Dictionary of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Competition Hegel Höffe I 329
Competition/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel adds three further topics to the debate, which is often conducted on the basis of social, legal or state theory: a) the human's confrontation with him- or herself,
b) confrontation with nature and
c) the concept of work belonging to the three dimensions.
>Labour.
In the fight against violent competition (...) he discovers (...) a far more fundamental task and ultimate achievement: "People do not initially become finished subjects, but must first acquire the necessary self-confidence in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock:
- the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself,
- the social with his or her peers and the
- economic with nature.(1)
>Self-Consciousness/Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel.

1. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Competition Smith Mause I 40
Competition/Adam Smith: Smith clearly focuses on the dynamic function of competition, i.e. its impact on economic growth, not on (static) efficiency, i.e. the allocative advantages of a market equilibrium, as later in the neoclassics. (SmithVsNeoclassics.) >Neoclassical economics as author, >Neoclassical economics, >Efficiency,
>Allocation.

EconSmith I
Adam Smith
The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010

EconSmithV I
Vernon L. Smith
Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Competition Neoclassical Economics Mause I 40
Competition/Neoclassics: for neoclassical theory, the (static) efficiency, i.e. the allocative advantageousness of a market equilibrium, is in the foreground. Adam SmithVsNeoclassical Theory: Smith clearly focuses on the dynamic function of competition, i.e. its impact on economic growth.
Mause I 162
Perfect Competition/Competition/Neoclassics: For neoclassical theory, the prerequisite for perfect competition is that goods and factors can in principle (...) be divided. This is not a problem for homogeneous goods such as salt, but it is impossible for machines for example. If the objects under consideration become even larger, such as railway lines or motorways, there is usually only one (regional) provider that is efficient. Then one speaks of "natural monopolies".
>Neoclassical economics, >Natural monopolies.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Competition Keynesianism Mause I 70
Competition/Keynesianism: The Post-Keynesians (who, like the Keynesians, do not see themselves as neoclassics) assume imperfect competition as the rule, emphasize the social context in which the economic subjects make decisions, demand realistic modelling of human decision-making behaviour and above all address production and accumulation (i.e. less exchange). The analysis focuses on production and distribution theory. (1) 1. VsNeoclassicism: the ratio between wage and interest rate, i.e. the distribution of national income among the factors of production, is not the result of market processes, but is determined by institutional factors and the respective negotiating power.
2. VsNeoclassicism: Vs assumption of rationality. This is not applicable in the case of "real" uncertainty.
>Keynesianism, >Rationality.

1. J. Robinson, The accumulation of capital. London 1956.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Competition Friedman Brocker I 405
Competition/FriedmanVsNeoclassics/Friedman: while neoclassical theory was based on perfect competition, which could ultimately only be guaranteed by permanent state intervention, Friedman favours the more evolutionary understanding of competition developed by Hayek as a method of discovery, which ultimately also provides for competition between institutions(1). From the point of view of a classic liberal like Friedman, the decisive criterion for effective competition is free market access alone. Cf.>Neoclassical economics.
Market imperfections: open up additional profit opportunities. According to Schumpeter this makes the development of innovation in the economy a worthwhile business, and the market is dynamically efficient if new prod ucers keep competing away the temporary monopoly profits.
>Innovation, >J.A. Schumpeter.

1. Goldschmidt, Nils/Wohlgemuth, Michael (Hg.), Grundtexte zur Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik, Tübingen 2008, S. 13f.

Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Econ Fried I
Milton Friedman
The role of monetary policy 1968


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Competition Schumpeter Brocker I 255
Competition/Schumpeter: Schumpeter's thesis: In the economic process of creative destruction, it is not only the visible but above all the invisible competition of potential competition that counts(1) and that for capitalism's innovative performance it is not the static dimension of price competition but the dynamic dimension of quality competition that is of overriding importance(2). >Innovation, >Progress, >Creativity.

1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946).S. 60, 140.
2. Ebenda S. 139.
Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

EconSchum I
Joseph A. Schumpeter
The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934
German Edition:
Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Competition Tullock Brocker I 529
Competition/TullockVsHirschman/Tullock: Gordon Tullock, one of the most important representatives of the commencing public-choice movement, slated Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, 1970 (1)): The idea that a restriction of competition - in order to strengthen conflict - could be helpful was apparently so cross-eyed ideologically that a differentiated judgement was not possible.(2) See Behavioral Economics/Hirschman. Context: Hirschman investigated the effects of the strategies of consumer migration and conflict in markets and of members of political parties and thus became a precursor of public choice. See Terminology/Hirschman Political Parties/Hirschman, Competition/Hirschman.

