Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Consciousness Dennett Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today.
Dennett II 23ff
Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >Thinking without language.
Rosenthal I 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
Metzinger I 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.
Metzinger I 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block.
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,
I 114
control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all.
Chalmers I 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Rosenthal I
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Consciousness Block II 458
Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept)
Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness.
Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious.
II 524
Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request.       This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control.
II 530
Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. (s) part or basis as a counterpart).
II 531
Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points.
II 535
Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering
2) is available for rational control of actions
3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious).
      p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck.
Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other.
Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action.
p-consciousness/Block: not functional! Sensations.
a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes".
Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain.
Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness.
II 555
Consciousness/Dennett:
1) Cultural construct!
2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects.
BlockVsDennett:
Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product.
Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept.
Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one.
II 568
Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness.
     Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness).

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Pain Block II 572
Pain/Hypnosis/Block: What reason is there to think that there is pain under hypnosis at all? Some authors assume a "hidden observer" (part of the person).
II 574
Pain/Anesthesia/Block: There is a difference between whether a patient receives a general anesthesia or a local anesthesia, a local anesthetic. In the case of local anesthesia, he cannot remember any pain, regardless of whether the local anesthetic was performed alone or together with a general anesthesia. This is avoided by intravenously administered valium.
After an anesthesia, he can "recall" the pain
      Block: the agonizing notion is that this is a case of p-consciousness without
a-consciousness.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Thinking Block II 547
Thoughts of Higher Order/Block: the thoughts of higher order must be obtained in a non-observing and non-inferential way. Otherwise recourse: I learn from my anger that I draw conclusions from my observed behavior. ((s) >Wittgenstein: "I only have my signs").
Metzinger II 575
Thinking/Block: Much of our thinking is neither p-conscious nor z-conscious!
II 458
Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact z means that the information is available for rational inference. (Functional concept). p-consciousness: phenomenal consciousness.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Block, Ned Burge Vs Block, Ned II 583
Burge pro Block: pro distinction P-consciousness (phenomenal) - a-consciousness (access consciousness, rational control). BurgeVsBlock: 1) a-consciousness presupposes p-consciousness.
  2) Access conscious states, even events themselves must not be phenomenally conscious.
  3) It is possible to have phenomenal states or events with phenomenal qualities, of which one is not conscious.
  So phenomenal qualities do not guarantee a phenomenal consciousness, for that they need to be perceived by a subject.
II 588
BurgeVsBlock: what makes rational access conscious states conscious are not primarily their representational aspects. Nor is access-consciousness is a functional concept.
No concept of consciousness is a purely functional concept.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Block, Ned Searle Vs Block, Ned Metzinger II 561
SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the meaning of a-conscious.   Searle: A total zombie can have no consciousness at all. ((s) a-conscious/Block: access-conscious, >p-consious: phenomenal consciousness.
BlockVsSearle: he packs p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference whether Armstrong's truck driver does not notice what is going on, or if he avoids accidents.)
 He also tried to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness.
  Block: in reality, these are degrees of a-consciousness.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Searle, J.R. Block Vs Searle, J.R. II 560
SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the definition of a-consiousness. Searle: A total zombie can have absolutely no consciousness.
II 561
BlockVsSearle: he puts p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference between whether E.g. Armstrong truck driver notices nothing, or whether he avoids accidents.) Also, he tries to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of ​​degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality they are degrees of a-consciousness.
II 568
Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: question: E.g. why the thirsty Blindsight patient does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That’s right. But it’s a mistake to move from one function of the machinery of the a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: drawing the premature conclusion that p-consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is absent (without being clear what kind of consciousness it is).

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Consciousness Block, Ned Metzinger II 458
Consciousness/Block: Thesis: is a mixed term of "Phenomenal Consciousness" (P-Consciousness/Terminology) and "Access Consciousness" (Z-Consciousness).
II 523
Consciousness/Block: Thesis: Consciousness is a mixed term of Phenomenal Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness.
II 566
Block: Thesis: Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness interact: moving something from the periphery to the center can affect one's own phenomenal state.