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The author or concept searched is found in the following 54 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analysis | Deacon | I 359 Analysis/Language/Evolution/Acoustic Analysis/Language Understanding/Liberman/Deacon: Al Liberman's investigations at the Haskins Lab have shown that, surprisingly, it was not the analysis of acoustic parameters of speech in the evolution of language that was decisive, but rather the prediction of movements of the vocal apparatus of participants in communication(1)(2). Cf. >Phonetics, >Phonology, >P.D. Eimas, >Comprehension, >Language, >Communication. 1. A. Liberman, F. Cooper, D. Shankweiler und M. Studdert-Kennedy (1967): Perception oft he speech code. Psychological Review 74, 431-461. 2. A. Liberman und I. Mattingly (1989): A specialization for speech perception. Science 243, 489-494. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Autism | Social Psychology | Slater I 157 Autism/social psychology: it turned out, that studies maintaining difficulties of autists in ToM tests are not always replicated. >Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen, >Theory of Mind/developmental psychology, >VsBaron-Cohen. Researchers have argued, that there is less of a deficit in social cognition than previously thought (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985(1)) and that some of the poorer performances in Slater I 158 social cognition tasks may be imputed to diminished social orientation (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998(2); Schultz, 2005)(3). If this is the case, performances in these tasks should be boosted when social orienting is enhanced by extrinsic factors. Speaking to this idea, Wang and collaborators (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2007)(4) compared neutral instructions (“Pay close attention”) and explicit social instructions (“Pay close attention to the face and voice”) in a recent study on the neural correlates of irony comprehension in autism. A similar effect of explicit instructions was also recently found in a task where participants heard both speech and non-speech sounds. In line with previous research (Ceponiene et al., 2003)(5), children with autism had atypical ERP (Event Related Potentials) profiles in response to speech sounds, but not to non-speech sounds. However, this difference disappeared when participants were explicitly required to pay attention to the sound stream. In other words, what performance in social tasks might primarily reveal may not be so much what participants are able to do but rather what they are spontaneously inclined to do (see also Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson, 2011)(6). 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. 2. Dawson, G., Meitzoff, A., Osterling, J., Rinaldi, J., & Brown, E. (1998). Children with autism fail to orient to naturally occurring social stimuli. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 28,479— 485. 3. Schultz, R. (2005). Developmental deficits in social perception in autism: the role of the amygdala and fusiform face area. International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 23, 125—141. 4. Wang, A., Lee, S., Sigman, M., & Dapretto, M. (2007). Reading affect in the face and voice: Neural correlates of interpreting communicative intent in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64, 698—708. 5. Ceponiene, R., Lepisto, T., Shestakova, A., Vanhala, R., Alku, P., Naatanen, R., & Yaguchi, K. (2003). Speech-sound-selective auditory impairment in children with autism: They can perceive but do not attend. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 5567—5572. 6. Chevalier, C., Noveck, I., Happé, F., & Wilson, D. (201 1). What’s in a voice? Prosody as a test case for the Theory of Mind account of autism. Neuropsychologia, 49,507—517. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Cairnes, John Elliott | Rothbard | Rothbard II 290 John Elliott Cairnes/Rothbard: J.E. Cairnes has been known as 'the last of the classical economists'; after Mill's death he assumed the mantle of outstanding British economist in the minds of the public, and in 1874 he lashed out in incomprehension at the revolutionary marginal utility theory of William Stanley Jevons (in Cairnes's Some Leading Principles of Political Economy). Cairnes was a determined cost-of-production theorist, granting his only significant exception in his well-known 'theory of non-competing groups'. This theory recognized that where factors of production, in particular labour, did not immediately and fully compete with each other, the prices of the factors are determined by demand rather than by cost. Unfortunately, Cairnes lifted the theory from Longfield's Lectures on Political Economy without giving him credit; we know that this was not a case of ignorance of a distinguished predecessor, since Cairnes assigned Longfield's work in his own classes.(1) >Mountifort Longfield, >John Stuart Mill, >Classical Economics. Method/Cairnes: Cairnes's work of most lasting value, his Character and Logical Method, while including some Millian positivism, was essentially a methodological work in the great Nassau Senior-praxeological tradition. >Positivism. Thus Cairnes, after agreeing with Mill that there can be no controlled experiments in the social sciences, adds the important point that the social sciences, nevertheless, have a crucial advantage over the physical sciences. For, in the latter, 'mankind have no direct knowledge ofultimate physical principles'. The laws of physics are not themselves evident to our consciousness nor are they directly apparent; their truth rests on the fact that they account for natural phenomena. But, in contrast, Cairnes goes on, 'the economist starts with a knowledge of ultimate causes'. How? Because the economist realizes that the 'ultimate principles governing economic phenomena' are 'certain mental feelings and certain animal propensities in human beings; [and] the physical conditions under which production takes Ppace'. To arrive at these premises of economics 'no elaborate process of induction is needed'. For all we need to do is 'to turn our attention to the subject', and we obtain 'direct knowledge of these causes in our consciousness of what passes in our own minds, and in the information which our senses convey... to us of external facts'.(2) Cairnes also demonstrates that the economist uses mental experiments as replacements for laboratory experiments of the physical scientist. He shows too, that deduced economic laws are 'tendency', or 'if-then', laws, and furthermore that they are necessarily qualitative and not quantitative, and therefore cannot admit of mathematical or statistical expression. 1. Cairnes's successor to the Whately chair in 1861, and the last holder of that chair in the archbishop's lifetime, was Arthur Houston (1833-1914), who continued in the new Mill-Cairnes cost of production tradition. In his Principles of Value in Exchange (1864), Houston held that the 'net cost ofproduction' was the dominent causal force in determining value, and even tried to arrive at a mathematically expressed 'unit of sacrifice' that could measure that cost. 'Criticism' of this theory, as Black noted, 'would be superfluous'. R.D.C. Black, 'Trinity College, Dublin, and the Theory ofValue, 1832-1863', Economica, n.s. 12 (August 1945), p. 148. Houston wrote other books on comparative law and the English drama. J.G. Smith, 'some Nineteenth Century Irish Economists', Economica n.s. 2 (Feb. 1935), pp. 30-31. 2. J.E. Cairnes, The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy (2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1875) pp. 83-7, 88. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Classes | Carnap | VI 99 Class/Carnap: classes are what is common to their elements - but not as common components. >Element relation, >Comprehension, >Sets, >Set theory, >Subsets. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Classes | Prior | I 63 Class/Prior: we think of it as a term for what we describe as identical if condition (2) is satisfied: (2) ∏x∏yEφxyφxy. >Sets, >Set theory, >Comprehension. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Coextensive | Carnap | VI 43/4 Def Coextensive/Carnap: coextensive properties belong to the same class - pre-range: class of possible antecedents. Def homogenous: is a relation, if pre- and post-range are isogenous. Def constitute: reduce a concept to another one (reduction) - Problem: transformation rule. >Element relation, >Comprehension, >Sets, >Set theory, >Subsets. --- VI 48 Def Logical Complex/Carnap: if an object can be reduced to another one, we call it a complex of the other objects. Classes and relations are complexes. They do not consist of their elements. >Complex/Carnap. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Cognition | Maturana | I 67 Def Cognitive Area/Maturana: entire interaction area of the body - can be extended indefinitely when new forms of interaction are created, it is enlarged with instruments. >Actions, >Domains/Maturana. I 78 Described things lie exclusively in the cognitive area - i.e. it is not part of the area that is to describe - (level) >Description levels. I 81 Cognition/Maturana: generation of a closed interaction area, not comprehension of an independent outside world. >Outer world, >Exterior/interior. Conclusion: Conclusions are necessary function results from the self-referential circular organization. - They are history-independent, because time itself is only part of the cognitive area of the ((s) second) observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Circularity, >Self-reference, >Time. I 146 Cognition/Maturana: Isolation of an area and call for appropriate behavior - only criterion: this appropriate behavior - it must be explained when cognition must be explained. >Explanation/Maturana. I 200 Cognition/Maturana: condition of realization (of the structural coupling) - not unveiling a reality, representation or description of "something". >Structural coupling, >Reality, >Representation. I 202 Cognitive Area/Maturana: with humans: language - humans exist in the range of objects that produce themselves through language actions - objects: do not exist outside language >Language, >Objects, >Domains/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Concepts | Wright | I 162 ff Concept/Wright, Crispin: concepts appear intensionally in the response to judgments. Thus they do not make any requirements for the details of their extensions. >Extension, >Intension, >Judgment. I 201 ff Perception/Theory/Wright: 1) Observing equals perceiving, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is conceptually characterized. (McDowell pro). This is now a good basis for the conception that the conceptual features of the subjects are different. >Theory ladenness, cf. >Psychological Nominalism. 2) Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world goes beyond experience in infinitely many ways. >Experience. 3) The comprehension of concepts does not merely consist in classifying. They include the possession of beliefs (e.g. that things form a species at all). >Beliefs. --- II 229ff Concept/Predicate/Wright: e.g. concept: color - predicate: red. >Predicates, >Predication. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Description Levels | Field | II 345 Indefiniteness 2nd order: it is unclear whether an undecidable sentence has a particular truth value. >Platonism. II 354 Logic/second order logic/Field/(s): excludes non-standard models better than theory 1st order. - 2nd order has no impredicative comprehension scheme. >Second order logic, >Comprehension, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. --- III 33 Theory of the 1st order/Field: E.g. the theory of the space-time points. - (s) E.g.a theory which only uses functions but does not quantify over them. >Quantification. Theory 2nd order/Field: E.g. theory of real numbers, because it quantifies over functions. - Quantities of higher order: are used for the definition of continuity and differentiability. III 37 Theory of 1st order/2nd order/Hilbert/Field: Variables 1st order: for points, lines, surfaces. 2nd order: Quantities of ... Solution/Field: quantification 2nd order in Hilbert's geometry as quantification over regions. Only axiom 2nd order: Dedekind's continuity axiom. III 95 f Logic 2nd order/Field: E.g. Quantifiers like "there are only finitely many". - Also not: E.g. "There are less Fs than Gs". >Quantifiers. III 98 Extension of the logic: preserves us from a huge range of additionally assumed entities. - E.g., what obeys the theory of gravity. QuineVs: we should rather accept abstract entities than to expand the logic. (Quine in this case pro Platonism). III 96 Platonism 1st order/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no logic 2nd order. Problem: but it needs this (because of the power quantifiers). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Everyday Language | Minsky | Münch III 130 "Proximity"/simulation/Minsky: Terms like "proximity" are too important for our everyday life to give them up because they cannot be axiomatized. >Axiomatization, >Localization, >Formalization, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Comprehension, >Simulation. