which is justified at an ideal limit of recognition when all empirical information has been obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one simply cannot know when one has all the information! Wright ditto I 68/69 Def Superassertibility: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrary verification of its ancestry and arbitrary extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear". |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Realism | Nietzsche Vs Realism | Rorty V 30 NietzscheVsRealism/Rorty: the human character passes its test if it is able to live with the notion that there is no convergence. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Putnam Vs Realism | I (c) 96/97 Realism/Putnam: argues ultimately that science should be taken "at face value", given the failure of all serious programs by philosophical reinterpretation of sciences without philosophical reinterpretation and that science, "taken at face value" implies realism. Realism is sort of "scientific theory of science". VsRealism: could be cited (in the absence of convergence) at the most that the realism would be refuted diachronically. --- I (i) 243 PutnamVsRelativism/PutnamVsRealism: both claim at the same time to be able to exist inside and outside the language. The Realism thus does not refute itself because it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But Relativism refutes itself with that. I (i) 249 PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism: both see the world as a product Realism: the world is a product ex nihilo. Relativism: product of our culture. Putnam: but the world is not a "product", it is only the world. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Sellars, W. | Putnam Vs Sellars, W. | III 131 Map/Sellars: unlike truth and reference: our normal linguistic schemata map the world more or less adequate. Some schemes are more adequate than others, although they are in no objective semantic relationship to the world. This has led to a split in the students of Sellars: Sellarean Left: Rorty waives the notion of mapping. PutnamVsSellars: does not explain how the picture would be possible for the frame of the ideal scientific scheme. III 132 To make a "perspective", characters and sounds have to map something. To give an objective description, they have to describe something. Absolute View/Williams: it will tell us, but not necessarily foreign researchers, how we understand this view. Putnam: So the "theory of error" is not provided by the absolute view, but from the "local perspective". Be it a perspective that is characterized by the absolute view. Does Williams claim that the existence of the absolute view is a member of our local perspective? Rorty could even agree on this. --- I (c) 96 Realism/theory/science/Peirce/Sellars: both try to maintain the idea that the theory B1 - (B) A statement may be wrong, even if it follows from our theory (or our theory plus the set of true observation sentences) - Could be wrong (yes, sooner or later turn out to be incorrect) without using a realistic concept of truth by not having identified them with present justified assertibility but with ideally justified assertibility. That is what both consider the meaning of the assertion, the Venus could also have no carbon dioxide. Realism/truth/PutnamVsPeirce/PutnamVsSellars: However, this presupposes that we sensibly fill the concept of "ideal limit" without a frame of spacetime localizations, objects, etc. and can specify the conditions for science. And that does not work. Besides, it also requires convergence. If there is no convergence, (so just more frequent cases of failure of convergence than of success) as Kuhn and Feyerabend believe, then the "ideal limit" is treated as badly as the realism. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Smart, J. C. | Peacocke Vs Smart, J. C. | I 103 Instrument/Smart: (Between Science and Philosophy, 1969) Thesis: extension of the senses. We du use theory, but it corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects at a distance. PeacockeVsSmart: nevertheless, the cases are different from the perspective of the subject: for seeing a number of objects in the distance we do not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc. Even if you have these concepts, they are not analogous to the epistemic possibility I 104 which are needed like active current for theoretical concepts. "Extension of the senses" should not be merely metaphorical. But this would require the existence of a way of thinking, that there is a physical property x [a current flows through x], and that it is not epistemically possible that under normal circumstances..., etc. and yet there is no current. I am not saying that such concepts are impossible, but this is about different concepts. Those concepts would take other places in the net of epistemic possibility. Better instruments never give us new concepts by themselves. ((s) We would also need to know that they are better or that e.g. that a higher resolution of a microscope simply shows similar structures in a better way, and not entirely new structures. >Presupposition.) |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Tradition | Castaneda Vs Tradition | Frank I 342 Proposition/Tradition/Castaneda: its strength: that all of these entities which this theory equates must somehow converge. If language is to be an efficient means of thinking, then meaning and thought content must coincide. I 343 Belief/Intention/Tradition: their contents should coincide. Frege: what can be believed can also be demanded, commanded, required, requested, etc. CastanedaVs: that seems to be synchronically successful, but it lacks dynamism. The discrepancies between the different entities involved in proposition ((i) - (vii) emerge when we consider the diachronic river, where one undergoes changing experiences about a constantly changing world. In particular, we must have direct contact with the world in order to locate ourselves in it. This is precisely the role of the indexical reference. Propositions/CastanedaVsTradition: classical propositionality theory fails with indexical reference when it encounters experiences with "here", "now", "I", "he", etc. I 345 Thinking/Language/Proposition/CastanedaVsTradition: we seem to have assumed that thinking is embodied by symbolic activity. While thinking one somehow produces an illustrative token; since it happens both when thinking aloud and in silence, there has to be some brain pattern. I 346 The distinction between episodes of production of sentences and episodes of thinking is already made in the theory itself: therefore it postulates the convergence of sentence meaning and thought content. The propositionality theory does not have to identify a thinking episode ,that p, with an event in the brain or in the entire body. It is not about the body-soul problem. Vs: the required application of this distinction breaks the elegant arrangement of the coincident units: the distinction between a symbolic system and its application! This is Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole. This accomodates the dynamics of language and is itself not dangerous for the propositionality