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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counterparts | Stalnaker | I 72 Counterpart/Lewis: the things in the actual world have counterparts in other worlds. Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual has accidental properties, properties that it does not have in other worlds. >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Bare particulars, >Possible worlds, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essentialism, >Possible worlds/Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Dispositions | Esfeld | I 289 Bare dispositions/Esfeld: bare dispositions have no non-dispositional basis. >Bare particulars, >Bare facts, >Foundation, >Actions. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Existence Statements | Existence statement, existence assertion, philosophy, logic: the simple assertion of the existence of an object is problematic because it cannot be empirically refuted. In contrast, quantification is the attribution of properties, not of "naked" existence. E.g. "Socrates exists" is considered by some authors as senseless. See also bare particulars, predication, existence, quantification, existence predicate, iota operator. |
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| Particulars | Stalnaker | I 72 Bare particular/anti-essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible worlds in which it does not. >Bare particulars, >Possible Worlds, >Essentialism. Exception: self-identity. Problem: we need special semantics for that. I 72/73 Essential properties/bare individual things/theoretical terms/particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare particulars there are undeniable essential properties. 1) Something that is necessarily an essential property of everything, e.g. the ability to be self-identical, e.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, e.g. to be colored when red. 2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967)(1) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: e.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, e.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, e.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, e.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. This also applies in possible worlds where Babe Ruth is a tricycle. 3) Possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970)(2) possible worlds-indexed properties are undeniable essential properties, e.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something/someone has in any possible world iff. this person/thing has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world). Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had. >Properties, >Necessity, >Necessity de re, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essential property, >Essentialism. 1. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967): Essentialism in modal logic, Nous 1, (1):91-96. 2. Alvin Plantinga (1970): "World and Essence", Philosophical Review 79, pp. 461-92. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Properties | Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness. |
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| Properties | Stalnaker | I 9 Def property/Stalnaker: a) Def thin/economic definition: a property is a way in which individuals can be grouped b) Def richer/Stalnaker: (more robust): a property is something in relation to which the individuals are grouped. To do this, we identify intrinsic properties with regions of a property-space. >Intrinsicness. Important argument: since the elements of the sets are not identical with the individuals that instantiate the property, this represents the independence of properties from their instantiation. ((s) So Stalnaker believes that properties also exist if they are not instantiated). >Instantiation, >Individuals, >Individuation. I 75 Modal Logic/ML/semantics/extensional/Stalnaker: e.g. property: a property is represented as a singular propositional function which takes an individual as an argument and delivers a proposition as a value. >Propositional functions. Equivalent to this: property: a property is a function that takes a possible world as an argument and delivers a set of individuals as a value. It is therefore intuitively a selection rule for a class of individuals, given the facts and vice versa: a selection selective procedure for a class of individuals is a property of the selected individuals. Cf. >Selection axiom, >Sets, >Set theory. Problem: there is no extensional equivalent to the distinction between referential and purely qualitative properties - unlike with the distinction between essential and accidental ones. >Essential properties, >Accidental properties. Def Referential properties: referential properties are defined in terms of the individuals that they have. Wrong solution: to stipulate that only accidental propositions may be selected for atomic predicates. This does not prevent that essential attributions could be true. It prevents only that they can be expressed. Anti-essentialism/solution: the property must be defined independently of the possible worlds and the individuals. >Essentialism. I 78 Intrinsic Property/bare particular/theory: to identify an intrinsic property we must distinguish possible world-indexed, time-indexed and referential properties from them. These do not correspond to any particular regions in the logical space. >Intrinsicness, >Bare particulars. E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. - This is how we can represent anti-essentialism. I 79 Kripke, early: Babe Ruth could have been a billiard ball. Kripke, later: there is a fallacy in that. Stalnaker: one cannot assume that he is actually a billiard ball, because then one could not refer to him as we already did. That is not what it is about (see below). This confuses the limits of what could actually be with the limitations of assumptions about what could counterfactually have been. >Conceivability. Essential property/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Kripke: thesis: names for natural species (natural kind terms) express essential properties. >Natural kinds, >Essence. Names for species are referential terms. Referential: referential means that they are determined by a causal connection. >Causal theory of reference. Natural kinds: natural kinds are not purely linguistic, but restrict the movement in the logical space. Bare particulars: if one allows Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball, then one must also allow it for any other thing - then this solution is uninteresting. I 81 Property/narrow/wide/propositional function: the distinction between 1) narrow P and 2) propositional functions: a propositional function in general is analogous to the distinction between possible individuals and concepts of individuals in general. >Narrow/wide, >Propositional functions. I 94f Physical non-property: a physical non-property is a complex combination of physical properties and relations (see below, e.g. golden mountain). Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience allows complex (composite) physical attributes to be physical properties. >Supervenience. Attribute: an attribute is an easy way of picking out. >Attributes. I 103 Def Property/Stalnaker: properties are simply a way to group individuals. Basic property/Stalnaker: basic properties must provide distinctions between individuals that could otherwise not be explained. Problem: then basic properties cannot supervene on something else. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reality | Armstrong | III 82 Reality/Armstrong: past and future are as real as the present. - Properties must be instantiated (principle of instantiation) i.e. there is no particular without properties ("bare particulars"). - Also there are no relations without particulars. >Past, >Future, >Instantiation. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Substance | Vaihinger | Vaihinger I 216 Substance/thing/Vaihinger: thing and substance are just fiction. - Because after deduction of the properties there is nothing left. >Properties, >Bare particulars, >Particulars, >Objects, >Identification, >Individuation, >Predication |
Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Simons Vs Aristotle | I 241 Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: the primordial matter fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) the substrate of change (change) and b) the carrier of properties. VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure, that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real. Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together. Primordial Matter/Simons: the primordial matter may well have its own special characteristics. Pro Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler. Diversity/tradition/Simons: diversity was explained by the combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This can already be found in the Tractatus. Foundation Stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): foundation stones are colorless. Simons: but the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars, but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal) or if they are accidentally real (Tractatus 2.0233). I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happen to it ((s) its life story!). SimonsVsFour Dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block. Universal Realism/Simons: universal realism could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics. Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary. Whole/Wholeness/Simons: the whole appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German Philosophy Between The World Wars). I 292 Whole/Aristotle/Simons: the whole seems to require inner relations towards a sum. Inner Relations/whole/Aristotle: e.g.: continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter. This includes species and genera. SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mention the most important relation: causation. Husserl/Simons: Husserl discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name. Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: the "pregnant whole" is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>Foundation/Husserl, Foundation/Simons). Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: a foundation can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD). Substance/tradition/Simons: the substance is (sort of) ontologically independent. Ontological Dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is ontological dependent. I 318 Independence/ontology/Simons: where independence is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) - as such many times in philosophy (rather theology) - is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: the substance is a very weak form of independence. Def primary: primary ist, what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it. SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Stalnaker Vs Essentialism | I 72 Bare-Particular-Anti-Essentialism//b.-p.-AE/Stalnaker: thesis: for each individual and each property there are possible worlds (poss.w.), in which the individual has this property and other poss.w., in which it does not. Exceptions: multiple exceptions are required: a) tautological properties as e.g. to-be-identical-with-itself. For such properties it is not valid that they could be omitted in some poss.w.. Vs: 1. we need a special semantics for the b.-p.-AE. This must be different from the standard semantics for modal logic (ML). In Leibniz's anti-essentialism that was not necessary. His formal semantics can be viewed as a special case of possible worlds semantics. Vs: 2. I want to present an alternative semantics that makes sense out of the theory of bare particular. It does not require that the AE is true. But the AE is embedded in a natural way in a formal condition for models in this semantics. Bare particulars/Stalnaker: I do not want to defend it but while I am doubting that the bare-particulars-thesis is metaphysically true, I think that the fact that it does not make sense within the extensional semantics shows a limitation of this extensional semantics. Essentialism/Stalnaker: it is for me not primarily about to argue VsEssentialism but to formulate by a formally correct representation of the counter-doctrine (AE) some new questions about the obligations the essentialism has. I 72/73 Anti-Essentialism/AE/Stalnaker: we examine the thesis that all properties of all objects are accidental. Here we need three types of exceptions, three types of undeniably essential attributes. They were discussed by Ruth Marcus (1967) Terry Parsons (1967 and 1969). ((s) bare particulars/b.p./Stalnaker/(s): theory of the b.p.: thesis that there may be things without properties as an alternative to the thesis that all things have essential properties.) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Stalnaker Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 73 Bare particulars/modal logic/ML/semantics/Stalnaker: the problem is now to connect the bare particulars-theory with these three restrictions with the quantified modal logic (ML). I 74 Terence ParsonsVs/Stalnaker: T. Parsons attacked this proof theoretically (1969). Anti-essentialism/T. Parsons: question: what axioms do we need for a full and reasoned anti-essentialist theory? That means a theory that prevents any questionable ascription of essential properties? StalnakerVsParsons: problem: some of his propositions are not theorems: e.g. Theorem: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx). ((s) if F is a necessary property for an object then this applies to all such objects x) E.g. if a square is necessary angular, then all squares). Stalnaker: but the following substitution instance is not a theorem: (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). ((s) If something is necessary the father of y, all is necessary the father of y.) Stalnaker: that means the atomic predicate "F" does not represent any property as it should normally be but just a random property of a certain kind. This is not bad per se but imposes the semantics additional burdens. Because the rules have to pick out suitable properties as values for atomic predicates. ((s) QuineVs - Quine: predicates do not represent properties). properties/anti-essentialism/predicates/Stalnaker: in distinguishing it is naturally about between intrinsic, qualitative characteristics and referential or possible world-indexed properties. Only the former come into question. StalnakerVsParsons: this one requires this but does not explain it. Atomic predicate/Stalnaker: this concept cannot help because it is purely syntactic and cannot make a semantic job by itself. Anti-essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bare Particulars | Stalnaker, R. | I 72 Bare Individuals/Anti-Essentialism/Stalnaker: Thesis: For every individual and every characteristic there are possible worlds in which the individual has this characteristic and other worlds in which it does not have it - exceptions: Self-identity - Problem: for this we need a special semantics. I 79 Bare Individuals/linguistic essentialism/Stalnaker: we can even bring this together with the thesis of bare individuals: it can be assumed as a purely linguistic fact that certain normal predicates are world-indexed (in relation to the real world) rather than properties in the narrower sense. For example, according to this, Babe Ruth would be essentially human, but still he could look like a billiard ball or even be one. |
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