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The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asymmetry | Arrow | Mause I 166 Asymmetry/Information Markets/Arrow: Market participants are often confronted not only with a lack of information of the type incomplete information, but also with a lack of information of the type asymmetric information. (1)(2) Example: A buyer is less informed about a used car than the seller. Terminology: this is described in the literature with the terms "principal" (seller, superior; holds more information) and "agent" (buyer, employee; holds less information). Problem: a) a buyer who is not aware of his information deficit will be disadvantaged, b) a buyer who is aware of this deficit may not enter into a contractual relationship. See Information/Arrow. 1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53, (5) , 1963, p. 941– 973. 2. G. A. Akerlof, The market for ‚Lemons‘: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3) 1970 p. 488– 500. |
EconArrow I Kenneth J. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Bubble Economy | Sunstein | I 140 Bubble formation/markets/economy/Sunstein: Bubbles often arise when people do not believe that a stock has great value, but rather when they believe that other people believe this. They are investing with the expectation that the value of the share will rise due to expectations of other market participants. (1) Prediction markets/Sunstein: can bubbles also arise in information markets? Of course. Investors can move in one direction because they expect other investors to do so. >Information/Economic Theories, >Information Markets. I 141 In the campaign for the 2004 presidential election, there was a rumor about Kerry, which provoked significant swings.(2) 1. See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 2d ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 2. 2. See Erin Jordan, “Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result,” Des Moines Register, Nov. 10, 2004, 5B. |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Competition | Hirschman | Brocker I 522 Competition/HirschmanVsTradition/Hirschman: Hirschman is critical of the ideal image of perfect competition. See also Demand/Hirschman. Brocker I 523 Def "normal" competition/Hirschman: a situation in which not all customers turn away from a certain company and its products in the event of price or quality changes. (1) Brocker I 524 Hirschman thesis: Competition can act as a cartel! According to Hirschman, whenever the quality of a competitor's product cannot be identified in advance due to a lack of transparency, an entire industry can jointly reduce the quality of its products and keep it low: If the quality of a product decreases, some of the consumers migrate to the competition, only to also not find satisfactory quality, whereupon they migrate to the next product, etc. Customers err from one product to another without complaining. (2) Panther: here Hirschman anticipates later developments: See Asymmetry/Arrow: Asymmetric Information Markets, Information Economics/Akerlof, Information/Sunstein. Brocker I 525 Migration/Customers/Quality: Problem: "For those customers who are most concerned about the quality of the product and who are therefore the most active, reliable and creative carriers of the conflict, this is precisely why there is also a clear likelihood that they will be the first to migrate in the event of a deterioration in quality"(3). It follows from this thesis that an inefficient monopolist can easily get rid of those through a little competition, and thus a little migration opportunity, who could most likely become dangerous to him . 1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. Dt.: Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch. Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten, Tübingen 1974, p. 17 2. Ibid. p. 22 3. Ibid. p. 39 Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHirschm I Albert O. Hirschman The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Sunstein | I 5 Google/Sunstein: how can a company predict its own development? Google has tried this with an innovative method. (1) In doing so, they created a virtual market in which employees invested expected amounts of money. >Collective Intelligence, >Markets, >Information Marketss. 1. “Putting Crowd Wisdom to Work,” Sept. 21. 2005, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/putting-crowd-wisdom-to-googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/putting-crowd-wisdom-to-work.html. |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
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| Information | Hayek | Sunstein I 14 Information/prices/markets/Hayek/Sunstein: a pricing system, as suggested by Friedrich August von Hayek, can help in solving the problem of how (implicit) pressure is exerted in group discussions to withhold potentially crucial information. This has a pronounced effect on the gathering of information. Markets/Hayek: Markets create prices for goods in a way that processes scattered information distributed among very different people. In markets, participants have an extreme incentive to be right. Some information may remain "hidden", but when it comes to making a profit, this information will not be hidden for customers and investors for long. For this reason, market prices reflect a high degree of information.(1) Sunstein: You could say that markets create something like a "Daily Us" see Filter bubbles/Sunstein. SunsteinVsHayek: However, his argumentation had a blind spot. Markets can also process false information. Styles can lead to inflationary prices. This can also affect land and real estate prices. >Markets/Sunstein, Markets/Hayek. I 132 Prediction markets/forecast markets/Sunstein: Examples where information markets are efficient: For example, to recognize tendencies of air pollution, to observe deficits in public budgets (2). For example, tracking outbreaks of diseases and predicting their spread or monitoring the solvency of institutions.