Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 61 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent. |
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| Concepts | Brandom | I 152 Concept/Brandom: One must have many concepts in order to get an idea. I 948 Definition concept/Frege: the concept is the semantic correlate of predicates, namely their "meaning" not their "sense". So concept defined by reference. >Predicates, >Meaning, >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. I 599f Concept: mere distinctive reactivity is not enough to recognize the application of concepts. I 601 Rationalist addition: the inferential role of reaction is critical. >Inferential role. I 852 Concept/BrandomVsKant: should not be separated dualistically from the non-conceptual. I 853 Concept/Conception/Kant/Brandom: B relates to A as 1) form to matter - 2) general to particular - 3) spontaneity (activity of the intellect) to receptivity. BrandomVsKant: these are orthogonal and independent - no contrast to the non-conceptual - Content of the judgment also conceptual - Brandom: ad 1: if the mind does not change its material, it is superfluous (> Hegel, Phenomenology) - ad 3) contrast between conceptual/causal order: Kant was unable to construct this as a contrast between concepts and causes. I 856 Definiton concept/Brandom: inferential role - it is about relations between concepts (e.g. East/West) not about relations between concept and object. >Inferential role. I 860 Conceptual structure/Brandom/(s): by repetition (anaphora) - necessary for cognitive purposes - conceptual content: by substitution? - ((s) or, more precisely: exchange of frames?). I 862 Inferential structure: ideally allows costruing thinking and the world as represented with an identical structure - conceptual structure of assertions: about E. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Concepts | Carnap | VI 5 Concept/Object/Carnap. also properties, relations etc. are all objects - to each concept belongs an object - but it dos not "fall under" it - term u object are the same functionalization of the term., >Object, >Objects(material things). VI 242 Concept/Object/CarnapVsFrege: the border between concept and object is sometimes fluent. - Question: if something is a real object or rather a conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe). - Relation: it is controversial whether e.g. distance is something real. >Semantic ascent, >Ontology. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Concepts | Chisholm | II 73/74 Terms/Kant/Sauer: Kant assumes analytic judgments to be partial explications of concepts. > Carnap. >Explication, >Analyticity, >Judgments. Chisholm: Concepts contain also predicator rules (Lorenzen, Erlangen school: >Dialogical logic.) Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Concepts | Davidson | I (d) 71 Concept/Davidson: We do not make out the words first and then try to figure out what they mean. - Instead: the use defines the content in the fundamental cases. (Pro use theory). >Use theory, >conceptual schemes/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Dennett | II 13 Criteria/Recognition/Dennett: E.g. An animal is confused. Question: "what is the conceptual content of it being confused?" II 57 Concepts/thinking//animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: a thought must consist of certain terms. II 58 Question of the description, resp. the formulation: Example A bowl with meat, a bucket with food, "the tasty stuff that tastes like this and like that"... Translation/Ascription: could we e.g. in English, express exactly the thought that the dog thinks? II 59 If not, then dogs can either not think at all, or their thoughts cannot be expressed at all, and so they lie outside our horizon. >Thinking without language, >Language and Thought, >Animal language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Dummett | I 109 Term: Conceptual thinking involves exceptions to the rule. >Rules. I 67 Knowledge/Concept/Dummett: In order to find something interesting you do not to know need the term "interesting". - but to perceive something as red, you need the term "red". >Conceptual content, >Thinking, >Problem solving. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Concepts | Evans | McDowell I 73 Concept/term / Evans: a term is activated only in the judgment, not in the perception or experience. By the judgment a new type of content comes into play. >Perception, >Language use, >Content, >Judgments. Frank I 569/70 Idea/concept/Evans: the two can not be equated, otherwise there is no possibility of deception. - But they can not be separated either: otherwise the appropriateness of the idea can not be justified. >Idea, >Imagination, >Correctness. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Concepts | Frege | II 29 Def Concept: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value. Concept: a concept is not an object in itself, while the concept scope (value progression, i.e. with an inserted value for the variable) is an object. >Object, >Truth value, >Function. II 66 f Concept: a concept is predicative, unsaturated and not an object. The inclusion of an object in a concept is an irreversible relation. E.g. "The morning star is nothing but Venus" but not "Venus is nothing but the morning star." II 66 f An equation is reversible, a predication is irreversible (intension, false: "Venus is nothing but the morning star.") >Intension, >Identity. II 66 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate) but always only a subject. A concept is not an object. The "meaning" (reference): is an object. E.g. the concept horse is not a concept (but just an object). Similarly: E.g. "This rose is red" and we say: "The grammatical predicate" "is red" is part of the subject "this rose". Here, the words "The grammatical predicate" "is red" are not a grammatical predicate but a subject. This is difficult to grasp, the city of Berlin being a city and the volcano Vesuvius being a volcano. II 71 > Def Concept: Meaning of a predicate. ((s) QuineVs: >Predicates/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Meaning/Quine). II 