Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Axioms | Field | I 220 Axiom/Field: a required law can easily be proven by adding it as an axiom - Vs: but then you need for each pair of distinct predicates an axiom that says that the first one and the second does not, e.g. "The distance between x and y is r times that between z and w". Everything that substantivalism or heavy-duty Platonism may introduce as derived theorems, relationism must introduce as axioms ("no empty space"). >Substantivalism >Relationism That leads to no correct theory. Problem of quantities. The axioms used would precisely be connectable if also non-moderate characterizations are possible. The modal circumstances are adequate precisely then when they are not needed. I 249ff Axiom/Mathematics/Necessity/Field: axioms are not logically necessary, otherwise we would only need logic and no mathematics. I 275 Axioms/Field: we then only accept those that have disquotationally true modal translations. - Because of conservativism. >Conservativity. Conservatism: is a holistic property, not property of the individual axioms. Acceptability: of the axioms: depends on the context. Another theory (with the same Axiom) might not be conservative. Disquotational truth: can be better explained for individual axioms, though. >Disquotationalism. I 276 E.g. Set theory plus continuum hypothesis and set theory without continuum hypothesis can each be true for their representatives. - They can attribute different truth conditions. - This is only non-objective for Platonism. >Platonism. The two representatives can reinterpret the opposing view, so that it follows from their own view. >Kurt Gödel, relative consistency. II 142 Axiom/(s): not part of the object language. Scheme formula: can be part of the object language. Field: The scheme formula captures the notion of truth better. >Truth/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Belief Degrees | Field | II 257 Belief Degree/BD/Conditional/Field: the classic laws of probability for belief degrees do not apply with conditionals. - Disquotational Truth/Conditional: refers to the complete: "If Clinton dies, Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes President. Non-disquotational: behaves like disquotational truth in simple sentences. With conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Disquotationalism, >Truth values, >Conditionals. II 295 Belief Degree/Probability/Field: the classic law of the probability of disjunctions with mutually exclusive disjuncts does not apply for degrees of belief when vagueness is allowed. >Probability, >Probablilty law. II 296 Probability Function/Belief Degree: difference: for probability functions the conditional probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional. >Probability function. II 300 Indeterminacy/Belief Degree/Field: the indeterminacy of a sentence A is determined by the amount for which its probability and its negation add up to less than 1. ((s) i.e. that there is a possibility that neither A nor ~A applies.) II 302 Indeterminacy/Belief/Field: some: E.g. "belief" in opportunities is inappropriate, because they are never actual. Solution: Acceptance of sentences about opportunities. - Also in indeterminacy. Solution: belief degrees in things other than explanation. II 310 Non-classical Belief Degrees/Indeterminacy/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary, is a good reason to assume non-classical belief degrees. Moderate non-classical logic: that some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded middle. >Excluded middle, >Non-classical logic. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Conditional | Field | II 253 Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. - >Nonfactualism. Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President. >Disquotationalism. II 254 Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)(1): Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses. >Logic, >Second order logic. II 255 Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them. II 255 Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979)(2): Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true. There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A). Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility. "Deep logic": says what is truth preserving. II 256 Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level. >Acceptability. Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them. >Facts. II 257 Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences". >Probability laws. 1. Robeert C. Stalnaker. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass: MIT PRess. 2.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Field | I 229 Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme. >Psychological states, >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotationalism. I 250 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. >Logical constants, >Language use. Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths. II 199 Correspondence Theory/ontological commitment/Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. >Ontological commitment. FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation. IV 416 VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct. Field pro "epistemic relativism". IV 419 RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense. >Relativism, >Skepticism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Field | I 91 Deflationism/knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist. I 108 VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel - MA: "possibly A" - I 110 Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. I 113 Deflationism/Field: deflationism does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement. Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A. II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central for meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: does not need truth conditions. II 108 Deflationism/Field: Main point: that the deflationism does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. II 114 Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that deflationism does not have to make the choice between facts. Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. II 116 Deflationism/Gavagai: for deflationism there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. II 117 Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic ascent. II 118 Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. II 119 Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the truth conditions p", or not. II 127 VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist or not a fascist". 