Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acceptability | Habermas | III 400/401 Acceptability/communicative action/Habermas: a speech act should be called "acceptable" if it fulfils the conditions so that a listener can say "yes". These conditions cannot be fulfilled unilaterally, neither speaker nor listener relative. Rather, they are conditions for the intersubjective recognition of a linguistic claim, which constitutes a content-specified agreement on liabilities that are relevant for the consequences of the interaction. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act. Within the theory of communicative action we start from the special case that the speaker literally means his statements. I call this case the standard conditions. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 406 A speaker can rationally motivate a listener to accept if, due to an internal connection between validity, validity claim and redemption of the validity claim, he/she can guarantee to give convincing reasons, if necessary, which stand up to criticism of the validity claim. The binding force of illocutionary success does not then stem from the validity of what has been said, but from the coordination effect of the guarantee it offers to redeem the validity claim if necessary. This applies in cases where there is no claim to power but a validity claim. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Best Explanation | Wright | I 146 Best Opinion/Wright, Crispin: The best opinion is an optimal judgment. - It forms a conceptual basis of truth. - Then the best opinion is necessarily true.- Then follows: Projectivism/Wright: projectivism is committed to the basic equation: e.g.: "Square" only when noted under standard conditions by standard observers. >Standard conditions. Contrary to this: Detectivism: here, the best opinion only reflects: Then it should be possible that certain best opinions are not causally properly come about. - Then the basic equations are only contingently true. >Beliefs, >Theories, >Observation, >Method, >Truth, >Assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Circumstances | Sellars | I XVIII Standard Conditions: the person who utters the sentence "this is green" must know that such a sentence is a reliable indicator of green objects. In addition, he must be aware that these conditions are standard conditions. He must be able to relate the opposite of other sentences in the logical space of reasons in relation. >Logical space, >Observation, >Observation sentence, >Perception, >Appearance, >Seeing, >Predication, >Attribution, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer. I 33 Standard Conditions: their assumption leads out of the logical atomism. >Atomism. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. Circumstances: to determine them we need to know something about the objects, about how they are in other circumstances. >Knowledge, >Reality, >World/thinking, >World, >Realism. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Circumstances | Vollmer | II 69 Information/Vollmer: normal lighting is without information. >Conditions, >Observation, >Method, >Experiments, >Standard conditions. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Colour | Millikan | I 270 Standard Conditions/Contents/Millikan: 1. To give them a content, "standard observers" must mean more than "observers for whom red things look red, under standard conditions." And according to "standard conditions". Cf. >Ideal observer, >Idealization, >Observation. Solution: Standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no human being has any idea how this should work. Problem: if you had every reason to believe that you are a standard observer, there are circumstances where an object appears to have a different color than it has. But then you would not conclude that the thing was not red. Problem: if a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must also be able to identify these opposing properties. And it can be the case that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify the opposite of red and green? Many authors: think that you can never assert at all that red and green could be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: this is not true, in reality, there are many possibilities, e.g. squinting. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certainty/Millikan: our confidence in the fact that red and green are opposites, (perhaps built into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is certainty for the objective validity of these concepts, for the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Content | Chalmers | I 203 Content/experience/phenomenal belief/Chalmers: 1. What do our concepts like "consciousness" or "red experience" actually pick out (in a given world)? >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reference. 2. What constitutes the content of these concepts, is it determined by the psychological nature alone, or also by the phenomenal? >Concepts, >Phenomena. I 204 Zombie: could it have the same intensions of beliefs as I do? If it is subject to a conceptual confusion, that might be the same for me. >Zombies, >Intensions. The zombie could not make true or false judgments about consciousness in itself, but also in relation to me! For it could not use the term properly. But the concept of consciousness differs from the concept of "water" insofar as the "acquaintance" with the object is much more direct in the case of consciousness. >Acquaintance, >Knowing how, >First person, >Other minds, >Incorrigibility. I 205 Experience: is there a public language usage, e.g. for the term "red experience"? >Language use. Problem: Inverted spectra. >Inverted spectra. Solution: Standard conditions for standard observers. Moreover, we do not want to limit the term to my personal experiences, but look at every one's