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Extensionality | Bigelow | I 368 Set/Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: a set will change when it receives an additional item or loses one. Logical form: extensional axiom: (y)(N(y ε x) v N ~ (y ε x)). Everyday translation: "Either something is an element of a given set in all possible worlds or in no world. It cannot be element in some worlds, "but not in others". Principle of Predication/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is an instance of this principle. (See 3.2). >Predication. It applies to quantities, but not to universals. A universal is only a set if the extensional axiom applies. Essential properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: have a very similar character as sets. Universals: also have essential properties. Sets: for them, the set of elements is essential. Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals. Their essential property, the extensionality is a reflection of the determining essences of universals. >Sets, >Set theory, >Universals. Elemental relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: acts in both directions. All elements taken together could not exist without simultaneously constituting this set. The individual elements could of course. Therefore, belonging to a set is not an essential feature of an element, taken alone ((s) of an individual?). Definition plural essence/plural essence/Bigelow/Pargetter: is then the essential that affects all elements of a set simultaneously. I 369 It always affects a plurality of things. "To be one of this group of things". Extensionality axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not yet ensure the existence of sets. This is achieved by the comprehension scheme. >Extensionality, >Comprehension. Comprehension scheme/comprehension/abstraction scheme/Bigelow/Pargetter: asserts that for each description there are a lot of things that fulfill this description. (Possibly the empty set). This is one of the dramatic examples for the resulting of ontological conclusions from semantic assumptions. Formally. Let ψ(x) be an open sentence, then (Ey)(x)((x ε y) ⇔ ψ (x)). Problem: fortunately or unfortunately the comprehension scheme contains a contradiction: ((s) E.g. possible instance of the schema: "The set of objects that do not belong to a set. Priest: (1979)(1) concludes that some contradictions are true. Comprehension scheme/Bigelow/Pargetter: but is not valid because of the contradiction. Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: the decision about what exists should precede the semantics. The semantics can then modify them. I 370 Therefore, we should not expect that the comprehension scheme is valid. BigelowVsComprehension Scheme: E.g. Suppose a general description, which we want to call an "open-ended type". Perhaps there is a property to be one of the things shared by many of these things that fulfill this description. But then there may be many other things that fulfill the description that do not have the property of being one of these things. There may be things that do not have the property, but they meet the description. E.g. It may also be that the property of the form "be one of these things" is fulfilled by some, but not by all, things which fulfill the description. VsComprehension scheme/Zermelo-Fraenkel/ZF/Bigelow/Pargetter: Zermelo-Fraenkel propose a replacement for the comprehension scheme: Separation: Separation/separation axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: with the help of other axioms, it entails the existence of sufficient sets for the purposes of mathematics. Especially for the reduction of geometry to the number theory. ...+... >Number theory. 1. Priest, G. (1979). The logic of paradoxes. Journal oof Philosophical Logic 8. pp. 219-41. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| False-Belief Task | Happé | Slater I 151 False-Belief Task/Happé: Happé (1993)(1) compared the understanding of literal and non-literal statements such as: “Caroline was so embarrassed. Her face was like a beetroot,” which is literally understandable and “Ian was very clever and tricky. He really was a fox,” which is literally false. She argued that “just as in the false belief situation (but not the true belief case) the actor’s mental state (belief) is crucial, and reality alone is no guide to action, so in metaphor (but not [literal language]) the speaker’s mental state (intention) is vital, and working with “reality” in the form of the literal meaning of the utterance is not sufficient for comprehension” (p. 104). Similarly, researchers went on comparing the ability to understand seeing vs. knowing, deception vs. sabotage, false photographs vs. false beliefs, the recognition of basic vs. complex emotions, and soon (for a review, see Baron-Cohen, 2000)(2). >Autism/Baron-Cohen, >False Belief Task/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/Dennett. 1. Happé, F. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48, 101—119. 2. Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Theory of mind and autism: A 15-year review. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg & D. J. Cohen (Eds), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from developmental cognitive neuroscience (pp. 3—21). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Hermeneutic Circle | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 193 Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Ast and the entire hermeneutic-rhetorical tradition, when he recognizes as an essential basic feature of understanding that the meaning of the individual is always only ever derived from the context and thus ultimately from Gadamer I 194 the whole. This sentence applies as a matter of course to the grammatical understanding of each sentence up to the point where it is placed in the context of the whole of a literature... or of a work yes, up to the whole of literature or of the literary genre. But Schleiermacher now applies it to the psychological understanding which must understand every thought formation as a moment of life in the total context of that person. It has always been clear that logically seen here there is a circle, provided that the whole, from which the individual is to be understood, is not given before the individual - unless in the manner of a dogmatic canon (as the Catholic and as we saw, to a certain extent also guides the Reformation's understanding of Scripture), or a preliminary concept of the spirit of a time analogue to it (as Ast presupposes the spirit of antiquity in the manner of presentiment). Solution: Schleiermacher, however, explains that such dogmatic guidelines cannot claim any prior validity and are therefore only relative limitations of the circle. Basically, understanding always means moving in such circles, so the repeated return from the whole to the parts and vice versa is essential. In addition, this circle is constantly expanding, as the concept of the whole is a relative one, and its placement in ever larger contexts always affects the understanding of the individual. Gadamer I 296 Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: [Schleiermacher differentiated the] hermeneutic circle of part and whole according to its objective as well as its subjective side. Just as the individual word belongs to the context of the sentence, so the individual text belongs to the context of the writer's work, and the latter to the whole of the literary genre or literature in question. On the other hand, however, the same text, as a manifestation of a creative moment, belongs to the whole of the soul life of its author. Only in such a whole, both objective and subjective, can understanding be completed. Dilthey: Following this theory, Dilthey then speaks of "structure" and of "centering in a center" from which the understanding of the whole emerges. He thus transfers to the historical world what has always been a principle Gadamer I 297 of all interpretation of texts: that one must understand a text from within oneself. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: But it is questionable whether the circular movement of understanding is so adequately understood. Here we have to go back to the result of our analysis of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. (>Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher). What Schleiermacher has developed as a subjective interpretation may be put aside completely. 1 GadamerVsSchleiermacher: When we try to understand a text, we do not put ourselves in the author's mental state, but if we want to speak of putting ourselves in the author's place, we put ourselves in the perspective under which the other person has come to his or her opinion. That means nothing else but that we seek to accept the factual right of what the other person says. We will even, if we want to understand, try to reinforce his or her arguments. 2. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: (...) also the objective side of this circle, as Schleiermacher describes it, does not get to the heart of the matter (...): The goal of all understanding and comprehension is the agreement on the matter. Thus hermeneutics has always had the task of establishing absent or disturbed agreement. The history of hermeneutics can confirm this, if one thinks, for example, of Augustine, where the Old Testament is to be communicated with the Christian message(1), or of early Protestantism, which was faced with the same problem(2), or finally of the age of Enlightenment, where it admittedly comes close to a renunciation of consent, if the "perfect understanding" of a text is to be achieved only by means of historical interpretation. It is now something qualitatively new when Romanticism and Schleiermacher establish a historical consciousness of a universal scope by no longer allowing the binding form of the tradition from which they come and in which they stand to be a firm foundation for all hermeneutic endeavour. Gadamer I 298 Schleiermacher (...) succeeds (...) in establishing harmony with the ideal of objectivity of the natural sciences, but only by [renouncing] to bring the concretion of historical consciousness to the fore in hermeneutical theory. HeideggerVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Heidegger's description and existential foundation of the hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, means a decisive turn. >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger. 1. Cf. for this: G. Ripanti, Agostino teoretico del' interpretazione. Brescia 1980 2. Cf. M. Flacius; Clavis Scripturae sacrae seu de Sermone sacrarum literarum, lib.II, 1676 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Infinity Axiom | Quine | IX 205 Def Infinity Axiom/Quine: an infinite number of elements in types should be possible. One possibility is e.g. : Tarski: that there is a non-empty class x², such that each of its elements is a subclass of another element. Russell: for each x² e N ³ there is a class y1 with x² elements: short L² ε N³. (1) Ex² (Ey1(y1ε x²) u ∀y1[y1 ε x² › Ez1(y1 ‹ z1 ε x²)]). Vs: some thought that the question of whether there were infinitely many individuals was more a question of physics or metaphysics. It is inappropriate to let arithmetic depend on it. Russell and Whitehead regretted the infinity axiom and the axiom of choice, and both made special cases dependent on them, as I do most comprehension assumptions. Frege's Natural Numbers/Quine: are plagued by the necessity of infinity axioms, even if we allow type theory, liberalization and cumulative types, or finally heterogeneous classes. Because within each type there is a finite barrier to how large a class can be, unless there are infinitely many individuals. Zermelo's concept of numbers would be a solution here, but brings problems with complete induction. IX 206 Real Numbers/Quine: for them and beyond, however, infinity axioms are always necessary. Infinity Axiom/Zermelo: (5) Ex[Λ ε x u ∀y(y ε x › {y} ε x)]. It postulates a class to which at least all natural numbers in Zermelo's sense belong. It is equivalent to "N ε ϑ" because N is itself an x that satisfies (5), and vice versa, if x satisfies (5), then N < x., and thus "N ε ϑ" according to the exclusion scheme. Unlike Russell's, this infinity axiom says nothing about the existence of individuals. But it separates the last connections to type theory. Zermelo's and Neumann's numbers are even antithetic to cumulative type theory, because such a class breaks the boundaries of all types. Axioms of Infinity/Russell: was caused by the law of subtraction "S'x = S'y > x = y". In other words, it was used so that the natural numbers would not break off. Similarly for the real numbers. But its meaning goes even further: each subsequent type is the class of all subclasses of its predecessor and thus, according to Cantor's theorem, larger than its predecessor. To accept infinitely many individuals therefore means to accept higher infinities without end. For example, the power class in (7) says that {x:x < N} ε ϑ, and this last class is greater than N after the theorem of Cantor. And so it goes further up. Infinity Axiom/Zermelo: breaks the type limits. Quine pro: this frees us from the burden comparable to the type indices, because even in type theory with universal variables we were forced to Frege's version of the natural numbers, which meant recognition of a different 5 in each type (about classes of individuals) of a different 6 in each type, a different N in each type, etc. In addition there is, throughout the whole hierarchy, a multiplication of all details of the theory of real numbers. 