Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogies | Feynman | I 349 Analogies/Physics/Electricity/Mechanics: Suppose we wanted to study the behavior of a complex system of several interrelated springs: then it is most practical to build a corresponding electric circuit to simulate the system. Instead of replacing the springs by strength, current and other levels can be regulated more easily. (>Analog computer). >Simulation. I 361 Analogy/Aanalog/Theory/Principle of the Shortest Time/Fermat/Identity/Physics/Feynman: apparently, the statement of the shortest time and the statement that angles are equal in reflection, and that the sinuses of the angles are proportional at refraction, are the same. >Refractive index. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Explanation | Lewis | I (b) 36 Explanation/Law/Lewis: Problem: my behavior is always explained by individual facts premises - Solution: the laws are implied by these individual fact premises - the attributions can only be true if something holds the causal role necessary, e.g., for wishes - this role can only be played by states that are connected causally in the right way with the behavior. >Causal explanation, >Individual causation, >Behavior, >Attribution, >Causal role/Lewis. --- V 218 Explanation/Sylvain Bromberger: something that needs time, language, speaker, etc. - Lewis: also something that can perhaps never be given. V 219 Lewis: even things can explain something. V 220 Event patterns can be described with different descriptions - there is also negative information e.g. about Arctic penguins and that there are no arctic penguins. V 211 Lewis: Thesis: there are no non-causal explanations. V 221 Non-causal explanation/LewisVs: 1) E.g. refractive index - Fermat: light must follow the shortest route - the refractive index is that part of the glass that has not yet been reached by the light - the pattern of alternate routes is part of the explanation, but not part the causal story - the explanation consists in relational information - 2) non-causal: star collapse comes to an end, so as not to violate the Pauli principle - 3) non-causal: possession of anti-bodies does not cause immunity - the immunity consists in the possession of anti-bodies - solution/Lewis: the possession is a disposition - it plays a causal role - solution/Lewis: What is explained is that something protects the patient. V 232 Probability explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation" - it must be distinguished from Fetzer's model: for both are: covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalization about an individual case chances - FetzerVsRailton: as in Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: like argument - LewisVsFetzer: But: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument - LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation, even if the event is extremely unlikely, but in that case a good explanation is a very bad argument - probability/explanation/Hempel: deviates from his deductive-nomological model. >Explanation/Railton. V 238 Explanation/unity/Lewis: Explanation is not a thing of which one can demand unity - rather something of which you can have more or less. LewisVsWhite, Morton: then a "therefore-response" is not an existential statement. V 269 Explanation/Lewis: partly causal, partly non-causal information. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Explanation | Railton | Lewis V 233 Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws. 2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place. If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability. >Deductive-nomological. Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining: 1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws) 2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions. >Sufficiency. LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach. But that is not available! >Covering laws. V 233/234 Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered. Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted! 2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events. 3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause! 4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause. 5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. >Explanation/Lewis. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model. Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it? Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws. If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments. But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little. But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions. "Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient. Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of. Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused. Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs. >Causal dependence, >Causality, >Causes, >Causal explanation. |
Railt P. Railton Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Knowledge | Feynman | I 363 Principle of the Shortest Time/Fermat/"Knowledge"/Feynman: how does light know which path to take? Important: there is an area near the optimum point where, in the first approximation, there is no significant change in time. But there is in second order. Feynman: this is not about causality! >Refractive index, >Causality, >Principles. In fact, the light decides! It practically smells the right path. This is related to the wavelength. I 538 Knowledge/Saying/Language/Uncertainty Principle/Feynman: that we cannot precisely measure place and impulse does not mean a priori that we cannot talk about it. It just means we do not need to talk about it! >Uncertainty relation, >Indeterminacy, >Vagueness. --- Genz II Knowledge/Atoms/Atomism/Feynman: if all physical knowledge were destroyed and only one insight was preserved, the thesis that everything is made of atoms would be the most important one. >Atoms/Feynman. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Laws | Bigelow | I 304 Natural Laws/NG/Bigelow/Pargetter: fall into two groups: a) causal laws: they govern forces. b) non-causal laws: they do not describe relations, but can provide indirect information about forces. Every description of the world imposes restrictions on causal relations. >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal laws, >Relations. I 306 For example: Kepler's laws of planetary motion: they show us which laws cannot be a correct description! They rule out earlier theories. >Descriptions, >Explanations. I 307 Conservation Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. Law of Inertia: explains how, but not why. Indirect indications of the causes are given. For example, when acceleration is observed. However, it does not explain why a body moves at a constant speed if it is not influenced by forces. >Conservation laws. For example, optical laws: provide even less causal information: e.g. Snell's law see >refractive index. Two materials of different density through which a beam of light moves): the height of a point above the surface is equal to the depth of the corresponding point below the surface, multiplied by a constant. It describes how light behaves, but not why it does so. I 308 On the other hand: For example, the law of the least time (> refractive index): between a point above and a point below the entrance area, the light takes the path for which it needs the least time. Assuming that the light moves more slowly in glass than in the air, for example, the light beam takes exactly the same path that Snell's law predicts. Snell's law is thus subsumed under a more general law. Or it is derived from it. Explanation: the law of the least time explains more than just refraction, it explains the path. And the law of reflection (entrance angle = exit angle). Does it also explain Snell's law? I 309 In a sense, yes: it tells us more about the cause of refraction. But still it does not tell us why the light behaves in this way. It seems to explain it when it says that the light takes this path, "so that it" covers the distance in the shortest time. But no one understands that as an indication of a purpose. >Purposes, >Why-questions. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Laws, fundamental | Genz | II 332 Fundamental Laws/Genz: the Fermatian principle (the shortest time, refractive index) is not a fundamental law. But it can be a model for fundamental laws. Principle/Genz: from today's point of view, the fundamental laws of nature can be deduced without exception from the demand that a function called the effect of base variables is as small as possible. Problem: to find out the base parameters and their function. >Laws, >Natural laws, >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Principles | Feynman | I 355 Principle/Theory/Feynman: Principles can explain laws. According to what principle should the law of Snellius be clear at all? >Laws, >Natural laws. I 355 Fermat's Principle of the Shortest Time/Refraction/Foucault: from all possible paths the light could take, it takes the path that requires the shortest time. I 356 The path that leads to the object is chosen, if the mirror had not been present. (~). I 357 Refraction: Transition from air to water: e.g. (Feynman): Suppose someone stands on the shore and sees someone falling from a boat into the water. We can run much faster than we can swim. Therefore, we should choose a path with a longer route on land than the distance in the water. Exactly the same as light does! Important: there is an area near the optimum point where, in the first approximation, there is no significant change in time. But in the second order. >Refractive index. I 358 When the ratio of the speed is n, light should penetrate at such an angle that the ratio of the sinuses of the angles Θi und Θr is the ratio of the velocities of the two media. sin Θi = n sin Θr. I 358 Principle of the Shortest Time/Fermat/Feynman: Conclusions: 1) Reversibility of direction. 2) E.g. the glass block displaces the beam parallel, since the exit angle is equal to the entrance angle. E.g. sunset: the light moves slower in the denser air on the ground. The light therefore chooses the shorter path by an acute angle at the entrance. This means that we can still see the sun, even when it has already gone down. I 359 Bsp mirage I 361 Analogy/Analog/Theory/Principle of the Shortest Time/Fermat/Identity/Physics/Feynman: apparently, the principle of the shortest time and the statement that angles are equal in reflection, and that the sinuses are proportional to the angles at refraction, are the same. >Analogies, >Comparisons, >Comparability. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Hempel, C. | Lewis Vs Hempel, C. | V 232 Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences: 1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all 2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue. I prefer Peter Railton's model: Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.). We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances. Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument! LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument. V 233 Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises. 2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place. If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability. Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation: 1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws) 2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach. But this cannot be achieved! V 233/234 An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones. e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded! 2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified. 3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause. 4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause. E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause. 5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model. Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them? Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.) If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments. But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough. But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions. "Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form. Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree. Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things. Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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