Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equivalence | Field | l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are platonist (E.g. "Direction1 = direction2") and nominalistic statements (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? >Platonism, >Nominalism. Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first. - They are only equivalent within a directional theory. Cf. >Definition/Frege, >Consequence. Solution/Field: one can regard the equivalences as important, even if the theories are wrong. Problem: for the meaning one should be able to accept truth. >Meaning. Solution: conservative extension (does not apply to the ontology) - this is harmless for consequences that do not mention directions. >Conservativity/Field, >Mention. I 228 Def cognitively equivalent/Field: equivalent by logic plus the meaning of "true". >Truth. Disquotational true/Deflationism: means that the propositions in the Tarski scheme should be cognitively equivalent. - ((s) Plus meaning of true here: the same understanding of true.) >Disquotationalism/Field, >Deflationism. --- II 16 Extensional equivalence/Field: Problem: if we assume extensional equivalence and abstract it from the size, there are infinitely many entities to which a simple theory, such as the chemical valences applies: For example, the number 3 not only applies to molecules but also to larger aggregates etc. >Reference classes. II 106 Redundancy theory/Field: an utterance u and the assertion that u is true (as the speaker understands it) are cognitively equivalent. >Redundancy theory, >Utterance. N.B.: the assertion that an utterance is true, has an existential obligation (ontological commitment): there must be something that is true. >Ontological commitment. While the utterance u itself does not provide an ontological obligation. Therefore, the two are not completely cognitively equivalent. Relatively cognitively equivalent: here: u and the assertion of the truth of u are cognitively equivalent relative to the existence of u. II 106 E.g. "Thatcher is so that she is self-identical and snow is white" is cognitively equivalent to "snow is white" relative to the existence of Thatcher - the verification conditions are the same. N.B.: we do not need any truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. II 252 Material Equivalence/Field: means that A > B is equivalent to ~ A v B. Problem: most authors do not believe the conclusion of e.g. "Clinton will not die in office" on "When Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito becomes President". Therefore equivalence does not seem to exist. Solution/Lewis: the truth conditions for indicative conditionals must be radically index-dependent to maintain the surface logic. >Conditionals. Lewis: thesis: the surface logic should not be respected. Lewis: thesis: E.g. Clinton/Vito: truth-maintaining despite absurdity. Solution: probability function: P (Vito I Clinton). >Probability function. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always presupposed. Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. >Conditional/Adams. Problem: then they will say less about the world. >Empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Equivalence | Prior | I 93 Material equivalence/Prior: Material equivalence must not be equated with identity. >Identity. All true propositions are material equivalent, but ((s) they do not say the same thing). >Propositions, >Statements, >Truth. Prior: Paradox of the truth-teller: "I think something true" requires a second truth beside this thought. >Paradoxes, >Thoughts, >Levels/order, >Description levels. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Facts | Taylor | II 263 Facts/F/tradition/Barry Taylor: description of sentences = existing situations - logical complexes - constituents: the entities that are relevant for the truth of any sentence - Problem: relevance when a totality of F is given. >Relevance. Def existing/Taylor : an element exists if its description is true. II 264 Theory of Tradition/Tradition: logical truths: all have the same descriptum - VsTradition: coextension: not the same F: E.g. having a heart, having kidneys. >Coextension. But synonymy: "aardvark/groundhog": here we have the same fact. >Synonymy. Tradition needs the principle of material adequacy: that is, the entities (constituents) must be relevant for the truth of the sentences that they describe. >Adequacy. II 269 Vs: this is vague and formulation-dependent. II 277 Negative facts/B. Taylor: conflict between principle of material equivalence and condition 3: intuitively, the same elements are relevant for the truth of the sentence S as for its negation. But S and ~ S have opposite truth conditions. >Truth conditions. That is, the sentences must have different descriptions. - Solution: take the negation sign itself as an element; above the elements which are themselves relevant for the truth of S. - Then neg F as category sui generis. >Negative fact. Negation: must have common constituents with the corresponding positive F. >Negation. II 277/8 Definition Fact/F/Barry Taylor: new: every F x in S associates with the set of "F-states (x)" of total states, so that x exists iff the actual total state is an element of the set of F-states (x). II 279 Then facts are equivalence classes on S (= sentence or set of F) under the relation ~, but whereby the descriptum of a sentence is now seen as an equivalence class to which belongs its descriptum in the former sense, and the new fact as existing, if their elements in the former sense exist. - Facts are then elements of S. II 280f Facts/application/B. Taylor: we no longer need that for truth conditions - and not anymore for a Tarskian truth theory - (the semantic apparatus is strong enough). >Truth conditions, >Truth theory, >A. Tarski, >Theory of truth//Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski. Facts: were used to explain connection between analytic/synthetic sentences - analytic sentences do not describe any F. Cf. >Truthmakers. New: method: to paraphrase sentences of natural language - e.g. Fischer's victory over Spasskij caused Breshnievs anger: victory (f,s) anger (b) - then expand syntax: by double-digit sentence operator "tries victory (f,s) anger (b)". Problem: fulfillment and truth for the extended language. - "Causes" is not truth-functional: solution: perhaps two-digit predicate of the meta-language "caus": should only be valid between existing facts - (and such that are equivalent to these - a sequence of elements satisfies caus(A,B) under the interpretation I iff caus(ascribe (A,s), ascribe(B,s)). >Satisfaction, >Truth functions, >Attribution, >Causation, >Truth. |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 |