3/5 is something different in every following type and also π, Q, R. For all these constants it is practically necessary to keep the type indices. In Zermelo's system with its axiom of infinity such multiplications do not occur with the task of type boundaries. Zermelo's protection was that he avoided classes that were too large. For the reverse assurance that classes cannot exist only if they were larger than all existing classes, very little provision has been made in its segregation scheme. IX 208 Fraenkel and Skolem first did this in their axiom scheme of substitution. II 93 Infinity Axiom/QuineVsRussell: the Principia Mathematica(1) must be supplemented by the axiom of infinity when certain mathematical principles are to be derived. Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with an infinite number of elements - New Foundations/Quine: instead comes with the universal class of ϑ or x^ (x = x). >Infinity/Quine, >Classes/Quine. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Intelligence | Deacon | I 269 Intelligence/language/innate/Deacon: some pragmatic language comprehension and problem-solving capacities have been found in children with Williams' syndrome who have reduced intelligence. This was seen as evidence of innate grammatical knowledge which is said to be independent of other cognitive abilities. >Innateness. DeaconVs: it is a mistake to extrapolate from the dissociation of language and general intelligence under pathological conditions to a general independence of language and intelligence. >Language/Deacon, >Thinking, >Intelligence/Psychology. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Intelligence | Psychological Theories | Corr I 163 Intelligence/psychological theories/Ackerman: Modern intellectual ability theories (see e.g., Carroll 1993(1)) represent intelligence in a hierarchical fashion, with a general intellectual ability (the most general construct) at the top of the hierarchy (Strata III), and somewhat narrower ability content as one moves down the hierarchy ((s) here from left to right). E.g. Crystalized intelligence - (e.g. verbal comprehension, lexical knowledge) Fluid intelligence - (e.g. sequential reasoning) Visual perception - (e.g. spatial relations) Learning and memory - (e.g. memory spun, associative memory) Speed - (e.g. perceptual speed, reaction speed) Auditory perception - (e.g. hearing and speech, music perception) (For the complete Table cf. (1)) For the relation between intelligence and personality traits see >Personality traits/Ackerman. Corr I 167 Def TIE/Ackerman: a measure of typical intellectual engagement: TIE is defined as the individual’s preference toward or away from intellectual activities.(Goff and Ackerman 1992)(2). The authors of the TIE hypothesized that scores on the measure would correlate mainly with measures of accumulated knowledge (an ability called ‘crystallized intelligence’) and less so with measures of fluid intellectual abilities (e.g., deductive reasoning and quantitative reasoning). Corr I 168 Overlap of intelligence with personality factors: The associations between personality trait measures that are narrower in scope than the broad five factors of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness typically show modest correlations with measures of intellectual abilities, whether at the general or specific level. Need for Achievement (nAch) probably shows the most robust positive correlations among this group of personality traits, with correlations in the range of r = .07 to .24. Traits like Alienation, Aggression, Harm-Avoidance and Traditionalism all show small negative correlations with intellectual ability measures, ranging from negligible magnitude to about r = −.15. >Personality traits/Ackerman. 1. Carroll, J. B. 1993. Human cognitive abilities: a survey of factor-analytic studies. New York: Cambridge University Press 2. Goff, M. and Ackerman, P. L. 1992. Personality-intelligence relations: assessing typical intellectual engagement, Journal of Educational Psychology 84: 537–52 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Slater I 127 Intelligence/psychological theories: Many who have recently addressed the subject have taken the same kind of debating perspective Jensen (1969(1) did, but from the opposite side. >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence test/Jensen, >Intelligence test/psychological theories. That is, they selectively present evidence just as indirect as Jensen’s but opposing his position, and prematurely conclude that he was wrong (see, e.g., Nisbett, 2009(2); Shenk, 2010(3)). Though the question of the source of the racial gap in test scores is certainly scientifically legitimate, it must be pursued responsibly from all perspectives (Hunt & Carlson, 2007)(4). Slater I 128 Jensen: Perhaps the greatest irony surrounding Jensen’s (1969)(1) article is that he was very creatively doing just that when he was sidetracked into arguing that socially dis-advantaged children were inherently less educable. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 2. Nisbett, R. E. (2009). Intelligence and how to get it: Why schools and cultures count. New York: Norton. 3. Shenk, D. (2010). The genius in all of us: Why everything you’ve been told about genetics, talent, and IQ is wrong. New York: Doubleday. 4. Hunt, E., & Carlson, J. (2007). Considerations relating to the study of group differences in intelligence. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 194–213. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Intensionality | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 39 Intensional statement connections/Hoyningen-Huene: linking two partial statements to form an overall statement in such a way that the truth value of the overall statement is not clearly determined by the truth values of the partial statements alone. >Truth value, >Intension, >Extension. Intension: sense of sentence. Extension: independent of the sense of sentence. Intension requires additional knowledge. II 68 Intensional Interpretation/Hoyningen-Huene: Assignment of statements to sentence letters, the same sentence letters must be assigned to the same statements. Extensional Interpretation: Assignment of truth values instead of statements. Read III 254 Infinite sets can only be treated intensionally: as examples of a general concept. III 255 Def Comprehension Principle/Read: each well-defined term defines a set. The antinomies of Burali-Forti and Russell showed that some restriction had to be imposed on it. Nevertheless, when sets are reconstructed from below, the Axioms of Infinity claim the existence of the extension of the terms "natural number" and "real number" as a definite totality. IntuitionismVsComprehension principle: the intuitionist denies this. These terms correspond to operations, i.e. intensional terms. No extensions. Salmon I 252 Intensional definition: linguistic definition. IV 253 Def Explicit definition: Specification of a word or a combination of words with the same meaning. For example "mendacious" = "dishonest", "bachelor" = "unmarried man". |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Interaction | Bruner | Upton I 61 Interaction/parent-child/language learning/Bruner/Upton: Def joint-action formats a term coined by Jerome Bruner to refer to the joint attention episodes that characterise parent—child interactions. According to Bruner, these episodes are essen tial for learning new skills, including language. Cf. >Triangulation. Joint attention and sharing interactions are key features of early relationships and, according to Bruner (1985)(1), these play a key role in the development of language. To begin with, such interactions might only involve the carer and child, for example playing a game of Peek-a-boo. In joint-action formats the mother creates simple, structured activities with objects such as toys so as to teach her infant what the objects are for and how to use them – for example, building blocks into a tower, or using a spoon for feeding. Upton I 62 These shared sequences are also talked about by the mother, which encourages the infant to acquire language (Bruner, 1975(2), 1985(1), 1993(3)). The joint-action formats provide a mapping activity during which the child learns to link words and phrases with the correct objects and events. Pointing has an important role to play in ensuring joint attention during joint-action formats – for example, when reading picture books with their carers, infants show joint attention to objects shown in the book through pointing, which is usually accompanied by labelling of the object. Adults’ role: the adult response to pointing by an infant is usually to label the object pointed at (Hannan, 1992)(4). Blindness: Research has also shown that blind children are able to label significantly fewer objects than sighted infants (Norgate, 1997)(5), which lends further support to the importance of pointing for acquiring object names. >Ostension, >Ostensive definition. Spcial context/Bruner: Bruner argues that, in this way, the mother (or other carer) provides a social context in which the meaning of language can be learned. This idea that the social context supports language acquisition is supported by evidence that the first words to be understood by an infant are typically the child’s own name, the names of other family members and the names of familiar objects such as clock, drink and teddy (Harris et al., 1995a)(6). >Language acquisition, >Learning, >Language development, >Language. 1. Bruner, J.S. (1985) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Bruner, J.S. (1975) The ontogenesis of speech acts.Journal of Child Language, 2: 1—19. 3. Bruner, J.S. (1993) Explaining and interpreting: two ways of using mind, in Harman, G (ed.) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in honor of George A Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 4. Hannan, T.E. (1992) An examination of spontaneous pointing in 20- to 50-month-old chil then. Perceptual andMotor Skills, 74: 65 1—8. 5. Norgate, S.H. (1997) Research methods for studying the language of blind children, in Horn berger, N.H. and Corson, D (eds) The Encyclopedia of Languczge and Education, Vol. 8:Research methods in language and education. The Netherlands: Kiuwer Academic Publishers. 6. Harris, M., Barlow-Brown, F. and Chasin, J. (1995a) The emergence of referential understanding: pointing and the comprehension of object names. First Language, 15: 19–34. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Jigsaw Method | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 221 Jigsaw method/psychological theories: in the years since Aronson’s experiments (>Jigsaw method/Aronson; Aronson et al. (1)) research on the jigsaw classroom has continued to yield positive results in terms of enhanced academic performance and esteem, particularly among students from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as improved intergroup relations within the classroom and the school (Johnson et al., 2000(2); Tomcho and Foels, 2012(3)). >E. Aronson, >Learning, >Learning theory, >Socialization, >Group behavior. It has been applied successfully to diverse topical Haslam I 222 areas such as English as a second language (ESL; Ghaith and El-Malak, 2004(4)) and physics classes (Hänze and Berger, 2007)(5), and positive results have been replicated internationally (Walker and Crogan, 1998)(6). Robert Cialdini initiated an influential set of studies on social influence that drew on observations of strategies used by individuals, such as salespeople, in applied settings, identified underlying psychological principles, and tested these ideas in field settings (Cialdini, 2009)(7). Also, basic research on attitudes and behaviour, such as the work of Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980)(8) theory of reasoned action (…), significantly guided the development of effective interventions to change sexual practices and promote medical adherence to help curb the emerging international AIDS epidemic (Albarracin et al., 2001)(9). Ingroup relations: research on this topic was also inspired by the jigsaw classroom research; see Paluck and Green (2009)(10). Haslam I 223 Publications: Indeed, the earliest publications publications on the jigsaw classroom – also known as cooperative learning – were published in education journals rather than social psychological journals. Limitations of the method:/VsAronson: Aronson’s work spawned a new generation of cooperative learning interventions that were constructed to be effective in a wider range of classroom situations, not just under the specific circumstances associated with recently desegregated schools. These newer cooperation-based interventions were more generally effective educationally. So it was that when David Johnson and colleagues (2000)(2) ranked eight commonly used cooperation-based teaching methods in terms of their effectiveness the jigsaw classroom was only ranked sixth in terms of impact on educational achievement. By the early 1990s, 79% of US elementary schools used cooperative learning methods (Puma et al., 1993)(11) attests to the influence of the jigsaw classroom on policy implementation. >Jigsaw method/Social psychology. 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Johnson, D., Johnson, R.T. and Stanne, M.B. (2000) ‘Cooperative learning methods: A meta-analysis’, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Johnson50/publication/220040324_Cooperative_learning_methods_A_meta-analysis/links/00b4952b39d258145c000000.pdf (04.05. 2019)). 