Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attribution | Peacocke | Avramides I 92 Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. >Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires, >Beliefs. But not particular propositional attitudes before language. >Language, >Understanding, >Language use. PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. >Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice. >Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice. Peacocke I 78f Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. >narrow concepts. I 83 We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available. >Narrow/wide. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Legal Policy | Kaplow | Parisi I 12 Legal policy/Kaplow/Shavell/Miceli: Kaplow and Shavell (2002)(1) have argued that social welfare, which they define as the aggregation of some index of the well-being of all members of society, should be the sole basis for evaluating legal policy. According to this view, fairness matters for legal rule-making, but only insofar as it affects people’s well-being (that is, to the extent that they care about fairness). Wealth as measure: At the same time, narrow concepts of efficiency like pure wealth maximization (or Kaldor–Hicks efficiency) are inappropriate because they exclude factors (like fairness) that people value. It is nevertheless the case that most law and economic analysis focuses on wealth maximization as the objective. >Efficiency. Distribution: Although changes in legal rules will often affect the distribution of income, it will usually be quite difficult to ascertain these effects, and in any case, tinkering with legal rules will not generally be the best means of achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth, or will entail a trade-off between fairness and efficiency. For example, the assignment of liability for product-related damages will likely affect both the distribution of wealth between businesses and consumers, and their incentives to avoid accidents. The fact that there exist alternative mechanisms for redistributing wealth that have no relation to products liability (such as the income tax and welfare systems) suggests that the liability system should be used solely for creating incentives to minimize accident costs.* Thus, the mainstream approach to law and economics, most often associated with the “Chicago school,” has for the most part employed the wealth-maximization approach to the development of economic models of law. * See the discussion in Shavell (2004(2), ch. 28). For a contrary view, see Sanchirico (2000(3)). 1. Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell (2002). Fairness versus Welfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Shavell, Steven (2004). Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 3. Sanchirico, Chris (2000). “Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Journal of Legal Studies 29: 797–820. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
EconKapl I Louis Kaplow The optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation 1996 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Chisholm | I 98 Meaning-that-principle/Chisholm: should be a reference to the meaning de dicto: accepted proposition or fact. - E.g the vagabond means that Karl called the police. Even if he did not know the name: that is ok. >de dicto.- E.g., His school mates believed that the future pope would never become a clergyman. >de re. I 100 (with respect to/(s): here: the speaker assigns meaning to a false object.) (De re). I 156ff Meaning (to mean) de re/Chisholm: of the greatest spy... problem: maybe there is none. Two meanings: A) There is a thing, and the one who means identifies it as that to which he ascribes a property (broad conception) B) The one who means identifies a particular thing as that of which he means something (narrow conception, still descriptive dependent). I 163 Wide view: A: it is easy for the thing to be held for something (corresponds to indirect attribution). >Attribution. Narrow view: B: it is difficult for the thing to be held for something by someone else. I 169 Belief de re/Chisholm: early, problem: cannot be explained de dicto, otherwise: e.g. because I know that the more valuable is the more valuable, I must choose both objects in the event of an error: 1. the one of which I believe it wrongly, 2. the right, because I believe of the more valuable ... Chisholm late: solution: the thing is also identified as the thing of which the subject believes ... --- II 128 Meaning (to mean)/Wittgenstein: no aiming at an object - no mental activity - paragraph § 689 - neither can the mental explain meaning and reference, nor vice versa. A picture is as less related to an object from itself as a sentence. - Only the use makes it to do it. >Use, cf. >Picture theory. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Externalism | Stalnaker Vs Externalism | II 170 Externalism/Stalnaker: this had amazing paradoxical consequences: 1. If what we think is not in the head we cannot know what we mean or think. Or at least not have the authority of the first person. Note: not necessarily: what follows is that the intrinsic state is not authoritative which means it does not follow that if the head of someone is in an intrinsic state that he has a certain conviction. But this does not mean that he does not have the authority of the first person. 2. The externalism threatens the explanatory role of mental states. We explain the behavior of people in the way that they believe and want something. Problem: how can mental states be causally relevant if they themselves depend on something outside? VsExternalism/Stalnaker: some grant it truth but deny its significance. It would only show that our normal concepts are inappropriate for behavior explanation. This suggests that we need to make only minor revisions. Solution/some: the def "organismic contribution": that is the component which is dependent or supervenient on internal states. VsExternalism/revisionism/terminology/Stalnaker: the revisionist objection against the externalism makes a positive and a negative assertion. a) negative assertion: there can be no behavior explanation which is not individualistic (non-externalist). b) positive assertion: although the normal psychological concepts are not individualistic, they can be reinterpreted to preserve the structure of intentional explanation. narrow content/Stalnaker: first, I examine a very simple causal analogue of the narrow content: a "narrow footprint". Example normal footprint: is a causal-relational concept. Something is a footprint by virtue of the manner in which it was created. It is not with the sand intrinsically. Versus: "Narrow footprint"/twin earth/tw.e./Stalnaker: e.g. here a footprint that is similiar to the one of Jone was accidentally created by a wave. Pointe: so there is something on the tw.e. which is intrinsically indistinguishable from a footprint, not a footprint. Then a philosopher might say with a sense for grip formulations: "Externalism": "Divide the cake in whatever way you want, footprints are not in the sand!". VsExternalism: revisionism might reply that this would only apply to colloquial terms and these are of no interest to science. Scientifically only states that are intrinsically with the sand count. Solution/revisionism/VsExternalism: the concept of narrow content (here: e.g. "narrow footprint"). narrow concept: here the relevant state is independent from the causal history. E.g. narrow footprint: is a foot shaped impression, howsoever caused. Then we could isolate that component which is intrinsically with the medium (here: the sand). II 172 ExternalismVsVs: pointe: the new concept is still a relational one! E.g. narrow footprints are now not anymore dependent on a specific cause but are still dependent on general causes which are extrinsically with the sand. E.g. assuming normal feet on the TE have a different shape. Then the footprint which was caused by a wave is not only not a normal footprint but also no narrow footprint. Then the footprint in the sand is just not in the shape of a foot. ((s) only if you transfer the shape from the actual world to the twin earth). Stalnaker: there are still a lot of everyday examples for this strategy: Disposition concept/Stalnaker: we begin with a causal interaction e.g. water solubility then we use counterfactual conditionals (co.co.) to obtain a stable property that the thing has no matter whether it comes to the interaction. intrinsically/Stalnaker: water solubility may be a purely intrinsic property, others not: e.g. observability also depends on the skills of the observer. Narrow concept/Stalnaker: e.g. belief may be a narrow description of the concept of knowledge in the sense that the dependence on special causes between facts and knower was replaced by a more general of patterns of causal relations between facts and internal states. Alternative: Def narrow footprint: "foot-shaped impression" is now reference-determining definde: it shall now mean, formed in the way how feet are formed in the actual world (act.wrld.). Important argument: then the by the wave formed impression on the TE is still a narrow footprint. intrinsically: so, it seems we have isolated a purely intrinsic state of the sand. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Regularity Theory | Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory | Arm III 13 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical. Arm III 25 TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational. Arm III 159 ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind. Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency? ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon. Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities? Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible. Arm III 53 Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God). Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro. III 54 The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself. Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto). He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life. VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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| Constructivism | Pro | Berka I 266 Constructivism: Lorenzen per - LorenzenVsHerbrand - LorenzenVsChurch (too narrow conception of constructiveness as recursivity) - LorenzenVsImpredicativity |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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