1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. Dt.: Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch. Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten, Tübingen 1974, S. 50
2. Tullock, Gordon, »Review of ›Exit, Voice, and Loyalty‹«, in: The Journal of Finance 25/5, 1970, 1194-1195. Wingrove, C. Ray, »Review of ›Exit, Voice, and Loyalty‹«, in: Social Forces 49/3, 1971, 502.

Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

EconTull I
Gordon Tullock
Arthur Seldon
Gordon L. Brady,
Government failure: A primer in public choice Washington 2002


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Competition Economic Theories Mause I 377
Competition/Economic Theories: If it is affirmed that consumers are free to decide what they buy from whom and when, then competition between suppliers will inevitably arise. The same applies if freedom of choice of trade and choice of profession is affirmed; even then competition inevitably arises between those who offer substitutes (i.e. goods which satisfy the same or similar needs from the point of view of the demanders). >Markets, >Supply, >Demand.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Competition Hirschman Brocker I 522
Competition/HirschmanVsTradition/Hirschman: Hirschman is critical of the ideal image of perfect competition. See also Demand/Hirschman.
Brocker I 523
Def "normal" competition/Hirschman: a situation in which not all customers turn away from a certain company and its products in the event of price or quality changes. (1)
Brocker I 524
Hirschman thesis: Competition can act as a cartel! According to Hirschman, whenever the quality of a competitor's product cannot be identified in advance due to a lack of transparency, an entire industry can jointly reduce the quality of its products and keep it low: If the quality of a product decreases, some of the consumers migrate to the competition, only to also not find satisfactory quality, whereupon they migrate to the next product, etc. Customers err from one product to another without complaining. (2) Panther: here Hirschman anticipates later developments: See Asymmetry/Arrow: Asymmetric Information Markets, Information Economics/Akerlof, Information/Sunstein.
Brocker I 525
Migration/Customers/Quality: Problem: "For those customers who are most concerned about the quality of the product and who are therefore the most active, reliable and creative carriers of the conflict, this is precisely why there is also a clear likelihood that they will be the first to migrate in the event of a deterioration in quality"(3). It follows from this thesis that an inefficient monopolist can easily get rid of those through a little competition, and thus a little migration opportunity, who could most likely become dangerous to him .

1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. Dt.: Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch. Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten, Tübingen 1974, p. 17
2. Ibid. p. 22
3. Ibid. p. 39
Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolHirschm I
Albert O. Hirschman
The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Competition Psychological Theories Haslam I 11
Competition/psychological theories: Norman Triplett (Triplett 1898)(1) found out, that the presence of other people affects us as individuals. A competitor [or an audience] might lead most individuals to try harder and exert more effort than they would when working alone. Def Social facilitation/Karau/Williams: Social facilitation refers to a tendency for the presence of other people (as co-actors or observers) to enhance our performance on simple or well-learned tasks, but to reduce it on complex or unfamiliar tasks (Geen, 1991(2); Zajonc, 1965(3)).
>Social Facilitation.
Def Social loafing/Karau/Williams: refers to a tendency for individuals to reduce their efforts when working with others on group or collective tasks (Latané et al., 1979(4)).
>Social loafing.
Over time, many hundreds of studies have been conducted on social facilitation and social loafing, and a host of theories have been proposed to explain how and why various group and social factors affect individual effort and motivation (Bond and Titus, 1983(5); Karau and Williams, 1993(6)). Triplett’s work is also frequently recognized as seminal to the development of sports psychology (Davis et al., 1995(7)).
>Competition/Triplett.

1. Triplett, N. (1898) ‘The dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition’, American Journal of Psychology, 9: 507–33.
2. Geen, R.G. (1991) ‘Social motivation’, Annual Review of Psychology, 42: 377–99.
3. Zajonc, R.B. (1965) ‘Social facilitation’, Science, 149: 269–74.
4. Latané, B., Williams, K.D. and Harkins, S.G. (1979) ‘Many hands make light the work: The causes and consequences of social loafing’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37: 822–32.
5. Bond, C.F. and Titus, T.J. (1983) ‘Social facilitation: A meta-analysis of 241 studies’, Psychological Bulletin, 94: 265–92.
6. Karau, S.J. and Williams, K.D. (1993) ‘Social loafing: A meta-analytic review and theoretical integration’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65: 681–706.
7. Davis, S.F., Huss, M.T. and Becker, A.H. (1995) ‘Norman Triplett and the dawning of sport psychology’, The Sport Psychologist, 9: 366–75.