3. Tomcho, T.J. and Foels, R. (2012) ‘Meta-analysis of group learning activities: Empirically-based teaching recommendations’, Teaching of Psychology, 39: 159–69. 4. Ghaith, G. and El-Malak, M.A. (2004) ‘Effect of Jigsaw II on literal and higher-order EFL reading comprehension’, Educational Research and Evaluation, 10: 105–55. 5. Hänze, M. and Berger, R. (2007) ‘Cooperative learning, motivational effects, and student characteristics: An experimental study comparing cooperative learning and direct instruction in 12th grade physics classes“, Learning and instruction, 17: 29-41. 6. Walker, I. and Crogan, M. (1998) ‘Academic performance, prejudice, and the jigsaw classroom: New pieces to the puzzle’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 8: 381–93. 7. Cialdini, R.B. (2009) Influence: Science and Practice (5th edn). New York: Pearson. 8. Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. (1980) Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior: Attitudes, Intentions, and Perceived Behavioral Control. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 9. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’. Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 10. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 11. Puma M.J., Jones C.C., Rock D. and Fernandez, R. (1993) ‘Prospects: The congressionally mandated study of educational growth and opportunity’, Interim Report. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Knowledge | Davidson | McGinn I 179 McGinn: Domestication theories of knowledge: newer version: refers to the externalism with regard to the content of consciousness: the mind and the world can diverge, as far as the skeptic would like to accept. (Putnam, Davidson). >Externalism. Davidson I (eb) 18 DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so the ignorance of imaginary objects is possible. Sense/feature/FregeVsDavidson/Frege per Hume: only what is relevant belongs to the comprehension of sense. Therefore "hidden" features may not be part of the meaning. Dummett: these are the "internal characteristics". >Sense, >Relevance. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Katz | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect. Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein). --- I 103 Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition). Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite. >Fregean sense. VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition? See also >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Language | Geriatric Psychology | Upton I 141 Language/memory/Geriatric psychology/Upton: The belief is that, in adulthood, language skills are maintained (Thornton and Light, 2006)(1). However, there is evidence that language development continues even into late adulthood: vocabulary increases (Willis and Schaie. 2006)(2) and older adults often maintain or even improve their knowledge of words and what they mean (Burke and Shafto, 2004)(3). However, some decline in language abilities may appear in late adulthood. This could link to physiological changes that take place in old age, such as hearing difficulties, which can lead to problems in distinguishing speech sounds (Gordon-Salant et al., 2006)(4). >Memory/Geriatric psychology. 1. Thornton, R and Light, LL (2006) Language comprehension and production in normal aging, in Birren, JE and Schaie, KW (eds) Handbook of the Psychology of Aging(6th edn). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 2. Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2006) Cognitive functioning among the baby boomers: longitudinal and cohort effects, in Whitbourne, SK and Willis, SL (eds) The Baby Boomers. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3. Burke, DM and Shafto, MA (2004) Aging and language production. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13: 21-4. Further reading: Salthouse, TA (2009). When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of Aging, 30(4): 507—14. Available online at http :! /faculty.virginia .edulcogage/hnks/publications/. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language | Putnam | Rorty I 323 Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language is seen as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language. Cf. >Language evolution, >Language acquisition, >Understanding, >Intentionality. --- Horwich I 457 Language/Putnam: if language is only noise, then it is nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. Instead: correctness makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities. (Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994.) --- Putnam III 124 Language/intensional/Davidson: e.g. the new minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. This is similar to the use of color predicates. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Language Acquisition | Psychological Theories | Slater I 199 Language Acquisition/psychological theories: Eimas et al. (1971)(1) alluded the problem of how does the infant settle on the subset of phonetic categories (>Categorical perception/psychological theories) Slater I 200 relevant to their native language? >Language development/Eimas, >Language development/psychological theories. We reviewed evidence for universal VOT categories (voice onset time; >Phonetics/psychological theories) that are then finely tuned by listening experience. But what if this experience contains two languages? Although some evidence suggests that early formation of language specific phonetic categories is advantageous for one’s first language (Tsao, Liu, & Kuhl,2004)(2), the sensitive period for native-like acquisition of a second language extends far beyond early infancy. How these phonetic constraints play themselves out in the domain of bilingualism, especially at the level of the lexicon, is a topic that has garnered considerable interest in the past few years (see Werker & Byers-Heinlein, 2008)(3). 1. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., &Vigorito,J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 2. Tsao, F.-M., Liu, H.-M., & Kuhl, P. K. (2004). Speech perception in infancy predicts language development in the second year of life: A longitudinal study. Child Development, 75, 1067—1084. 3. Werker, J. F., & Byers-Heinlein, K. (2008). Bilingualism in infancy: First steps in perception and comprehension of language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 144—151. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Language Development | Bruner | Upton I 3 Language development/BrunerVsChomsky/Bruner: theorists such as Jerome Bruner (1983(1)) agree with Chomsky’s notion of an LAD. However, Bruner asserts that Chomsky gives too big a role to this aspect of language acquisition, noting that social context, and the behaviour of parents in particular, have a significant impact on language development. This aspect of the environment he calls the language acquisition support system (LASS). According to Bruner, the LAD cannot function alone and every LAD therefore needs a LASS. Def Language acquisition support system (LASS)/Bruner: Bruner’s term to describe the range of interactive precursors, such as joint picture book reading, that help support language development in children. These social interactions provide a scaffolding environment to structure the child’s early language utterances. Upton I 62 Language development/Bruner/Upton: Joint attention and sharing interactions are key features of early relationships and, according to Bruner (1985)(2), these play a key role in the development of language. To begin with, such interactions might only involve the carer and child, for example playing a game of Peek-a-boo. >Interaction/Bruner, >Motherese/Developmental psychology. In joint-action formats the mother creates simple, structured activities with objects such as toys so as to teach her infant what the objects are for and how to use them – for example, building blocks into a tower, or using a spoon for feeding. Upton I 62 These shared sequences are also talked about by the mother, which encourages the infant to acquire language (Bruner, 1975(3), 1985(2), 1993(4)). The joint-action formats provide a mapping activity during which the child learns to link words and phrases with the correct objects and events. Pointing has an important role to play in ensuring joint attention during joint-action formats – for example, when reading picture books with their carers, infants show joint attention to objects shown in the book through pointing, which is usually accompanied by labelling of the object. Cf. >Triangulation. Adults’ role: the adult response to pointing by an infant is usually to label the object pointed at (Hannan, 1992)(5). Blindness: Research has also shown that blind children are able to label significantly fewer objects than sighted infants (Norgate, 1997)(6), which lends further support to the importance of pointing for acquiring object names. Spcial context/Bruner: Bruner argues that, in this way, the mother (or other carer) provides a social context in which the meaning of language can be learned. This idea that the social context supports language acquisition is supported by evidence that the first words to be understood by an infant are typically the child’s own name, the names of other family members and the names of familiar objects such as clock, drink and teddy (Harris et al., 1995a)(7). >Language acquisition, >Stages of Development. 1. Bruner, J. S. (1983) Child’s talk: Learning to use language. New York: Norton. 2. Bruner, J.S. (1985) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Bruner, J.S. (1975) The ontogenesis of speech acts.Journal of Child Language, 2: 1—19. 4. Bruner, J.S. (1993) Explaining and interpreting: two ways of using mind, in Harman, G (ed.) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in honor of George A Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 5. Hannan, T.E. (1992) An examination of spontaneous pointing in 20- to 50-month-old chil then. Perceptual andMotor Skills, 74: 65 1—8. 6. Norgate, S.H. (1997) Research methods for studying the language of blind children, in Horn berger, N.H. and Corson, D. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Languczge and Education, Vol. 8:Research methods in language and education. The Netherlands: Kiuwer Academic Publishers. 7. Harris, M., Barlow-Brown, F. and Chasin, J. (1995a) The emergence of referential understanding: pointing and the comprehension of object names. First Language, 15: 19–34. |
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| Language Development | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 61 Language development/Developmental psychology/Upton: Joint attention and sharing interactions are key features of early relationships and, according to Bruner (1985)(1), these play a key role in the development of language. To begin with, such interactions might only involve the carer and child, for example playing a game of Peek-a-boo. In joint-action formats the mother creates simple, structured activities with objects such as toys so as to teach her infant what the objects are for and how to use them – for example, building blocks into a tower, or using a spoon for feeding. >Triangulation. Upton I 62 These shared sequences are also talked about by the mother, which encourages the infant to acquire language (Bruner, 1975(2), 1985(1), 1993(3)). The joint-action formats provide a mapping activity during which the child learns to link words and phrases with the correct objects and events. Pointing has an important role to play in ensuring joint attention during joint-action formats – for example, when reading picture books with their carers, infants show joint attention to objects shown in the book through pointing, which is usually accompanied by labelling of the object. Adults’ role: the adult response to pointing by an infant is usually to label the object pointed at (Hannan, 1992)(4). Blindness: Research has also shown that blind children are able to label significantly fewer objects than sighted infants (Norgate, 1997)(5), which lends further support to the importance of pointing for acquiring object names. Upton I 63 Research suggests that most infants begin to understand their first words when they are around eight months old and the total number of words understood grows slowly up to about 12 months of age, when there is a sudden increase in vocabulary (Fenson et al., 1994)(6). Harris et al. (1995b)(7) carried out a longitudinal study in which they found that the age at which infants first showed signs of understanding the names of objects was ten months. >Language acquisition, >Stages of Development, >J. Bruner, >M. Tomasello. 1. Bruner, J.S. (1985) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Bruner, J.S. (1975) The ontogenesis of speech acts.Journal of Child Language, 2: 1—19. 3. Bruner, J.S. (1993) Explaining and interpreting: two ways of using mind, in Harman, G. (ed.) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in honor of George A Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 4. Hannan, T.E. (1992) An examination of spontaneous pointing in 20- to 50-month-old chil then. Perceptual andMotor Skills, 74: 65 1—8. 5. Norgate, S.H. (1997) Research methods for studying the language of blind children, in Horn berger, N.H. and Corson, D (eds) The Encyclopedia of Languczge and Education, Vol. 8:Research methods in language and education. The Netherlands: Kiuwer Academic Publishers. 6.Fenson, L., Dale, P.S., Reznick,JS, Bates, E, Thai, DJ and Pethick, SI (1994) Variability in early communicative development. Monographs of the Society of Research in Child Development, 59: serial no. 242. 7. Harris, M., Yeeles, C., Chasm, J. and Oakley, Y. (199 5b) Symmetries and asymmetries in early lexical comprehension and production,Journal of Child Language, 22: 1—18. |