experiences. >Observation, >Standard conditions. I 206 Qualia: secondary intensions are not enough. We also learn something when we learn how it is to experience something red: the experience of something red could have been different, but it is so. In this way, we limit the scope of possibilities. For this, however, we need different primary intensions. Cf. >Color researcher Mary. I 207 Communication/Qualia: Only if others can have such experiences (under relevant causal conditions), my Qualia are communicable. >Understanding, >Intersubjectivity. Content/Consciousness/Conclusion/Chalmers: Beliefs about experiences are central. And these cannot be the same with my zombie twin as with me. But we do not need a causal theory of knowledge. We can even refer to experiences by assuming a property dualism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Property dualism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Wright | I 154 WrightVsCounterfactual Conditionals: E.g. a chameleon sits in the dark on a green billiards table: it cannot a priori apply that the truth conditions for the corresponding sentence are covered by the statement to be analyzed. (Conditional Fallacy). >Truth conditions. Wright: but we are keen on an equivalence (projectivist?) that can be valid a priori. >Equvalence. Solution: provisional equation: e.g. chameleon: could not have happened if we had determined that it was about its color under standard conditions and with a standard observer - provisional equation: If competing statement, then (it would be the case that P iff would S judged that p) (competing statement: no alternative circumstances for competing statement) - provisional equation: at best true a posteriori - loss of universality, no statement about of non-standard conditions. Standardconditions. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Descriptions | Sellars | I 27 Report/statement/Sellars: phrases like "This is green" both have a facts-declaratory and a reporting use. E.g. Tie seller John must learn to suppress his report. I.e. the report on his own sensory impression which contradicts the fact that he has learned: under different illumination the colors can change. John says now: "this tie is blue". But he makes no reporting use of this sentence. He used it in the sense of a conclusion. Report: experiences, feelings, sensations. On the other hand: Determination: conclusion, facts. >Experience, >Sensations, >Facts, >Conclusion; cf. >Ideal observer, >Standard conditions. --- II 318 Thesis: that one can translate every statement that contains at least one reference expression and a descriptive expression, into a (fictional) understandable language, that contains the equivalent of reference expressions, but not of description expression, but therefore a special notation for reference terms, in which the description expressions can be translated into. Once again the essence of "mapping" has been proved as a translation. (Mapping/translation). >Mapping, >Translation, >Observation language, >Perception, >Seeing-as, >Concepts/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Epistemology | Millikan | I 269 Epistemology/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle reappears at the level of epistemology: I 270 For example, the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the assertion "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions. Problem: then follows from "x is not red": "x does not look red for .. under ...". Ontology: this corresponds to the fact that non-red would be a void, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. However, it is about that "x is not red" is equivalent to "x does not look red under standard ..." is either empty or false. >Appearance, >Apearance/Leibniz, >Perception/Aristotle, >Knowledge, >Predication. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Euthyphro | Wright | I 108 Definition Euthyphro/Plato ("Eutyphro contrast") Realist, Socrates: certain actions are liked by gods because they are pleasing to God. The gods have the ability to recognize the property, the property of Godliness is one thing, to track it another. This is the "detectivistic" version. Extension falls apart. Contrary to this: Anti-realist, Eutyphro: certain actions are pleasing to god because they are liked by gods This is constitutively dependent on the opinion of the gods, not to explore epistemically, not independent of the opinions. The "because" here is conceptual, "projectivistic". Extension: coincides here. Realist/Dummett: certain statements (in the questioned discourse) are super-asserting, because they are true. (Constitutive independence of truth of the super-assertibility). >Assertibility. Anti-realist: such statements are true because they are super-assertible. >Superassertibility, >Antirealism. I 142 Euthyphro/Plato: Certain actions are pleasing to God, because the gods like them (awarding of a predicate, projection). Counter position: Realism: they are liked, because they are pleasing to God: Here something is detected, there is an ability, it is "detectivistic". Color/Johnston: shape is read detectivistically, color projectivistically. I 143 Euthyphro/Wright: basic equation: For all S, P: P if and only if (CS, then RS) S: each actor "P": all the judgments of a very broad class of judgments; "RS": expresses that S shows a certain relevant reaction; "CS": fulfillment of certain optimality conditions for that particular reaction. The fulfillment of the conditions C through S ensures that no other circumstances of an alternative could give a greater credibility. Basic equation/Mark Johnston: E.g. x is square if and only if x is seen by standard observers under standard conditions as square. - This also applies for red. >Standard conditions. Shape/color/Johnston: central difference: shape: gets detectivistic - color: is read projectivistically. Moral discourse: this discours is like the discourse about color. I 152 Euthyphro/projectivistic:> a priori knowledge - detectivistic: not a priori, not analytical. >a priori, >Analyticity, >Knowledge, >Morality, >Color, >Perception, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Evidence | Sellars | I 30 Appearance/Sellars: the evidence for the experience differs as little as the experience. I 27 Report/statement/Sellars: phrases like "This is green" both have a facts-declaratory and a reporting use. E.g. Tie seller John must learn to suppress his report. I.e. the report on his own sensory impression which contradicts the fact that he has learned: under different illumination the colors can change. John says now: "this tie is blue". But he makes no reporting use of this sentence. He used it in the sense of a conclusion. Report: experiences, feelings, sensations. On the other hand: Determination: conclusion, facts. >Experience, >Sensations, >Facts, >Conclusion; cf. >Ideal observer, >Standard conditions. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Information | Vollmer | II 69 Information/Vollmer: Normal lighting does not carry information. >Standard conditions, >Observation, >Ideal observer, >Idealization, >Experiments, >Method, >Observation language, >Circumstances. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Observation | Millikan | I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. to give them a content, "standard observers" must mean more than "observer for whom red things look red under standard conditions." And accordingly for "standard conditions". >Ideal observer, >Idealization, >Conditions. Solution: Standard conditions for "red" must be spelled out. Problem: no human being has any idea how this should work. Problem: if you had every reason to believe that you are a standard observer, there are circumstances where an object appears to have a different color than it has. But then you would not conclude that the thing was not red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must also be able to identify these opposing properties. And it may be that these never come to light! >Identity/Millikan. Problem: how can my experience testify the opposite of red and green? Many authors: thinking that you can never assert at all that red and green could be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: this is not true, in reality, there are many ways, e.g. squinting. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certainty/Millikan: our confidence in the fact that red and green are opposites, (perhaps built into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is certainty for the objective validity of these concepts, for the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Properties | Aristotle | Millikan I 269 Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposing properties: for Aristotle they serve to explain that nothing can originate from nothing. >Change/Aristotle, >Ontology/Aristole. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those who mutually withdraw the foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Change/conversion/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties which are the opposites of the earlier properties. Opposite/Aristotle: opposite is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then these opposites are bound together at the most fundamental level (in their nature). Millikan pro Aristotle: with the latter he was right. In Aristotle, there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. >Beginning, >Justification/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz, >Ontology/Leibniz, Properties/contrary/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: he was right in the fact that the assertion that two opposing properties apply to the same substance means to contradict each other. But this is about an indeterminate negation, not about the assertion of a certain absence or; absence is the presence of inconsistency. Example: Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothingness: e.g. zero acceleration, zero point of temperature, empty space, etc. zero represents a quantity. Consistency/Law of Consistency/Millikan: is then a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle reappears at the level of epistemology: I 270 For example, the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the assertion "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions. >Predication, >Appearance, >Ideal observer, >Idealization. Problem: then it follows from "x is not red": "x does not look red for .. under ...". Ontological/ontology: this corresponds to the fact that being-non-red would be a void, an absence of red - rather than the opposite of red. However, it is about that "x is not red" is equivalent to "x does not look red under standard ..." is either empty or false. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Properties | Sellars | Rorty VI 421 Relations/Sellars: Question: "Are relations directly given in experience?" such a question must be rejected, since it presupposes the idea of a "condition". >Circumstances, >Perception, >Relations, >Complex, >Given, >Standard conditions. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Terminology | Habermas | IV 188 Reference context/terminology/Habermas: In a sense, the world to which the communication participants belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for a current scene: the context of reference. IV 189 Lifeworld/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the problem of the life world, we can think of the life world represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organised inventory of patterns of interpretation. Then the context of reference must no longer be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as IV 190 a connection of meaning between a communicative utterance, the context and the connotative horizon of meaning. Reference contexts go back to grammatically regulated relationships between elements of a linguistically organized inventory of knowledge. IV 209 Def Culture/Habermas: I call culture the inventory of knowledge from which the communication participants provide themselves with interpretations by communicating about something in a world. Def Society/Habermas: I call society the legitimate orders through which communication participants regulate their affiliation to social groups and thus ensure solidarity. Def Personality/Habermas: By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, i.e. repairing, participating in processes of communication and thereby asserting one's own identity. Semantics/Habermas: the semantic field of symbolic contents form dimensions in which the communicative actions extend. Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. IV 260 Norm/Terminology/Habermas: Norm = generalized behavioral expectation. Principles: = higher-level norms. IV 278 Form of communication/terminology/Habermas: Structural violence is exercised through a systematic restriction of communication; it is anchored in the formal conditions of communicative action in such a way that the connection between objective, social and subjective world is typically prejudiced for the communication participants. For this relative a priori of understanding I would like to introduce the concept of the form of communication in analogy to the a priori of knowledge of the form of object (Lukács). IV 413 Def Control Media/terminology/Habermas: are those media that replace language as a mechanism for action coordination . Def communication media/Habermas: are such media that merely simplify over-complex contexts of communication-oriented action, but remain dependent on language and on a lifeworld. IV 536 Def Legal Institution/Terminology/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms, which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivistic reference to procedures. E.g. the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure. As soon as they are questioned, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms of action, form the background of communicative action. IV 539 Def Inner colonization/Habermas: this thesis states that as a result of capitalist growth, the subsystems of economy and state become more and more complex and penetrate deeper and deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 548 The thesis makes it possible to analyze processes of real abstraction, to which Marx had an eye, without using an equivalent of value theory (see Value Theory/Habermas). III 144 Def Action/Habermas: Actions are only what I call such symbolic expressions with which the actor, as in teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action, makes a reference to at least one world (the physical, the consciousness or the mentally divided world) but always also to the objective world. From these I distinguish between body movements and secondary operations. III 70 Def Critique/Habermas: I speak of criticism instead of discourse whenever arguments are used, without the participants having to assume that the conditions for a speech situation free of external and internal constraints are fulfilled. Aesthetic critique is about opening the eyes of participants, i. e. leading them to an authenticating aesthetic perception. III 412 Def Meaning/Communicative Action/Habermas: within our theory of communicative action, the meaning of an elementary expression consists in the contribution it makes to the meaning of an acceptable speech action. And to understand what a speaker wants to say with such an act, the listener must know the conditions under which he can be accepted. III 41 Def rationality/culture/Habermas: we call a person rational who interprets his or her nature of need in the light of culturally well-coordinated value standards, but especially when he or she is able to adopt a reflexive attitude towards the standards of value that interpret needs. IV 251 Def Productive Forces/Marx/Habermas: According to Marx, productive forces consist of a) the labour force of those working in production, the producers; b) the technically usable knowledge, insofar as it is converted into productivity-increasing work tools, into production techniques; c) organisational knowledge, insofar as it is used to set workers in motion efficiently, to qualify workers and to effectively coordinate the division of labour cooperation of the workers. IV 252 The productive forces determined the degree of possible availability of natural processes. IV 252 Def Relations of Production/Marx/Habermas: relations of production are those institutions and social mechanisms that determine how the labour force, at a given level of productive forces, is combined with the available means of production. The regulation of access to the means of production or the way in which the socially used workforce is controlled also indirectly determines the distribution of socially generated wealth. Relations of production express the distribution of social power; they prejudice the structure of interests that exists in a society with the distribution pattern of socially recognized opportunities of the satisfaction of needs. IV 203 Def Situation/Habermas: the situation includes everything that can be seen as a restriction for (...) action initiatives. While the actor retains the environment as a resource for communication-oriented action, the restrictions imposed by the circumstances of the implementation of his plans are part of the situation. III 400 Def Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. IV 270 Def Knowledge/Habermas: I use "knowledge" in a broader sense that covers everything that can be acquired through learning as well as through the appropriation of cultural tradition, which extends to both cognitive and social integrative, i.e. to expressive and moral-practical elements. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Understanding | Habermas | III 152 Understanding/action/sociology/Habermas: there is a problem of rationality when understanding actions, because the different types of action (teleological, dramaturgical and communicative action) presuppose different relations of the actor to the world. >Actions/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. III 159 Sociology must seek an understanding approach to its field of objects, because it contains processes of understanding through which the field of objects has in a way already constituted itself. The social scientist encounters symbolically pre-structured objects; they embody the structures of pre-theoretical knowledge with the help of which subjects capable of speech and action have produced these objects. The waywardness of this pre-structured reality (...) is contained in the generation rules according to which the subjects produce the social context of life directly or indirectly. Examples are acts of speech, purposeful activities, cooperations and sediments of these utterances such as texts, traditions, documents, works of art, theories, goods, techniques, etc. Speaking and acting are the unexplained basic concepts. >Basic terms, >Method. III 160 In order to understand the lifeworld, the social scientist, who has no access to it other than the layman, must be able to participate in its production in general. >Lifeworld. III 170 Communicative actions cannot be interpreted in two steps, i. e. first of all to be understood in their factual course of events and then compared with an ideal-typical course of events. III 171 Instead, the interpreter must assume a divided basis all the time, which he/she has in common with the one to be judged. III 173 If we assume that there is a possibility of mutual criticism between the observer and the actor,... III 174 ...the distinction between descriptive and rational interpretation becomes meaningless. The rational interpretation is here the only way to open up the factual process of communicative action. >Hermeneutics/Habermas. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. III 403 We need to broaden our perspective to the context of interaction so that we can identify fulfillment conditions under which the listener can connect his actions to the actions of a speaker. However, knowledge of the "fulfillment conditions" is not sufficient to know when an expression is acceptable (see Acceptability/Habermas). For this we still need knowledge of the conditions for an agreement. III 404 Imperative: in the case of imperatives involving a claim to power of the speaker, i.e. a possible sanctioning, we must know the sanction conditions. IV 400 Understanding/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Thesis: Understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action can be expanded, organizationally mediated and rationalized, but not replaced and thus mechanized by media in the areas of life that primarily fulfil functions of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization. >Agreement/Habermas. Gaus I 157 Understanding/Habermas/Bohman: 'Formal pragmatics' is Habermas's term for a general account of the capacity of a speaker to use and understand speech acts correctly: 'the know-how of subjects who are capable of speech and action, who are attributed the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves capable of distinguishing (at least intuitively) between valid and invalid expressions' (1990(1): 31). Bohman: the intuitive knowledge of a competent speaker permits them to engage in second-order evaluation in asking for justification or reasons for various sorts of validity claims that are implicit in utterances; to understand an utterance is to know its 'acceptability conditions'. While validity claims may remain implicit so long as communication is unproblematic and ongoing, competent speakers may also demand that the implied warrant be redeemed and demand explicit justification in second-order communication (communication about communication, or 'discourse' proper) in order to reach an understanding. Critical function/Bohman: such a reconstruction of implicit know-how may have a critical function in so far as it can specify when speakers violate the conditions of rationality implicit in communicatively successful utterances. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Armstrong, D. | Wright Vs Armstrong, D. | I 153 VsBasis Equations/WrightVsLewis/WrightVsArmstrong/WrightVsCounterfactual Conditionals: counterfactual conditionals have hardly been conspicuously successful in the history of philosophy. Problem: the following sentence can always be nullified if it is possible that the realization of Q could causally interfere with a fact that actually exerts influence on the truth value of P itself: P then and only if (would it be the case that Q), it would be the case that R (P = statement, Q = "light on", R = reaction). Example Johnston: a chameleon sits in the dark on a green billiard table. Then the creation of "standard" conditions can cause a change, which we can see from the skin color of the chameleon. But if the truth conditions were correctly captured by the subjunctive conditional, then we would have to say, "The chameleon is green until the lights go on". I 154 Conditional fallacy: here the class of judgments in which we are interested participates in the causal order. It cannot therefore apply a priori that the truth conditions for P are captured by the statement to be analysed. Vs: when we consider a counterfactual conditional sentence, we certainly only have to consider relevant, not absurd possible situations! VsVs: but that is so, in the case of the e.g. chameleon. The objection misses the point: the kind of equivalence we are