(3) I 137 Manipulation: Candidate Pat Buchanan's supporters bought large quantities of shares in the IEM (Iowa Electronic Market, a prediction market for elections) in 2000 to manipulate the prediction. However, better informed investors subsequently took advantage of this. 1. Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 1: Rules and Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) p. 13. 2. See Abramowicz, “Prediction Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis,” pp. 990–92. 3. ibid. pp. 987-90. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Knowledge | Sunstein | Sunstein I 118 Knowledge/Friedrich Hayek/Sunstein: In his essay "The Use of Knowledge in Society" Hayek writes that the great advantage of prices is that they reflect both information and people's tastes, which is much more than planning or planned economy could achieve. According to Hayek, the information is distributed to individuals in the form of incomplete and often contradictory fragments of knowledge.(1) >Information/Hayek, >Information Markets. Sunstein: the knowledge of course includes facts about the product, but also about customer preferences. Sunstein I 119 Knowledge/Hayek: the knowledge contained in the prices exceeds that of the best experts. Prices/Hayek: in this context, Hayek underlines the importance of moving prices. Small movements produce the complete economic picture, which is overlooked by many economists according to Hayek. --- Sunstein I 120 In particular, prices react to new information. 1. Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35 (1945): 519, reprinted in The Essence of Hayek, ed. Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt Leube (Stanford: Hoover, 1984), 211. A superb treatment of Hayek’s thought is Bruce Caldwell, Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Market Failure | Stigler | Mause I 166 Market Failure/Information/Information Markets/Stigler: Problem: Suppliers and demanders in markets [are] generally (...) not fully informed about market developments. The acquisition and processing of market-relevant information - unlike in the model world of perfect competition - involves costs in the form of time, energy and money.(1) >Information/Economic Theories, >Information economics, >Information production. 1. G. J. Stigler, The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy 69 (3): 1961, p. 213– 225. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Markets | Beck | I 74 Markets/Risk Society/Beck: by changing risk definitions completely new needs - and thus markets - can be created. The self-developed risk replaces the pre-defined and manipulable needs as a reference point for the production of goods. The economy thus becomes "self-referential". >Risks, >Knowledge, >Society/Beck, >Society. I 75 A symptomatic and symbolic risk "coping" is essential for this. Cf. >Information markets, >Markets. |
Beck I U. Beck Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi 1992 German Edition: Risikogesellschaft Frankfurt/M. 2015 |
| Markets | Sen | Brocker I 883 Markets/Sen: Sen is concerned with the consideration of subjective assessments of quality differences. As indicators of subjective valuations, markets clearly work better the more citizens participate in social price formation through payments. However, it is rarely guaranteed that all citizens have enough economic means to participate at all in the communication of prices; for this to happen, politics must specifically influence the Pareto-efficient equilibria achievable in markets (cf. Dasgupta 1989)(1). On its own, the market cannot create the conditions for its optimal functioning (cf. Beckert 2002)(2). >Information Markets, >Information/Economic Theories, >Information/Hayek, >Prices. Furthermore, markets are only suitable as discovery methods for scarcity and benefit estimates in relation to commensurable goods. If here the part is taken for the whole and the market as well as the Pareto efficiency to be promoted by it (cf. Mishan 1972)(3) is chosen as the judge of all things - even those that are not or hardly marketable - the information performance of the market turns into its direct opposite. Misallocations occur, because, according to Sen, a Pareto-efficient result could be completely unfair and terrible(4). Sen Thesis: the free market does not exist. What exists are merely the most diverse forms of a socially regulated exchange of goods arising from an interplay of interests and values. Markets and the options they offer are creations of the values incorporated into their order and environment. Solution/Sen: Markets must be designed in such a way that they do not undermine their social, cultural, moral and ecological preconditions. >Freedom/Sen. 1. Martha S. Dasgupta, »Power and Control in the Good Polity«, in: Alan P. Hamlin/Philip Pettit (Hg.), The Good Polity. Normative Analysis of the State, Oxford 1989. 2. Jens Beckert, Beyond the Market. The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency, Princeton 2002 (dt. 1997) 3. E J. Mishan, Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis, London 1972. 4. A.Sen, Rationality and Freedom, Cambridge, Mass./London 2002, S. 524 Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Markets | Varian | I 495 Markets/Varian/Shapiro: information markets are not like competitive markets, markets in which there are many suppliers offering similar products, each lacking the ability to influence prices. >Information/Economic Theories, >Information economics, >Information production. I 534 Characteristics of an information market: 1.The dominant firm (…) may or may not produce the “best” product, but by virtue of its size and scale economies it enjoys a cost advantage over its smaller rivals. I 540 2. In a differentiated product market we have a number of firms producing the same “kind” of information, but with many different varieties. Taken from: Information Rules Shapiro, Carl. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy Harvard Business Review Press. Kindle Edition. |
EconVarian I Hal R. Varian Carl Shapiro Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy Cambridge, MA 1998 |