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| Language Production | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 63 Language production/Developmental psychology/Upton: Language production develops after comprehension. Early talkers may produce their first word at around nine or ten months, but many children do not produce their first word until well into their second year. As with comprehension, first words are limited in number and overextension and underextension are both commonly seen in the use of first words (Woodward and Markman, 1998)(1). >Language development/Developmental psychology. Overextension: overextension young children’s extension of a word to cover events/objects beyond that which the word is normally used for, such as calling all animals ‘doggie’. Underextension: underextension the limiting of a word meaning to too few instances by a young child, for example when a child restricts the word ‘dog’ to situations in which the child is playing with a toy, but then fails to refer to the animal at the park as a ‘dog’. Word production increases gradually until around the end of the second year, when there is a vocabulary spurt (Bloom et al., 1985)(2). At around the same time, a qualitative change in language use can be seen as infants begin to use two-word phrases. 1. Woodward, AL and Markman, EM (1998) Early word learning, in Kuhn, D and Siegler. RS (eds), Damon, W (series ed.) Handboook of Child Psychology, Vol. 2: Cognition, perception, and languoge (5th edn) pp37 1-420). New York: Wiley. 2. Bloom L, Lifter, K and Broughton, J (1985) The convergence of early cognition and language in the second year of life: problems in conceptualisation and measurement, in Barrett, M (ed.) Children’s Single-word Speech. London: Wiley-Blackwell. |
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| Logic | Nagel | I 61 That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no consequences on the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). >Convention, >Logical constants, >Logical truth, >Meaning/Nagel. I 85 Logic/Nagel: logical judgments are based on our comprehension, but they are not a judgment about our ability of comprehension. >Judgments, >Recognition. I 94 Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason. There is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it. Not everything can be revised. - Something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Logical Constants | McDowell | I 56 Speaking relative/logical constants/intuitionism/Quine/McDowell: one might think that the logical constants have a different meaning in intuitionism than in classical logic. - Vs: Problem: then the intuitionist could not reject the law of the excluded middle, because it would mean something different from his mouth than from the mouth of the classical logician. >Intuitionism, >Excluded middle. Otherwise he would have to take a schizophrenic position. >Syntax/Prior. Translation involves, to describe the linguistic behavior of the other, so one understands what the other is exactly rejecting. >Radical interpretation. ((s) The complete non-comprehension of the reasons of another is compatible with understanding the meanings of the words used, i.e., speaking the same language, or translating it perfectly.) II 56 Logical Constants: if they get their meaning from logical truths that are true with any interpretation: then the meaning must be in what remains the same: the connnections. - validity: question of the meaning loyalty of logical constants. >Validity. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Mathematics | Field | I 80 Existence/Field: Existence should not be part of the logic - therefore, mathematics cannot be reduced to logic - otherwise too many properties would have to be assumed. >Mathematical entities. I 80f Mathematics/Knowledge/Field: nevertheless, mathematical knowledge is simply logical knowledge because of deflationism. >Deflationism. E.g. Knowing a lot/little about maths: two kinds of knowledge: mathematical knowledge: non-logical knowledge: e.g. what other mathematicians accept. I 112 This knowledge is empirical. --- III 9 Pure mathematics/application/Field: e.g. number theory: is not applicable at all to the world. - E.g. set theory: must allow the use of elementary elements. >Set theory. Solution: "impure mathematics": functions that map physical objects to numbers. - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. - E.g. instances of the separation axiom. III 13 Mathematics/Field: Mathematics can prove to be inconsistent. - Even if it is extremely improbable - then it would also be non-conservative. - So mathematics is not a priori true. >Conservativity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning Theory | Schiffer | I 12 Meaning theory/Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P. - Then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory. - No one has ever done this. >Compositionality, >Meaning theory/Davidson. I 182 Truth Theory/Schiffer: a truth theory cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. >Truth theory, >Understanding. I 220 Meaning theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. >Relation theory. I 222 The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true. I 261 Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites. Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. Then every sentence must have a feature, and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning. Because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description. Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic properties. E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently. >Semantic properties. I 264 SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. >Intentions/Grice. I 265 Meaning theory/meaning/SchifferVsMeaning theory: all theories have failed. Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation). Schiffer:Meaning is not an entity - therefore there is also no theory of this object. I 269 Schiffer: Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory. I 269 No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. The scheme "x believes y iff __" cannot be supplemented. The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical. >Language use, >Language behavior. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Memory | Geriatric Psychology | Upton I 141 Memory/Geriatric psychology/Upton: Loss of memory skills may also result in problems with word retrieval; for example, the tip of the tongue phenomenon, which is typified by feeling confident that a word is known but is just out of reach (Thornton and Light, 2006)(1). This decline is often compensated for by using very familiar words and much shorter sentences (Burke and Shafto. 2008)(2). >Aging. 1. Thornton, R and Light, LL (2006) Language comprehension and production in normal aging, in Birren, JE and Schaie, KW (eds) Handbook of the Psychology of Aging(6th edn). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 2. Burke, DM and Shafto, MA (2004) Aging and language production. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13: 21-4. |
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| Paradoxes | Quine | VI 124 Comprehension/paradoxes/Quine: that each element relation (each term) results in a set is not possible because of Burali-Forti, etc. - Solution: these element relations (conditions) may determine sets, or perhaps the last (outermost) classes - outer condition: cannot be an element in turn - are introduced layer after layer - for classical mathematics "true0" already suffices - everything is in one language - there is a hierarchy of truth predicates. >Truth Predicate/Quine. VII (g) 136 Paradoxes/Quine: no longer occur when the levels of language are distinguished, i.e. if one keeps out the expressions "true-in-L", "denotes-in-L", etc. of the language L itself. IX 124 Burali-Forti/paradox/Quine: "the class of ordinal numbers does not exist": "NO ε ϑ": is the tamed version of Burali-Forti: that there must be a larger ordinal number and simultaneously it cannot exist. - Reductio ad absurdum of the comparability of the ordinal numbers - solution/today: we will not assume that every condition about the existence of an element relation determines a class. X 70 Grelling paradox/Quine: "x does not fulfil itself" must not occur in the object language. >Object Language/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Paradoxes | Thiel | I 321 False Conclusions/Thiel: only of interest if they are intentionally induced as "fallacies", or if they smuggle supposedly legitimate conclusions into an argument in the form of "sophisms", or as in Kant's case so-called "paralogisms" which have their reason "in the nature of human reason" and are therefore "inevitably though not indissoluble". Example: arithmetic fallacy: 5 = 7 (I 321 +). Example: Syllogism with a quaternia terminorum (hidden occurrence of four instead of three allowed terms in a final schema) Flying elephants are fantasy imaginations. Imaginations are part of our reality. So, flying elephants are part of our reality. Paradoxes are something contrary to ordinary opinion (doxa). Other form: fact wrapped in a puzzle solution. For example, that a strap placed tightly around the equator would suddenly protrude by 1/2π, i.e. by about 16cm, after being extended by only one meter. I 322 In everyday use, paradoxes are often only corny things, like the hypochondriac who only imagines himself to have delusions (question of definition) or "Murphy's law" that everything lasts longer, even if one has already considered it. Since the English scientific literature "paradoxically" compromises both paradoxes (not real antinomies) and antinomies, a distinction has not yet prevailed. I 327 Example "crocodile conclusion" (already known in ancient times): a crocodile has robbed a child, the mother begs to give it back. The crocodile places the task of guessing what it will do next. The mother (logically preformed) says: you won't give it back to me. Hence stalemate. Because the mother now argues that the crocodile must give the child back, because if the statement is true, she gets it back on the basis of the agreement, but if it is false, then it is just wrong that she does not get the child back, so because it is true that she gets it. The crocodile, on the other hand, argues that there is no need to give the child back, because if the mother's statement is false, she will not get it back because of the agreement, but if it is true, it means that she will not get the child back. Only a careful analysis reveals that the agreement made does not yet provide a rule for action. If "z" stands for giving back, "a" for the mother's answer (which is still indefinite and can therefore only be represented schematically by a), the agreement does not yet provide a rule system that can be followed, but rather the rule schema. "a" ε true >> z "a" ε false >> ~z If the range of variability of a is not restricted, then one can also make choices of a that are incompatible with Tarski's condition of adequacy for truth definitions. >Adequacy/Tarski, >Convention T. I 328 This states that for a predicate of truth "W" and any statement p, from which it can be meaningfully stated, always "p" ε W <> p has to apply. In the crocodile conclusion, the mother selects ~z for a, thereby turning the rule scheme into the rule system. (R1) "~z" ε true >> z (R2) "~z" ε false >> ~z The crocodile now concludes to R2 and Tarski (with ~z for p) to ~z. The mother, on the one hand, deduces after R1 and on the other hand metalogically from the falsity of "~z" and from there (after Tarski) further to z. Since the argumentation makes use of a predicate of truth and a predicate of falsehood as well as the connection between both, the crocodile conclusion is usually counted among the "semantic" antinomies. One can see in it a precursor of Russell's antinomy. >Russellean Paradox. I 328 One should not hastily deduce from this that the antinomies and paradoxes have no meaning for mathematics. Both Poincaré's criterion (predictiveness) and type theory force a restriction of the so-called comprehension axiom, which determines the conditions permissible as defining conditions for sets of forms of statement. >Impredicativeness, >Comprehension, >Type theory. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Philosophy | Heidegger | Figal I 101 Philosophy/Heidegger/Figal: also according to the conception of being and time, it is a liberation from the bonds of transmitted concepts, but if this liberation no longer leads to the free attention to the beginning of history, but to the actual structure of existence, the history in its essence is no longer historical. The structure of existence exists as long as existence exists. >Dasein/Heidegger, >History/Heidegger, >History. Figal I 102 Solution: Heidegger succeeds the breakthrough in the winter term 1931/32: interpretation of the cave-parable (Politeia). Liberation from fetters, but metaphor of light (for the time), openness, permeability,"liberate." Figal I 104 Freedom/Heidegger: Being and time: existence makes free - later: light makes free. existence designs: 1. Art 2. Natural science 3. History I 107 Art/Heidegger: neither "expression of experiences" nor pleasure. Instead, "the artist has the essential focus for the possible" to bring the hidden possibilities of beings to work. Figal I 171 HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientificization. --- Cardorff II 13 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's philosophy has no subject. It does not want to organize knowledge, make no statements, but create an event with its speech. "Passion for the useless". His philosophy propagates the domination of an admittedly dialogically unlegitimate speaking. Cardorff II 36 Subject/object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. Instead: "Walten sui generis". (Walten: prevailing). VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Knowledge - Divine/Human - Vs Totality-constituting categories: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself. (HeideggerVsSchopenhauer). Cardorff II 46 Development in Heidegger's work: the process of condensation, the difference between existence and being becomes lesser; the human makes up less as something withstanding and holding to something and more and more as an executing and fitting in. The difference between being and exist (ontological difference) tends to be stronger than the inner action of being itself. Cardorff II 60 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: 1. The thing about which it is can never be guilty of an incomprehension. It reigns as it reigns. 2. Heidegger is never to blame for an incomprehension; he is much too much into the thing. 3. The reader can want to be guilty, but ultimately is never guilty, because it is not he who blocks himself, but the one who is turning away. 4. It can always be assumed that Heidegger has been looking for uncertainty. Cardorff II 69 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's texts draw the reader's attention, inter alia, as both meanings and meaning levels pass into one another. Heidegger is concerned with making it impossible to grasp the subject. Cardorff II 102 Heidegger: all the evaluations of his philosophy are meaningless because they come from wrong questions. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Phronesis | Aristotle | Gadamer I 27 Phronesis/AristotleVsPlato/Aristotle/Gadamer: It is (...) a positive, ethical motive [in the judgement] effective, which enters into the Roman Stoic doctrine of the sensus communis. The comprehension and moral coping with the concrete situation requires a (...) subsumption of the given under the general, i.e. the purpose that one pursues, that the right thing arises from it. Thus, it presupposes a direction of the will, i.e. a moral being (hexis) already. Therefore the phronesis is a "spiritual virtue" according to Aristotle(1). He sees in it not simply an ability (dynamis), but a determination of moral being, which cannot be without the whole of the "ethical virtues", just as conversely these cannot be without them. Although this virtue in its exercise has the effect of distinguishing the feasible from the infeasible, it is not simply practical wisdom and general resourcefulness. Its distinction between the doable and the undoable has always included the distinction between the decent and the unseemly, and thus presupposes a moral attitude which in turn trains it. It is this motif, developed by Aristotle against Plato's "idea of the good", to which, according to Vico's reference to the sensus communis, the matter refers. >Sensus communis/Vico, >Sensus communis/Thomas. 1. Aristoteles, Eth. Nic. Z. 9, 1141b 33. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Pragmatics | Brandom | II 164 Pragmatics/Brandom: because the sentence is the smallest unit of comprehension, the semantics must be oriented towards the pragmatics. >Subsententials, >Compositionality, >Frege principle. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Davidson | I (b) 20 A suggestion boils down to interpret the remainder of the sentence after "believes" as a complex adverb. >That-clauses. DavidsonVs: no human being has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from them. But we obviously understand the sentences because we understand the contained words. >Meaning (intending), >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Propositions, >Idiolect. I (b) 22 If the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, new, very long words would have to be learned, which often occur only once. Since, however, each statement can appear as a content sentence, its number is infinite and therefore cannot be learned. >Propositional content. I (e) 104 Fodor: inner "solipsist" states that determine what is meant. DavidsonVsFodor: But such conditions do not exist at all, which is obvious: the very general characteristics for porcupines, e.g. "Has four paws, and spines," etc. are as dependent on the natural history of the acquisition of these words as the words "porcupine" and "short-beaked echidna". >Other minds. Glüer II 127 Propositional Attitudes are individuated through public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects (with privileged access, for example). - >Externalism, >Individuation. Avramides I 102f Rationality/Davidson: is what we need to understand propositional attitudes, not for physics - ((s) = reason). Davidson I (b) 22 Propositional Attitude/Content/Meaning/Davidson: if the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, we would always have to learn new, very long words, which often occur only once. I (b) 23 Propositional Attitude/Belief/Reference/Content/Davidson: according to that there is no alternative to the concept of belief sentences as relational sentences. Thus, one must consider the content sentence "The diamond Kohinoor is one of the crown jewels" together with "that" as a singular term. >Singular terms. I (b) 39 Propositional Attitudes/Object/Content/Belief/Desire/Brentano: no internal object are different from the outer object - ((s) Davidson, actually, also Vs "inner objects" - but: DavidsonVsBrentano: Problem with objects that do not exist. Solution/Davidson/(s): Learning history secures word meaning without reference - Brentano Thesis: Intentionality is irreducible to brain states. >Intentionality/Brentano. I (e) 97 Propositional Attitudes/Davidson: are not subjective. - Access to other minds is guaranteed by the mechanism of language comprehension. - One must be able to come from the observed behavior to the attitudes, because language and thought are interpretable. Glüer II 127 Propositional Attitudes/Davidson: are individuated via public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects - (externalism) - no representation - predicate "x believes that p": relation between speaker and an utterance of the interpreter. >Representation, >Speaker's meaning, >Utterances, >Interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Regression Theorem | Mises | Rothbard IV 59 Regression Theorem/Money/Austrian School/Menger/Mises/Rothbard: Mises built on Menger's logical-historical account of the origin of money out of barter, and demonstrated logically that money can only originate in that way. In doing so, he solved the problem of the circular explanation of the utility of money. Specifically, the problem of the circle is that, at any given time, say DayN, the value (purchasing power) of money on that Day is determined by two entities: the Supply of MoneyN and the demand for Money - which itself depends on a pre-existing Purchasing Power on DayN-1. Solution: Mises broke out of this circle precisely by understanding and grasping the time dimension of the problem. For the circle on any given day is broken by the fact that the Demand for Money on that day is dependent on a previous day's purchasing power, and hence on a previous day's demand for money. But haven't we broken out of the circle only to land ourselves in an infinite regress backward in time, with each day's Rothbard IV 60 purchasing power resting on today's demand for money, in turn dependent on the previous day's purchasing power, in turn determined by the previous day's demand, etc.? It is no help to escape circular reasoning only to land in a regress of causes that can never be closed. Rothbard: But the brilliance of Mises's solution is that the logical regress backward in time is not infinite: it closes precisely at the point in time when money is a useful non-monetary commodity in a system of barter. In short, say that Day 1 is the first moment that a commodity is used as a medium of indirect exchange (to simplify: as a "money"), while the previous Day 0 is the last day that commodity, say gold, was used only as a direct good in a system ofbarter. In that case, the causal chain of any day's value of money, say Dayw, goes back logically in time, to Dayl, and then goes back to Dayo. In short, the demand for gold on Day 1 depends on the purchasing power of gold on Day 0. But then the regress backward stops, since the demand for gold on Day 0 consists only of its direct value in consumption, and hence does not include a historical component, i.e., the existence of prices for gold on the previous day, Day 1. Cf. >Regress/Philosophical theories. In addition to closing the determinants of the value or purchasing power of money and thereby solving the Austrian Circle, Mises's demonstration showed that, unlike other goods, the determinants of the value of money include an important historical dimension. The Regression Theorem also shows that money, in any society, can only become established by a market process emerging from barter. Money/Mises/Rothbard: money cannot be established by a social contract, by government imposition, or by artificial schemes proposed by economists. Money can only emerge, "organically" so to speak, out of the market.(1) RothbardVsHayek: comprehension of Mises's Regression Theorem would spare us numerous impossible schemes, some proffered by Austrians or quasi-Austrians, to create new moneys or currency units out of thin air: such as F.A. Hayek's proposed "ducat," or plans to separate units of account from media of exchange. 1. The presentation of the Regression Theorem is in Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and credit, 3rd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 108-23. Mises later answered critics of the theorem in his Human Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 405—13. For a reply to more recent critics, Gilbert and Patinkin, see Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction, p. 13, and Rothbard, Man, Economy and State (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), I, pp. 231-3 7, and esp. p. 448. Also see Rothbard, "The Austrian Theory of Money" in Edwin Dolan, ed., The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976), p. 170. For the most recent discussion of the Regression Theorem, including a reply to Moss's critique of Mises, see James Rolph Edwards, The Economist of the Country: Ludwig von Mises in the History of Monetary Thought (New York: Carlton Press, 1985), pp. 49-67. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Rules | Brandom | I 59 Rule/Wittgenstein/Brandom: application of a rule may prohibit or permit performance - the rule determines the accuracy only if it is applied correctly - therefore, it always takes more rules, down to the last, implicit rules. Interpretation/Wittgenstein: Rules for the application of a rule. >Interpretation/Wittgenstein. I 62 Background: practices. > I 119 Wittgenstein: he uses "rule" in at least three different meanings: 1) Rule says explicitly what one must do. 2) Everything that guides the behavior of the person whose behavior is being judged, no matter if discursively or conceptually. 3) Sometimes just talks about following the rules when behavior is subject to normative judgment. Game: the rule can be a substitute for teaching playfully. But also: a rule is used neither in the classroom nor in the game itself. >Language game. I 120 Color charts and even signposts are expressions of a rule. >Colour. There is no comprehension of a rule that is not an interpretation. Brandom: no rule without asserting, judging and describing. Make an announcement or giving orders is not rule-following. >Rule following. I 820 Rules/Wittgenstein/Brandom: pro Wittgenstein: explicit norms are only intelligible against a background of implicit ones - Vs: nevertheless it is possible that interpretation is involved at every level. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Set Theory | Set Theory: set theory is the system of rules and axioms, which regulates the formation of sets. The elements are exclusively numbers. Sets contain individual objects, that is, numbers as elements. Furthermore, sets contain sub-sets, that is, again sets of elements. The set of all sub-sets of a set is called the power set. Each set contains the empty set as a subset, but not as an element. The size of sets is called the cardinality. Sets containing the same elements are identical. See also comprehension, comprehension axiom, selection axiom, infinity axiom, couple set axiom, extensionality principle. |