74 Number/Numbers/Concept/Object/Frege: Figures are statements about a concept. E.g. "There is at least one root of 4" is not about a specific number 2 but about a concept: the root of 4. On the contrary: e.g. "The concept root of 4 is fulfilled": the first 5 words form the name of an object. Something is being said about an object. Fulfillment/Frege/(s): fulfillment is not a property of a concept, but of an object. The fulfilled object is the concept. >Satisfaction. II 80 Object/Relation/Frege: Problem: with the words. "The relation of being included in an object": we mean no relation but an object - ((s) the words are the name of the relation, the relation is an object). I 82 Concept/Frege: E.g. "All whales are mammals" is about concepts - not a single animal can be shown. It is better than to speak of an "indefinite object" > number: not the objects but the concepts are the carriers of the number. IV 110 Concept/Frege: whether a term is contradictory must be shown through research. Tugendhat I 195f Concept/Frege: "logical basic relationship": is the inclusion of an object in a concept", whether it is properly applied: is not a logical, but empirical question. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Concepts | Geach | I 26ff Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept. I 220 Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). >Description level, >Level/Order, >Senseless, >Object. >Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human being is timeless". I 226 Concept/Frege/Geach: Frege has a purely extensional view - therefore he deals not with the "sense of the name", but the reference of the predicate. ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) >Extension. But: Extension/Frege/Geach: = object Concept/Frege: not an object! Reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name. >Name/Frege. I 228f Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise" ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise". Sentence/Geach: sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity". - Sentences about concepts need a quantifier. >Quantifier, >Quantification, >Sentence/Geach. I 230 Concept/Geach: a concept cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. >Predicate/Geach, >Predicate/Frege. VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x". >Names/Geach. Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'." I 234 Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary! >Concept/Quine, >Object/Quine. GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it. >Element relation/Quine, >Class/Quine. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Concepts | Heidegger | Concepts in: M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1993 Heidegger III Abhängigkeit (der Realität von der Sorge) 212 Angst 182,186, 342 Antike Ontologie (logos bei Platon, Aristoteles, copula) 159,160 Augenblick 427 Auslegung (Vorhaben, Vorsicht, Vorgriff) 150 Ausrichtung 108 Aussage 154 ("als"):158 Aus-sein auf 261 Bedeuten 87 Bedeutsamkeit 364 Begegnen (Ganzheit) 85 Bewandtnis 84 Besorgen 56/57 Bestehen (nicht vorhanden, nicht zuhanden) 333 Bezirk 67,114,248 (Metaphysik),283,398 Charaktere 250 (Existenz: sich vorweg gericht in die Zukunft) (Faktizität: schon sein in Gewesenheit) (Verfallenheit: sein bei Gegenwart) Da 132,263 "Da" (Vereinzelung) 263 Dasein (ist seine Erschlossenheit) 133,134 ("Dass es ist"), 284, (Dasein selbst: Erstreckung) 374 Ego cogito (ich denke etwas) 321 "Einfühlung" 125(Vs) Ekstasen: Gewesenheit Zukunft Gegenwart 328 Entdecktheit (nicht Daseinsmäßiges) 85,218 (Wahrheit) Ent-Fernung 105 Entschlossenheit 296/97, 305 Entwurf 145, (=Existenz): 284 Erbe (und Überlieferung) 383 Erkennen 202 Erschlossenheit 75,220,260 Erwarten 262 Evidenz (Vorhandenes) 265 Existenz (=Entwurf) 284 Existenzialien statt Kategorien 44 Existenzialität Struktur der Existenz 16 Existieren 263,284 Faktizität 56,135,222,250,259,284,241,362,379 (F. contra Tatsächlichkeit): 276 Freigabe (Woraufhin; verweist auf Phänomen Welt) 85/86 Freiheit 188 Furcht 140 (Näherung der Nähe) Fürsorge 121 Gegend 103,368 (>Platz) Gegenwart (eigentliche: Augenblick) 338 Gerede 168 Gewärtigen 337(uneigentliche Zukunft) Gewissheit 256/57,265 Gewesenheit Gegenwart Zukunft 327 Gewissen 270ff Gewissenlosigkeit (Bedingung für existentiell "gutes" Handeln) 288 Gewaltsamkeit 311 Geworfenheit 135,179 Grund 284 Handeln (verantwortlich) 288,300 "Idee" (keine Deduktion) 182 Innerzeitigkeit 333 In-Sein, In der Welt sein 53 (wohnen bei, vertraut),188 Jemeinigkeit 240 Kant (VsKant: Zeit: unmittelbar physisch wahrnehmen) 419 Kants Dunkles Zimmer (Orientierung "rechts, links") 109 Lichtung (Erschlossenheit des Daseins): 170 (vor aller Zeitlichkeit): 350 Man 126 Man selbst 129 Mitdasein, Mitsein 118,120,121 (Mitsein als Umsicht) 123 Möglichkeit 187 Neugier (Zerstreuung) 172 Nichtigkeit 285,305 nicht 283,284 "Nichts" 279 Nietzsche (zur Historie) 396 ontisch-ontologisch 8,11,13,185 Platz 368 Raum 368 (109 113) Region 64,114 Ruf 269ff "Rufer" 274 Sagen 169 Sein zum Tode 266 Selbstheit (Weise) 267ff (Bezeugung, Ruf) Schicksal 384,386 Schuld (schuldig) 287 Sinn 151 Situation 299 Sorge 192 (sich vorweg schon sein in (der Welt) 198 (Sorge Gedicht, Herder,Vorrang der Sorge vor Leib und Geist) "Subjekt" (ontologisch) 320,366 Substanz des Menschen ist die Existenz 212 Substanzialität: Seinscharakter der Naturdinge 63 Theorie 358ff Tod 245,250,258 (Tod anderer, Vertretung): 237 transzendieren 363 (Schwere des Hammers setzt Objektivierung voraus, nicht zuhanden) Uhr 413 Umschlag Besorgen/Entdecken 360,361 Umsicht 56,69,123,172 Unbestimmtheit 308 Unwahrheit 308 Verfallen 176, (ontisch/ontologisch) 293 Vergessen (Wiederholbarkeit) 399,342,344 Verschlossenheit 348 Verstehen 87,144,145,363 Verstehen (des Anrufs) 288 Verweisung 74,77,78,82 (Zeigen Verweisung Beziehung) Volksgemeinschaft 384 Vorhandensein = "existentia" (trad.) 42 Vorlaufen 262 Wahl 268, 287 Wahrheit (Entdecktheit und Entdeckend sein) 218,316, (W. vorausgesetzt) 227,316 Welt, "Welt" 64/65, ("weltlich" = innerweltich Seiendes), Weltlichkeit, (die Welt ist nicht mehr) 380 Werden 243 