interested in must be valid a priori. I 155 It must be possible to know a priori that the implementation of antecedence will not materially affect those relationships that may affect the actual truth values of the analysandum. But how could one know this without collateral empirical information about the peculiarity of the world one actually finds oneself in? Thus: a priori correct subjunctive conditional markings of the conditions of truth (in the discourse that interests us) are not to be obtained. The basic equation is to be rejected. Instead: "Provisional Equations"/Wright: the problem with the e.g. chameleon could not have happened if we had determined that its color is at stake under standard conditions that a standard observer has to check. Changing the truth values should not be a problem if it is the truth value of P under C conditions (no other circumstances) that S is to judge under C conditions. Provisional Equation: If CS, then (It would be the case that P then and only if S would judge that P). So we do not concentrate on bi-conditionals with conditional parts to the right, but on conditionals with bi-conditional consequences. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 261 VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations. Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half. Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication. Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism). Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both! Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that. Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double. Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement. I 263 Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y} Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances. MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong. Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world. I 264 Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them. I 268 Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property. The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". ((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".) Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B". Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction. I 269 Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds: 1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or 2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together. MillikanVsLeibniz. Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties. Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other. Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency. Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity. Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology: I 270 Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...". ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke Vs Observation Language | I 88 Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts/Peacocke: the distinction can be defended. The attacks against it fall into two groups: 1) VsObservational Concepts/some authors: Vs allegedly too casual, arbitrary (permissive) way to make the distinction. E.g. one and the same device can be seen as an x-ray tube or a Geiger counter. These concepts enter the representational content. I.e. experience itself represents something as X-ray tube. So there is no conscious inference taking place! Theory Ladenness/Hanson/Peacocke: most provocative formulation: that theoretical concepts determine the content of experience; milder formulation: theoretical assumptions can determine some reasons to express a sentence typically classified as observation sentence. Theoretical Concept/Tradition: X-ray tube is one typically considered a theoretical concept. If it now enters the representational content, it meets certain standard conditions for observability. Observability: again depends on the ability (sophistication) of the observer. 2) VsDistinction Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts: the classical approach to observability is empty: nothing really fulfills the conditions. In reality, theoretical considerations do indeed play a role. Both criticisms can be represented together, although that means claiming that the distinction simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Tradition | Millikan Vs Tradition | I 13 classical realism: thought and knowledge are separated and intentionality is transparent. Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: intentionality is not transparent: many processes which are "about" something, are not done consciously. Ex von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, but bees do not know. Bees merely react adequately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the reference is identified. Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are. That's why they are representations. Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in what general structure the world has to have so that subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. can be projected onto it. Realism/Millikan: properly understood realism does not require that the world must be "allocated correctly" for that. I 17 Eigenfunction/Millikan: Ex heart has something to do with the fact that it pumps blood. But what kind of connection to the blood pump must be given? Some hearts are malformed and can not pump, others, Ex water pumps could perfectly pump blood, but they are not hearts. Ex artificial hearts: do not belong to the biological category. So it's not the actual constitution, the actual forces, dispositions etc that make something an element of a biological category. Eigenfunction/Millikan: causes to submit something into a biological category. It has nothing to do with forces and dispositions, but with history. Having an intrinsic function means to be "slated for