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| Set Theory | Prior | I 165 Nouns/Prior: nouns are no names, no class names. >Names, >Singular Terms, >General Terms, >Terms, >Words, >Word Meaning, >Reference, >Predication, >Naming, >Designation, >Denotation, >Comprehension. Epsilon/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: "x ε a": Translation: "A is an element of the class of humans" seems to be a relation between a concrete and an abstract object. >Element relation. Vs: better "x is a": "Russell is a man" - Prior: "is a" is no real verb that makes a sentence of a name, rather a sentence of name and noun - "ε" is not a real predicate. >Predicates, >Predication, >Is, >Type theory. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Sets | Carnap | Quine IX 15 Classes/Sets/Cantor: (historical letter, 1899): Def Set/Cantor: Class or multiplicity, Quine IX 16 which one can think of as "coherent", as from a "unit" or a "finished" thing. Def Class/Cantor: Postulate: a class or multiplicity is a set if it is of the same thickness as a set, or if it is a subclass of a set, or if it is the classes of all elements of elements of a set. >Set theory, >Element relation, >Comprehension, >Classes, >Subsets, >Sets. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sets | Field | I 157f Operator/sets/Field: sets can be obtained from the operator "exactly the same things that are __, __ are" plus predicate functor "{x} I. ..". >Comprehension, >Set theory, >Classes, >Operators. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Sets | Frege | IV 14/15 Set/class/term/FregeVsSchröder: one cannot speak of "classes" without having a concept. ((s)>Intension determines >extension). IV 95 Class/Frege: a class has a conceptual scope, not a concept. >Comprehension, >Term scope. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Sets | Quine | IX 21 Ontology/Class/Sets/Relations/Quine: Classes and relations as values of quantifiable variables must be regarded as real objects. >Ontology/Quine. IX 219 Set/Quine: the property to be a set only means that ∃z(x ε z) ((s), there is something that x is a part of) - then ∃y x(x ε y (Ez(x ε z) u Fx)) - since Ez(x ε z) x ε Uϑ. - Even narrower: a ∩ Uϑ ε ϑ - Uϑ is then the class of all sets. The point is that ϑ ε ϑ (if there are extreme classes), so Uϑ is still the most comprehensive class that exists. The condition of being a set: ∃y(z ε y). III 318 Sets/class/von Neumann/Quine: (...) Classes are not sets. IX 228 Set/Neumann/Quine: a class is a set if it is not larger than a certain set (sets can be an element, classes cannot). IV 418 Ontology/Quine: Standards of ontological admissibility: two principles. 1. No entity without identity. 2. Ontological thriftiness. According to Quine, there are physical objects and quantities. V 149 Class/Set/Quantification/Quine: Classically, a quantification via classes is an object of quantification (referential quantification). >Quantification. Class: abstract terms for classes are singular terms. Include/Epsilon/Quine: "ε" is a two-digit predicate or relative general term. "Is an element of." (Originates from the predication scope "is one"). Now we get the theorem of comprehension: V 150 Comprehension/Quine: (1) (EZ)(x)(x ε Z . ≡ Fx) The compression set assigns a class to each element relationship. III 293 Classes/Sets/Condition/spelling/Quine: we always have the need to assign of the class of all and to only assign those objects that fulfill a certain condition. We write this as x^. III 294 Example x^~(x e a) the class of all non-elements of a. These are abstracts. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Terminology | Husserl | Chisholm II 153 Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. We separate files and transcendental objects. II 154 ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing. --- Husserl I 19/57 Husserl: research strategy: scheme part-whole. General thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation. I 37 Real/Husserl: the real is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is constituted by what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units. I 39 Noema(thought)/Husserl: noema has a a) a relational sense: as intension and b) a subject core as a carrier. Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: noesis = perception). I 53 "Principle of all principles"/Husserl: "the principle of all principles" is the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge, e.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method, a "way of givennes to oneself". I 58 Bracketing (era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses. I 42 f Def Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: the perception, comprehension). I 43 Def Noema: Greek: noema means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. And b) it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions. I 44 b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held. I 65 ff A horizon of possibilities is given by any act of consciousness. I 67 Interior Horizon/Husserl: the interior horizon is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning. Outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects. I 68 Appresentation: is co-meaning. I 69 Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity. Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition. Eidetic variation/Husserl: the eidetic variation is activated by contingencies. Constitution/Husserl: constitution is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. I 45 Thought/Husserl: if one understands thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert. I 72 Def Kinesthesia/Husserl: kinesthesia is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence. I 85 Transcendental Ego/Husserl: the transcendental ego has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). Intersubjectivity/Husserl: intersubjective are a) objects, b) social. Objectivity/Husserl: objectivity arises through a variety of perspectives. Environment/Husserl: environment is a) set by the intentional consciousness and b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish. I 89 Def primordiality/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal. --- Tugendhat I 167 "Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object. Tugendhat I 177 Husserl: main term "species": "species" comes from the Greek "eidos", which means "sight" or "appearance" (common feature in Kant, term). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Terminology | Meixner | I, 43f Tropics: individual properties as basic building blocks of reality - then no accidentals but substances. >Accidens, >Substance. Vs: linguistic determinations surpassed, "revisionary" ontology: must depict language as irrelevant. >Ontology. I 45 Group individual: e.g. "the first three chancellors" - constituents: all possible combinations - but: Adenauer's head part of Adenauer, but not a (constitutive) part of the group. >Constitution, >Mereology, cf. >Sets, >Set Theory, >Comprehension. I 56f Def INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: individual-like objects: Example "the round square", but also e.g., Sherlock Holmes, fictitious persons and their parts of the body, of which it cannot be said whether they have certain properties or not - "the man who knew that he knew nothing": not Socrates, but INDIVIDUAL (overdetermined: knowledge/ignorance). >Fiction, >Knowledge, >Predication, >Attribution, >Individuals/Meixner. I 56 Def (initial property-wise) complete: e.g. numbers: we cannot say that they smile or do not smile. >Numbers, >Nonsensical. I 57 Def initial property-wise maximally consistent/Meixner: entities that are ee ee complete and not ee overdetermined - Def maximally consistent/Wessel: (external): a set of formulas that are consistent and no further consistent formulas exist. That is, that any addition of another formula makes the set inconsistent. >Overdetermination, >Consistency, >Properties/Meixner. Def maximally consistent/Meixner: of every individual property, the INDIVIDUAL contains either that one itself or its negation. >Continuous determination/Kant. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Unity | James | Diaz-Bone I 128 Unity/Multiplicity/James: this is the most important philosophical problem, because it has substantive consequences. Is multiplicity really irrelevant? Unity is not the only need. Nevertheless, I will always regard unity as a preeminence to multiplicity. I 130 Unity: the concept alone cannot be a guarantee for the comprehension of the whole through the conceptual idea. The term universe is not an evidence for its actual existence. World/James: instead of the question of unity and multiplicity, the view is of particular importance that it is a space-time continuum. I 131 Unity and multiplicity are absolutely equivalent here! I 131 Causality/James: can be spoken of causal unity or a purpose-unit of the world at all? Multiplicity can be regarded just as eternal as causal unification! I 132 World/James: Neither universe nor multiverse, unity and multiplicity can exist simultaneously and side by side. The world is one in which their parts are connected. It is more and more brought into uniform systems by humanity. (Davidson: description-dependent; >Reality/Davidson, Descriptions/Davidson, Ontology/Davidson, World/Thinking/Davidson). |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Universal Set | Universal set (universal class): comprises an assembly which is a determined by properties. It contains elements and subsets, not the properties. > Comprehension axiom,> self-reference,> paradoxes, > second order logic, > higher order logic, (HOL) |
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| Universe | Quine | VII (e) 97 Universe/v. Neumann/Set Theory/Quine: divides the universe (of discourse) into things that can be elements and those that cannot be. What exists for Zermelo are von Neumann's elements. For the existence of classes, elements and others there are further postulates, which satisfy every condition φ, whose bound variables are limited to elements as values. IX 221 Universe/Quine: we get our expanded universe by adding classes to the extreme universe of new foundations. The resulting system is called an enlargement of the system of new foundations. - We cannot use the old comprehension schema of new foundations. Maintained because for example "(x: Fx} ε ϑ "(Fx stratified)) - "{x: x = x}" is now wrong. - ((s) Because not stratified.). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Use Theory | Schiffer | I 187 Thinking/talking/meaning/use theory/Schiffer: language use in thinking is one thing, language use in speaking another - therefore, we need different theories. >Speaking, >Language use, >Thinking, >Language of thought. I 187 Use theory/reference/meaning/compositionality/Schiffer: new trend: (Putnam 1978)(1) thesis: we can have use theories of language comprehension (not the meaning) which do not require truth-theoretic semantics. - The theories of understanding and reference do not have so much to do with truth than most people think. Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use) nothing is required by a "correspondence" of words and things. 1. Hilary Putnam (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Routledge I 260 Use/Use theory/Schiffer: no problem for simple signals: meaning = use. Problem: composite utterance type: s could mean p, even if never uttered. Solution/Schiffer: that is the reason why the practice should belong to language and not to the individual sentence. >Language use, >Situation semantics. Problem: we need an approach that requires no knowledge of the meaning in the community. - Otherwise everyone would have to understand every sentence. >Language community, >Understanding. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Vocabulary | Field | II 237 Deflationism/VsDeflationism: is it possible that most of our present scientific concepts have less power in a deflationist perspective? >Deflationism, >Concepts, >Observation, >Explanation, >Theory language. Field: perhaps this is so: deflationism shows that there is no best translation of Newtonian terms into modern language. >Theory change, >Meaning change. New Vocabulary/Field: can often be captured with old vocabulary plus higher-order quantification. This is e.g. a Ramsey sentence. >Conservativity, >Ramsey sentence, >Quantification, >Description levels, >Levels (Order). II 267 Applying/Explaining/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - This explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Satisfaction, >Reference, >Unintended models, >Models, >Model theory. II 355 Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number". FieldVs: that is cheating. >Expansion/Field. New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary. Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Yet FieldVsIndeterminism) --- III 9 Pure Mathematics/Application/Field: E.g. Number theory: is not applicable to the world. - For example, set theory: must allow primordial elements for the application. Solution: "impure mathematics": Functions that map physical objects to numbers - Then the comprehension axioms must also contain non-mathematical vocabulary. E.g. instances of the separation axiom. >Comprehension. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| World | James | Diaz-Bone I 128 World/Unity/Multiplicity/James: this is the most important philosophical problem, because it has substantive consequences. Is multiplicity really irrelevant? Unity is not the only need. Nevertheless, I will always regard unity as a preeminence to multiplicity. I 130 Unity: the concept alone cannot be a guarantee for the comprehension of the whole by the conceptual idea. The term universe is not an evidence for its actual existence. World/James: instead of the question of unity and multiplicity, the view is of particular importance that it is a space-time continuum. I 131 Unity and multiplicity are absolutely equivalent here. Causality/James: can then be spoken of causal unity or a purpose-unit of the world at all? Multiplicity can be regarded just as eternal as causal unification. I 132 World/James: Neither universe nor multiverse, unity and multiplicity can exist simultaneously and side by side. The world is one in which their parts are connected. It is more and more brought into uniform systems by humanity. (Davidson: description-dependent; >Reality/Davidson, Descriptions/Davidson, Ontology/Davidson, World/Thinking/Davidson). |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avramides, A. | Davidson Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 97 Method/Theory/Avramidis: Basically, you cannot resolve the difficulty by appealing to counterfactual circumstances in which these problems do not exist. There is simply no actual or possible situation in which the beliefs and intentions of a language user are accessible regardless of language comprehension. This is the full strength of Davidson’s doubt. DavidsonVsAvramides: thus Davidson also doubts the profound epistemic asymmetry: he doubts that we can distinguish observations at the surface of deeper possibilities. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Comprehension Scheme | Bigelow Vs Comprehension Scheme | I 370 BigelowVsComprehension scheme: E.g. Assume that a general description, which we will call an "open-ended type". Perhaps there is a property of being one of the things that is shared by many of those things that match this description. But then there can be many other things that match the description and that may not have the property of being one of those things. There may be things that do not have the property, but match the description! E.g. it may also be that the property of the form "being one of these things" is fulfilled by some but not all things that match the description. VsComprehension scheme/Zermelo-Fraenkel/ZF/Bigelow/Pargetter: ZF propose a replacement for the comprehension scheme: Separation. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Hilbert | Quine Vs Hilbert | IX 187 Notation/Set Theory/Terminology/Hilbert/Ackermann: (1938, 1949): still lean to the old theory of Russell's statements functions (AF): for classes and relations: "F", "G", etc. with repressible indices, in stead of "x ε a" and "xRy" (Russell: "φx" and "ψ(x,y)" Hilbert "F(x)" and "G(x,y)". Quine: the similarity is misleading: The values of "F", "G", etc. are not AF, but classes and extensional relations and so for the only criterion that those are identical with the same extension. QuineVsHilbert: disadvantage that the attention is drawn away from essential differences between ML and logic. IX 188 It encourages us (incorrectly) to just consider the theory of classes and relations as a continuation of the QL, in which the thus far schematic predicate letters are re-registered in quantifiers and other places which were previously reserved for "x", "y" I.e. "F", "EG", "H(F,G)". The existence assumptions become too inconspicuous, although they are far-reaching! Just implicitly by quantification. Therefore every comprehension assertion, e.g. EF∀x(FX >> ... x ...) by such insertions simply follows from "G EF ∀x (Fx Gx) which in turn follows from "∀x(Gx Gx)". This had escaped Hilbert and Ackermann, they also took on comprehension axioms, they realized that they could have taken a primitive concept of abstraction instead (like Russell). Predicate Calculus/Functions Calculus/Church/Quine: (nth order): type theory breaking of after n types, fusion of set theory and logic (QuineVs). E.g. PK 2nd Stage: Theory of individuals and classes of individuals. It was simply seen as a QL where predicate letters are approved quantifiers. The actual QL then became a first stage PK. This trend also contained an erroneous distinction between TT and ML, as if one did not contain as good as assumptions about the other. On the other, hand he nourished the idea that the Ql itself already contained a theory of classes or attributes and relations in its "F" and "G". QuineVs: the vital distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables is neglected. X 96 Logic 2nd Stage/Hilbert's Successor/Quine: "higher-level PK": the values of these variables are in fact sets. This type of introduction makes them deceptively similar to logic. But it is wrong that only a few quantifiers are applied to existing predicate letters. E.g. the hypothesis "(Ey)(x)((x ε y) Fx)": here the existence of a set is asserted: {x:Fx}. This must be restricted to avoid antinomies. QuineVsHilbert: in the so-called higher order PK this assumption moves out of sight. The assumption is: "(EG) (x) (Gx Fx)" and follows from the purely logical triviality (x)(Fx Fx)" As long as we keep the scope of the values of "x" and "G" apart there is no risk of an antinomy. Nevertheless, a large piece of set theory has crept in unnoticed. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: more than mere syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Intuitionism | Poincaré Vs Intuitionism | Wessel I 236 PoincaréVsIntuitionism/VsConstruktivism/Wessel: (Poincaré calls the intuitionists pragmatists): "The pragmatist should take the position of the extension, the Cantorian that of comprehension (compréhension). The objects, however, are there before the inscriptions, and the set itself would exist if there was no one who would undertake to organize it." I 237 Intuitionism/Logic/Wessel: the intuitionists reject not only the concept of the actual infinite, but they also believe that they have to limit logic: Brouwer: the law of excluded third only applies within a certain finite main system, since it is possible to come to an empirical confirmation here. BrouwerVsLogic: as foundation of mathematics. Instead: vice versa! I 238 (s) It is about the practice of the mathematician, therefore the limits of the constructive possibilities are not random or can be overcome easily by logical considerations.) Constructivism/Brouwer/Heyting: examines the construction as such, without inquiring after the nature of the objects, e.g. whether they exist! Law of Excluded Third/Intuitionism/Heyting/Wessel: (a) k is the biggest prime number such that k-1 is also one; if there is no such number, k = 1 (s) "the only prime that is adjacent to another". (b) l is the biggest prime such that l-2 is also one; if there is no such number, l = 1. Wessel: k can really be determined (k = 3), while we do not have any methods to determine l. This leads to the rejection of the law of excluded third: for if the sequence of prime twins was either finite or infinite, then (b) would define an integer. Intuitionism/Logic/Logical Operators/Wessel: because certain laws of logic do not apply here, the different logics are various complexes of operators. But the intuitionists have the same claim, to comprehend the meaning of "and", "not", "or" in the everyday language. Def Conjunction/Intuitionism/Wessel: p u q can be claimed exactly then when both p and q can be claimed. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Neumann, J. von | Quine Vs Neumann, J. von | IX 227 Neumann/Set Theory/Quine: took (1925) extreme classes to extend Zermelo's system. QuineVsNeumann: halted before the full force of the axiom scheme "^ uFu ε θ" or (3) (Chapter 42) unfolded. His system provides "^uFu ε θ" when the bound variables in the formula "Fu" are restricted to all sets, otherwise it does not apply in general. --- IX 228 If the sets should be exactly Zermelo's classes, they could be specified by relativizing Zermelo's comprehension axioms to "Uθ". In particular, every abstraction term from the Zermelo's separation scheme "X n a ε θ" x ε Uθ> x n a ε Uθ, which we would use for "a", would be relativized to "Uθ" additionally. (That is, the "universal class of sets" or "there are only quantities"). Equivalent to this: Since such a relativization is guaranteed that a = z for a certain z we could just take the single axiom (1) x ε Uθ> x n z ε Uθ. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Rorty, R. | Brendel Vs Rorty, R. | I 136 Semantic Truth/pragmatist/Rorty/BrendelVsRorty/Brendel: Thesis: Rorty's approach is less radical than he himself claims, and also compatible with a semantic truth-concept. Truth-Def/RortyVsTruth-Def/Brendel: his rejection of a truth-definition is mainly based on his anti-essentialism. Definition/BrendelVsRorty: is attached to the outdated notion, a definition must capture the "essence". That is outdated nowadays. Definition/Today/Brendel: modern definition theory does not require the comprehension of an "essence". |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Spinoza, B. | Rorty Vs Spinoza, B. | II (e) 104 World/Mind/Matter/Spinoza/Rorty: two equally valid ways of describing the world: one in terms of matter, then in terms of the mind. The order based on the connection of the corpuscles is the same as the order and connection of our ideas. The mind only knows as long as the body is well and vice versa. "We know God all the more, the more we understand individual things." SpinozaVsSocrates: we should not, like Socrates, be discouraged by the fact that there are no teleological explanations for natural events. II (e) 105 The Spirit of God is no more and no less than the comprehension of all relations between individual things. RortyVsSpinoza: as soon as the ways of description are recognized as equivalent, the idea of the natural order is in danger. Also both ways of description can be illusory. >Description Levels. Thus entering the slippery slope down to Kant's unrecognizable thing in itself. Ultimately, the relativism of Protagoras. >Relativism/Protagoras. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Verificationism | Brandom Vs Verificationism | I 193 Verificationism/Def understanding: to understand a concept, is to practically master the circumstances that entitle to approve, regardless of comprehension!. BrandomVs: But claims can have the same circumstances and different consequences of using!. E.g. "I predict that I will write a book about Hegel," - "I will write a book ..." All circumstances that entitle to approve one claim also entitle to approve the other. But the consequences are quite different. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Verificationism | Putnam Vs Verificationism | Danto I 75 Verificationism: radical variant: meaning lies literally in the verification. (PutnamVs verificationism: E.g. The meaning of "Gold" for goldsmiths is then different.) VII 440 Trancendental idealism/Kant/Putnam: thesis: the notion I propose instead is not quite like Kant's trancendental idealism, but similarly truth = idealized rational acceptability. PutnamVsVerificationism: this kind of idealism is not verificationism: it demands that one claims that sentences about the past be understood by asking how we would verify them in the future. Truth/Putnam: Thesis: all I claim is that what is assumed to be "true" must be "justifiable" for rational and reasonable beings based on experience and comprehension (intelligence). VII 441 Putnam: the notion which I point out is only a notion and not a theory. Theory: in order to establish a theory, I would have to at least come up with a theory of idealized warrant. Problem: I think that's not even feasible for actual justification. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Truth nonconceptual | Pro | Chisholm II 138 Perception / meaning / Husserl / Mulligan / Smith: even if perceptions are meaningless, it does not lack any structure. To perceive an object is not yet conceptual comprehension. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Meaning Theory | Dummett, M. | EMD II 110 Dummett: Thesis: the intuitionist explanation of logical constants provides a prototype for a meaning theory in which truth and falsehood are not the central concepts. The basic idea is that to grasp the meaning of a mathematical proposition is not to know what must be the case (fact) but to recognize the construction and determine whether it is evidence or not. The assertion of a mathematical proposition is then not the claim to be true, but that a proof for it exists. Therefore the comprehension of the meaning of a mathematical proposition is shown by the mastery of the mathematical language in use and not every proposition must be decidable! It is sufficient if we recognize the proof. Negation: we understand the mathematical proposition when we recognize what proof is for it. Dum I 150 ff Dummett: in earlier writings. Thesis: the theory of meaning was a theory of understanding. Today: Relationship is more subtle. Neither can be explained by the other. Shi I 3 Dummett: Thesis: meaning theory and theory of understanding are identical. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Meaning Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 261 Meaning / BT / language / Schiffer: all theories of language and thought go from false assumptions - Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. I 264 Solution / Schiffer: we ourselves are still cognitive mechanisms, noise-generating physical information-processing systems. I B264 Schiffer: ultimately it is the way in which we use characters and sounds - described non-semantically and non-psychologically - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). |
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