Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Anti-Realism | Putnam | VI 393 Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data). >Sense data, >Fact. Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. >Verification. N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent. >Bivalence, >Incorrigibility. Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. >Observation sentence, >Reference. Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. >Metaphyiscal realism. Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies. >Meta language, >Private language. --- I (d) 124 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again. I (d) 125 It can even define reference à la Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. I (e) 150 Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions. >Assertibility. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Assertibility | Wright | I 26ff It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T. This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker. >Asymmetry, >Equivalence, >Implication. I 26 Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation. >Negation, >Justification. Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here. I 51 Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility. >Truth, cf. >Redundancy theory. A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa. >Conventions, cf. >Language use, >Language community. --- Field II 120 Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper. Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either. I 52ff Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless. >Timelessness. I 68ff Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Cf. >Justified assertibility. Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless. Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is metaphysically neutral. I 81ff Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.) I 102f Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor. >Morals. I 115ff Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this. >Mathematics, >Truth, >Discourse. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Brains in a Vat | Putnam | VI 391 Brains in a vat/BIV/metaphysical realism/Putnam: brains in a vat is a part of metaphysical realism, not of internal realism. Then "verified" does not imply "true". >Internal realism, >Metaphysical realism. --- V 21f Brains in a vat/Reference/Putnam: the language of brains in the vat does not refer to anything in the outside world. There is no reference. They cannot even think "We are brains in a vat". V 77ff Bracketing/Putnam: parenthetical thoughts have no reference conditions that would make them true. Internalism: (existential questions only within a theory:) as brains in a vat we cannot think here that we are in the vat, except the bracketed sense. V 179 Brains in a vat/PutnamVsBrains in a vat: our worldview is coherent, because, taken as a whole, it includes an explanation of our activity of coping and developing a world theory. --- I (a) 21 Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat cannot refer to brains in a vat. Meanings are not in the head. I (f) 156f Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat is no problem for internalism, there are no possible worlds. Externalism: here it is possible that some brains are outside the vat. >Internalism, >Externalism. Realism: realism asserts extrinsic connections between signs and things that help explain the nature of the reference. PutnamVs: e.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of the word "electron" does not refer to these books. VsRealism: realism cannot determine the "right kind of causality". >Reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Capabilities | Nussbaum | Brocker I 895 Capabilities/Nussbaum: Nussbaum wants central human capabilities to be understood as specific political goals in the context of political order. As political goals, they stand beyond particular metaphysical justifications and can therefore be regarded as the basis of basic constitutional principles. In this way, capabilities can become the object of an "overarching consensus". ...the state is indeed obliged to enable each individual to exercise the basic capabilities, but the actual realization is left to each individual. Brocker I 896 Nussbaum basically focuses on the question of possibilities/skills instead of actual satisfaction.(1) Brocker I 901 Capabilities Approach/Nussbaum: its task is twofold: 1. to enable comparability of the quality of life of different people in different contexts; 2. to establish an overarching normative basis that allows core areas of human functioning to be determined and thus certain capabilities that must be guaranteed for every citizen in every nation in political contexts.(2) For problem see >Universalism/Nussbaum. VsNussbaum: Question: Doesn't Nussbaum introduce here an implicit reference to "human nature" that pushes her into the risky direction of metaphysical realism? >Human nature. NussbaumVsVs: Nussbaum does not assume a neutral observer who judges the facts of human life from an external perspective. Rather, she pleads for an internal reconstruction of knowledge about ourselves: We can only understand and comprehend ourselves from ourselves and against the background of shared experiences (cf. Pauer-Studer 1999, 10 f.).(3) Brocker I 902 It is crucial that the liberal basic principle of "each person as an end", aggravated by the "principle of each person's capability"(4), is recognised. The recognition of this principle is reflected in the fact that it is not certain lifestyles that are to be defined, but rather abilities and spheres of action that are to be guaranteed in order to allow people the free choice of how they perceive these possibilities. Functional abilities of the human being: See >Functions/Nussbaum. Brocker I 903 Nussbaum understands the capabilities approach as a theory of basic conditions, not as a full theory of justice. A complete theory would require a more clearly marked approach to determining the threshold level of capabilities.(5) >Justice theory, cf. >J. Rawls. Three categories of abilities/Nussbaum: a) basic capabilities, b) internal capabilities, c) combined capabilities. (Interaction with external conditions).(6) Cf. >Rights/Nussbaum. 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p, 12. 2. Ibid. p.71 3. H. Pauer-Studer 1999, »Einleitung«, in: Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 7-23., p.10f 4. Nussbaum ibid. p.74 5. ibid. p. 12 6. ibid. p.84 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Causal Theory of Reference | Putnam | VI 392 Causal Theory/reference/metaphysical realism: that all words could refer to something different is part of the theory of metaphyical realism and not internal realism. >Löwenheim. Internal RealismVsLöwenheim). >Internal realism/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Cognitivism/ Noncognitivism | Wright | I 261 Morality/ethics/McDowellVsNon-cognitivism: proceeds from a messy construction of ethical fact and objectivity. (Scylla). As if the moral facts existed independently of the evaluative standpoint.> Scylla: see >Necessity/Wright. >Metaphysical realism, >Facts, >Ethics, cf. >Emotivism, >Morality. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
Correspondence | Millikan | I 107 Correspondence/correspondence relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon. 2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides! 3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value. N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance). Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole). E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar. I 108 Transformation/sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair). Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations. I 307 Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways. Cf. >Picture theory. I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. >Representation. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked. >Reference, >Interpretation. Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers. Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself, E.g. COW Or by holding up a different sign, e.g. REFERS Or maybe CAUSES. Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know": The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head, ((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general"). PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer. >Intentionality. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Deflationism | Putnam | Williams II 502 Deflationism/Metaphysical RealismVsDeflationism/Putnam: the deflationism may not regard sounds as representations by virtue of a reference relation. It must represent meaning through assertibility conditions but conditions are no noise. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (although this picture is sympathetic): meaning is better in terms of appropriate use in the situation ((s) instead of community). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Doubts | Dewey | Suhr I 160 Error, doubt, ignorance: these are aspects of nature! They are not subjects! If nature had been completed, there would be no place for the mind. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism, >Mind, >Reality, >Errors, cf. >Skepticism. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
Internal Realism | Putnam | VI 389 Internal Realism/Putnam: internal realism is an empirical theory - collective spokesperson-behavior. In contrast, metaphysical realism is not empirical, but a model (like billiard balls). VI 400 Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is understood" cannot be discussed within the theory itself. Whether the theory has a clearly intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. Metaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism asks for a theory-independent fact in regards to what a term refers to within a theory. Internal Realism: our use of "cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. This works but only with a verificationist approach of understanding - not with a truth-conditional. Hence, the use is already explained. >Truthconditional semantics, >Verificationism, >Use. --- I (a) 18 Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a theory): here use and reference are linked. I (e) 151 Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: internal realism is related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification. >Anti-realism, >Justification, >Idealization. Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (f) 156ff Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theory-dependent. Truth: truth has rationalized acceptability. Brains in a vat are not a possible world, because they are only assessable from God's perspective. >Brains in a vat. Observation through a "different world" is excluded by definition. The internal realism recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme", within which objects exist. Internalism: "rabbit" refers just to rabbit. >Conceptual scheme, >Gavagai. I (f) 159 ExternalismVs: externalism does not tell us what reference is. Internalism: tautologies are sufficient for reference (> Meaning Postulates). Causality is irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to aliens. ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us by association with "not from this earth" and that is ultimately causally mediated. E.g. natural type: the natural type is the basic concept for future horses. I (f) 160 InternalismVs"of the same kind": "of the same kind" does not make sense outside of a category system. Everything is kind of the same kind. There are no extra facts that make true that horses are horses, there are just horses. >Natural kinds. VsInternalism: but in this way self-identifying objects are accepted (and the world arranges itself). Putnam: ultimately, there are self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist sense. Solution: objects are made and discovered. Then they have intrinsic labels (but they are not mind-independent). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Limits | Goodman | IV 180f Limit/Goodman: in principle there is no limit for lawlike connections. E.g. making true: making true concerns externalism. Metaphyical: a necessary link with a (possibly unknown) fact is metaphysical. >Metaphysics, >Truthmakers, >Facts, >Metaphysical realism. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