something", "to want" something ("supposed to", designed to "). We must now examine in a naturalistic, non-normative way. Language/propositional attitude/Millikan: So we have to ask, "what are they good for." Sentence/Millikan: Just as a heart sometimes may be deformed, a sentence can also not be well-formed. Other sentences are simply wrong. Tradition/falsehood/Millikan: the tradition was obliged to accept that false beliefs are beliefs. Then we also have to have the forces to influence our dispositions. MillikanVsTradition: but a broken kidney does not have the power to fulfill its function. I 18 And wrong and confused thoughts also do not have such forces. Tradition: here has more to do with input-output relations. Millikan: thesis: we are dealing with the biological functions, the functions that "something thought for". Millikan: thesis: by focusing on the intrinsic function (biological function), we are free to find the defining characteristics between true convictions and the world outside. Eigenfunction/Millikan: 1. direct eigenfunction: the first part of the theory relates only to the functions of things that are members of families that are similar to each other Ex hearts, or are similar to an archetype Ex sentences, words, Ex shaking hands. 2. derived eigenfunction: here we have to show that new things can have eigenfunction: Ex new behavior, new bee dances, new convictions. I 133 Intension/tradition/Millikan: always has to do with the application criteria. 1. set of properties or characters that are associated in the mind. 2. this criterion defines what the term is applied to - the extension! Extension/intension/tradition: the two are connected in spirit. Intension/MillikanVsTradition/Millikan: instead, it is the evolution that defines the connection between intention and extension. Sense/Millikan: results from the combination of term and reference, how the term "is intended to project". We still need the concept of testing. I 157 Rationalism/rationalist/tradition/Millikan: (similar argument): what a term means in one idiolect must be known to the speaker of this idioleckt a priori. But all that can be known a priori is whether two expressions in the idiolect have the same intension. If a term now has more than one intension, one can not know a priori whether the intensions will converge in the application. Therefore, each unambiguous term must have only one intension. meaning/sense/MillikanVsTradition: importance of Frege'ian sense, not intension. Then emptiness is the primary type of insignificance and neither ambiguity nor synonymy are determined by reasoning that is purely a priori. Intension/Millikan: is only the secondary meaning. I 158 They can be meaningful only insofar as these intentions are explicit and have meaning themselves. I 171 Error/delusion/to show/indexical word/Millikan: Ex there are two items on the table, an ashtray, which I do not consider an ashtray and a thing that is not an ashtray but I think it is and say "This is a nice Ashtray". Question: have I thereby said that the ashtray is nice, although I meant the other object? Ex I hold up a book and say, "This belonged to my grandfather." However, I am mistaken and am holding up the wrong book. I 172 What I have said, of course, is wrong. What is not so clear is whether what I meant is something other than what I said. Millikan: thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" have meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous with respect to Frege's sense. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have so often ignored that. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead us to temporary concepts. temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: intensions are then linked to our ability to pursue things and to re-identify them. preliminary concept: Ex this coffee mug for me is totally indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it's my cup. I 173 Question: whether that even counts as a concept. Ability to track the object leads to an interior concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: if thinking is not mediated by perception the objects one thinks of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are provided with an index. I 174 Error/delusion/indexical word/perception/misidentification/Millikan: Ex Suppose I'm wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived meaning from the ability to track the object. 2. inner concept I already had previously. "This" is therefore ambiguous. I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. in order to give them a content a "standard observer" must mean more than "observers to whom red things appear red under standard conditions". And accordingly for "standard conditions". Solution: standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no one has any idea how that could work. Problem: if you have every reason to believe that to be a standard observer, there are circumstances in which an object seems to have a different color than it has. But one would not conclude that the thing would not be red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must be able to identify these opposite characteristics, also. And it may be that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify to the oppositeness of red and green? Many authors: think that one could never argue that red and green could even be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: but that is not true, in fact there are many ways, Ex strabismus. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certitude/Millikan: our trust in the fact that red and green are opposites (perhaps incorporated into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is exactly the objective validity of these concepts, of the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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