Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arithmetics | Thiel | Thiel I 225 Arithmetics/Lorenzen/Thiel: Arithmetics is the theory in which the infinite occurs in its simplest form, it is essentially nothing more than the theory of the infinite itself. Arithmetics as the theory of the set of signs (e.g. tally-list) is universal in the sense that the properties and relations of any other infinite set of signs can always be "mapped" in some way. The complexity of matter has led to the fact that a large part of the secondary literature on Gödel has put a lot of nonsense into the world on metaphors such as "reflection", "self-reference", etc. >Self-reference, cf. >Regis Debray. I 224 The logical arithmetic full formalism is denoted with F. It contains, among other things, inductive definitions of the counting signs, the variables for them, the rules of quantifier logic and the Dedekind-Peanosian axioms written as rules. >Formalization, >Formalism. I 226 The derivability or non-derivability of a formula means nothing other than the existence or non-existence of a proof figure or a family tree with A as the final formula. Therefore also the metamathematical statements "derivable", respectively "un-derivable" each reversibly correspond unambiguously to a basic number characterizing them. >Theorem of Incompleteness/Gödel. Terminology/Writing: S derivable, $ not derivable. "$ Ax(x)" is now undoubtedly a correctly defined form of statement, since the count for An(n) is uniquely determined. Either $An(n) is valid or not. >Derivation, >Derivability. I 304 The centuries-old dominance of geometry has aftereffects in the use of language. For example "square", "cubic" equations etc. Arithmetics/Thiel: has today become a number theory, its practical part degraded to "calculating", a probability calculus has been added. >Probability, >Probability law. I 305 In the vector and tensor calculus, geometry and algebra appear reunited. A new discipline called "invariant theory" emerges, flourishes and disappears completely, only to rise again later. I 306 Functional analysis: is certainly not a fundamental discipline because of the very high level of conceptual abstraction. Invariants. I 307 Bourbaki contrasts the classical "disciplines" with the "modern structures". The theory of prime numbers is closely related to the theory of algebraic curves. Euclidean geometry borders on the theory of integral equations. The ordering principle will be one of the hierarchies of structures, from simple to complicated and from general to particular. >Structures. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Forms | Dennett | I 268f Form/Meaning/Dennett: in the world of macromolecules form is the same as determination. ((s) Cf. >Functional analysis, >Functional explanation.) |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Function | Minsky | I 123 Function/structure/description/context/uniframes/Minsky: [a chair can be described in different ways}: a) A chair is a thing with legs and a back and seat. b) A chair is something you can sit upon. To catch the proper meaning, we need connections between parts of the chair structure and the requirements of the human body that those parts are supposed to serve. >Functional explanation, >Functional analysis, >Analysis, >Explanation, >Function, >Description. Solution/Minsky: I 121 Uniframe/terminology/Minsky: a description constructed to apply to several different things at once. ((s) E.g. building blocks may be arranged in different ways and create tools for different functions). I 123 Uniframes that include structures like this can be powerful. For example, such knowledge about relations between structure, comfort, and posture could be used to understand when a box could serve as a chair… >Frames, >Frame Theories, >Terminology/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Functional Explanation | Dennett | Lanz I 300 Dennett/Lanz: functional analysis makes an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to carry out its tasks). Intentional analysis is similar: the agent is rational: he has goals that he should have because of his constitution and his place in the world. He also has opinions that he should have. Thus, only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. So if one asks, what are the relevant causal factors for the educated behavior which can either be explained functionally or intentionally depending on interest and complexity of the behavior, then only the physical explanation provides information. It follows that it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of other mental states and causes of action. Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsEveryday Psychology). >Folk Psychology. Dennett I 276 Function/causality/Dennett: Problem: did the first nucleotides have a function or simply causal powers? Did the clay crystals (Cairns-Smith) possess real teleological properties or just "something like" teleological properties? Function/Game of Life/Dennett: Do the gliders have the "function" of movement or do they just move easily? Dennett I 301 Function/function analysis/Dennett: a now present form has always emerged from a process. Therefore it is accessible to the functional analysis. Fodor/Dennett: the requirement that an organism works smoothly at any stage imposes iron restriction on its subsequent properties. A functional analysis is complete only when it confirms that a construction method was established. Cf. >Functionalism, >Functional role, >Functions, >Intentionality. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Functionalism | McGinn | II 71 Theory/McGinn: What makes a scientific theory successful? >Theory, >Success. Functional analysis: What makes the kidney effective as a filter system, makes it inefficient as pumping system at the same time.> >Functional explanation. The design of a machine is definitely not a question of "Where there’s a will, there’s a way". Our language is useless when it comes to seeing the world as it is, just as the eye cannot speak. >Language. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Holism | Fodor | IV 41/42 Holism/science/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: if the network metaphor is correct, then there is nothing transtheoretical. Vs: but this is needed for the public nature of the observation. IV 49 Conceptual holism/Fodor/Lepore: assumptions about the necessary relationships between concepts have no psychological consequences, e.g. cat/animal requires nothing for the actual use or for learning (VsConceptual Holism). >Semantic holism. IV 127f Holism/Fodor/Lepore: a functional analysis of the belief can make it holistic but that does not imply conceptual holism, because belief is not a basic concept, but a representation. Thesis: belief holism is secured, conceptual holism is not! IV 129/130 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: intentionality: does not lead to holism (propositional attitudes are not holistic qua intentionality, their semantic properties depend on things which only God knows). Functionalism: leads to holism. >Intentionality. Fodor/LeporeVs: no, because there is no analytic-synthetic distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity. IV 179 Inferential role/Fodor/Lepore: originally, the attractiveness of the inferenctial role as a causal role consisted in providing a basis for the solution of Brentano's problem of irreducibility to neurophysiology. (>Computation). IV 180 Fodor/Lepore: either one represents the semantics of the conceptual role or one is a holist. >Conceptual role semantics. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language | McGinn | I 186 Language: from our ability to learn the native language very quickly, does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of learning ability. Reason: as in other areas, the language ability is probably designed modular. There is no reason to believe that our reasoning ability is able to see through the operation of these modules. I 187 There is no reason to believe that we even possess a second-level cognition, which grasps the first level performance. I 232 Gene/McGinn: must include a marking of human grammar, so as to generate an innate language ability. (> Chomsky). Whether linguistics could read this genetic information one day, depends on whether the reason is able to give an account of what represents the genes already, and that is not necessarily true. It could be that the grammatical encryption does not happen de dicto, but only de re. But probably de dicto if the physical realization of the same grammatical properties may vary in different organisms. --- II 53 McGinn pro Chomsky: pro innate language modules. >Chomsky. II 71 Our language is useless when it comes to see the world as it is, as the eye cannot speak. E.g. functional analysis: what makes the kidney efficient as a filter system, it makes it as inefficient as the pumping system at the same time. >Functionalism, >Functional explanation. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Propensities | Bigelow | I 333 Functional Explanation/Forward-looking theory/function/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. Aetiological theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: I 334 For example, suppose that a pattern usually has a certain effect and is the result of natural selection. Then the aetiological theory says, that it is now a function of this pattern. >Function, >Cause, >Effect, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Functional explanation, >Functional analysis, >Selection. In the past, there must have been a relevant effect in a sufficient number of cases. >Relevance. N.B.: the corresponding situations are not randomly chosen situations, but situations where the effect was appropriate. In these situations, it contributes to survival. Propensity/Survival/Bigelow/Pargetter: although probability laws allow for a long series of coincidences, this is very unlikely. Normally, there will be a propensity towards the survival of the individual. Function/Bigelow/Pargetter: if there are only a few coincidences, we certainly do not speak of function. >Coincidence. I 335 Etiological theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: we interpret it in a way so it attributes the function for the whole time, even before it contributed to survival! At that time, it contributed to a propensity. Environment: this too must be relativized for the environment. If this suddenly changes, there may be ambiguities of adaptation. >Adaptation, >Environment, >Niches. I 336 Function/Bigelow/Pargetter: Functions can be described as components of an organism in descending hierarchy of complexity. For example, body parts, but also cells have functions. >Complexity, >Parts. Propensity theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to it, the functions are therefore relational properties. >Properties. And they are dispositional. >Dispositions. This is true even if the individual does not survive or is never in his normal environment. >Individuals, >Natural kinds. I 337 Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the functions interpreted (like that as propensities) explain survival by causal information, as a why-explanation. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Functional explanation, >Why questions. Propensity Theory/Artefacts/Bigelow/Pargetter: can it be applied to artifacts as well as to biological patterns? It can be part of an overarching theory, but with artifacts there is again the problem of looking back (see above). >Artifacts. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: we propose a theory of propensity for selection as a forward-looking theory for biological patterns and artifacts. >Selection. I 338 This means that all functions, be they biological or artifacts, have something in common. Function/fitness/causal explanation/propensity theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is possible that an organism may not survive, even though it has developed a survival function. But if it survives, it is because of this function. VsPropensity theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example, a structure does not serve any purpose at all, suppose its environment changes, and suddenly its functions serve survival. Then our theory of propensity would have to say that the structure has a function lately. For example, suppose one could say that heart tones have the function of alerting doctors. But only in this century, that seems wrong. Aetiological theory: says that heart tones have no such function because they are not designed for it. Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless the reason why we want to deny heart tones a function is not that they have no evolutionary history of the desired kind... I 339 ...but because the heart tones have an inevitable connection with the function of blood pumping. >Functional analysis. The heartbeat does nott produce any propensity for survival. This corresponds to examples of functions that existed in the past, but have now lost their function: VsPropensity Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: this assumes that the pattern has no function. Aetiological theory: assumes that it has a function, no matter what it was used for and what it was designed for. Propensity Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: generally gives better explanations. We can say that this function used to exist in the past, but unfortunately it became harmful to the individual. I 340 Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: a propensity can play an explanatory causal role, while the fact that something has a historical origin does not matter. This shows us that the propensity theory has such strong advantages that it seems to be justified to argue away counterexamples. Paul GriffithsVsPropensity Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: just because fitness is forward-looking, functions should be retrospective. And we can even give up the term "function" in favour of "fitness". BigelowVsVs: Function and fitness can play independent roles. Fitness: Property of an organism Function: functions specify the properties that together contribute to fitness. And here we can also ask why they are doing this. Information/Bigelow/Pargetter: an attribution of fitness breaks apart into the attribution of many functions. Thus, functions are more informative in one respect, and less informative in another than fitness. a) they do not tell us about the level of fitness, but b) each one tells us not only what characteristics contribute, but also why. I 341 Artifact/Fitness/Bigelow/Pargetter: artifacts are not about fitness, so function cannot be made superfluous by them. Therefore, fitness cannot be redundant in it. But instead, necessity can be redundant analogously. Propensity Theory/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a uniform concept of function that also applies to artifacts. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Theories | McGinn | II 71 Theory/McGinn: What makes a scientific theory successful? >Theory, >Success. Functional analysis: What makes the kidney effective as a filter system, makes it inefficient as pumping system at the same time. >Functional explanation. The design of a machine is definitely not a question of "Where there’s a will, there’s a way". Our language is useless when it comes to seeing the world as it is, just as the eye cannot speak. >Language. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Computation | Searle Vs Computation | Lanz I 295 Computation/computer model of the mind/Lanz: thesis when a program contains the functional analysis of a psychological ability then the machine on which the program is running, owns this psychological ability. The standing behind the program functional analysis then explains what this ability is based on. (SearleVs). SearleVsComputer model/Lanz: E.g. speech understanding. >Chinese room. The rules for the passenger are such that the Chinese from the outside would get the impression that they led a normal conversation. I 296 But: the successful imitation or simulation of a psychological ability is not a sufficient condition that the simulating machine has the simulated capacity, nor that an explanation of this psychological ability was given |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Functionalism | Luhmann Vs Functionalism | Baraldi I 61f Functional Analysis: allows to understand each phenomenon as contingent and comparable. Each phenomenon becomes a problem that opens up different possibilities of connection. Functional analysis describes the relationship between problems and their possible solution. VsFunctional Analysis: there is no differentiation between function and effect possible in an isolated system: e.g. heart could be a system for generating heart sounds, or a mechanism for information. It is an event that selects states of the system and it exerts selective influence on structures and triggers changes. The ability to process information presupposes the ability to orient oneself to distinctions. - > Communication/Luhmann. Environment has only function of irritation and disturbance of the system, it comes to information, if irritations are processed by own structures of the system. Information arises, if an unexpected event leads to change, what one will expect later. Communication does not transmit information, because nothing is transmitted, the communicator retains information, the understanding person does not get something, but processes his/her structures autonomously. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 |
| Functionalism | Searle Vs Functionalism | Lanz I 295 Functionalism/Lanz: promises a way out by adopting a level of information processing, the causal and semantic elements 'somehow' integrated. SearleVsFunctionalism/Lanz: there is no explanatorily useful level between folk psychology and neurobiology. The speech of subpersonal cognitive processes is absurd. Cf. >functions. Lanz I 296 SearleVsFunctionalism: there is no explanatorily useful level between folk psychology and neurobiology. The speech of subpersonal cognitive processes is absurd. Computation/computer model of the mind: if a program contains the functional analysis of a psychological ability then the machine on which the program is running owns this psychological ability. The standing behind the program functional analysis then explains what this ability is based on! (SearleVs). SearleVsComputer model: E.g. speech understanding. > Chinese room. The rules for the passenger are such that the Chinese outside get the impression that they led a normal conversation. I 296 But: the successful imitation or simulation of a psychological ability is not a sufficient condition that the simulating machine has the simulated capacity, nor that an explanation of this psychological ability was given. (> simulation/Deutsch). (>Forgery). Chinese roomVsComputer model/VsSimulation as an explanation for skills. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Physicalism | Pro | Block I 167 Def functionalism * /a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, per: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. > Psycho functionalism. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Functionalism | Block I 167 Def functionalism* / a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, pro: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
|
| |||