Steven J. Karau and Kipling D. Williams, “Social Facilitation and Social Loafing. Revisiting Triplett’s competition studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Competition Triplett Haslam I 11
Competition/Triplett: Norman Triplett (Triplett 1898)(1) found out, that the presence of other people affects us as individuals. A competitor [or an audience] might lead most individuals to try harder and exert more effort than they would when working alone. >Competition/psychological theories.
Haslam I 17
Overstimulation/Triplett: Positively stimulated children generally had faster times on competition trials than on alone trials, and appeared to be motivated by competition. ‘Overstimulated’ children had slower times when working competitively rather than alone. However, Triplett did not attribute this reduced performance to reduced motivation, but instead to becoming too excited and losing mental or motor control as a result of trying to [work] too hard. Finally, one quarter of the children showed relatively small differences between alone and competition trials, suggesting that they were relatively unaffected by competition.
Haslam I 18
Method/Triplett: Triplett’s research (…) had several features that would later become hallmarks of high-quality social psychological research. 1) He used multiple methodologies, grounding his hypotheses in a detailed archival analysis of competitive cycling results and then testing those hypotheses in a laboratory setting. Using multiple methods to provide converging evidence has become central to the development and advancement of social psychology (Cialdini, 1980)(2).
2) Triplett identified multiple theories that might account for the competition effects he noted in [his] data. He then focused in on the ‘dynamogenic factors’ involving competition and designed a laboratory apparatus that would allow him to study those factors while controlling, at least to some extent, for others. Identifying competing hypotheses derived from multiple theories is crucial to the development of scientific knowledge (Platt, 1964)(3) and has been a key to the advancement of social psychology over time (Ross et al., 2010)(4).
Haslam I 21
The impact of Triplett’s classic research has been profound. It is often cited as the first published study in social psychology (e.g., Aiello and Douthitt, 2001(5); Strube, 2005(6)), as well as in sports psychology (e.g., Iso-Ahola and Hatfield, 1986(7)); and an influential review article on the early history of social psychology by Gordon Allport (1954)(8) refers to it as the very first social psychological experiment (for a dissenting view, see Haines and Vaughan, 1979)(9).
1. Triplett, N. (1898) ‘The dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition’, American Journal of Psychology, 9: 507–33.
2. Cialdini, R.B. (1980) ‘Full-cycle social psychology’, Applied Social Psychology Annual, 1: 21–47.
3. Platt, J.R. (1964) ‘Strong inference’, Science, 146: 347–53.
4. Ross, L., Lepper, M. and Ward, A. (2010) ‘History of social psychology: Insights, challenges, and contributions to theory and application’, in S.T. Fiske, D.T. Gilbert and G. Lindzey (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, 5th edn. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. pp. 3–50.
5. Aiello, J.R. and Douthitt, E.A. (2001) ‘Social facilitation from Triplett to electronic performance monitoring’, Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 5: 163–80.
6. Strube, M.J. (2005) ‘What did Triplett really find? A contemporary analysis of the first experiment in social psychology’, American Journal of Psychology, 118: 271–86.
7. Strube, M.J. (2005) ‘What did Triplett really find? A contemporary analysis of the first experiment in social psychology’, American Journal of Psychology, 118: 271–86.
8. Allport, G.W. (1954) ‘The historical background of modern social psychology’, in G. Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, 1st edn. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. pp. 3–56.
9. Haines, H. and Vaughan, G.M. (1979) ‘Was 1898 a “great date” in the history of social psychology?’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 15: 323–32.

Steven J. Karau and Kipling D. Williams, “Social Facilitation and Social Loafing. Revisiting Triplett’s competition studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Competition Sherif Haslam I 156
Competition/cooperation/Sherif: The evidence from the Boys’ Camp studies (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, Sherif et al. 1969(1)) clearly shows that competition leads to increased intergroup discrimination, and that cooperation towards superordinate goals leads to a reduction in intergroup discrimination. Nevertheless, Sherif and his colleagues report much anecdotal evidence to suggest (a) that the boys showed ingroup favouring attitudes before the formal introduction of competition (see Sherif, 1966(2): 80; Sherif and Sherif, 1969(1): 239); and (b) that, although cooperation towards superordinate goals reduced ingroup favouritism, it did not eradicate it completely. VsSherif: This means that other social-psychological processes are clearly at play, ones that Sherif and his colleagues failed to address directly.

1. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row.
2. Sherif, M. (1966) In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Class studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Competition Positive Political Theory Parisi I 225
Competition/Positive Political Theory/Tiller: [there are] three general theaters of political-institutional competition—the horizontal, the vertical, and the internal. a) Horizontal: The horizontal theater involves institutions interacting on primarily equal standing in a policy struggle, such as when the U.S. Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court battle for a policy outcome.
b) Vertical: The vertical theater involves a more direct principal-agent struggle, such as what we see in a judicial hierarchy where higher courts attempt to control the outcomes of lower courts through doctrinal statements and reversals, and lower courts attempt to avoid higher court surveillance and discipline through a variety of decision strategies (e.g. opinion publication choices, case outcome choices, and selectively choosing grounds to support a decision).
c) Internal: (…) the internal theater involves actors internal to an institution vying for the policy outcomes of the institution as a whole. This includes, for example, judges sitting together on a judicial panel who have different preferences over the case outcome, or the two houses of Congress (and their specialized committees) competing with each other over legislative enactments. The competitive moves could include, for example,
Parisi I 225
opinion drafting and circulation for judges, and, for legislatures, amendment proposals and strategic assignment of bills to committees. (…) judges on a judicial panel often compete in the internal theater in the shadow of the higher court's vertical relationship to the lower court. This latter scenario has been the central focus of the recent "panel effects" literature (Cross and Tiller, 1998(1); Kim, 2009(2); Kastellec, 2011)(3). >Law/Positive Political Theory, >Legal doctrine/Positive Political Theory, >Positive Political Theory/Tiller.
1. Cross, Frank B. and Emerson H. Tiller (1998). "Essay, Judicial Partisan and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals." Yale Law Journal 107:
2155-2176.
2. Kim, Pauline T. (2009). "Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 15 7: 1319-1381. 3. Kastellec, Jonathan (2011). "Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Court of Appeals." Journal of Politics 73:345—361.

Tiller, Emerson H. “The “Law” and Economics of judicial decision-making. A Positive Political Theory Perspective.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Lewis Vs Aristotle IV 42
Essence/essentialism/LewisVsAristotle: essences of things are only secured to the extent that they are counterpart relations. And the counterpart relations are not very secure! >Counterparts/Lewis, >Counterpart Relation/Lewis, >Counterpart Theory/Lewis. This is due to the weaknesses of the similarity relation.
Similarity/Lewis: problems:
1. Which aspects should count?
2. Which weights are assigned to the individual aspects?
3. What should be the minimum similarity that will be counted?
4. To what extent are candidates eliminated from the competition for the strongest similarity?
Vagueness: concerns the counterpart relation and thus the essence and modality of the general.
Conclusion: it is difficult to say anything wrong about essences at all.
IV 43
a) extreme position: a suitable context may provide an anti-essentialist counterpart relation - one in which everything is counterpart to everything, and nothing has an essence worth mentioning. Or: Hazen: we could thus divide things into species and assume a counterpart relation according to which everything is counterpart to everything of its kind.
Then the essence would simply be identical with the species.
LewisVs: that would violate postulate P5: no thing may have a counterpart within its world.
b) other extreme: hyper-essentialistic counterpart relation: nothing has a counterpart except itself. Then, according to P2, nothing has extra-worldly counterparts and nothing has accidental characteristics!

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Frankl. V. Nozick Vs Frankl. V. II 579
Death/Nozick: it is often assumed that our mortality is a particular problem for the meaning of life. Why? Would this problem not exist if life were infinite?
Life/Infinite/Victor Frankl: Thesis: it is death himself who gives meaning to life.
Suppose we had an infinite life: then we could legitimately postpone all our actions forever. It would be of no consequence whether we do something now or later. It might then happen that someone voluntarily ends their life to give it meaning. Scientists who discovered a remedy for immortality would probably keep it secret.
((s) Vs: (similar to above): this possible world is so far away from us, and the description is so general and vague that it is hard to say anything about it and hardly any conclusions can be drawn from it: would we not need anything to eat then, would we not need to work for it? Would we not need breathe regularly and would we not stumble into certain conflict situations? Would immortality make our bodies so different that the physiology became incomparable and thus our way of life then would not be comparable to our life now? Would there be no competition for finite resources therefore?)
Nozick: perhaps other things would be won that would outweigh the loss of meaning?
Frankl/Nozick: our only desire is to get certain things done.
II 580
Nozick: also: if we had an infinite life, we could look at it as a whole, as something we could shape ((s) Does infinity not prevent that?. NozickVsFrankl: does not seem to be in question whether infinity did not eliminate the meaning of God's existence!
Frankl: just general assumption that restrictions and pre-existing structures are necessary to operate a meaningful organization or store things (in vessels).
NozickVsFrankl: even if that were true, death is only one way of limitation, sonatas and sonnets have different restrictions.
Death: why should we think that the bad thing about death is the good which it ends, and not the good that it prevents from happening? E.g. a child dies three minutes after birth.
II 581
Why does it bother us that after death an infinite amount of time will pass in which we do not exist? Death/Epicurus: is not bad for someone who lives, because this is not dead, and not bad for someone who is dead, because the dead no longer exist.
Nozick: is death bad because it makes our life finite? E.g. Suppose our past is infinite, but we have forgotten most of it. If death still bothers you, it is not because it makes life finite!
E.g. Inverse situation: infinite future. That does not explain why there is an asymmetry between past and future.
II 582
E.g. why do we not mourn our late birth as much as we mourn our early death? Is it because we already accept the past as fixed and the future as malleable? Perhaps a fulfilled past in which we have experienced, seen, and lived through everything would let death appear less serious than an endless monotonous past.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Kant Nagel Vs Kant I 129
NagelVsKant: unrestricted judgments about astronomy belong to a worldview that, compared to the Kantian alternative, is quite durable! In a conflict with Kant both opinions would be in competition, as there is no independent position from which to assess them.