| Morning Star/Evening Star | Block | Fodor IV 168 Conceptual Role/Fine-Grained/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problem: whether the conceptual (inferential) roles of morning star and evening star differ depends on how inferential roles themselves are individuated. This, in turn, depends on how fine-grained or coarse-grained they are perceived. a) as coarse-grained as the individuation of extensions: then the roles of MS/ES are not distinguished! (s) This is, in turn, distinguished from the distinction between the meta-language and the object language, for example, that "bachelor" starts with B). E.g. Suppose our concept of inference was based on material equivalence: IV 169 Then all coextensive expressions will have the same inferential roles. Conversely: E.g. if the inferential roles are as fine-grained as orthography (not only ES/MS but also distinction "bachelor" and "unmarried man"), then we lose the explanatory power for the (presumable) fact that synonymous expressions, other than merely coextensive ones, are substitutable salva veritate. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) now we see: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege's problem if there is an adequate individualization principle for them. But there is no criterion for this! Block also called this the main problem. Thus it is not easier to distinguish between inferential roles than between meanings. > Fine grained/coarse grained. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Propositions | Prior | I 12/13 Propositions/Prior: propositioes are logical structures (i.e. no real objects), (facts and phrases are not). >Objects, >Intensions, >Facts, >Sentences. Therefore propositions are language independent. >Language dependency, >Language independence, >Translation, >Meaning. I 19 Proposition/fact/Prior: "Grass is not pink": complex sentence on grass, not sentence about "proposition" Grass is pink"". >About, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 29 Proposition/Prior: you cannot only think P, but also about P, but other form than about objects: E.g. "__ thinks that the proposition __ is absurd": because the second gap is not for name but a sentence. >Names, >Sentences, >Meta language, >Thinking. "about"/Prior: belief-that, thinking-that: this is never about propositions, but about what propositions are about. "about" is systematically ambiguous, what it means depends on what kind of name or quasi-name (for example, numbers) follows it. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. I 42 Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter from what "order" are always truth functions of independent sentences. I 52 Propositions/Prior: have only Pickwick's importance. (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94), there is not a "special" meaning besides the "ordinary" B.) - Proposition/Church: propositions have the property, "to be the concept of truth or falsehood". >Thoughts, >A. Church. I 53 Proposition/Prior: when we speak of propositional identity, we are forced, to no longer see them as logical constructions. We need to treat them as real objects. (PriorVs). >Intensions, >Intensionality, cf. >Hyperintensionality, >Identification, >Individuation. I 53 Name/proposition/Prior: "the proposition that p" only apparent name. >Names, >Names of sentences. I 64 Identity of propositions/Prior: no substantive equivalence. >Equivalence, >Material equivalence. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Truth | Foster | I 10 Extensional/Foster: "X is true if p" - intensional "x means that p". I 9 Intensional: indirect speech - extensional: material equivalence. >Truth theory/Foster, >Meaning theory/Foster. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tarski, A. | Peacocke Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 162 T-Sentence/PeacockeVsTarski: logical form for a language with index words: ApAt (true (s,p,t) ↔ A(p.t)). s: "structurally descriptive name" of a sentence A(p,t) is a formula that does not contain "true" and "fulfilled". p, t: people, time points. (s) this takes circumstances into account, unlike Tarski, thus making it empirical. Truth/PeacockeVsTarski/PeacockeVsDavidson: Point: i.e. we must assume a certain access to the concept of truth already! When we omit this empirical tendency, the question is what makes one language the language of a community instead of another language. (>Meaning theory/Loar). EMD II 163 Then we do not know what "true in L" means for a particular population P. Demanding an answer here does not mean to criticize Davidson's program. We merely sought to fill a gap. Vs: it could be argued that this gap is already closed by the requirement that every truth definition must satisfy convention T. (Convention T: right side must be a translation of the left, material equivalence, extension is not enough). Davidson: himself speaks of the assimilation of a translation manual. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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