2. It cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success) 3. It cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse 4. It cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages 5. It gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true") 6. It cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa 7. It cannot explain learning. --- Ad II 260 Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For deflationism, it is senseless to ask why "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Disquotationalism | Field | II 105 Purely disquotational true: 1. Generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which) 2. "True-like-I-understand-it" 3. The concept is use-independent E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate. Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently. Ad II 105 Definition disquotational/(s): "literal". Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it". ((s) So referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic.) Deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence. >Deflationism. Disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it". Cf. >Principle of charity, >Understanding. II 123 Field: Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true. >Tarski-scheme, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Thruth theory/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski. ad II 135 Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words. Disquotational: only repeating literally; this does not work for indices and demonstratives.# >Index words, >Indexicality. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true. >Translation. II 164 Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical. Necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined. - Truth is here always related to the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. II 223 Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker. Cf. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 259 Definition disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless. >Reference. II 261 Non-disquotational view/indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level. >Indeterminacy. II 269 Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones. - Because they are applied primarily to our idiolect. >Logic, >Semantics, >Idiolect. Here they function as logical concepts. - (E.g. "true" for generalization) N.B.: that "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic truth. - Then there is still indeterminacy in translation. II 272 Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Pointing, >Ostension, >Inference, >Inferentialism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Domains | Field | I 247 Truth/domain/deflationism/disquotationalism/Field: "Truth in D" is not disquotational truth. >Disquotationalism, >Deflationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Generalization | Field | II 120 Realism/variant/Field: here: "There are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a truth-term to generalize. >Infinite conjunction/disjunction. Anti-Realism/Variant: here would be the opposite position: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. Cf. >Truth/Peirce, cf. >Assertibility, >Pragmatism. >Ideal justification. Truth-predicate/generalization/truth/Field: For example, the desire to only express true sentences: "I only utter "p" if p." II 121 E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true" - or, for example, they are contingent: "not every one needed to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth. >Disquotationalism. II 205 Partial Denotation/generalization/Field/(s): partial denotation - This is a general case of denotation (not vice versa). >Denotation/Field. II 206 This makes a simple denotation (which is a special case) superfluous. II 207 Partial match: generalization of consistency. >Consistency. II 206 Generalization/Field: E.g. partial denotation is a generalization of denotation. >Generalization. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Logical Constants | Field | II 114 Logical connectives/Deflationism/Field: a major advantage seems to be that it does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it means that "or" obeys the truth value table: It follows from the truth-functional logic, together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning of any facts about the usage. "p" is true iff p follows with conceptual necessity by the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: Conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" obeys the truth value table. - We still need generalization. II 275 Logical constants/indeterminacy/Field: E.g. a logic-beginner: nothing in his informal explanations will show whether he is an intuitionist or a representative of classical logic. For example, the full use by people who only have one of two terms, most likely the term completely. The indeterminacy of logical constants is, however, from a non-disquotational point of view, more illuminating than from a disquotational. >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Probability Distribution | Field | I 257 Nonfactualism/NF/Field: must assume that acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability law, which governs the acceptance of "fact sentences". >Conditionals, >Acceptability, >Probability law. Linearity Principle/Lewis/Field: P(D) = P (D I B). P(B) + P(D I ~ B). P(~ B) - is not acceptable for the nonfactualism if D is a form of A > C. >Nonfactualism. That is, the law for belief degree fails. >Belief degrees, Belief degree/conditional: in conditional conditions, the classical probability laws for belief degrees do not apply. Disquotational truth/conditional: refers to the whole: "when Clinton dies Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes president. >Disquotational truth. Non-disquotational: with simple sentences such as disquotational truth. For conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Truth values. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relativization | Field | II 205 Relativity/relative/absolute/Quine/Field: Ontological relativity on a background language). Disanalogy: Places can only be understood by relations of objects - but this does not apply to words. No "linguistic relation" which would rule out indeterminacy. Real indeterminacy/Field: E.g. no fact decides which translation is the best for Newton's "mass" (net weight or relativistic mass). E.g. a) impulse = mass times velocity and b) mass is invariant (independent of the reference system). The two exclude each other. Solution: Mass partly denotates the one and partially the other. >Partial denotation. II 208 Consistency: is here no question of empirical linguistics. E.g. a) "it would be good" b) "it would be good according to my standards". Analog: disquotational truth: can then be a statement that is relativized to my norms - but no non-relativized evaluative statement can be disquotational true. >Disquotationalism/Field. II 254 Relativization/Field: Problem: in a relativization to a mere subjective probability law we do not get a truth value, but only conditional probability laws. >Probability law, >Truth values. Solution: conditional probability laws of B I A & R, where R is the totality of all truths (known or unknown) of a particular type, then conditionalities are perceivable that are believed only from a misunderstood background (not wrong!) Field: we better do it completely without relativation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Substitutional Quantification | Field | I 245 Substitutional quantification/Field: Solution for the formulation of infinite conjunctions. >Conjunction. I 245 Def Disquotational truth with substitutional quantification: (P: for all sentences, not objects) applies: S is true iff p (if S = p then p). >Disquotationalism/Field, >Disquotationalism, cf. >Referential quantification. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski | Field | I 33f Tarski/Field: According to Tarski the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities like quantities. ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology/Field, >Tarski-scheme. --- II 124 Tarski/Truth: Tarski's truth theory is unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. >Disquotationalism/Field. Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. >Quantifiers. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). >Generalization. DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. >Deflationism. Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) >Compositionality. Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or". >Logical constants. II 125 Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. >Reference, >Denotation. Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: Reference and danotation is not important for it. >Compositionality). II 141 Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. II 142 Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. --- Soames I 477 FieldVsTarski/Soames: Tarski hides speech behavior. Field: Tarski introduces primitive reference, and so on. >language independence. SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms. >Semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Translation | Field | II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Predicate | Field | II 28 "True"/Truth-Predicate/Purpose/Generalization/Generality/Quine/Field: (Quine, 1970)(1): above all, the truth-predicate has the role of generalization. - That is his whole value. - Leeds dito. Field: E.g. "All true sentences of this theory are theorems". Camp/Grover/Belnap/CGB: (CGB, 1975(2), dito). E.g.: "There are true sentences that no one will ever have a reason to believe". --- II 120 Truth-Predicate/Generalization/Truth/Field: E.g. the desire to express only true sentences: "I utter "p" only if p". --- II 121 E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true". - Or, for example, they are contingent: "Not every had to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth. >Disquotationalism, >Disquotational truth, >Speaker meaning. 1. Quine, W.V.O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press (1970) 2. Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap. 1975. A Prosentential theory of truth. Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correspondence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Correspondence Theory | Horwich I 487 Deflationism/M. Williams: (pro) However, we should not call it theory but perspective. He is interesting, not because he tells us something new, but because he denies that we need something beyond that. (VsCorrepsondence Theory, VsCoherence Theory). I 488 Question: What could a substantial truth theory (which goes beyond deflationism) say that deflationism cannot? Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory/M.Williams: appeals to "intuition", which is not a helpful term. (Also Correspondence TheoryVsPragmatism). "Intuition": should be here that even ideally justified beliefs can be wrong. ((s) Whereby the term "ideal" is kept rigid.) Correspondence Theory: then follows realism by saying that truth has nothing to do with justification or acceptability, but with a non-epistemic relation to the world. ((s) Example causation). M.WilliamsVs: if this were the case: even if all philosophers shared this intuition, why should it be more than a cultural prejudice in favor of correspondence theory? Def Epistemic/(s): e.g. justification, acceptability. Instead of e.g. causation. M.WilliamsVsCorrespondence Theory: the intuition against epistemic access to truth is not automatically an argument for correspondence theory. At best it excludes an identification of truth with an epistemic property. Thus it becomes acceptable for deflationism, which does not make this identification either. Disquotationalism//M.Williams: this shows that even disquotational truth is "realistic". That is, truth is not an epistemic property (justification or acceptability, M. WilliamsVsPutnam), just as it is not in a full-fledged correspondence theory. Someone who believes that truth must be epistemic can regard disquotationalism as a "minimal realism". |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Deflationism | Field Vs Deflationism | I 102 Applicability/Mathematics/VsDeflationism: Problem: (see above): Deflationism cannot explain the benefits of the proof theory without having to assume it truth ((s) and thus the existence of mathematical entities (ME). Two attempts at a solution:. 1) there may be a nominalist proof theory which is just as good as the Platonic one. But that would only be a change of subject, as long as nothing more is explained. 2) trying to the explain Platonic proof th. without assuming that it is true. Field II 126 VsDeflationism/Field: 1) Vs: if one simply accepts the T-sentences, that has nothing to do with the content. ((s) Due to equivalence which requires only equal truth values). So the language is cut off from the world. E.g. "There are gravitational waves" is true iff there are gravitational waves has, disquotationally seen, nothing to do with gravitational waves. So we should have a connection between our use of the term "gravitational waves" and gravitational waves, regardless of the scheme. DeflationismVsVs/Field: but Deflationism allows that precisely: it allows for facts that II 127 Refer sentences on gravitational waves regardless of the disquotational truth. E.g. laws of physics. The use is not the only fact that exists here. 2) VsDeflationism/Field: (most important): it cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions E.g. for explanation of behavior, or the explanation of how far behavior is successful. 