I 137
NagelVsKant: but to defend ourselves against Kant's limiting of the reach of reason, we have to claim more than this.
I 138
Kant admits that we cannot help but understand ourselves as part of an independently existing world, though. But his thesis is not a thesis about the phenomenal world, but one about the relation of the phenomenal world to the world itself.
I 139
But since he claims that the normal scientific thinking only applies to the phenomenal world, he exempts himself from the usual conditions of evaluation. The thesis of transcendental idealism is itself not one of the synthetic judgments a priori whose validity it claims to explain, but a thesis, a priori it still is. If this is unimaginable or self-contradictory, the story ends here. It implies, as Kant says, thesis: that Berkeley's idealism is inevitable if we assume that the things themselves have spatial properties!
Nagel: the whole idealism becomes a hypothesis. There is something wrong with insisting that we had a bare idea of ​​our position in an consciousness-independent world, while arguing the logical possibility of something that goes beyond it.
PutnamVsKant: (elsewhere) from the fact that we cannot recognize the world as such does not follow that it must be completely different from what we do recognize.

I 146
NagelVsKant: we note that our unrepentant empirical and scientific thinking unabatedly prevails even against Kant's skepticism. Kant is implausible for empirical reasons and thus simply implausible.
III 126
NagelVsKant: the step towards objectivity reveals how things are in themselves and not how they appear to be. If that is true, then the objective picture always omits something.