Metaphysics | Bigelow | I 275 Metaphysical Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: per metaphysical realism, which does not simply interpret the causal relation as a predicate, or a set of ordered pairs, but as a universal. >Metaphysical realism, >Universals, >Relations, >Predicates, >Sets, >Ordered pairs. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Objectivity | Maturana | I 22 Objectivity/knowledge/Maturana: knowledge, first personally, privately. - That allegedly transferable is only created by the listener (observer). >Observation, >System/Maturana, >Action. I 156 Def objectivity in parentheses/Maturana: should mean: everything that happens is brought forth by the observer in his life practise as the primary basis of experience and any explanation for this is secondary. >Experience/Maturana, >Explanation/Maturana. I 157 There are then as many areas of existence as there are kinds of distinction - leads to the multiverse - all verses are equally legitimate, although they are not all as pleasant. >Domains/Maturana. Objectivity without parentheses/MaturanaVs: demands unity and ultimately leads to reductionism - because it must define reality as a single, last valid area (independent existence). >Reality, >World, >World/Thinking, >Existence/Maturana, >Ontology. I 196 E.g. explanation by action, not by independent reality. Cf. >Manifestation. I 223 Objectivity without parentheses/Maturana: does not distinguish between illusion and perception, because it asuumes an independent reality. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. That contradicts the structural determinism of living systems. - It cannot explain scientific explanations because observers ability is presupposed. >Observation/Maturana, >Operation/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
Objectivity | Rorty | I 363 Objective/Rorty: ambiguous: a) a belief everyone would get; >Intersubjectivity. b) things as they really are. >Reality, >Metaphysical Realism. Subjective/Rorty: ambiguous: a) opposite of objective; >Subjectivity b) opposite of verdict. >Judgement. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Qualities | Esfeld | I 176 Secondary Qualities/Esfeld: in secondary qualities the answer-dependence refers not only to the acquisition, but also to the content. Acquisition: when something red, which was surrounded by darkness, comes to light, it will appear red. Contents: content is the contrast individuated by the inferential role. I 175 Def "Global response dependence" with respect to the acquisition of concepts: "Global response dependence" is (...) a necessary condition for the acquisition of the concept F, that something is F only if being F involves the disposition to appear...to the members. The careful phrase "includes" is meant to avoid implying that the property must be dispositional. This global response dependence is sufficient for a social theory of rule-following. Content/appearance: but the content need not say anything about F appear. The content is determined by the inferences. I 176 This blocks the step to noumenal realism. >Metaphysical realism, >Realism. Response dependence allows us to introduce a category of terms for secondary qualities: Def Terms for Secondary Qualities/Esfeld: Terms for secondary qualities are precisely those for which response dependence refers not only to acquisition but also to content. Ex It is part of the content of "comfortable" that persons appear comfortable. >Secondary qualities, >Primary qualities. Content/acquisition/conditions/response dependence/asfield: difference: not all things belonging to the extension have to be such that they really trigger the disposition to classify them as F (secondary quality). >Content, >Dispositions, >Behavior, >Meaning. We don't have to assume that our answers are enough to fix the extension! Ex things which are surrounded by darkness during their whole existence. Yet being red includes the disposition to appear red (if they were brought to light). Thus the content conditions are shifted to the acquisition conditions. Vs: One might object that this would merely allow us to know the effects that a thing has by appearing F to us. I 177 So we have no reason to infer nature. Esfeld: In fact, this can be understood as blocking epistemic access to the thing itself. Response dependence/appearance/Esfeld: Response dependence does not mean that F to appear involves a property in persons that mediates epistemic access. Response can be triggered very indirectly by sophisticated instruments. Response dependency/Esfeld: The biconditional sentence can be read in both directions: 1. from left to right: if something is F, then it appears so under normal conditions. 2. from right to left: If something appears so under normal conditions, then it is also F. Vs: The latter could compromise realism. >Appearance, >Appearance/Sellars. I 177/178 But that depends on how we understand circumstances (normal conditions). Circumstances/Esfeld: Circumstances are found out by judging our actions as correct or incorrect by sanctions. Thus we find out the conditions in which our dispositions to continue a given series converge. But we don't need to identify the normal conditions with the specific conditions under which we converge! Esfeld: We can figure out the conditions of our converging and thus determine the conceptual content, but at the same time view it as aiming at a determination of the conditions under which we have access to things as they are. ((s) Reversal.) Thus, this view of response dependence does not compromise realism. Truth is not determined by our practices! >World/thinking, >Practice. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
Realism | Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism. |
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Realism | Bigelow | I VII Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: pro scientific realism. Logic can also be understood best in this way. Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: a scientific realist should be a modal realist. ((s) I.e. he/she should assume the existence of possible worlds). >Modal realism, >Possible worlds. I 38 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is neutral in relation to reductionism. >>Reductionism. I 275 Metaphysical realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro metaphysical realism, which does not simply interpret the causal relation as a predicate, or as a set of ordered pairs, but as a universal. >Metaphysical realism, >Causal relation, >Ordered pairs, >Predicates, >Universals. I 341 Best explanation/BE/Bigelow/Pargetter: behind it are different kinds of realism. >Best explanation. I 342 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: many of his varieties are based on a best explanation. Since we are assuming there is something to explain in the explanation. Foundation/fundamental realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: a fundamental class of entities is assumed. These do not explain anything themselves, but provide the material to be explained. >Foundation, >Explanation. Vs: the raw material should be sensations (perception, experience). >Sensations, >Perception, >Experience, >Perception, >Experience, cf. >R. Carnap. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we start with it, we can reach the best explanation for any kind of realism by concluding. >Appearance. But it is not "realism about phenomena". Realism always accepts objects. BigelowVsTradition: erroneously assumes that we ourselves are in some way outside and not in the midst of reality. Realism/Explanation/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: not everything we assume to be real does contribute to explanations at all! ((s) For example redundancies and repetitions are not unreal, tautologies are not unreal either, nor boring stuff. So we cannot assume from the outset that reality is a valid explanation. Neither would we deny the existence of boring stuff.). >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also doubtful whether all things should explain appearances. I 343 Def direct realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we perceive objects "directly". I. e. without deducing their existence from anything fundamental by inference. There is some truth in it! (pro: Armstrong 1961(1), discussion in Jackson 1977b(2)). BigelowVsDirect realism: even if we could keep object and appearances apart through reflection, it would be questionable whether the material thing would be the better explanation! >Objects, cf. >Thing in itself. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: dealing with it is tricky. It seems as if we have to find out something about our inner states first. The normal case, however, is the extroverted perceiver. The situation of extroverted perception must also precede introverted reflection. >Perception, >Reflection. Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: nonetheless, if we are realists, we will understand material objects as the best explanation of our appearances (or perception). Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: now it shows that there is a hierarchy of two realisms ((s) a) direct, naive, b) reflected, by deduction from appearances) and how this hierarchy is destroyed in practice: we begin with a realism and come to the conclusion of the best explanation to the second realism, and these merge into one and the same reality. >Abduction. The hierarchical order does not remain in things, but becomes an extrinsic characteristic of their relation to us as perceivers. There is also a feedback: the inverse conclusion from the reflected realism on the unreflected. I 344 Holism/Bigelow/Pargetter: that leads to some kind of epistemic holism that we accept. It does not threaten realism. >Holism. Explanation/Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we accept realism on the basis of conclusions drawn from the best explanation, we must ask what kind of explanation is at issue. It can be about different kinds of (Aristotelian) causes (see above). The most convincing ones are certainly those that are concerned with "efficient" causes: e.g. Cartwright, Hacking: Realism/Cartwright/Hacking: is best supported by causal explanations. >Realism/Cartwright, >Realism/Hacking. Quine/Two Dogmas/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quine has caused many philosophers not only to sit in the armchair, but also to question the experiments that scientists have carried out in real. We reject that. >Two Dogmas, >W.V.O. Quine, >Experiments, >Science, >Certainty, >Method, >Measurements. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we also reject the other extreme, that realism would have to arise solely from causal explanations. >Causal explanation, >Causality. I 345 There may also be formal reasons (formal causes/Aristotle) for realism. >Aristotle. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also a legitimate question as to what constitutes modalities in science. Modal realism is the best explanation here for such matters. >Modal Realism. Metaphysics/Platonism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be supported by the Best Explanation: by inferences on the best explanation we show that we need modalities and universals in the sciences. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: their primary source is mathematics. Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: our metaphysics allows a realistic understanding of mathematics. (BigelowVsField). >Mathematics/Hartry Field, >Mathematical entities, >Platonism, >Universals. 1. Armstrong, D. M. (1961). Perception and the physical world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2. Jackson, F. (1977b) Perception. A representative theory. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Realism | Chisholm | I 12 Chisholm per extreme realism: there is an indefinite number of necessary things - even not-exemplified characteristics such as round-and square-be. >Round square, cf. >Metaphysical realism. II 24/5 Naive realism/Rutte: with the question: "does the object have the color also when we do not look", we do not mean that the object moves when we go out, but we ask with it whether it has the mode of appearance. ((s) And this question only makes sense if it is related to subjects.) Rutte: to speak of the mode of appearance of the object means as much as: the thing has this mode of appearance, even if nobody perceives it. Perception problem: consists not in the question whether we can perceive things as they are, but whether we have good reasons to conclude from our experiences to a causer of these experiences. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Realism | Field | I 249ff Truth/Realism/Field: does not want to claim truth as a metaphorical concept about the theory but instead the theory itself. The existence of mathematical entities follows from the theory itself, not from the truth of the theory (in the sense of correspondence theory). >Mathematical entities. --- II 120 Realism/Variant/Field: here: Thesis: "There are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a T-concept to generalize. > Infinite conjunction/disjunction. Anti-realism/variant: would be the opposite position here: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. >ideal justification. --- IV 405f Metaphysical Realism/Field: three game styles. Metaphysical realism 1: there are mind-independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: There is only one correct description (FieldVs) Metaphysical realism 3: correspondence theory. A refutation of metaphysical realism 3 is not yet one of metaphysical realism 1. IV 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Thesis: metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. >Relativism. This refutes itself. Dichotomy between evaluative (pseudo-facts, nonfactual) and non-evaluative facts. FieldVsPutnam/Field per relativism: we can refer the relativism to purely evaluative statements (not facts). Garfinkel: the relativism itself is no valuation. Internal Realism/Putnam: our standards of rationality are objectively correct. >Internal realism/Putnam. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Realism | Kant | Strawson V 230 Realism/KantVsLeibniz assumes truths about independent objects. Kant: we may only speak of terms instead. >Thing in itself/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant; ((s) Cf. >Semantic ascent/Quine). Stroud I 134 Realism/Kant: a) metaphysical realism: that things exist independently of us in the room - b) epistemic realism: contains something about our approach to things. Thesis: Perception: is directly and unproblematic - hence knowledge of external things (the outside world) is possible. Scandal/Kant: that the realism was never proved before. Stroud I 135 Moores hands/Kant/Stroud: Kant cannot complain that Moore would assume things only by belief itself. >Moore's hands. Stroud I 136 It is not about lack of generality. ((s) The proof is quite general (s.o. chapter 3). Stroud I 162 Def Transcendental Realism/Kant: understands the external things as something separate from the senses - KantVs: that leads to the empiricist idealism. Problem: we are aware of our representations but do not know whether they corresponds with something that exists. >Representations/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
Realism | Poundstone | I 124 Realism/Poincaré: "a reality that is independent from thr mind, which captures, sees or feels it is impossible". >Metaphysical realism, >Reality, >Consciousness independence, >Knowledge, >World/thinking. Poincaré: What we call reality is what is comon to sentient beings. >Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity. Poincaré believed that there were multiple realities. >H. Poincaré. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
Realism | Putnam | Rorty I 305ff Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty: an anti-realist understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct descriptions of a solid inventory, but he/she does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals. >Antirealism. PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. Internal realism: (according to Rorty): is a position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment". >Internal realism. Putnam: by means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. >Conventions. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language >Relativism. --- Putnam VI 389 Realism/Putnam: realism explains why theories tend to convergence. Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world. VI 395 f Realism/fact/Putnam: e.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points, that is, into smaller and smaller segments. Then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments. Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. "Hard core" realism: the "hard core" realism would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions. VI 398 Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - this is stated b Quine in ontological relativity. >Metaphysical realism, >Ontological rellativity. --- Putnam VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) it has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention. --- Putnam I (c) 78 Realism/Putnam: realism must left it inexplicable that e.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. What has prediction to do with truth then? I (c) 95 Realism: a realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory. >Junctions, >Connectives. I (g) 175f PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism faces infinitely many correspondences. There are endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. Problem: to choose the right correspondence, without a metaphysical access. ((s)> Loewenheim, >Unintended models. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Reality | Barrow | I 240 Reality/Quantum Mechanics/Einstein-Podolski-Rosen/EPR/BohrVsEPR: The EPR argument did not make an impression on Bohr because he did not accept their definition of "reality". He claimed that a distinction between reality and observed reality was meaningless. >Quantum mechanics, cf. >Copenhagen interpretation, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Measurement. I 241 Reality/Bohr/Barrow: thesis: there is no unobserved reality. - There are no laws of nature. Cf. >Metaphysical realism. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
Reality | Brandom | Rorty VI 190 Truth/reality/Brandom: believes, however, that (...) can be reconciled with the assertion that "the objects and the comprehensive world of facts are as they are, no matter what anyone believes!" RortyVsBrandom: that is incompatible with pragmatism. ((s): if that is compatible with Searle, Brandom's position is incoherent in itself.) >Pragmatism, >Truth, >World, >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Reality | Dummett | I 128 Reality/Realism/Dummett: It is useless to say that there is something we can not talk about. Cf. >Metaphysical realism. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Reality | Seel | Seel III 161 Reality/Seel: the fact that reality cannot be spoken of independently of its accessibility does not mean that there is no independent reality. If everything were only a function of our thinking and speaking, there would be no comprehensible thinking and speaking. We would have no sense of perspective. Therefore, there is no "disappearance of reality". That would only be possible if reality existed as something independent. VsMedia Theory. >Realism, >Metaphysical Realism, >Perspective, >Standpoint, >Media theory, >Media, >Understanding, >World/thinking, >World. |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