Wiederholung 385 Wissenschaft 358ff Worum willen (In der Welt Sein des Daseins) 84 Zeichen 76ff Zeit ("wesentliche") 329, (Zeit Raum): 367, 408 (gewärtigen: Zukunft gegenwärtigen: jetzt, behalten: Gewesenheit) 408, ("Weltzeit" = innerweltliche Zeit, auch vorher) 424 zeitlicher Horizont 365 Zeitlichkeit des Seins, Seinsweise des Daseins temporal 19,23 Zeitlichkeit der Furcht (Angst) 342 (Zeitlichkeit: Seinssinn der Sorge) Zeitlichkeit der Seinsmodi Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, Verfallenheit 350 Zeitmessung 414 Zeug (im Besorgen begegnend) 68 Zirkel (nicht vitiosus) 152/53,314 (als "Entwurf" zulässig, Grundstruktur der Sorge) Zuhanden 69,71,324 Zukunft (Zeitlichkeit) 326, (Vorrang):329,330, (eigentliche Z.: Vorlaufen) 336,408 |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Concepts | Husserl | I 34 Concept/Husserl: concepts are empty. Synthesis arises by connecting it with vivid insight. >Recognition, >Perception/Husserl, >Knowledge. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Concepts | Kant | Term/Kant: "intuitions without concepts are blind." (KrV B 75) --- Strawson V 22 Terms/Kant: not any arbitrary amount of terms is sufficient for us - there must be terms of persistent objects and re-identifiable objects in the room. V 23 The distinctions must be created in the terms themselves, because there is no "pure perception of a reference system". V 122 Terms/Kant/Strawson: objects can only be changed in the context of a recognition - respective restrictions must somehow be reflected in the terms. - But it is not about a specific link but about the existence of any such links. V 123 Terms for objects are always summaries of causal law. V 128 Terms/StrawsonVsKant: terms are not yet socially characterized by him. --- Tugendhat I 191 Term/Kant: a term is a general idea, mediate. Intuition/Kant: immediately. Tugendhat: ambiguous: Imagined or subjective imagined - Kant per the latter. Objective meaning: "nota communis" common feature -> = species/Husserl. --- Bubner I 105 Knowledge/judgment/Kant: knowledge is formulated in judgments which always presuppose concepts. Concept/Kant: in terms, must be done transcendentally, then the realization of knowledge must be guaranteed by judgments. >Judgment/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Concepts | Kripke | I 141 Origin of terms: "this thing" - any property attributed to that object at that moment may turn out to be falsely attributed. >Natural kinds, >Reference/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Concepts | Locke | Rorty IV 36 Myth of the Given/Locke/Rorty: imagines that if we invent "green" we simply translate from the mental thing into our language. >Myth of the given, >Color words, >Language of thought, >Language/Locke. Danto I 110 Term/Locke/Danto: two ways: 1st analytically from the dictionary: shaping the understanding of the essence - 2nd e.g. data from experience "yellow", "good" - are different from experience to ecperience -> Good/Moore. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Concepts | McDowell | I 33f Concepts/McDowell: are used in receptivity. Concept/McDowell: something that lies beyond the reach of spontaneity of naming "a concept" and then calling the relationship "rational", is fraudulent labelling. >Spontaneity. I 59 Concept/McDowell: we must not imagine the world to be "behind the outer border of the conceptual realm". Otherwise Davidson would be right, of course, there would be nothing but purely causal effects of the world on us. But there is no such border. We can say this now without becoming idealists because of it or disregarding the independence of reality. >Myth of the given, >Reality. I 86 Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue: When someone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. >Experience/McDowell, >Judgment/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Concepts | Meixner | I 153 Name of a term/Meixner: the very term (the name cannot be owned as property). >Names of sentences, >Names of expressions, >Clauses, >Names, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Properties. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Concepts | Nagel | I 50ff Conceptual scheme/NagelVs alternative conceptual schemes: There are such schemes, from which we could not even then get out when we look at ourselves from the outside as thinking beings. Therefore, the idea of a different kind of consciousness or conceptual scheme contributes nothing to distance ourselves from such thoughts. >Conceptual scheme, >Scheme/content, >Language community. I 61 ff The type of match does not make the whole concept. Just as sensory perception, through which one detects a physical object, does not make the whole concept of this detected object. (Vsuse theory of meaning). >Use theory, >Correspondence. Meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense, which already implies meaning. >Language use. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Concepts | Peacocke | I 89f Concept/Peacocke: a concept is a way to showcase a property. Translation: the translation cannot preserve both the property and the way of givenness. >Way of givenness, >Properties, >Translation, >Representation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Concepts | Poundstone | I 95 Projectability/Poundstone: three types of situations in which positive examples of something are not transferable: 1. Grue/bleen Paradox > >Additional hypotheses, >Hypotheses, >Predication, >Knowledge, >Certainty. 3. "All emeralds are been observed": there are no unknown emeralds. - This is well rooted in the language, but not expandable (not projectible). >Induction. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Concepts | Putnam | VI 392 Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: concepts could be mental particulars, i.