Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Articles | Russell | Cresswell I 179 Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ. >Scope, >Narrow scope, >Wide Scope. Russell I X Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names. >Proxy, >Names, >Logical proper names, >Axioms, Typographical abbreviation: >"blackening of the paper", >Formalism. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Scope | Cresswell | I, 179f Scope/Cresswell: E.g. everyone loves someone: a) everyone is such that someone is so that the former loves the second b) someone - someone is so that everyone is so that he, the second named, loves him, the former - game theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: has brought nothing new, what Kamp/Heim did not already have - game theory: sequence of choice. >Hans Kamp, >Irene Heim, >File change semantics, >Game-theorical semantics. II 48 Scope/description/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: sentences about propositional attitudes can always give descriptions a wide range. That is, to make them rigid. >Narrow/Wide, >Rigidity. II 126 He*/scope/Cresswell: wide scope: then it can also be interpreted as "I". Narrow scope: allows "he", "she" or "it". Gods-example/solution/Cresswell:> - speaker index. >Two omniscient Gods/Cresswell, more authors on >"Two omniscient Gods". II 126 "Now"/scope/Cresswell: analog to the case of "I". Narrow scope: here "now" becomes "then". "Here"/Cresswell: Problem: that "people coordinates" could lead to an infinite list - because of the context dependency. CresswellVs: instead I use (Cresswell, 1973a(1), pp. 110-119.) properties of utterances. II 143 Hob/Cob/Nob-Example/Geach/Cresswell: (Geach 1957(2), 628): Cresswell: needs a quantifier, which is simultaneously inside and outside the scope of the attitude-verb. - Solution/Hill/Kraut: intensional objects as surrogates for individuals and a further quantifier. >Cob/Hob/Nob-case. II 150 Names/scope/Cresswell: normally names have a wider reach than modal operators - this is the "modal objection" VsKripke. KripkeVsVs: (Kripke, 1972(3), p. 279.) 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). Logics and Languages. London: Methuen. 2. Geach, P. (1957). Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3. Kripke S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Scope | Geach | I 118 Range/scope: Tradition: Tmesis, logically indivisible operator: either or: E.g. either both: young and stupid or evil - or either young or stupid and evil. I 144 Range: problem with descriptions, not with names. Description, >Nmae. E.g. it is (logically) chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus. Description: Caesar = man who not begat Brutus. Then: narrow scope: logical impossibility; the whole sentence is wrong. Wide scope: someone who is described among other things as non-producer of Brutus ... This sentence remains true. >Narrow/wide. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Scope | Lewis | IV 30 Scope/Lewis: If a quantifier is beyond the reach of the modal operator (MO), we have to limit its object area to the actual world - If modal operators occur within modal operators, we have to start working from the outside to the inside. >Domain/Kripke, >Operator, >Modal operator, >Quantifier/Lewis. IV 33 Scope/De re/de dicto/Lewis: a) narrow scope: (only in actual world): here the modal operator is applied to the already closed sentence. - E.g. every possible world contains one single A so that the sentence ya is true in every possible world - de dicto - this is referentially opaque. - The translation of the apparent Leibnizian identity is invalid. - b) broad scope: here the modal operator is applied to an open sentence to form a new modal sentence f, and the attribute that is expressed by Nf is preceded by the real thing -That is de re - and is referentially transparent. - The translation of the apparent Leibnizian identity is valid here. >de re/Lewis, >de dicto/Lewis. IV 34 Medium scope/Lewis: for each description there are three scopes. Also a medium one: E.g. NM(h = z) - broad scope: de re, transparent: says that the attribute expressed by f is essential and is denoted by z. >Description. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Scope | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper names/Quine: (= descriptions). Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. >Name, >Description, >Rigidity, >Substitution. Improper names: they lead to more complex forms: e.g. "There is one greatest among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina". - e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven." Russell: here, only 7 is a real name. Therefore, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical. >Indistinguishability, >Leibniz principle, >Identity. QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that no new constituent will correspond to them in the new formulation. --- Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. --- Read III 133/134 Scope/Descriptions/Possible World/Read: Narrow scope: the description refers to different objects in different possible worlds - wide scope: the same object in different possible worlds - real names: always large scope. >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms, >Proper names. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
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