Reductionism | Putnam | V 193 Metaphysical Realism/subjectivism: metaphysical realism and subjectivism are, generally speaking, related. See e.g. cats/cats*, interpretation I/interpretation J in: Loewenheim/Putnam. >Löwenheim sentence/Putnam. V 194 If the interpretations are not equally correct, just because one is the correct reference, so this fact itself, seen from a physicalist point of view, is an inexplicable fact. This argument is also an argument. VsReductionism: because reference and truth are words that we cannot utter, without falling into contradictions. When I think "a cat is on the mat", I commit myself to the belief that "cat" refers to something (but not according to the metaphysical realism!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Reference | Putnam | VI 395 Theory of Reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: the theory of reference might refute that (but not a theory of meaning). >Metaphysical realism, >Meaning theory. --- III 52f Counterfactual Conditional/reference/representation/Fodor: thesis: the actual nature of reference is explained by means of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditional. Asymmetric dependence: cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things. III 54 Reference comes into being by causal attachment to the world, i.e. also through images and mockups. If does not come about by cats, then it does not come about by pictures of cats. III 56 Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". N.B.: this is ultimately dependent on real cats. III 57 Fodor: if pictures do not work as a trigger, then cats also do not work as a trigger (PutnamVs). III 61 Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x (FodorVs). That leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism. >Meaning holism, >Semantic holism. III 64 PutnamVs: e.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence, because there is no world with witches. However, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law (Armstrong: anyway vice versa). III 65 PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either. III 69 Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause. Otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior. But this is correct vice versa (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?). PutnamVs: that is interest-relative. III 78 Reference/PutnamVsFodor: reference cannot reduce them with the help of the terms "law", "counterfactual conditionals" or "causality". III 133 Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference, one speaks of individual sciences or everyday language causality. >Inscrutability of reference. III 140 Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. Fundamental physics cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory. III 208 Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. It is only subject to causal restrictions. --- V 75 Reference: thesis: input is shaped by concepts. There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. V 79 Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): problem: what actually is reference. Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. >Externalism. --- I (a) 34 Reference: if reference is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject. I (a) 35 Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed descriptions. Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent. I (b) 65 Reference: in logic: reference is that what corresponds to the description. Field: Field has shown that this does not fulfill the task. I (a) 67ff Primitive Reference/Putnam: e.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): these are, in fact, feelings of the beings themselves. This amounts to the causal theory of reference. When it is expanded to absent, past or future objects this is not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced. I (b) 69 Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic). That would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers. N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved. I (b) 70 Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. +> Gricean intention: Grice/Avramides, > Intentions. --- Rorty I 312 (According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this. --- Rorty IV 20 ff Rorty: Relation/Putnam: early: only the causal theory of reference (not the intentional one) can save us from relativism. --- Rorty VI 123 Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: VsDifferentiation "intrinsic"/"relational". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Relativism | Harman | II 426f Moral relativism/Harman: moral relativism corresponds to the >metaphysical realism: there is no place for purely normative facts in a world that consistently has a unique causal order. They are not localizable (Harman pro). Moral absolutism/Harman: moral absolutism is possible in the internal realism, because there is no single and unambiguous causal explanation and order. Then there is not the problem of localization (Putnam pro). >Absoluteness. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Representation | Rorty | I 162 Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions). >Judgements, >Sensory impressions. SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together. I 278f Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists. II (c) 76 Camps: Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality. >Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson. II (e) 112 PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation. >Pragmatism, >Correspondence theory. VI 45 Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism. >Realism. VI 51 R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense - VI 49 Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance. VI 54 Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.). >McDowell's Wittgenstein. RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii. >Kripke's Wittgenstein. VI 63 Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world - VI 71f Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs). DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.) >Judgment/McDowell. VI 107f Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former? VI 125 f RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us! >Metaphysical realism. VI 130 Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything. >Language/Rorty, >Language. VI 139 Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling. VI 140 Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation. Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Semantic Ascent | Soames | I 469f Semantic ascent/Quine/Soames: for generalization: instead of e.g. "there is a doppelganger of the sun, but we will never find evidence." - "There is a true sentence ...". This can transmit the same information, although not express the same thing. - >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Because sentences about sentences reflect truth about the world, provide semantic ascent with the T-predicate and therefore a means to compare conflicting metaphysical perspectives. >Metaphysics, >Truth predicate, >Metalanguage, >Content, >Reference, >Generality. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
Skepticism | Carnap | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Carnap: Thesis: we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if an appropriate sensation is possible for us - if we can determine the truth of the corresponding sentences. - Then we have to determine a sphere within which this is possible. Stroud I 173 Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: E.g. the sentence: "No one will ever know if __." Here the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because unverifiable - Meaningless: neither true nor false - then the question "Are there external things?" would be pointless, because neither true nor false. - Useful, however: internal questions: questions of existence within an area of knowledge. - Within an area of knowledge: the same sentence can be produced - i.e. the syntax is not decisive. - Sense: something that is true cannot contradict something that is meaningless. - CarnapVsSkepticsm: meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Stroud I 179 Descartes: has the same explanation for the truth of skepticism as Carnap for its futility: the lack of verifiability of empirical existence statements. >Existence statements. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSkepticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic frame (reference system) - Knowledge/Carnap: Two components: 1) Experience - 2) Linguistic frame (reference system), within which we understand the experience. Stroud I 188 The only theoretical question is that about the rules of the system. - Mother Tongue/Carnap: we do not choose it - therefore, it reflects no thesis about the existence of the outside world. - Decision: if we continue to use it. - Problem: because it is a decision there are no objective facts that make it. Stroud I 191 Skepticism/Reference System/StroudVsCarnap: introduces a "we" and experience as something that happens to us - The fact that we exist and have experience cannot just be regarded as an "internal" truth of the thing language. >exterior/interior. Stroud I 193ff StroudVsCarnap: either leads to idealism or to metaphysical realism or to skepticism all three of which he rejects - because of the futility of external questions. >External questions. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
States of Affairs | Brandom | I 690 State of Affairs/Brandom: facts and truth conditions are dependent on judgment and assertion - (VsMetaphysical Realism). >Facts, >Truth conditions, >Judgment, >Assertion. I 690 BrandomVsRepresentation: the facts cannot be understood before claiming or judgment - pro representation: contents have required a representational aspect - but representation is not fundamental. >Representation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Values | Singer | I 87 Values/Death/Killing/Utilitarianism/P. Singer: Assuming we could fix pain and pleasure as objective values, then we have another problem: there are two ways of reducing pleasure in the world, for example: a) Eliminating the pleasure out of a being's life b) To end the life of this being. This means that we cannot automatically move from the higher rating of a pleasant life over a less pleasant one to a higher rating of a pleasant life over the alternative that is not a life. Reason: when we are dead, we do not miss the pleasurable. >Death, >Life, >Morality, >Ethics, >Norms, >Pain, >Suffering. I 88 Utilitarianism: when it comes to the multiplication of pleasure in the world, why should we not have more and more children and breed more and more animals that have a pleasant life? This is what I call the "total view". >Utilitarianism. Vs: one could object that the life of the now existing beings would be restricted for this. And the beings who have not yet been born do not exist and therefore cannot suffer or do without anything. VsVs: on the other hand, one could assume a "prior existence" from the future beings. This means that our current decisions refer to beings that do not yet exist. >Future, >Decisions. I 89 Problem: in this case, one has to deal with asymmetry when deciding, for example, whether a child who is likely to suffer extremely badly and will soon die should be born. >Abortion. Problem: both perspectives, the "overall view" and the "pre-existence" viewpoint lead to contra-intuitive consequences. I 245 Values/Consciousness/knowledge/animals/Singer, P.: are there values beyond the reach of knowing beings? >Absoluteness, >Perspective, >Metaphysical realism. I 246 Intrinsic value: is a value that is desirable in itself, as opposed to a value that something receives as a means to something else. For example, luck is an intrinsic value, money is not. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Environmental destruction/Singer, P.: If a valley is now destroyed by dam construction, one must not only consider the fate of the knowing creatures, but also the fates of the other species, most of which will die. >Animals. I 247 Utilitarianism: will in this case include the fact that the animals that would have lived there would have done so for hundreds of years to come. Ethics/Singer, P.: how far can it be extended beyond the realm of knowing beings? The ethical position I have developed in this book (P. Singer 2011(1)) is limited to knowing beings. I 248 It is difficult to extend ethics beyond this area. Problem: the concept of interest is missing when it comes to weighing up. >Interest. Another problem: without the concept of knowledge, the boundary between animate and inanimate nature is more difficult to defend. >Knowledge, >Nature. I 249 Solving/Albert Schweitzer/Singer, P.: Life/Law/Consciousness/Schweitzer: the most immediate fact of consciousness is: I am life that wants to live and I want to exist in the midst of life that wants to live... and this extends to all life in my environment, even if it cannot express itself. (A. Schweitzer 1929(2)). I 250 P. SingerVsSchweitzer: his language is misleading when he speaks of all forms of life without exception and ascribes them longing, desire, enthusiasm, pleasure and terror. Plants cannot feel any of this. Holmes RolstonVsSinger, P.: If natural selection has given an organism the traits it needs to strive for its survival, then this organism is able to evaluate something on the basis of these traits. (H. Rolston 1999)(3) P. SingerVsRolston: he does not explain why natural selection makes it possible to evaluate organisms, but not human design and creation. Should we say that solar cells, which automatically adjust to the sun, add value to the sun? >Selection, >Evolution. Life without Consciousness/Singer, P.: there is no reason to pay more respect to the physical processes that dominate animated things than to the physical processes that dominate inanimate things. If that is the case, at least it is not obvious why we should have more respect for a tree than for a stalactite. >Laws of nature, >Nature, >Life. 1. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, 2011. 2. A. Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics Part II, The Philosophy of Civilization, London, 1929, pp. 246-7. 3. H. Rolston, Respect for Life: Counting what Singer Finds of no Account“, in: Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and Critics, (Oxford, 1999) pp. 247-268. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Absolutism | Harman Vs Absolutism | II 426 Truthfulness/Reason/Motive/Rationality/Harman: Thesis: Suppose a person has reasons to be truthful, then it must be possible to give a neutral assessment of their reasons in non-normative vocabulary that shows why this consideration is a reason for this person (for their truthfulness or honesty). It also seems to me that this is not always feasible. HarmanVsMoral Absolutism: hence the absolutist will fall back to a normative specification by saying the reason that it would be wrong for this person to lie or steal is that it would be wrong for this person. Harman: but that would not be a satisfactory answer. Moral Relativism/Metaphysical Realism/Putnam/Harman: Putnam sees rightly that there is a connection between the two. MR/Harman: because I believe that there is a clear causal order, all reasons for action ((s) motifs) must be localizable in this order. Normative Facts/Standard/Harman: I’m skeptical about facts that can be exclusively normatively specified. ((s) i.e. about which you could not say nothing physicalist or then they would be no facts). Important argument: Internal Realism/Moral Absolutism/Harman: an internal realist like Putnam who says that there is a clear causal order may allow purely normative facts which are not localized in nature. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Antirealism | Putnam Vs Antirealism | Putnam I131 VsAntirealism/Putnam: it could be argued: someone could reasonably make the possibly true statement: A; but it could have been the case that A, and our scientific development proceeds differently so ~A becomes part of the ideal theory accepted in the long run. In those circumstances A would be the case, but A would not be true. PutnamVs: the argument is faulty: the different "scientific development" here means choosing a different version. We cannot assume that the sentence A has a meaning regardless of the version that we accept. ((s) see above: but: Theory/PutnamVsKuhn: (among others): meaning does not change from theory to theory). Metaphysical realism is facing the same problem: he, too, has to accept that there are cases where the reference of a term depends on which theory is accepted. E.g. now his two theories can be true. Then someone might say: A; but it might have been the case that A, and our scientific development proceeds differently so that T2 is accepted. In this case, A would be the case, but A would not be true. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Benacerraf, P. | Field Vs Benacerraf, P. | I 24 VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself. I 25 Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities. I 26 Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I I understand Benacerraf). I 27 VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7). I 29 Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Carnap, R. | Stroud Vs Carnap, R. | I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Dummett, M. | Putnam Vs Dummett, M. | VI 394 Understanding/truth conditions/WB/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. PutnamVsWittgenstein, DummettVsWittgenstein. Cf. >Understanding/Wittgenstein. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible when reversed, what this knowledge should be. Meaning/Meaning Theory/PutnamVsDummett: I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (Through a theory of reference, not meaning theory). --- III 48/49 Proto-thoughts/PutnamVsDummett: terms for animals: dogs have just as little a preconception of meat, like gazelles have a preconception of running fast. ---- I (d) 124 Realism/anti-realism/PutnamVsDummett: Problem: We argue that the understanding of sentences would be knowing the truth conditions. But how can we say at all what this knowledge is? Putnam: We have seen that "mentalese" does not help. I (e) 151 Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to Dummett, but: truth is not identified according to him with justification, but with an idealization of justification. Putnam: Truth should be a property of statements that cannot get lost contrarily to the justification. Justification is also gradual as opposed to the truth. The "ideal justification" corresponds to the "frictionless surfaces" of physics. It has "pure value". Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification, Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (e) 152 Truth is independent of justification here and now, but not of any justification. (> Assertibility). Like Quine: the conditions of justification change with the development of our corpus of knowledge. ---- I (f) 161 Truth/justification/PutnamVsDummett: to reject the divine point of view, does not mean to identify truth with rational acceptability as Dummett says that we should do it. Truth: cannot get lost. Justification: can very well do this. E.g. "The earth is a disk." E.g. also that it is a ball, is not a "gradual truth" but it is gradually justified. Truth/Putnam: an idealization of rational acceptability. (Under epistemically ideal conditions). I (f) 162 Truth/Putnam: 1. independent of the justification here and now, but not independent of any justification. 2. supposed to be stable and convergent. --- I (h) 214 Truth/Dummett: (1976, 1991) is justification. PutnamVsDummett: 1. this is misleading in many ways, it is likely that one cannot specify the conditions of the justification for the sentences of a natural language. (But Dummett believes that). 2. Dummett believes in a final verification, I only in an idealized one (based on the current evidence, so context-sensitive). Assertibility conditions/PutnamVsDummett: are not manageable for an arbitrary sentence. How do we learn them? By appropriating a practice. But this is not an algorithm (how reductionist philosophers believe). I (h) 215 The assertibility conditions cannot be formalized and therefore not the human rationality. ((s) They may well be independent of situations, but not of our entire practice.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Esfeld, M. | Putnam Vs Esfeld, M. | I (c) 93 Esfeld: Thesis: meaning (and conceptual content) are identical with factual use in a community. They are determined by normative attitudes that the members take to each other. Standards/Normative Attitudes: are themselves subject to an evaluation as correct or incorrect, and not reducible to social facts and do not supervene on them. Correct/Correctness/Objectivity/Esfeld: depends on the way the world is made. (PutnamVsEsfeld: there is not a ready-made world; >metaphysical realism. (s) The world that is also shaped by us. But: (I (f) 161): Esfeld: the world is independent of our practices. III 80/81 Putnam: Those who, like myself, deny that there is a ready-made world do not yet claim that we are inventing the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 |