| Prediction | Sunstein | I 39 Prediction/Experts/Laymen/Individuals/Groups/Sunstein: statistically selected groups of experts had made 12.5% fewer misjudgements than individual experts on issues as diverse as poultry prices, gross national product, patients' chances of survival, housing development. (1) This means that companies are better off listening to the advice of many experts than hiring external consultants(2). >Collective Intelligence. Election Forecasts/Political Forecasts/Sunstein: here it has become standard practice to examine a lot of election results and take the median. In the USA, the Polly system was used for this purpose in 2004. (3) I 40 Problem/Sunstein: if several surveys are taken together and investigated, they usually did not ask the same questions. One then tries to find out a pattern of attitudes on which these different questions are based.(4) I 132 Prediction markets/forecast markets/Sunstein: Examples where information markets are efficient: For example, to recognize tendencies of air pollution, or to observe deficits in public budgets. (5) for example to track outbreaks of diseases and predict their spread, or to observe the solvency of institutions.(6) >Information Markets. I 137 Manipulation: Candidate Pat Buchanan's supporters bought large quantities of shares in the IEM (Iowa Electronic Market, a prediction market for elections) in 2000 to manipulate the forecasts. However, better informed investors subsequently took advantage of this to their benefit. I 138 Tendencies: one often sees that a candidate's supporter believes in the victory of this particular candidate. In 1980, for example, 87% of Jimmy Carter's supporters believed in his victory and 80% of Ronald Reagan's supporters believed in their candidate's victory.(7) This is not surprising, but limits the predictive power. People process new information in such a way that it can be integrated into their previous world view. For this reason, many investors also lose money on the stock market. >stock market. I 139 Marginal Trader Hypothesis: this thesis exploits this and is oriented towards the behaviour of a small group of traders identified as one that is less susceptible to tendencies. I 144 There was a famous bet between Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich on the scarcity of natural resources. (8) Simon had predicted that they were inexhaustible. In 1980, Ehrlich and Simon bet on prices for raw materials that Ehrlich picked out. Simon won because the prices dropped until 1990. Sunstein: If there had already been information markets at that time, they would have tended strongly towards Simon. 1. See Armstrong, “Combining Forecasts,” 419–20. For many factual questions, of course, a little research would be sufficient to identify the correct answers. But for some factual issues, even significant research is inconclusive, and it is best to consult experts. pp. 428, 430-31 2. ibid. p. 428. 3. See Alfred Cuzán et al., “Combining Methods to Forecast the 2004 Presidential Presidential Election: The Pollyvote” (unpublished manuscript, Jan. 6, 2005), 12, available at http://www.politi calforecasting.com. 4. I am grateful to Robert MacCoun for this point. 5. See Abramowicz, “Prediction Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis,” pp. 990–92. 6. ibid. pp. 987-90 7. Donald Granberg and Edward Brent, “When Prophesy Bends: The Preference-Expectation Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952–1980,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45 (1983): 479. 65. See Wolfers and Zitzewitz, “Prediction. 8. For an overview, see “FAQ: People, Julian Simon’s Bet with Paul Ehrlich,” Overpopulation.com, at http://www.overpopulation.com/faq/People/julian_simon.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Risks | Arrow | Mause I 168 Risks/Insurance Markets/Information/Information Markets/Arrow: (1) Def Negative selection/adverse selection: is when an insurance company no longer offers certain insurance policies because the risks to be insured are too high. Example: Conscientious customers can also no longer acquire certain insurance policies, ultimately because of the behavior of other customers. >Insurance, >Information/Economic Theories, >Information Economics, >Adverse Selection. 1. K. J. Arrow, The economics of agency. In Principals and agents: The structure of business, Hrsg. John W. Pratt und Richard J. Zeckhauser, S. 37– 51. Boston 1985. |
EconArrow I Kenneth J. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Thinking | Surowiecki | I 15 Thinking/Problems Surowiecki: I divide problems here in three ways: 1. cognitive problems for which there is a solution, such as who wins the final or how many copies of a particular book are sold, e. g. how high the probability is that a certain drug will be approved by the drug authority. Perhaps there is not only one correct answer here, but we will be able to distinguish which answers are better than others. 2. coordination problems: this concerns the coordination of behaviour, e.g. in a market, when using the subway, when looking for an apartment, etc. How do buyers and sellers get together? 3. cooperation problems: how can cooperation be brought together despite mistrust and self-interest? For example, action against pollution, a general understanding of the appropriate level of wages and salaries. I 122 Coordination problems: it is not enough for an individual to find the solution for himself/herself, he/she must take into account what others think is right. (...) Rules have only a limited influence. Solutions must come from the bottom. I 288 Cognitive tasks/Surowiecki: the flow of information in companies should never be controlled by organisational charts. Wrong decisions become more likely the more the power is entrusted to a single person. Internal (information) markets are a possible instrument for solving such problems. >Information markets, >Information/Hayek. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
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