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign. >Regress. PutnamVsOckham: problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW or another sign, with REFERS. VI 393 On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head", Putnam pro). >Use, >Sign, >Particulars, >Reference, >Relation. But: problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects" ((s) "concept": here means "way of using characters"). If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains. --- Putnam V 40ff Concepts/Putnam: concepts cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public. They are (partially) skills, not incidents. --- I (b) 63 Cluster concept/Putnam: e.g."human" as a list of properties. PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means". >Convention, >Meaning(Intending). I (g) 190 Concept/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts, e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? Possible worlds deliver too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. >Ontology, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Possible world/Putnam, >Essentialism. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties. Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted the essential characteristics to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world (e.g. a liquid other than H20 is water). This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. We just say water should be nothing else (intention). That is simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) (Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference (materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationships). >Reference, >intrinsic, >Materialism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Concepts | Quine | Rorty I 216 (According to Rorty): concept, meaning: Quine: is only a type of intention. And all intentions are to be overturned. "Means", "believes" and "wishes" have no behavioral equivalent; "opinion" and "desire" are just as dispensable as the terms "concept" and "intuition". RortyVsQuine: concepts and meaning are harmless as long as they are postulated to explain our behavior. They only become harmful when they are supposed to be the source of a certain kind of truth. Rorty VI 170 Language/World/Quine/Rorty: Vs separation between the conceptual and the empirical. Stroud I 216 Conceptual Sovereignty/Quine/Stroud: a meagre input is light/dark, temperature variations, etc. Rich output are theories about the world. Sovereignty: we discover something about the meagreness and thus discover the extent to which science is our "free creation". Quine VIII 25ff Quine/Concept: the word (!) "horse" can be seen as a designation of a certain characteristic, which is an abstract combination of characteristics. Qualities/Existence/Quine: the special existential statement "There is a thing that is horse" (not a horse) does not indicate that there are horses, but that there is the characteristic. IV 419 Concept/Quine: Quine deliberately chooses no observation concepts as starting points, since sentences have semantic priority over predicates! Sentences are first and foremost determined by sense data, not by concepts. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Concepts | Rorty | I 185 ff Concept/Rorty: Neither are there views that can be dissolved to terms (like Carnap), nor internal relations between concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in the Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytic philosophy". I 192 RortyVsOxford: there are no grammatical discoveries alone between terms. I 326f RortyVsPutnam (internal realism): this means no more than that we should congratulate ourselves on the invention of the term lithium, so that something stands for lithium, for which all the time there had been nothing. The fact that based on our insights we are coping with the world very well is true, but trivial. That we adequately reflect it is "just an image". Cf. >Picture Theory. I 339f Platonic concepts: the trouble with them is not that they are "false", but that not much can be said about them. They cannot be naturalized or otherwise connected with our needs. Davidson: would probably say the good would not require verificationist arguments. >Platonism, >Ideas/Plato. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Concepts | Schiffer | I 63 Def Individual concept/Naturally/Russell: "the P" that is the property of unambiguously having P - nothing else has it - may contain yourself and the present moment. >Individual concept. Definite description: the thing that is now R (relation) for me = reduction to thoughts de re. >Description, >Definite description. (EP) (Emily instantiates the P and the B (Ralph The proposition >Individuation, >Uniqueness, cf. >One. I 66 Problem/Schiffer: that is not sufficient for believing that something is a dog, because you can believe that something belongs to a biological genotype, without believing that it is a dog. >Elm Trees/Beech Trees. Wrong: "species of these things" - could be mammal, pet, male, spaniel etc. >Reference class. Complete content: is never of biological nature: it does not work with children. - E.g. shepherd dog is more wolf-like than a poodle. I 68 Not a metalingual individual concept: "What experts call a dog": 1) not manageable 2) no property that only dogs have. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Concepts | Searle | V 151f Concept/Frege: the "concept horse is not a concept". Searle: "concept" is used in the language in a double sense. The "concept horse" can be the grammatical subject but not the predicate of a sentence. The property of being a horse is in itself no ascription of a property. Property predicates do not mean the property. >Predicates/Searle. Frege, the "concept horse" is not a concept in itself (but an object) and self-ascription of a property is not a property. >Predication, >Attribution, >Syntax, >Grammar, >Subject. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Sellars | I 76 Concept/experience/Sellars: it is not true that we have the concept of something because we recognize that sort of thing. It is rather the reverse: the ability to recognize a type of something, presupposes that one already has the concept of this type. We cannot have the impression of a tree, if we do not have the concept of the tree. >Appearance, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Seeing, >Seeing-as. --- II 308 Concept: A conceptual object will become what it is, only by the difference that was caused by its presence in at least some inferences. This is a familiar theme in contemporary philosophy. > Inferentialism/Brandom, inferential content/Brandom, inference/Brandom. --- Field II 166 Term/Schiffer: a term is only the shadow of subsentential expressions. >Subsententials. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Concepts | Stalnaker | I 81 Def Individual Concept/Stalnaker: an individual concept is the function of possible worlds on individuals. Thesis: as some singular terms are not rigid (e.g. "the baddest man in America"), so are some predicates. >Rigidity, >Predicates, >Individual concept. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Concepts | Strawson | I 163 Monad/Strawson: simplest form: the concept of an x, that... - but not determined by the relative clause, but the concept of these things. E.g. the concept of a person who has killed a man: Universal, but no monad. Because it is not a complete concept. >Universals, >Complete concept. Strawson: in the real world a complete description is completely meaningless. >Description, >Completeness, >Situation, >Fact. I 164 Complete Concept/Leibniz/Strawson: classes can be formed from complete descriptions if the descriptions given by the relative clause contain in both cases identical, but differently arranged elements. >Relative clause. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Concepts | Wittgenstein | II 32 Concept/Logical Form/Wittgenstein: E.g. "thing", "complex", "number" are not concepts, but logical forms. Concept/Wittgenstein: can be expressed as a propositional function - Number: is a pseudo concept - must occur within the brackets - e.g. (Example number). Fx. >Numbers. False: (e.g.).x is a number - wrong: (e.g.).x is a thing - AF: f() = () is a human. But not: f () = () is a number! II 34 Pseudo Concept: e.g. "color", "primary color": it draws a limit to language - Concept: e.g. red: draws a line in language. >Colours, >Language. II 39 Point: (in maths) not a concept. II 254 Concept/Meaning/Experience/Wittgenstein: the fact that a thing corresponds to a concept is not an empirical fact. - In a sense, it must always have corresponded to it. - ((s) but our concepts are like rules) - ((s) therefore correspondence is not a natural fact) >Correspondence, >Representation, >Experience. On the other hand: correspondence with a pattern is an empirical fact. II 255 Rules: do not follow from the concept, but are constitutive for it - the rules are also not included in the concept - a symbol connected to a concept is just another symbol. >Symbols. --- IV 46 Formal Concepts/Function/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4,126 formal concepts - (e.g. numbers, name) - cannot be represented by a function - each variable is the sign of a formal concept. >Signs. IV 46f Pseudo Concept/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: e.g. object - the variable name x is its real sign - correct use: "(e.g.) ..." - otherwise pseudo-sentences are formed - Pseudo-sentence: -there are objects- correct sentence: e.g. -there are books - Pseudo-sentence: to speak of the number of all objects. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Concepts | Wright | I 162 ff Concept/Wright, Crispin: concepts appear intensionally in the response to judgments. Thus they do not make any requirements for the details of their extensions. >Extension, >Intension, >Judgment. I 201 ff Perception/Theory/Wright: 1) Observing equals perceiving, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensation, because it is conceptually characterized. (McDowell pro). This is now a good basis for the conception that the conceptual features of the subjects are different. >Theory ladenness, cf. >Psychological Nominalism. 2) Any pre-philosophical statement about the material world goes beyond experience in infinitely many ways. >Experience. 3) The comprehension of concepts does not merely consist in classifying. They include the possession of beliefs (e.g. that things form a species at all). >Beliefs. --- II 229ff Concept/Predicate/Wright: e.g. concept: color - predicate: red. >Predicates, >Predication. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Concepts | Flusser | I 161 Concept/Imagination/Flusser: We constantly try to imagine terms, to comprehend this idea, and then to make this concept conceivable again. >Imagination, >Conceivability, >Images, >Interpretation, >Interpretation("Deutung"). This overbidding of imagination through conception and vice versa, in which images become conceptual (concept art) and texts "imaginary" (science fiction) is an important aspect of today's "crisis of art". >Literature, >Art, >Texts, >Fiction. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Concepts | Adorno | Grenz I 121 Concept/Adorno/Grenz: the synthetic moment of concepts proves the non-conceptual to be its content: "The non-conceptual, the indispensable to the concept... I 122 ...disavowes its being-in-itself and changes it. "(Negative Dialektik(1), p. 139). >Syntheticity. Adorno XIII 213 Recognition/nature/Epicurus/Adorno: Problem: how do you bring this together: to teach at the same time the being-in-itself of nature, which is thus independent of us and yet to accept our sensory perception as the source of all recognition? >Nature/Adorno, >World/Thinking, >Cognition, >Theory of Knowledge. Solution Epicurus: recognition is a relatively early model for what I designate with aporetic terms. >Epicurus. Aporetic concept/Adorno: such concepts are not formed because there are any facts directly corresponding to them, but the theorists look at them, because their otherwise motivated theories would remain in unresolved contradictions and escape the unification. >Unification, >Unity, >Identity/Adorno. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Concepts | Aristotle | Gadamer I 436 Concepts/Aristotle/Gadamer: [in the] Epagoge-Analysis(1) (...) Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. (...) he thus [takes] into account (...) the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. In this respect, also according to Aristotle, the formation of linguistic concepts possesses a completely undogmatic freedom, in that what is seen as common in experience and thus leads to the general, has the character of a mere preliminary work, which stands at the beginning of science, but is not yet science. Proof/Science/AristotleVsSpeusippus/AristotleVsPlato: If science sets up the compelling ideal of proof, it must go beyond such procedures. Thus Aristotle criticized Speusipp's doctrine of the common as well as Plato's dihairetic dialectic from his ideal of proof. See >Analogies/Speusippus; >Language/Aristotle. 1. An. Post. B 19. --- Adorno XII 50 Concept/Aristotle/Diogenes Laertius/Adorno: according to Diogenes Laertiues Aristotle uses different names for the same thing: in this way, he calls ideas also form (eidos), genus (genos), pattern (paradigm) and beginning (principle, ark). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Concepts | Brentano | Chisholm II 228 Concepts/Brentano: Concepts are gained from concrete view and have always concrete views as the basis in later use. E.g. When I say "There is impossibly something non-colored red" so I have seen something red before. (Other authorsVs). All concepts are empirical, not a priori. Even in descriptive psychology, whereas their judgments are a priori. >a priori, >Empiricism, >Perception, >Judgments, >Colour. Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Concepts | Feyerabend | I 87 Concepts/FeyerabendVsCommon Concepts: first step: creation of a criterion for assessing these concepts. Later, we will investigate whether the criterion is better or less good than the material under investigation. ((s) How to compare the criterion with the material?). >Comparisons, >Criteria, >Language use, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Meaning change. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Concepts | Feynman | I 538 Concept/Measurement/Knowledge/Science/Theory/Feynman: a concept or thought that cannot be measured or directly proven with an experiment can be useful - or not. It does not need to exist in a theory. >Theories, >Measurements, cf. >Instrumentalism, >Operationalism, >Language of theories, >Language of observation, >Language use. Idea/Concept/Theory/Quantum Mechanics/Feynman: Question: Is the idea of the exact location of a particle and the exact impulse sound or not? The classical theory agrees with this, and quantum mechanics does not. I 539 Theory/Concept/Heisenberg: the new theory (quantum mechanics) does not need to answer such questions, because such questions cannot be asked experimentally. >Definability, >Senseless. Measurement/Concept/Feynman: in quantum mechanics, there are many constructions that we cannot directly measure. >Quantum mechanics. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Concepts | Gadamer | I 432 Conept/Gadamer: That the natural concept formation, which goes along with language does not always follow the order of essence, but very often carries out its word formation on the basis of accidentals and relations, is confirmed by every look into Platonic conceptual dihaireses or Aristotelian definitions. But the primacy of the logical order of essence, which is determined by the concepts of substance and accidental, makes the natural conceptualization of language appear only as an imperfection of our finite mind. Knowledge/Definition/Gadamer: Only because we know the accidentals alone, one is of the opinion that we follow them in the concept formation. Even if this is correct, however, a peculiar advantage follows from this imperfection - and Thomas Aquinas is right to have recognized this - namely the freedom to form infinite concepts and the progressive penetration of what is meant. >Knowledge. Thinking/Explaining: By thinking the process of thinking as the process of explication in the word, a logical achievement of language becomes visible, which cannot be fully understood from the perspective of the relationship of a material order as it would be before the eyes of an infinite mind. >Thinking, >Explanation. Categorization/Logic: The subordination of the natural formation of concepts by language to the essential structure of logic, which Aristotle and, following him, Thomas Aquinas taught, thus only has a relative truth. In the middle of the penetration of Christian theology by the Greek thought of logic rather something new arises: The center of language, in which the mediation of the incarnation event first brings itself to its full truth. >Incarnation/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. Christology becomes the forerunner of a new anthropology, which mediates the spirit of the human in his finiteness with divine infinity in a new way. Here what we have called the hermeneutical experience will find its real reason. >Hermeneutic consciousness/Gadamer. I 433 Thinking/Abstraction/Gadamer: the logical scheme of induction and abstraction [is] very misleading in that there is no explicit reflection in the linguistic consciousness on what is common between different things, and the use of words in their general meaning does not understand what is named and designated by them as a case subsumed under the general. The generality of the genre and the classificatory formation of concepts are quite far removed from the linguistic consciousness. >Categorization/Gadamer, >Induction, >Abstraction. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Concepts | Hegel | Bubner I 183 Concept/ Hegel: is the true essence of the matter, after the Absolute must not be longer be taken as substance, but to be construed as the subject. >Absolute/Hegel, >Subject/Hegel, >Substance, I 184 Opposed to the subjective, theoretical concept of the good, in knowing, is the "Idea of the Good" in practical action. >The Good. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Concepts | Jackson | Black I 234 Conceptual analysis/Lewis/Schwarz: While for most authors the conceptual analysis is separated from philosophy, it is connected to it for Lewis and also for Jackson. SchwarzVs: Vs both positions: as, for example, Panprotopychism and the world as it is show, there are indeed metaphysical supervenience relations which are not associated with analytic reducibility. N.B.: this shows that they do not deserve the philosophical status: panprotopsychism is not a real physical position, the supervenience of all truths in the "world as it is" is an irrelevant formal curiosity. >Panprotopsychism, >Conceptual analysis, >Supervenience. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Concepts | Leibniz | Holz I 73 Complete concept/notio completa/Leibniz: The complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a certain being, is therefore identical with the concept of the world as a whole. >World/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz. It is only perceptible to an infinite mind. I 75 Complete concept/notio completa/Leibniz: Each individual is only completely determined by the whole series (series rerum) from the origin onwards: The fact that this is only a fiction for the finite mind does not mean now that this reason of all things would not exist. >Fiction, >As if, cf. >Concept/Hegel. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Concepts | Mayr | 91 Concepts/Mayr: they must be particularly "open" in science, so that further results can be included. >Order, >Progress, >Science, >Classification. Concepts can be transferred unintentionally from one particular phenomenon to another. E.g. "mutation" initially used for species, later for genes. E.g. "teleological": used for 5 different phenomena E.g. "group": 5 different phenomena E.g. "evolution": three very different processes E.g. "variety". >Evolution, >Teleology. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Concepts | Millikan | I 253 Def Concept/Millikan: a concept denotes a set of intensions that regulate the repetition of an inner concept. Definition Concept/new/Millikan: (further definition): a concept is the ability to identify a thing. N.B.: then concepts show other dimensions beyond beliefs and intensions. >Identification, >Intension, >Belief. I 255 Concept of higher level/Millikan: a concept of higher level is no ability to identify an object, but correspondingly a higher ability: e.g. to recognize a rotated figure as the same figure. Thus, mental names for forms can be created. >Description level. I 256 For example, the ability to recognize people by their faces. >Recognition. I 272 Concept/property/predicate/Millikan: the relation between a concept and world lies between the head and the world and cannot be internalized. Cf. >Reference. I 273 Therefore, there is not even a one-to-one relationship between concepts and properties. Two concepts could correspond to one property and one concept (if it has ambiguous Fregean sense) can correspond to two properties. Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, this is never a priori knowledge. Properties/a priori/knowledge/Millikan: there is also no a priori knowledge about the incompatibility or compatibility or identity of properties. At most there is natural necessity (natural necessity). "Competition" between properties/MillikanVsStrawson: competition is just another type of "natural necessity" besides causality and identity. It is not a "logical competition". Logic/Concept/Necessity/Millikan: also "logical possibility" and "logical necessity" between concepts are ultimately natural necessities between concepts. Logic/Millikan: one should better consider logic as an empirical science. For example, "S cannot be at the same time P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world. I 315 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities. Their adequacy is not destroyed by the appearance of a contradiction. I 323 Concept/Knowledge/Millikan: Concepts are abilities, but in an important respect unlike other abilities: e.g. the ability to start a car is so that we immediately know whether we succeed or not, when applying concepts we do not know immediately whether we succeed. Success/Validity/Concept/Millikan: to know the validity of our concepts, they must be able to occur more than once in the same judgment. This is sufficient to be as secure as we can that the concept is really from something real. >Knowledge, >Judgment. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Proust | I 230 Concept/perception/Proust: Difference: concepts allow inferences, simple perceptions don't. Definitions are normative, because each has its conditions of use. >Inference, >Conclusion, >Perception, >Application conditions, >Language, >Logic, >Language use. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Schurz | I 186 Pre-theoretical/Schurz: E.g. The place function for the mechanics, is explained in the kinematics. This in turn contains the axioms of length metrization, time metrization and Euclidean geometry as pre-theories. >Theories. Theoretical terms/meaning/Schurz: their meaning is often explained by higher-level theories, I 187 which are not vortheories of theory T. Ex "electric charge" in chemistry is explained by electrodynamics. >Theoretical terms. Descriptive terms: are empirical and pre-theoretical terms. >Description, >Evidence, >Observation. Theoretical terms/TT: Broad sense: neither empirical nor pre-theoretical. Narrow sense: all terms of theory T which are neither empirical nor pre-theoretical in T. For T-theoretic terms, T itself provides an assignment law. >Assignment. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Concepts | Waismann | Gärdenfors I 24 Concepts/Waismann(1)/Gärdenfors: Thesis: most concepts are essentially incomplete in the sense that one can only specify some characteristics of the concept, but not all. >Incompleteness, >Definiteness, >Indeterminacy, Definitions, >Definability. 1. F. Waismann. Verifiability in A.G.N. Flew (Ed.) Logic and language (pp. 117-144), Oxford, Blackwell 1968, p. 121 |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Concepts | Bachelard | Foucault II 9ff Bachelard/Foucault: describes epistemological acts and sthresholds: displacements and transformations of concepts. (Also >Concepts/Canguilhem). [Transformations and deplacements] abolish the unlimited accumulation of knowledge, break its slow maturation and let it enter a new time. They cut it off from its empirical origin and from its initial motivations. They purge them of their imaginary complications. In this way they no longer prescribe to historical analysis the search for the silent beginnings, no longer the endless regression to the first precursors, but rather the discovery of a new type of rationality and its manifold effects. Deplacements and transformations of concepts: Georges Canguilhem's analyses can serve as a model for this. >Order/Canguilhem, >Science/Canguilhem. |