Externalism | Putnam Vs Externalism | V 75 Putnam: per internalism. (Coherence) VsCorrespondence. Thesis: it is about compliance with our belief system, not with mental independent or speech independent "issues". (Metaphysical realism). --- V 76 Brains in a Vat/BIV/internalism/Putnam: the whole problem will be solved when you look at it from internalism. From whose point of view is the story actually told? Obviously not from the viewpoint of the sentient beings in this world. Externalism (PutnamVs): viewed from here, the problem cannot be so easily solved. --- V 77 Nevertheless: if we are really brains in a vat, we cannot think that we are, except in the bracketed sense, and this bracketed thought does not have reference conditions that would make it true. So it is not possible here that we are brains in a vat. Magical theory of reference: we would have to presuppose "noetic rays" or "self-identifying objects", and the realism does not want that, of course. --- V 78 Externalism: popular answer today: although there is no sign that corresponds necessarily with certain things, there are contextual (causal) connections. PutnamVs. E.g. "Electron" is contextually related to textbooks, but it does not refer to textbooks. The externalism will respond that this was no causal chain of the appropriate type. PutnamVs: but how can we have intentions that determine which causal chains are "appropriate", if we do not already refer to something? Internalism: here the situation is quite different: characters are used within the conceptual scheme of a community. Objects and characters are equally internal elements of the scheme, so it is possible to specify what corresponds to what. (> conceptual scheme). Within a language, it is trivial, what "rabbit" refers to: to rabbits, of course. --- V 79 Externalism: is of course also of the opinion that "rabbit" refers to rabbits, and "alien" to an element of the set of aliens. But this is no information for him what reference is. For him, it is a problem to find out what reference actually is. PutnamVsExternalism: the idea that a causal connection is necessary, is refuted by the fact that "alien" certainly refers to aliens no matter if we have ever been interrelated with them or not. Yes, even in such simple words as "horse" or "rabbit" the externalist could have noted that the extension includes many things with which we are not causally related (E.g. future horses or rabbits that live in the deep forest and have not seen a human yet). --- I (f) 158 PutnamVsExternal Realism/VsExternalism: E.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of "electron" does not refer to textbooks. RealismVs: this is not the "correct causal chain". VsRealism: but how could we have intentions that determine which causal chains: are of the right kind, if we were not already be able to refer? I (f) 160 InternalismVsExternalism: "of the same kind" does not make sense outside the category system. In some respects, finally everything is "of the same kind" as anything else. The whole apparatus of "correct causal chains and facts that make that future horses belong to the same kind" as the "with whom I have interacted" are far too complicated. There are simply horses. (Metaphysical position). InternalismVsExternalism: in a certain sense, the world is actually made of "self-identifying objects" but not in a sense that is accessible to the externalists. If "objects" are made as discovered, as well as products of our conceptual invention as the "objective" factor in the experience, then objects belong intrinsically to certain labels. I (f) 161 Because these labels were initially our tools to construct a version of the world with such objects. But this kind of "self-identifying objects" is not mentally independent. Realism/externalism: wants to imagine a world of objects that are at the same time mentally independent and self-identifying. Internalism/VsExternalism: one cannot do that. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Field, H. | Putnam Vs Field, H. | Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Harman, G. | Putnam Vs Harman, G. | Harman II 421 Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world. Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world. Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues. PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions: 1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented) 2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic). Harmans II 428 Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as >consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. Harman II 434 Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance. Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation". Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd. Harman II 435 Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, Harman II 436 or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged. Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values. Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument). Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman). Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism. Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order. Harman II 437 PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*? Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words. David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ... |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Internal Realism | Horwich Vs Internal Realism | Horwich I 399 Internal Realism/Putnam: why is internal realism not refuted by all this? VsInternal Realism: e.g. he might ask, "How do you know that 'cow' refers to cows?" After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: e.g. suppose God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be an infinite number of possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the phrase "cow refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then that in this sense of "true" it is true that there is an unambiguous "intended" interpretation? How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a particular set of things as opposed to a particular set of things in any accessible interpretation? Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the opposite direction. Reference/Internal RealismVsVs: the fact that "cow" refers to cows follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism was wrong! Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. Unrevisability: it is not absolutely unrevisable, however, that "cow" refers to cows, but in order to revise it you would have to overthrow the entire theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: that does not answer the question: "'cow' refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Metaphysical Realism | Maturana Vs Metaphysical Realism | I 223 Objectivity without Brackets/Maturana: neglects the distinction between perception and illusion. Here the observer cannot explain language and perception, because according to this perspective he can refer to the independent. However, this contradicts the structural determinism of living systems. Cannot explain scientific explanations, because here the abilities of the observer are presupposed as general and given. ((s) MaturanaVsMetaphysical Realism). |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
Metaphysical Realism | Putnam Vs Metaphysical Realism | VI 390 Truth/metaphysical realism/Putnam: thesis: truth is not radically epistemic. Because we could all be brains in a vat, even the most beautiful and most ideal, simplest and most conservative theory could be wrong. Verification/metaphysical realism: then "verified" implies not "true". Peircean Realism/Putnam: thesis: there is an ideal theory (weaker: than a regulative idea that is presupposed by the terms "true" and "objective"). PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: I criticize precisely the characteristic that distinguishes it from Peirce's realism. E.g. T1: is an ideal theory as we understand it. We imagine that it has any property except for objective truth; e.g. it is complete, consistent, predicts observations accurately (as we see and meets all "operational restrictions", it is "beautiful", "simple", etc. Putnam: thesis: T1 may still be wrong. E.g. WORLD/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Suppose, it can be divided into an infinite number of parts. And T1 says that there are infinitely many parts in it, so that it is "objectively correct" in this regard. T1: is consistent (by hypothesis) and has only finite models. Completeness Theorem: according to it, T1 has a model for every infinite cardinality. M: is a model with the same cardinality as the WORLD. (This is finite.) The particulars of M are mapped one to one to the parts of the WORLD. We use this mapping to define the relations of M directly in the WORLD. SAT: is then the result of it: a fulfillment relationship, a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of parts of the WORLD. ((s) sets because of the predicates). Truth: the theory results then in "true" when we interpret "true" as "TRUE(SAT)". (I 403 thereby SAT is of the same logical type as "satisfied" and TRUE(SAT) is defined in terms of SAT like "true" is defined in terms of "satisfied" with Tarski). VI 391 TRUE(SAT): is then the property of the truth, determined by the relation SAT. ideal theory: Question: what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory could be wrong" in reality"? Solution: It may be that SAT is not the intended correspondence relation (unintended model). "Intended"/Putnam: what does it mean in this case? T1 meets all operational limitations. E.g. if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" belongs to T1, VI 392 then that will naturally appear true when there is a cow in front of me. But SAT is a true interpretation of T. Definition operational conditions/Putnam/(s): that a sentence can be falsified if the object does not have the properties that the sentence attributes to it. T1 is TRUE(SAT). Thus, the sentence is "true" in this sense, in the sense of TRUE(SAT). On the other hand: if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" is operationally "wrong" (falsified), then the sentence is FALSE(/ SAT). Reference: thus, it meets the "operational conditions". theoretical conditions: the interpretation of "reference" as SAT meets all theoretical conditions for reference. N.B.: so the "ideal" theory T1 becomes true. ((s) Problem: We wanted to ask how it can be wrong according to the metaphysical realism). unintended: question: what additional conditions are there for reference, that could SAT pick out as "unintended" and a different interpretation as intended? Putnam: thesis, the assumption that even an "ideal" theory could be wrong "in reality", should then be incomprehensible. Causal theory/reference/metaphysical realism/Putnam: a causal theory of reference would not help here, because how "cause" should clearly refer, is, according to the metaphysical realism, as much a mystery as "cow" can clearly refer. VI 393 Reference/anti-realism/verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/anti-realism/Dummett: thesis, the theory of understanding should be operated in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (for example, sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses truth-conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence is to know what would be its verification. Analogy: for the intuitionism: knowing the constructive proof, is to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility condition/assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam. N.B.: we say the sentence is verified when it is pronounced > Firth: Definition self-affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirmative. It is thus verified when it is pronounced. This does not mean that it is incorrigible. It also does not have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: thesis: in this sense (the "self-affirmation of observation sentences" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". VI 394 N.B.: thereby, the realistic terms of truth and falsity are not used. N.B.: the problem how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise. Because the term "reference" is not used. Reference: can we introduce it à la Tarski, but then ""cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and understanding this sentence needs no metaphysical realism. Facts/verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: one should not operate the verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither the one of sense data). Otherwise you could repeat all objections VsMetaphysical Realism on the level that the meta language gets incomprehensible (which would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein's private language argument). (?). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply the verificationism also in the meta language and the meta-meta language etc. Understanding/truth condition/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible vice-versa in what this knowledge should be. Meaning/meaning theory/PutnamVsDummett: but I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (with a theory of reference, not meaning theory). Realism/Putnam: then it is not wrong per se, but only the metaphysical, which was just a picture anyway. (So you could say at least). Solution: Internal realism is all we need. Problem: that is not the whole story: Peirce: the metaphysical realism collapses at a certain point, and this point tells us something, because it is precisely this point at which the metaphysical realism claims to be distinguishable from Peirce's realism . (That is, from the proposition that there is an ideal theory). PeirceVsMetaphysical realism/PutnamVsPeirce: is mistaken when he says that the metaphysical realism collapses at this exact spot. And I, myself, was already wrong in this point. > E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism/PutnamVsPeirce: the metaphysical realism is incoherent elsewhere: E.g. Suppose, the WORLD is merely a straight line. Then you can tell 2 stories about the WORLD: Story 1: there are points. That is, the line has segments which can be infinitely small. The same relation "part of" is valid between points and segments that contain it VI 396 and between segments and large segments. Story 2: there are no points. Line and all segments have expansion. Thus, it is not claimed that story 1 would be wrong, points are simple logical constructions of segments. Speech about points is derived from speech about segments. VI 397 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Problem: when you cannot say how the WORLD theory is independent, the speech of all these descriptions will be empty. Putnam: Quine says that in "Ontological Relativity". E.g. Theory: if we have a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation (AER): "provable co-extensiveness", with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes (Aeki), no model of the theory refers to the referent, while, if they belong to the same equivalence class, they have the same referent in each model. We take advantage of that. Now, if our view is correct, VI 399 then there is a unique reference maintaining "translation", which connects the two languages. Problem: it is known that there are often not equivalent interpretations of a theory within another theory. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2, namely in many different ways. E.g. "points" can be understood as sets of segments with negative power of two. Or sets of segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3. VsMetaphysical Realism/problem: if that was so, there ought to be a fact about which translation "really" contains the reference. Putnam: now we can make the picture again more complicated in order to also address the second objection: we allow that the language has more than one way, how it can be applied to the WORLD. (> way of use). Problem: we can no longer hold onto the image itself. If that, what is a unique set of things within a correct theory, could be "in reality" no definite set, then we have no picture anymore. Internal realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all of these? VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "how do you know that "cow" refers to cows"? After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: E.g. Suppose, God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be infinitely many possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the sentence ""cow" refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then, that it is true in this sense of "true" that there is a unique "intended" interpretation? "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a certain set of things as opposed to a certain set of things in each accessible interpretation?" Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the reverse direction. Reference/internal RealismVsVs: that "cow" refers to cows, follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism would be wrong. Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. not revisable: but it is not absolutely unrevisable that "cow" refers to cows, but to revise it you would have to reject the whole theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: The question is therefore not answered: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. VI 401 Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism/Putnam: the metaphysical realism makes it a mystery how there can be truths a priori, even in the contextual sense, even as a limiting case. An a priori truth must be given by a mysterious intuition. Even E.g. "bachelors are unmarried" would only be a priori due to an intuition. But if it is a "verbal" truth ((s)> "analytical", true because of the meaning of the words) then this is an abbreviation for E.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried. And that is an instance of "all AB are A". And why is that true? VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism is doomed to a) consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believed, myself) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or b) he must see the logic as a priori in the sense, which cannot be explained by the term of convention. --- Field IV 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (Reason, Truth and History pp 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and the relativism refutes itself. --- VII 440 Theory Change/truth value/Putnam: not every sentence changes the truth value when it changes from an acceptable theory in another acceptable theory. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: but to set off an image, it suffices to show that his project of a complete description of the world without such sentences that change truth values, is impracticable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Metaphysical Realism | Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism | Millikan I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified. Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously. Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex COW Or by holding up another sign e.g. REFERENCES Or maybe CAUSES. To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning: The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head, ((s)> the "overarching general"/Leibniz). PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Phenomenalism | Dummett Vs Phenomenalism | Brandom I 429 Dummett: problem of "recognition transcendence": distinguishing three things: 1. What should be considered phenomenalistically (objects, mental activity, semantic properties, the past, etc.) 2. To which considering-to-be or attribution the talk about such things should supervene, 3. how this supervenience relation is to be fully understood. For each phenomenalistic assertion there is now a class of assertions that are realistic, in the sense that they deny the phenomenalistic "there is nothing but« analysis. (DummettVsPhenomenalism). Horwich I 393 Reference/Anti-Realism/Verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/Anti-Realism/Dummett: Thesis: the Theory of Understanding should be pursued in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (E.g. sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses the truth conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence means knowing what its verification would be. Analogy: for intuitionism: knowing the constructive evidence means to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility Condition/Assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam: Important Argument: we say the that sentence is verified by being pronounced! > Firth: Def Self-Affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirming. It is verified by being pronounced. ((s) In such and such circumstances). That does not mean that it is incorrigible! Neither does it have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: Thesis: in this sense (of the "self-affirmation of observation statements" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". I 394 Important Argument: The realistic terms of truth and falsity are not needed for this! Important Argument: the problem of how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise! Because the term "reference" is not needed. Reference: we can introduce it à la Tarski, but then "cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and the understanding of this sentence does not need a metaphysical realism. Facts/Verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: you should not use verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither of sense data). Otherwise all objections VsMetaphysicAL Realism could be repeated at the level that the MS becomes incomprehensible (this would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s private language argument). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply verificationism also in the metalanguage and the meta-metalanguage, etc. (1) 1. Hilary Putnam, “Realism and Reason”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1976, pp. 483-98, in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Putnam, H. | Hacking Vs Putnam, H. | I40 Truth/Reason/Putnam: are very closely connected. HackingVsPutnam. I 148 Meaning/Science/HackingVsPutnam: we should talk about types of objects, not about types of meaning. Meaning is not a very good concept for philosophy of science. I 156 HackingVsPutnam: Reference is ultimately not decisive! (E.g. muon). For physicists, "Meson" was initially synonymous with "whatever corresponds to the presumption of Yukawa". That’s something like Fregean sense. When it became clear that this sense did not correspond to the object, the baptism was annulled and a new name was given. I 163 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Vs idea of "fixed whole of mind-independent objects". HackingVsPutnam: nobody has never represented this!. I 164 HackingVsPutnam: links his different theses, as if they were logically connected. They are not!. HackingVsPutnam: he used to represent a scientific realism. He has not changed party, he has changed war. I 179 HackingVsPutnam: however, actually he has shown nothing but the failure of the reference by naming a number of true statements, which are brought into being in the first-order logic (>Löwenheim, >AustinVsMoore). I 181 Löwenheim-Skolem/Premises/Hacking: 1) the sentence is only about the first-order logic sentences. So far, no one has proved that the language of the physicists could be pressed in this context. Spoken languages contain indicators: "this" and "that". Montague thesis: colloquial language primarily uses second-order quantifiers. Wittgenstein’s arguments against showing, according to which it was not possible to fully specify meaning using rules, do not imply that there was something in our linguistic practice, which is essential undetermined. Löwenheim and Skolem spoke about large numbers and we can only talk about them. About cats or cherries we can do more than merely talk. Putnam asserts that it is possible to reinterpret words such as "designate" and "refer" in turn. HackingVsPutnam: I do not need theory of reference to refer. And it’s a - possibly with reference to Wittgenstein - at least defensible conception that there cannot be a general theory of reference. I 182 scientific articles on muons are full of photographs! - E.g. muons: it has been found that the mass of the muon is 206,786 times the mass of the electron. How have we found out this figure at the time?. I 183 From a whole bunch of complicated calculations with a bunch of variables and a number of relations between nature constants. These consist not only of sentences, but are linked to experimental findings. They also have been found by independent scientists and laboratories. I 184 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is not constructive. I.e. in principle there is no method for producing a non-intended interpretation available to man. - E.g. we also speak of "Persian" and "Heart Cherry". These species names do not act like ordinary adjectives of the type "sweet", because sweet heart cherries are sweet fruits and not "heart fruit". - Solution: This is not possible or would be noticed, because the number of subspecies is not the same: the number of cherry species is different from the number of cat species. So no correspondence relation will preserve the structure of the species names. Moreover, you would not bake a cake with cats! How should cherry facts come to light in the cat world?. I 185 Putnam perhaps commits the gravest error possible in philosophy: he takes a sentence as an example that was perhaps never uttered and would be pointless outside logic. The next step is then to assert that just as it is possible to reinterpret "cherries" it is possible to reinterpret "designating". Reference: its warranty does not depend primarily on the expression of true propositions, but on our interactions with the world. Even at the level of the language there is far more structure given than Putnam involves. I 220 HackingVsPutnam: transcendental Nominalist (anti-realist). It is not possible to step out of the system of thought and retain a base of reference that does not belong to one’s own system of reference. HackingVsPutnam: misguided dichotomy of thought and action (like Dewey). Hacking Thesis: man is a representing being. (A tribe without images is not a human tribe for me). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Reductionism | Putnam Vs Reductionism | V 193 Metaphysical realism/subjectivism: the two are, generally speaking, related. See E.g. Cats/Cats*, interpretation I/ interpretation J in: Löwenheim/Putnam. --- V 194 If the interpretations are not equally correct, just because one is the correct reference, so this fact itself, seen from a physicalist point of view, is an inexplicable fact. This argument is also an argument. VsReductionism: because reference and truth are words that we cannot utter, without falling into contradictions. When I think "a cat is on the mat," I commit myself to the belief that "cat" refers to something. (But not according to the metaphysical realism!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Rorty, R. | Putnam Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 178 Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards. Putnam I (a) 21 Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate. PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God. Putnam I (h) 204/205 PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever. Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is! Putnam I (i) 239 Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists. I (i) 240. Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant. I (i) 242 justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy. By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case! RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"". PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind? I (i) 242/243 A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language! Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself. Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors. Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement". I (i) 243/244 As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.) PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent! Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not. Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse. normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture. hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements. I (i) 244/245 PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936). If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image? PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it! Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God. Rorty VI 79 Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Skepticism | Field Vs Skepticism | IV 418 Epistemic Relativism/Field: here, equally good proof systems may differ in their evaluation of convictions. Perhaps there is no best proof system. There are three main tasks: 1) a spectrum of variation must be demonstrated by proof systems, 2) a variation range of intuitively desirable goals 3) (most importantly): ER must evaluate how different proof systems can fulfill different goals. This cannot be done from a neutral point of view. Important argument: the assertion that one proof system is better than another is a factual assertion, and in that, of course, we use the proof system that we normally use. This has led some people to a skepticism that no assertion is ever really justified. Relativism: for him, the question of a "real" justification does not make sense anyway. IV 419 Relativism/FieldVsSkepticism: precisely relativism provides a refutation of skepticism! PutnamVsEpistemic Relativism/Field: three arguments: 1) (p 136): (premise): there are no facts that are independent of values. And that is only of interest if we are VsMetaphysical Realism before. 2) (p 119f): it seems inconsistent to simultaneously represent one point and another that seems to be equally good. FieldVsPutnam: a relativist who is not simultaneously a Protagorean (>Protagoras) should not assume that all points of view are equally good! Some are true, some are false, some are reliable, others are not, etc. 3) (Putnam p 121f): (refers to the inability to distinguish relativism of justification from that of the truth: If statements of the form "X is true (justified) relative to person P" themselves are absolutely true or justified, then this is ultimately an absolute concept of truth (justification). FieldVsPutnam: but precisely that does not apply to justification: the above only shows that statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false, and since truth is factual, not evaluative, for the metaphys.r., this is unproblematic for the MR. FieldVsPutnam: his attempt to refute epistemic relativism fails. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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metaphys. Realism | Pro | Horwich I 421 metaphysical realism: Harman per -PutnamVs. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Causal Explanation | Pro | Horwich I 436 Harman: World has a clear causal order - Harman per metaphysical realism - Harman per moral relativism (due to metaphys realism.) - PutnamVs |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Realism | Field, Hartry | Horwich I 405 Metaphysical Realism / / Field: three theses, not separated by Putnam. 1 MR1: the world consists of a set of mental-independent objects. 2 mR2: there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. I 406 3 mR3/Field: truth involvea a kind of correspondence theory between words and external objects. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Morality | Harman, G. | Horwich I 421 Moral / Putnam: we can and must assume that there is a non-relative moral truth. HarmanVsPutnam: of which I am fascinated but not persuaded. I still feel attracted by metaphysical realism. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Redundancy | Harman, G. | Horwich I 430 Redundancy theory / metaphysical realism / Field: thesis: one can be a metaphysical realist and at the same time accept the redundancy theory. One can be a m.r. and still not accept the correspondence theory. Redundancy theory: truth is not a property. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Correspondence Th. | Putnam, H. | Horwich I 389 Correspondence/Putnam: (Reference and Understanding, 1976): Thesis: Correspondence between words and sets of objects can be understood as part of an explanatory model for collective speaker behavior. (formally as fulfillment relation). Put V 75 Putnam: Pro internalism. (Coherence) VsCorrespondence! Thesis: it concerns agreement with our belief system, not with mind-independent or speech-independent "state of affairs". (Metaphysical Realism). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Realism | Putnam, H. | Horwich I 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: ( II pp. 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis: metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and this relativism refutes itself. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Realism | Stroud, B. | I 151 Metaphysical Realism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that there are things that are independent of us proves to be empirically true. Because of the empirical distinction between independent things (stones) and things dependent on us (dreams). B. (empirical epistemic realism). "Independent"/epistemic/Kant/Stroud: the same can be said about the epistemic aspect: e.g. we distinguish in the experience between things we perceive directly (e.g. in daylight at medium distance) and those we perceive indirectly (e.g. via mirror or screen). I 152 Solution (see below): even here there is a single distinction: the concept of "direct" perception should then not itself be understood as "empirical". The thesis of empirical realism is then itself a -"transcendental" thesis. Solution/Kant/Stroud: if he uses the words "dependently", "independently" and "transcendental", he is an idealist. Transcendental/Stroud: a transcendental thesis cannot be empirically confirmed or refuted. ...I 163 StroudVsKant: this seems to be the thesis of the "epistemic priority" again: |
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