3) VsDeflationism/Field: it cannot distinguish between a vague and non-vague discourse or between a discourse which is based on facts and one that is not. The following are less important and are discussed in the following sections. 4) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle truth attributions in other languages. 5) VsDeflationism: it gives "true" false modal properties (s) "necessarily true" or "contingently true"). 6) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle ambiguity, indices and demonstratives. 7) VsDeflationism: it cannot explain how we learn from others. FieldVsVs: 4 - 7 per Deflationism. Here my version of Deflationism is radical. II 135 Index Words/Demonstratives/Truth Conditions/Deflationism/Field: we must distinguish two stages of sentences that contain them: 1) focuses on sentence types: there must be no unrelativized T predicate here E.g. a sentence type like "I do not like her" has no truth value. Solution: we can associate a truth value corresponding to a pair of objects : then the sentence is true relative to if b dislikes x. Field: this is not "strictly disquotational", because it involves a grammatical change. 2) Then we need access of unrelativized truth for sentence tokens. That means we must assign an object to each index element. I/Now: is no problem here: that’s "the author of the utterance" or "the time of the utterance". But that is not possible with the others. VsDeflationism: for assigning "this" or "he" we need semantic terms, i.e. it does not work in a purely disquotational way. II 137 Learning/VsDeflationism/Field: Thesis: you need inflationism to explain the learning from others, because we assume that most of what other people tell us is true. ((s) so it is purely disquotational, not merely a repetition, or "true, if the sentence is repeated, because you do not learn meanings from repetition, you need something like paraphrases.). VsDeflationism/Field: 1) with learning some kind of translation must be involved so that a certain inter-personal synonymy is presumed in the inference. 2) even purely disquotational truth + synonymy is not sufficient: E.g. My friend Charley said that in Alabama (a southern state) there was a feet of snow (which never happens). II 138 VsDeflationism/Solution: the reformulated inference works, because a more substantial property is attributed than merely disquotational truth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Field Vs Grice, P.H. | II 223 Radical Deflationism/RD/Terminology/Field: within Deflationism it is disputed whether the W concept must always be disquotational. Narrow Deflationism/Radical Deflationism/Field: Deflationism is uninteresting if it is not considered narrowly (radically). Radical Deflationism only permits purely disquotational truth and Vsinter personal synonymy. Truth/Translation/Radical Deflationism/Field: yet "true" and "satisfied" can be applied to other languages as well. Non-Radical Deflationism/Field: can remain non-trivial if it explains inter-personal synonymy as equality of the computational role. FieldVsSpeaker Intention/Understanding/Truth/Deflationism/Field: the radical deflationism which I favor declares it to be meaningless to ask whether a proposition is true in the sense that the speaker understands it. It’s all about how the listener understands it. II 224 Ambiguity/Deflationism/Solution: according to this, a sentence is true in some uses, but not in others. Translation/RD/Field: the concept of a "good translation" makes sense, but strongly interest-relative and contextual. It should not be understood as a correct translation. Correctness/Translation/Deflationism: the question of the correctness of inter-personal translation is useless. Non-Radical Deflationism/Translation/Field: thinks here that there is an objective concept of synonymy for good translation. VsDeflationism/Utility Theory/Field: it could be argued that it is a contingent fact that we use "snow is white" in a way that the sentence is true if snow is white. So our use of "true" is not purely disquotational. (Because of (2)). VSVs: It’s true that we could have used the sentence differently! ((s) But we do not do it. And it’s about actual use in the actual world). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Linguisticism | Field Vs Linguisticism | II 163 Vs Quasi-Translation/Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Truth/Linguistic View/Field: One could argue that you need additional premises to say that "snow is white" means that it is true that snow is white. But this will be trivial for our own sentence and it will not imply that our own sentence is only true if snow is white. Therefore, it could be argued that the linguistic point of view leaves out a key feature in the attribution of meanings: the truth conditions! Equally it can be said that the attribution of meaning to singular terms or predicates, which does not rely on the conditions under which he or it refers at all, leaves out something important. FieldVsVs: I do not see why the uncontested background assumption. II 164 That "snow is white" is true iff snow is white should not be sufficient. But even if not: Solution/Field: disquotational truth (+ disquotational reference, etc.): according to this view, the Tarski scheme expresses no contingent empirical truth. (accordingly for reference): E.g. "teacher of Alexander" only refers to something if the person was a teacher of Alexander. This is not an empirical coincidence. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Kripke Vs Tarski, A. | III 337 Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage. III 367 Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence". III 410 Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way. Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski. Field I 245 Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (∏/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) for all sentences, not objects") definiert werden. S is true iff ∏p(if S = "p", p). where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?. Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>Semantic Paradoxes, (s) >Everything he said is true). Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates. Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ. KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need. Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für Field I 246 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?. → sQ: Could then be used as a basic term. → Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini. → b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b). → If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well. → Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| |||