Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Predication | Searle | V 150 Predication: problem: e.g. "Sam is drunk": is there something that is equivalent to "drunk" as is equivalent to "Sam"? Yes: the term "drunkenness". But there is a problem: substitutability is not possible >salva veritate. V 182 Predication: predication is not reference. It is a kind of >abstraction (such as a move in chess). It only indicates a content and is completely determined by an >illocutionary role. V 182 Term theory/predicate/reference/Strawson/Searle: the term theory understands predication as a special kind of reference (SearleVs). V 174 Theory of terms: both the subject and the predicate identify non-linguistic entities. The subject identifies single terms (non-relational connection). The predicate identifies the general term. Frege: the name means the object. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Subjects | Aristotle | Geach I 48 Subject/predicate/Aristotle: each predicate can be a substantive (but not: e.g. "this white is tree"). Geach: then we get a "two-term theory": the sentence then consists of similar parts. GeachVs: E.g. Lord Home became Prime Minister - not: "Lord Home became Churchill". >Predication, >Sentence, >Statemment, >Propositional logic. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Subjects | Searle | V 182 Subject/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: there is a functional difference between subject and predicate: the subject identifies the object and the predicate characterizes the already identified object. V 150 Predication/object/existence/Searle: Problem: e.g. "Sam is drunk". Question: Is there anything that corresponds to "is drunk" in the same way as Sam corresponds to "Sam"? V 151 Frege: Yes, a term. Here, it is the term "drunkenness". Problem: this violates the Leibniz Law (interchangeability salva veritate): Example: "Sam is drunkenness". Frege's solution: "the term horse is not a term, but an object". Term/Frege: "term" exhibits a predicament of language. The term "term" is used in a double sense. The term "horse" can be a grammatical subject but not a grammatical predicate of a sentence. The quality of being a horse is not itself an attribution of a quality. V 173 Frege did not succeed in demonstrating a symmetry of subject and predicate. ((s)> Brandom: proves necessary asymmetry). >Singular terms/Brandom. V 174 Term Theory/Strawson/Thesis: both the subject and the predicate identify "non-linguistic entities". They introduce them into the proposition where they are linked by a "non-relational connection". (SearleVs). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Terms | Searle | V 174 Term Theory/Strawson/Thesis: both the subject and the predicate identify non-linguistic entities: The subject identifies single terms (non-relational connection). The predicate identifies a general term. Frege: the name means object. Predicate: means a term, ((s) not a property). Cf. >concepts, >Individuation >Identification, >Fregean Meaning, >General term, >Singular term, >Predicate. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leibniz, G.W. | Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 221 Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle). Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties. In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates. In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language. Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects: Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life. In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it. I 228 Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply". Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate. x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa). WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true. Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce: x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged! Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. (x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e) and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle): (x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n) Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae P(x) ↔ P(y) and -i P(x) ↔ -i P(y) are not equivalent. Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988): the same predicates must also be denied! strict identity: x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded! I 229 In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Searle Vs Strawson, P. F. | Searle V 160 Referential/attributive/Donnellan: E.g. we come across the mangled corpse of Smith without knowing who committed the murder. We might then say: "The murderer of Smith is crazy" without meaning someone specific. V 161 E.g.' The man who is (falsely) accused, rioted in the courtroom. In this case, we do not mean: "The killer, whoever he was" but a certain man. referential: should it turn out that Smith committed suicide, our statement about the man in the courtroom would at least in a certain sense still be true. attributiv: in the attributive meaning it cannot be true if the description doe not apply to anything. (DonnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsStrawson: both do not account for the distinction). referential: S has talked about e, regardless of whether e is actually φ. He said something true or false about it independent of whether e is actually φ. But he implied it. >Attributive/referential. One can report correctly about his speech act that he talked about e, because one can report also with other expressions than with "the φ". If the identification was used attributively, there were no such entity e. (And the speaker would not even have had in mind that it exists). V 176 Term theory/object/universals/SearleVsStrawson: in what sense is the is by "is red identified term a non-linguistic form? Is the universal in a similar sense a non-linguistic form like the material object? >Term theory. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? >Universals. V 177 Universals/Searle: they do not persist in the world, but in the language of our representation of the world. They are however not linguistic in the way as words are (as phonemes), but linguistic in the way in which the meanings of words are linguistic! SearleVsStrawson: considering the usual criteria for distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic entities his finding that universals are not linguistic is therefore wrong. V 178/179 Universals/Searle: so are not identified with the help of facts, but with the help of meanings! Universals/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: shows that "to identify" has both times completely different meanings in the model of the term theory. V 179/180 According to Strawson we would be forced to assume that also subject expressions identify universals. E.g. "The rose is red". If "is red" identified redness, then "rose" would identify the property of being a rose, something like "roseness". Or e.g. The thing that is a rose is red. By this proposition no more and no less universals are identified than by: The thing that is red is a rose. I cannot imagine any argument with which it could be shown that hereby "is red" a universal is identified without necessarily showing at the same time, that "is a rose" identifies a universal. The term theory is not consistent enough. If predicate expressions identify universals (what the theory claims) then subject expressions necessary do this as well! V 181 Universals/SearleVsStrawson: no non-linguistic entities! |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Wessel Vs Various Authors | I 17 Tolerance Principle/Carnap: ("Die logische Syntax der Sprache", 1934): "We do not want to establish prohibitions, we want to make determinations. Prohibitions can be replaced by a definitory distinction. There is no morality in logic. Everyone may construct his logic, i.e. his linguistic form, as he wants, but if he wants to discuss with us, he must indicate syntactic determinations instead of philosophical discussions." (The principle of tolerance was first formulated by Karl Menger). I 20 WesselVsTolerance Principle: overall we reject it, but we agree with Menger that the concept of constructiveness is unclear. VsMenger: the broadest concept of constructiveness is not the demand for mere consistency! (Wessel like Chr. Thiel). Justification/Logics/Wessel: all attempts at justification here are ultimately circular! Pro Carnap: of course, every logician and every mathematician has the right to build up arbitrary calculi first, whereby he has to specify the rules correctly. VsCarnap: this does not mean, however, that the possible or existing calculi are equal! That would be a "principle of indifference" . I 136 Def Analytical Implication/Parry/Wessel: (1933): If a formula A analytically implies a formula B, then only those statement variables occur in B that also occur in A. I 137 Axioms: (selection) + A 12. (A ‹-› B) u F(A) -> F[A/B] A 13. F(A) -> (A -> A) Analytical Implication/WesselVsParry: no solution to the problem since > is again an operator and can occur more than once in axioms and theorems. Pro: here for the first time the idea is expressed that only those variables may occur in the conclusion, which are also contained in the prerequisite. Paradoxes/Implication/Non-Classical Direction/Wessel: Questions: 1. Are there any guarantees that paradoxical formulas are not provable? 2. Are there guarantees that non-paradoxical formulas are not erroneously excluded? 3. Are there criteria to decide whether an arbitrary formula is paradox or not? 4. Is it possible to build a system in which all paradox formulas are not provable, but all non-paradox formulas are provable? I 219 Identity/M.Stirner: "to see the human being in each other and to act against each other as human beings...I see in you the human being as I see in myself the human being and nothing but the human being, so I care for you as I would care for myself...both of us are nothing but mathematical propositions: A = C and B = C therefore A = B, i.e. I nothing but human and you nothing but human: I and you the same". WesselVsStirner, Max: this is the same logic as in "J.Kaspar (pseudonym of Stirner) is a living being, a donkey is a living being, so J. Kaspar is a donkey". This is the confusion of different logical forms. ((s) Predication is not a statement of identity: "I am a human being" does not mean "I = human being".) I 314 Euler Diagrams/Borkowski/Lejewski/"ontological table"/Wessel: Extension of Euler diagrams: Inclusion and exclusion of meaning, existence, etc. WesselVsLejewski: his theory is burdened with serious deficiencies. I 315 Term Theory/Wessel: there are unlimited singular terms possible, but each theory gets by with a limited number. WesselVsLejewski: For example, the term "cosmonaut" undergoes a mysterious transformation. first empty term, then singular term, then general term! WesselVs: it is a general term right from the start: the reference has absolutely nothing to do with it. The distinction between empty and non-empty is a completely different classification of terms. This is not a purely logical task. I 352 Intension/WesselVsStegmüller: the term "content-related" problem only shows that it has not yet been solved on the logical level. StegmüllerVsModal Logic: because modal contexts would have intensional character. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two-Term Theory | Geach, P. | I 47 Two-Term-Theory/Aristotle/Geach: instead of original (and correct): name and predicate not interchangeable - now: both are interchangeable. Consequence: if the expression is shifted from predicate to subject position, it can also be a complex expression. Thus Aristotle dropped the demand that the subject of a predication must be a simple name. GeachVs: that was a disaster. Question: why did Aristotle not see it for himself? I 48 Because his theory of syllogisms was so successful. |
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| Term Theory | Strawson, P.F. | Searle V 174 Term Theory/Strawson Thesis: ("term theory") both the subject and the predicate identify "non-linguistic entities". They introduce them into the sentence where they are linked by a "non-relational connection". Thus, he avoids saying that the proposition is an enumeration. Strawson: stresses that he does not provide an explanation of the difference between subject and predicate, but only a description. SearleVsStrawson: wrong description. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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