theory. But: Problem: the distinction between knowing the meaning and correct use exists! This is not a problem in most cases, but: I 347 E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen compounds in my liver": we may understand the sentence, but we do not know whether someone expresses a truth or falsity with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Wiggins, D. | Wright Vs Wiggins, D. | I 231 Wright: Proposal: the relevance of problems related to convergence is best interpreted for moral discourse under the heading of cognitive coercion. WigginsVsWright: sees relevance differently. Restrictive condition: If X is true, X will cause convergence under favorable circumstances and the best explanation of this convergence will require the actual truth of X. Wiggins: So not the fact that participants hold certain beliefs, but the fact of convergence is the explanandum. I 233 WrightVsWiggins: misguided weighting of causality: the belief that people believe that P because P, P is acceptable only if the facts that P plays a direct causal role! Wiggins: not direct causal role, but rather Def "acquittal explanation": an explanation that a subject is attached to a belief, according to the scheme: For this, that or other reason, there is actually nothing to think other than that P. Therefore, it is a fact that P. I 234 Therefore, given the circumstances, etc., it can come as no surprise that the subject believes that P. Example (i) Nothing else can be thought but that 5 + 7 = 12. (ii) The best explanation for the belief of my son and his classmates is that they follow a rule of calculation that shows that nothing else can be thought of. Wright: this involves two steps: the second involves a procedure! I 235 Moral/Ethics/Wiggins: For example slavery is wrong, nothing else can be thought of. Wright: one could soften the conditions as far as the opinions involved in the discourse at least sometimes fulfill them. The corresponding facts (about these opinions) could then still form a class, even if there is no tendency towards convergence. WrightVsWiggins: it is questionable, however, whether his "acquittal explanation" can fulfill what the Best Explanation is trying to do: Concerns arise when we realize that nothing of meaning is lost if we omit the words "so it is a fact that P"! Then it just says: I 235/236 "for this or that reason, as well as circumstances that do not allow other thoughts, the subject believes that P." Acquitting Explanation/Wiggins: Causal explanation, where causality does not refer between consciousness and values or consciousness and numbers. Wright: It is about the attentive use of appropriate rules. ((s) The causality takes place between the rules and the beliefs.). I 237 WrightVsWiggins: that does not get us any further than minimal anti-realism. Justification/Permissive/Wright: none of the discourses we consider are purely permissive with regard to the conditions: it is simply not true that absolutely everything can be found to be funny or disgusting in a permissible manner. Def Demonstration/Wright: any presentation of circumstances and considerations that require the acceptance of the statement according to the standards of assertibility when the standards are to be observed. I 238 Like "Chernobyl wasn't funny." No matter which discourse it is, some of his statements will allow a demonstration in this sense if the discourse is not purely permissive. According to Wiggin's acquittal explanation (nothing else is conceivable): (i) For one reason or another (here follows the demonstration), nothing else is conceivable. (ii) Since the parties act in accordance with the relevant beliefs, it is not surprising that they agree that P. Minimum Truth Capability/WrightVsWiggins: on condition that the discourse is not purely permissive, the minimum truth capability ensures the fulfillment of Wiggins condition. However, it does not guarantee that the reference to "the facts" in the correspondence platitude can carry the additional content that the game with the best explanation is supposed to secure. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Miracle | Lewis, D. | V 49 Divergence / convergence / asymmetry / Lewis: what makes convergence a miracle (unlikely) is the asymmetry of overdetermination: V 50 Whatever happens, is leaving many and highly distributed traces in the world of the future. They are hardly ever afterwards brought together again, but that does not matter, as long as they exist. |
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| Ethics | Mackie, J.L. | Put V 276 Ethics/Mackie thesis: The good is ontologically "strange": you cannot know that something is good without having a "pro attitude" towards that something. This amounts to assuming emotivism in order to prove it. It also presupposes that there is A TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is incorrect, there are also cases of deliberate contravention. Philippa Foot: You can even aim to be a bad person. V 277 The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad function of vocabulary! The fact that "good" is used to recommend does not mean that it is not a property! Stegm IV 266 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: Primacy of rights over duties and goals. IV 286 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Problem: Exceptions for animals, sick, disabled, old. IV 287 Thesis: Here we have to develop a humane attitude that makes us wish that people and animals are well. (Disposition). IV 287 Moral/Ethics/Mackie: neither teleological nor deontological: rather methodological! Without reference to mythical entities such as "objective values", obligations and "transcendental necessities". IV 288 Self-love is a positive value for Mackie. IV 288/289 He hopes that "utilitarianism", "law" and "egoism" will result in one and the same thing. ">Convergence optimism. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Convergence | Putnam, H. | Horwich I 389 Convergence / theory / Putnam: Thesis: earlier theories are special cases (borderline cases, limiting cases?) of later theories. This makes it possible to understand theoretical terms (TT) as retaining their reference beyond the theory change. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Instrument | Smart, J.C. | Peacocke I 103 Instrument / Smart: (Between Science and Philosophiy, 1969) Thesis: the i. is an extension of the senses. We probably use a theory, but this corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects in the distance. PeacockeVsSmart: yet the cases from the point of view of the subject are different: for seeing a number of objects in the distance one does not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Convergence | Willams, B. | Rorty IV 32 Convergence / Bernard Williams thesis in scientific investigations, there should be in the ideal case, a converging approximation to an answer. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Convergence | Nagel, E | Hacking I 119 Ernest Nagel: These Erkenntnis hat die Tendenz zur Akkumulation - eine neue Theorie subsumiert ältere Theorien. KuhnVs. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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