Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | Dennett | Rorty VI 161 Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. Dennett I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. Dennett II 23ff Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >Thinking without language. Rosenthal I 430 Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory! Metzinger I 475 Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. Metzinger I 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block. Chalmers I 113 Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory, I 114 control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model. Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter". ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience. Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3) Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all. Chalmers I 229 Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Rosenthal I David M. Rosenthal "Multiple drafts and the facts of matter" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Block | II 458 Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept) Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness. Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious. II 524 Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request. This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control. II 530 Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. (s) part or basis as a counterpart). II 531 Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points. II 535 Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering 2) is available for rational control of actions 3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious). p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck. Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other. Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action. p-consciousness/Block: not functional! Sensations. a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes". Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain. Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness. II 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) Cultural construct! 2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects. BlockVsDennett: Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product. Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept. Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Pain | Block | II 572 Pain/Hypnosis/Block: What reason is there to think that there is pain under hypnosis at all? Some authors assume a "hidden observer" (part of the person). II 574 Pain/Anesthesia/Block: There is a difference between whether a patient receives a general anesthesia or a local anesthesia, a local anesthetic. In the case of local anesthesia, he cannot remember any pain, regardless of whether the local anesthetic was performed alone or together with a general anesthesia. This is avoided by intravenously administered valium. After an anesthesia, he can "recall" the pain Block: the agonizing notion is that this is a case of p-consciousness without a-consciousness. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Thinking | Block | II 547 Thoughts of Higher Order/Block: the thoughts of higher order must be obtained in a non-observing and non-inferential way. Otherwise recourse: I learn from my anger that I draw conclusions from my observed behavior. ((s) >Wittgenstein: "I only have my signs"). Metzinger II 575 Thinking/Block: Much of our thinking is neither p-conscious nor z-conscious! II 458 Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact z means that the information is available for rational inference. (Functional concept). p-consciousness: phenomenal consciousness. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block, Ned | Burge Vs Block, Ned | II 583 Burge pro Block: pro distinction P-consciousness (phenomenal) - a-consciousness (access consciousness, rational control). BurgeVsBlock: 1) a-consciousness presupposes p-consciousness. 2) Access conscious states, even events themselves must not be phenomenally conscious. 3) It is possible to have phenomenal states or events with phenomenal qualities, of which one is not conscious. So phenomenal qualities do not guarantee a phenomenal consciousness, for that they need to be perceived by a subject. II 588 BurgeVsBlock: what makes rational access conscious states conscious are not primarily their representational aspects. Nor is access-consciousness is a functional concept. No concept of consciousness is a purely functional concept. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Block, Ned | Searle Vs Block, Ned | Metzinger II 561 SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the meaning of a-conscious. Searle: A total zombie can have no consciousness at all. ((s) a-conscious/Block: access-conscious, >p-consious: phenomenal consciousness. BlockVsSearle: he packs p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference whether Armstrong's truck driver does not notice what is going on, or if he avoids accidents.) He also tried to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality, these are degrees of a-consciousness. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Searle, J.R. | Block Vs Searle, J.R. | II 560 SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the definition of a-consiousness. Searle: A total zombie can have absolutely no consciousness. II 561 BlockVsSearle: he puts p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference between whether E.g. Armstrong truck driver notices nothing, or whether he avoids accidents.) Also, he tries to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality they are degrees of a-consciousness. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: question: E.g. why the thirsty Blindsight patient does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That’s right. But it’s a mistake to move from one function of the machinery of the a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: drawing the premature conclusion that p-consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is absent (without being clear what kind of consciousness it is). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | Block, Ned | Metzinger II 458 Consciousness/Block: Thesis: is a mixed term of "Phenomenal Consciousness" (P-Consciousness/Terminology) and "Access Consciousness" (Z-Consciousness). II 523 Consciousness/Block: Thesis: Consciousness is a mixed term of Phenomenal Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness. II 566 Block: Thesis: Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness interact: moving something from the periphery to the center can affect one's own phenomenal state. |
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