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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Functionalism | Avramides | I 146 Functionalism/Avramidis: functionalism allows to refer to behavior with propositional attitudes, not on linguistic behavior. - It allows a subjective image of the mind. >Propositional attitudes, >Behavior, >Understanding, >Language behavior. I 147 Problem: this requires an indefinite number of further propositional attitudes. I 149 Functionalism/Lewis: we take mental concepts as theoretical terms (TT) and define our mental-theoretical terms by reference to the platitudes (commonplaces) of folk psychology. >Theoretical terms, >Folk psychology, >Everyday language, >Observation. These shall contain both, theoretical terms and the rest. - Then we transform every theoretical term into a name, replace the names with free variables. - then existential closure (of the open formulas ((s) Ramsey sentence). >Ramsey sentence, >Open formula. With that we achieve the original theory with the claim that it has a single implementation. - Then the theory has input/output concepts, but no specifically mental terminology. >Input/output. Problem/Avramides: how do we characterize input and output? BlockVsFunctionalism: either characterizes them chauvinistically or liberally. ((s) Because a purely physical characterization of the inputs and outputs would include or exclude the wrong ones.) >Philosophical chauvinism. I 153f AvramidesVsFunctionalism: if he is set to non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he has to say what distinguishes mental from non-mental systems that have the same functional organization. Avramides: we always start with mentalistically characterized behavior. - Even with the marsians we say that his behavior must have an interpretation. So if normal evidence (Ned Block: not only linguistic, but mainly linguistic behavior) is part of our theory of propositional attitudes, we are committed to a symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. >Language behavior, >Ned Block. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Probability | Schurz | Def Conditional probability/Schurz: the probability of A assuming that B exists: P( A I B) = p(A u B)/p(B). (pB) must be >0. B: conditional event, antecedent. A: conditional event, consequent. In the statistical case, p(A I B) coincides with the rel.frequ. of A in the finite set of all B's. Or with the limit of rel.frequ. in an infinite random sequence of B's. >Bayesianism. Non-monotonicity/non-monotonic/conditional probability /Schurz: conditional probabilities are non-monotonic: i.e. from p(A I B) = high does not follow that p(A I B u C) = high. >Monotony. Objective probability /type/predicate/Schurz: statistical probabilities always refer to a repeatable event type, expressed in a predicate or an open formula. Subjective probability: refers to an event token, expressed in a sentence. E.g. that it will rain tomorrow: tomorrow exists only once. >Subjective probability. Subjective/objective/probability /Reichenbach: Principle for the transfer from objective to subjective probability: I 101 Principle of narrowest reference class/Reichenbach: the subjective probability of a token Fa is determined as the (estimated) conditional probability p(Fx I Rx) of the corresponding type Fx, in the narrowest reference class Rx, where a is known to lie. (i.e. that Ra holds). E.g. Whether a person with certain characteristics follows a certain career path. These characteristics act as the closest reference class. Ex Weather development: closest reference class, the development of the last days. Total date/carnap: principle of: for confirmation, total knowledge. Subjective probability: main founders: Bayes, Ramsey, de Finetti. Logical probability theory/Carnap: many authors Vs. Mathematical probability theory/Schurz: ignores the difference subjective/objective probability, because the statistical laws are the same. I 102 Disjunctivity/ probability: objective. The extension of A u B is empty subjective: A u B is not made true by any admitted (extensional) interpretation of the language. Probability/axioms/Schurz: A1: for all A: p(A) > 0. (Non-negativity). A2: p(A v ~A) = 1. (Normalization to 1) A3: for disjoint A, B: p(A v B) = p(A) + p(B) (finite additivity). I.e. for disjoint events the probabilities add up. Def Probabilistic independence/Schurz: probabilistically independent are two events A, B. gdw. p(A u B) = p(A) times p(B) . Probabilistically dependent: if P(A I B) is not equal to p(A). >Conditional probability, >Subjective probability. I 109 Def exhaustive/exhaustive/Schurz: a) objective probability: a formula A with n free variables is called exhaustive, gdw. the extension of A comprises the set of all n tuples of individuals b) subjective: gdw. the set of all models making A true (=extensional interpretations) coincides with the set of all models of the language considered possible. I 110 Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. >Probability theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Proxy Function | Quine | VI 43 Proxy Function/Quine: is every explicit and reversibly unambiguous transformation f - E.g. if Px originally meant that x was a P, we therefore re-interpret Px so that it means that x is now f of a P -according for multi-digit predicates - the predicates then apply to the correlates fx instead to x - all sentences stay as they are - observation sentences remain correlated to the same stimuli - but the objects of the theory have changed dramatically - ((s) Example: There is a Gödel number of x.) >Predicates/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine VI 45 Ontology/Loewenheim/Proxy Function/Quine: the different ontologies resulting from both are unambiguously correlatable - and as a whole empirically indistinguishable. - E.g. Tabhita: is only Geach’s cat or cosmos minus cat - distinction: is relativistic: by the role that one plays relatively around the other - even the link to trained stimuli remains intact - the nodes where we assume the objects are neutral. >Ontology/Quine Lauener XI 145 Definition proxy function/Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: a function that assigns to each object of the original theory such a one from the new theory. - E.g. The Goedel number of - to reduce one theory to another. Proxy Function/(s): maintains number of digits of the predicates (fulfillment of n-tuples of arguments by n-tuples of values). - Thus it averts the trivialization of a reduction to a theory of natural numbers (> Loewenheim). XII 72 Proxy Function/PF/Reduction/Quine: must not be reversibly unambiguous. E.g. irreversible proxy function which reduces a theory of expressions and fractions: Expressions by Goedel numbers, fractions with diagonal process. Then the same number can stand for a fraction or an expression. - That is ok, because fractures and expressions are so different that the question of identity does not arise, therefore, the original theory does not benefit from the differences. -> multi-sort logic - if, in contrast, all elements of the initial theory are distinguishable. (E.g. pure arithmetic of rational or real numbers) you need a reversibly unambiguous proxy function. >Reduction/Quine XII 74 Apparent Class/Quine: is given by open formula - E.g. a proxy function can be construed as an apparent class, if it is a function as an open formula with two free variables. - (> apparent quantification). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Truth Values | Schiffer | I 127 Truth value/mind state/Schiffer: mind-state tokens also have truth values. >Mental states. ((s) No truth values have: sentences in mentalese/language of thought; inner states like brain states.) >Brain states, >Mentalese. ((s) Also no truth values have: subsentential expressions.) >Subsentetials, >Words, >Open formulas, >Propositional functions. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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