Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autonomy | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Autonomy/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests. >Action, >Rationality, >Empiricism. Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order. >Norms, >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 310 This moral compulsion, which is reflected in feelings of obligation as well as in the reactions of guilt and shame - a force that is not only compatible with the autonomy of action, but in a certain way even constitutes it; this force is no longer perceived as external violence but from within by penetrating the motives. >Coercion, >Responsibility, >Duties. Habermas IV 314 Freedom of Choice/Parsons/Habermas: is characterized by moral fallibility for Parsons. Solution/Parsons: normative standards receive the status of non-instrumentalizable value stand ards or end uses; corresponding value orientations can regulate the determination of purpose themselves. >Values, >Purposes. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Free Will | James | Diaz-Bone I 108/160 Definition Voluntarism/James: Voluntarism is the will to believe in Free Will. (This meaning of "voluntaristic" comes from the philosophy of life. >Lebensphilosophie. The will is here the important principle of knowledge (in contrast to reason). Freedom/James: freedom is holding on to a concept A while avoiding the transition to any other concept B, which is equally possible. Belief in free will: could be imposed by some authority! James: the free will is unobservable! The appearance of freedom is a feeling. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Politics | Mill | Höffe I 357 Politics/Mill/Höffe: Mill rejects [in his reflections on representative government(1)] two basic conceptions of the nature of politics as one-sided, both the voluntaristic conception, which declares the state to be the product of human will for specific purposes, and the historical conception, which sees the community as "a kind of organic structure" that "grows out of the nature and life of the people concerned"(1). (MillVsVoluntarism). Mill (...) seeks (...) a benchmark for exemplary politics and sees it in the per-saldo increase in the intellectual, moral and practical skills of citizens. According to this criterion, i.e. not in principle, but merely in most cases, >democracy is preferable as a form of government. 1.J.St. Mill Considerations on Representative Government, 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Pragmatism | James | Diaz-Bone I 68 Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. I 70 Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being. I 76 Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision. I 78 We do not live to think, but we think to live. 79 Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability. I 88 PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment). I 102 VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem). |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Society | Neo-Republicanism | Gaus I 175 Society/Neo-republicanism/Dagger: (...) civic virtue is necessary if self-government is to be sus- tained. NeorepublicanismVSLiberalism: But the neorepublicans also tend to believe that civic virtue is either in decline or in jeopardy, and they frequently place the blame on liberalism. As Sandel says, 'the civic or formative aspect of our LAmericanJ politics has largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen' (1996(1): 6). >Liberalism. SandelVsRawls: This 'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found in the works of liberal philosophers such as Rawls and the decisions of liberal jurists, has fostered a society in which individuals fail to understand how much they owe to the community. >J. Rawls, >Voluntarism. 1. Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy 's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Mill | Höffe I 357 State/Mill/Höffe: Mill rejects [in his reflections on representative government (1)] two basic views of the nature of politics as one-sided, both the voluntaristic view, which declares the state to be the product of human will for specific purposes, and the historical view, which sees in the community "a kind of organic structure" that "grows out of the nature and life of the people concerned"(1). (MillVsVoluntarism). >Voluntarism. Theoretical justification: According to Mill, a theory that is fair to its object must combine both views. a) In accordance with the voluntaristic view, a community enjoys freedom in shaping its political institutions, but not unlimited freedom. b) Because three conditions must be taken into account, which now speak in favor of the historicist view: 1) The institutions must be recognized by the people; 2) they must make an active contribution to the preservation of the constitution; (...) 3) they require responsible action on the part of public officials. >Institutions. Höffe I 358 Parliamentarism/Mill: In his observations on representative government(1), Mill argues in accordance with the title for an elected parliament -on the basis of popular sovereignty- and for a separation of powers with government control. In contrast to the current understanding of representative democracy, however, parliamentary powers are limited. Parliament delegates the task of not only debating ("parleting") laws but also passing them, i.e., the legislative power, to another institution, a committee that is responsible for drafting and passing laws. 1.J.St. Mill Considerations on Representative Government, 1861 2. Ibid., Chap. 1. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Utilitarianism | Parsons | Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purpose-rational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. >Procedural rationality, >Actions/Parsons. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends").(1) 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. >Purposes. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. >Autonomy/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. >Cultural values, >Institutionalization, >Internalization, >Lifeworld. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| |||