II 54
Ethics/Law/Moral/God/Theology/Nagel: an act does not become wrong by the fact that God exists. Murder is wrong per se and thus prohibited by God. (>Eutyphro). Not even the fear of punishment provides the proper motives of morality. Only the knowledge that it is bad for the victim.
NagelVsKant: categorical imperative: we could say that we should treat others considerately so that do likewise by us. That is nothing but good advice. It is only valid in as far as we believe that our treatment of others will have an impact on how they treat us.
Nagel: as a basis of ethics, nothing else is in question than a direct interest in the other.
II 55
Nagel: there is a general argument against inflicting damage on others which is accessible to anyone who understands German: "Would you like it if someone else did that to you?"
II 56
If you admit that you had something against someone else doing to you what you just did to him, you admit that he had a reason not to do it to you. Question: what is this reason? It cannot be anchored in the particular person.
II 57
It is simply a matter of consequence and consistency. We need a general point of view that any other person can understand.
II 58
Problem: this must not mean that you always ask if the money for the movie ticket would bring more happiness into the world if it was given to someone else. Because then you should no longer care more for your friends and family than for any stranger.
II 59
Question: are right and wrong the same for everyone?
II 60
Right/Wrong/Ethics/Morality/Nagel: if actions depend on motives and motives can be radically different in humans, it looks as if there could be no universal right and wrong for each individual. The possible solutions, all of which are not very convincing:
1) you could say: Although the same things for everyone are wrong or right, not everyone has a reason to do what is right and not to do what is wrong.
Only people with the "right moral motives" have a reason.
Vs: it is unclear what it would mean that it was wrong for someone to kill, but that he has no reason not to do it. (Contradiction).
2) you could say that the reasons do not depend on the actual motives of the people. They are rather reasons that modify our motives if they are not the right ones.
Vs: it is unclear what the reasons may consist in that do not depend on motives. Why not do something if no one desire prevents you from doing it?
II 61
3) you could say that morality is not universal. I.e. that someone would only be bound by morality if he had a specific reason to act like this, with the reason generally depending on how strongly you care for others. Vs: while making a psychologically realistic impression this conflicts with the idea that moral rules apply for everyone.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Maxwell, G. Quine Vs Maxwell, G. II 212ff
Maxwell thesis: that our knowledge of the outside world exists in a commonality of structure. Quine: important truth.
Definition structure is what we retain when we encode information.
---
II 213
The speech about material objects has no qualitative similarities between the objects and the inner state of the speaker, but only one type of coding and of course, causal relations. Maxwell has a theory of relative accessibility of the foreign-psychological with which I agree in a strange way.
Quine: difference: I assume that between the knowledge of two individuals with regard to the same things exists a more substantial similarity, than between knowledge and things.
But to that, to which our most secure knowledge relates to, is not the knowledge of other people, but publicly perceptible bodies.
---
II 213
Knowledge/Quine: between knowledge of two people more substantive similarity than between person and thing (language, observation term has consensus inclination). ---
II 213
Properties/Quine: can be emergent: (water) table smooth, brown, but not atoms, similar to "swarm" and "waging war": only for masses because of that not unreal or subjective. Observation Termini have consensus inclination, because they are learned through ostension.
---
II 214
Therefore, I share not Maxwell's theoretical belief that "The outside world is not observable." Quine: On the contrary, as an observation scene, the outside world has had little competition. Maxwell denies the colors of the bodies, since they would be accumulations of submicroscopic particles.
QuineVsMaxwell: water remains liter for liter of water, even if sub-microscopic particles are rather oxygen and hydrogen. And that has nothing paradoxical. As little paradoxical as that a table remains smooth and brown square inch for square inch, although its submicroscopic particles are discrete, swinging and colorless,. (> Emergence).
Qualities: Quine: the qualities of wateriness, of the smoothness and the "being brown" are similar to the properties of swarming and of waging war. They correspond exclusively to masses as properties. Thus they are not getting unreal or subjective. It is not necessary that a predicate is true for each part of the things to which it applies. Finally, not even a figure predicate would stand the test. That specifically wateriness, smoothness and "being brown" are similar in this regard to "being square" (one corner alone is not square) and to the swarming. This is a modern knowledge, it is not a contradiction.
QuineVsMaxwell: he reified without questioning the sense data, Humean sensations, floating spots of color. If one attaches the color to a subjective "curtain", there is nothing else than to leave the bodies colorless.
Quine pro Maxwell: We agree that bodies and our knowledge of them are not linked by common properties with each other, but only structurally and causally.
---
II 214
Knowledge: structurally and causally related to the object, not by similarity. The curtain comes from the time when the philosophy wanted to be closer to the objects than the natural science, and when it claimed, to just pull those curtains aside.
---
II 215
Quine: this and not behaviorism is the exaggerated empiricism which must be expelled. Neurath: Philosophy and Science are in the same boat.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Parsons, Ta. Verschiedene Vs Parsons, Ta. Luhmann AU Kass 14
Conflict/Luhmann: here there is an ideological theory controversy in the 50s: DahrendorffVsParsons: Overestimation of consensus, underestimation of conflict.
Luhmann: that was read into Parsons.
Luhmann: Question: can the distinction consensus/conflict be made like this? Cooperation/Competition? Can one imagine models that only opt for one side, for example that our society is only a competitive society or that without cooperation no action would be possible?
Solution/Luhmann: the concept of communication with bifurcation yes/no shows that in the operation itself cooperation and competition are always real!
I.e. one-sidedness burdens a theory.
Consensus and conflict always both occur, a theory must take this into account.
AU Kass 1
Action TheoryVsParsons: Action is incompatible with any system.




Strawson, P. F. Millikan Vs Strawson, P. F. I 175
Denotation/Millikan: for us the goal here is to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite denotations is. We have to proceed on our own. We can not rely on the tradition Russel-Strawson-Donnellan.
Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we have to assume that there are not only speakers who makes references, but must assume that the linguistic expressions make references themselves, too.

I 272
Subject/predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (S a P in "Logic and Grammar" Millikan: "general concept" is replaced by "characteristics". Fundamental asymmetry:
Individual things: in space and time, exemplify characteristics that come from a particular area.
Then we know for every property that it is in competition with others.
Asymmetry: no such competition applies for individual things. No individual competes with others for characteristics within an area.
No things are related to each other in such a way that for each property, which exemplifies one thing, it would follow that the others do not exemplify it (not simultaneously).
MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? For concepts it is traditionally accepted, but we can not apply that to properties and relations.
Concept/property/predicate/Millikan: the relation between one word and the world lies between the head and the world and can not be internalized. (see above).
I 273
Therefore, there is not even a one-to-one relation between concepts and properties. Two concepts could correspond to one property and a concept (if it has ambiguous Fregean sense) may correspond to two properties. Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, that is never a priori knowledge.
Properties/a priori/knowledge/Millikan: on incompatibility or compatibility or identity of properties, there is no a priori knowledge. At most there is a natural necessity.
"Competition" between properties/MillikanVsStrawson: is just another type of "natural necessity" besides causality and identity. No "logical competition".
Logic/concept/necessity/Millikan: also "logical possibility" and "logical necessity" between concepts are ultimately natural necessities between concepts.
Logic/Millikan: should furthermore be understood as an empirical science.
Ex "S can not simultaneously be P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Various Authors Luhmann Vs Various Authors Habermas I 436
VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism.
Habermas I 440
LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions.
Reese-Schäfer II 28
LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty).
Reese-Schäfer II 42
VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx.
Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts.
Reese-Schäfer II 78
Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation.
Reese-Schäfer II 89
Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91
VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions.
Reese-Schäfer II 102
VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language.
Reese-Schäfer II 103
Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason!
Reese-Schäfer II 112
Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest.
Reese-Schäfer II 138
Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs).
AU Cass. 3
VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions.

VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes?
(AU Cass. 4)
VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor.
(AU Cass. 6)
Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization.
AU Cass 6
Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information.
Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events!
The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from.

Reese-Schäfer II 76
LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good.
AU Cass 11
Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems.
It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication.
Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure:
Information,
Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!).
Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape.
Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components.
Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly.
The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work.
LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question:
What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion.
Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration).
Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself?
Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see!
Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves.
When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly.
Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself.
Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations!
Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Various Authors Cartwright Vs Various Authors I 79
Mathematical explanation/Quantum damping/Agarwal: Important argument: There are six different approaches here with six different equations! (>Redundancy, alternative explanation).
I 80
For example, There are various versions of the Schroedinger equation.
I 81
Equation/Theoretical explanation/Laws/Cartwright: Thesis: these (alternative, redundant) explanations do not determine any objective laws. Equations/CartwrightVsAgarwal: the alternative equations are in competition with each other. They offer a variety of laws for the same phenomenon. AgarwalVsCartwright: he thinks that different approaches serve different purposes. That means they do not compete.
I 94
Laws/Include/Explanation/Laws of Nature/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it is not the cause of L. Laws are not explained by showing that the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but that their truth is a special case of a more comprehensive truth. CartwrightVsGrünbaum: In this, it is assumed that the fundamental laws make the same assertions as the concrete ones which explain them.
I 95
This then depends on the phenomenological laws being derived from the fundamental ones (>deduction >deductive) if the situation is specified. If the phenomenological laws are right, then the fundamental ones are too, at least in that situation. Problem: there is still a problem of induction: do the fundamental laws make correct generalizations about situations? Explanatory laws/Explanation/Cartwright: the explanatory laws are to explain the phenomenological ones and therefore a variety of other phenomenological laws in other situations. But they are much more economical (because they do not need to specify the special situations). Measuring/Reality/Realistic/Real/Cartwright: if we want to know which properties are real in a theory, we must look for the causal role.
I 182
Measuring/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Problem: the static values ​​of dynamic variables have no effect. Only if systems exchange energy, momentum or another conserved quantity, something happens in the QM. E.g. knowing the position of a particle, does not say anything about his future conduct. The detector only responds to a change in energy. Measuring/QM/Henry Margenau/Cartwright: (Margenau, Phil.of Science 4 (1937) p 352-6): Thesis: all measurements in QM are ultimately position measurements.
Cartwright: but position measurements themselves are ultimately registrations of interactions at the destruction. This is inelastic, that is, the energy is not conserved in the particles. That means the detector absorbs the energy of the particle. This causes the detector to be ionized.
Transitional prob/CartwrightVsMargenau: Solution: So it’s about the prob that the ionization of the detector takes place.
Problem: there could be background radiation which causes the ionization without particles. Or, conversely, the disc could be ineffective, so that the energy of the particle is not registered.
I 183
Problem/Cartwright: Another problem: the energy must be adequate. This could lead to inconsistencies. Soret effect: here we only need to assume simple linear additivity in our law of action, and we obtain a cross-over effect by adding a thermal diffusion factor to Fick’s law. Unfortunately this does not work for any random influences in the "Transport Theory" (heat transfer, etc.).
I 65
Cross-over effect/Cartwright:. There is only one failed attempt to establish general principles for cross-over effects: by Onsager, 1931, further developed in the 1950s. But this was merely a Procrustes-like attempt that explains nothing new. VsOnsager: His principles are empty because they have to be interpreted once in one way and another time in a different way. They may not be followed literally, too much of it is up to the physicist’s imagination. Principle: is empty if it has to be interpreted differently on different occasions.
I 174th
Schroedinger equation/CartwrightVsSchroedinger equation: Problem: according to it, the electron in the accelerator has neither a particular direction nor a particular energy - SE is refuted daily by reducing the wave packet - not by measurement, but by preparation.
I 75
Science/Explanation/Cartwright: the framework of modern physics is mathematical and good explanations will always allow precise calculations. Explanation/Rene Thom: (1972, p 5): Descartes: his vortexes and atom chains explained everything and calculated nothing. Newton: calculated everything and explained nothing. CartwrightVsThom: in modern science we have to keep causal and theoretical explanation apart as well, but they work differently:
If we accept Descartes’ causal story, we must accept his assertions of linked atoms and vortexes as true.
But we do not assume Newton’s law on the inverse square of the distance to be true or false.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Verificationism Stroud Vs Verificationism I 201
Verificationism/Knowledge/Stroud: this draws attention to a little-noticed problem of the relation between the verification principle and traditional skepticism: one usually only sees a one-sided competition between them: the principle implies that the skeptical conclusion is meaningless. Asymmetry: so the whole problem is meaningless.
Verification Principle/VP/Skepticism/Stroud: but in reality have the same task to solve: to explain how our belief is empirically confirmed.
SkepticismVsVerificationism: its standards of confirmation are not fulfilled at all.
Stroud: this is a dispute about what our standards are and if anything fulfils them. No side is in a better position, they share the problem.
I 202
Skepticism/Stroud: is not refuted by the verification principle: if we do not know whether we are dreaming, we also do not know whether the confirmation by evidence does not only take place in the dream. ((s) The argument of empirical verification is something quite different from the argument about the use of language.) Confirmation/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: there is already a conflict about how the verification principle (VP) should be formulated at all, or about what can be considered a confirmation. If the verification principle is to be adequate, it must imply that there can be no meaningful difficulty of the kind that the traditional skeptic puts forward.
Problem: when formulating the principle, the principle itself cannot yet be applied to the decisive concept of confirmation. ((s) Otherwise circular).
Empirical confirmation/confirmability/Stroud: their definition would need an explanation of how and why the traditional concept of our everyday practice should be wrong.
I 203
Skepticism/Stroud: cannot simply be rejected without showing the relationship between "internal" and "external" (distanced) access as incoherent. StroudVsVerificationism: in everyday life, the conditions of the verification principle are never completely fulfilled. A successful theory of empirical confirmation must therefore show what is wrong with the concept of confirmation.
It could nevertheless be that verificationism is on the right track.
I 204
Confirmation/Tradition/Stroud: it is generally true that the problem of the outside world (skepticism) is empirically undecidable, no matter what concept of empirical confirmability one chooses. This is the common problem that scepticism and verificationism must share. So it seems reasonable that the verification principle must first be formulated precisely before it can be used.
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism: as long as lack of verifiability is connected with futility, our speech about the world around us will be condemned to futility if skepticism is right.
StroudVsRational Reconstruction/StroudVsCarnap: we can leave the rational reconstruction aside and simply ask how plausible it is to make sense of verifiability. And apparently we cannot do that without trying to assess the plausibility of skepticism ((s) and not dismissing it as meaningless ourselves).
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why Question). Verification Principle/Stroud: to accept it, we need an understandable diagnosis of why and how skepticism is wrong. ((s) quasi circular, one presupposes the other).
StroudVsVerificationism/DescartesVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: Descartes' example "I don't know if I'm really sitting by the fireplace with a piece of paper in my hand" is a perfectly sensible sentence! We understand it well enough to know what would be the case if it were true. And it can be true or false.
It would be nonsense to claim that sentences like "Here is a human hand" or "There are mountains in Africa" would be meaningless.
Verificationism/Stroud: but only claims that they are meaningless in connection with the traditional conclusion that their truth can never be known (skeptical conclusion).
I 206
Verification Principle/Stroud: we would have to show that there is nothing to fear from scepticism.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Vollmer, G. Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. Putnam I 196
Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical.
Vollmer I 275
VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation.
However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption).
I 290
DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6)
I 292
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule.
I 293
VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic.
I 298
Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti)
2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus
3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized.
This is a genetic fallacy.
VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused!
The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view!
Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage.
Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails.
I 300
Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently.
Lotze: Validity
Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent
Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc.
Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity.
Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity.
Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity.
I 309
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular.
I 310
Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers.
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks:
Explication of concepts and knowledge
Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems.
Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements.
Illumination of the conditions for cognition.
Demonstration of cognitive boundaries.
I 315
Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature
2. thinking category
3. this category of thinking is the result of selection.
Therefore, causality generates causality via causality.
a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75).
b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6).
I 316
VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience.
I 318
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology".
The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization".
Vollmer I 313
Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation".
Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself.
I 314
Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception:
I 323
Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself.
I 314
Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles":





Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Forgery Grafton, A. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 S 39
Forgery / Grafton, Anthony: (Forgers and Critics, 1990, standard work) thesis: interdependence, competition and complicity, connects philology and forgery, counterfeiting and critics.
Voluntary cooperation: in the modification of authenticity criteria.
Each work edition has a hypothetical element.
Authenticity criteria are timeless GaddisVsGrafton.
309
Forgery / Grafton: It is not true that past eras had a different concept of truth than ours. (Many authors VsGrafton).