Bache I Gaston Bachelard The New Scientific Spirit. Boston 1985 German Edition: Der neue wissenschaftliche Geist Frankfurt/M. 1988 Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Concepts | Churchland | Lanz I 271 Mind/concepts/Patricia Churchland: the self-sufficient analysis of concepts alone is not enough to solve the problem. The empirical sciences are a necessary part of research. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Concepts | Ghiselin | Mayr I 364/365 Concepts/Ghiselin: Concepts can only be defined, details can only be described. >Definitions, >Definability, >Concepts, >Terms, >Theoretical terms, >Observation language, >Theory language, >Words, >Word meaning, >Description, >Description dependence. |
Ghis Michael T. Ghiselin Metaphysics and the Origin of Species New York 1997 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Concepts | Baudrillard | Blask I 104 Concepts/Baudrillard: Baudrillard propagates the revaluation of old concepts. >Revaluation, >Concepts, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Meaning, >Reference, >Language, >Language use, >Tradition, >Culture, >Culture shift, cf. >Values/Nietzsche, cf. >Deconstruction. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Concepts | Lyotard | Sokal I 157 Concepts/Lyotard/BricmontVsLyotard/SokalVsLyotard/Sokal: Lyotard(1) often uses terms from physics in a wrong context. Lyotard, like other authors who do not come from the natural sciences, often uses terms from the macroscopic realm and mixes them with findings of quantum mechanics which they have heard of but which refer to the microscopic realm where other laws apply. For example "density of gases" (Lyotard 1993, p. 165), "fractal geometry", Sokal I 158 "Non-rerectifiable" (Lyotard 1993, S 172f): Lyotard uses the term in the sense of "non-rectifyable". SokalVsLyotard: in fact it is a property of certain non-differentiable curves. Sokal I 159 Chaos/Chaos Theory/SokalVsLyotard: the terms "linear" and "nonlinear" are used metaphorically by Lyotard and are applied and transferred prematurely. Sokal I 165 Linearity/Nonlinearity/Postmodernity/Sokal: Authors of so-called "postmodern science" have added other meanings to the terms "linear" and "nonlinear". Sokal I 166 It is not true that Newton had only linear equations. Sokal I 167 In contrast, the Schrödinger equation of quantum mechanics is absolutely linear. There are very difficult linear and very simple nonlinear problems. Contrary to popular belief, a non-linear system is not necessarily chaotic. >Chaos, >Quantum mechanics. For the correct use of the concepts of physics and mathematics see >Sokal/Bricmont, >Feynman, or >Thorne. 1. J. F. Lyotard, Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien, 1993. |
Lyo I J. F. Lyotard Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud Lyotard II J.F. Lyotard Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien 1993 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Concepts | Gärdenfors | I 21 Concept/Gärdenfors: concepts are expressed by words. --- I 24 Concepts/Waismann(1)/Gärdenfors: Thesis: most concepts are essentially incomplete in the sense that one can only specify some characteristic of the concept, but not all. --- I 25 Concepts/Gärdenfors: are based on one or more quality domains (while properties are based on one domain at a time). Concepts have several cognitive functions: they categorize perceptions, play a role in concluding, and form the basis for word meanings. 1. Waismann, F. (1968). Verifiability. In A. G. N. Flew (Ed.), Logic and language (pp. 117-144 (p.121)). Oxford: Blackwell. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Concepts | Langacker | Gärdenfors I 34 Concepts/Langacker/Gärdenfors: (Langacker 1987)(1): Thesis: one concept presupposes another concept. >Meaning holism, >Semantic holism, >Holism. GärdenforsVsLangacker: this is ambiguous: a) a car part can be replaced, the car remains a car - b) but this is not the case with color compositions. Therefore, the color space has no meronic structure. (Meronomic: part-whole structure). Solution/Gärdenfors: my assumption of the convexity of regions: what lies between two points in the conceptual domain has the same property as the concepts located at the two outer points. >Domain/Gärdenfors. 1. R. W. Langacker (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar (Vol I). Stanford, CA: Stanford Universtity Press. |
Langa I Ronald W. Langacker Foundations of Cognitive Grammar Stanford, CA 1999 Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Concepts | Simon | Wilson I 88 Concepts/concept formation/complexity/Simon/E. O. Wilson: (H.A. Simon (1983)(1): What distinguishes creative thinking from the more common patterns of thought is 1) the willingness to accept and gradually structure problem statements that are very vaguely defined 2) to deal continuously with the same problem for a fairly long period of time; and 3) to acquire comprehensive background knowledge in relevant and potentially relevant domains. >Creativity, >Thinking, >Method, >Knowledge, >Definitions, >Definability, >Background, >Pre-knowledge, >Bounded Rationality. 1. H.A. Simon, „Discovery, invention and developemnt: human crative thinking“ in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 80 (1983), S. 4569-4571. |
psySimn II Herbert A. Simon Models of Thought New Haven 1979 Simon I Herbert A. Simon The Sciences of the Artificial Cambridge, MA 1970 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Concepts | Lévi-Strauss | I 70 Terms/Lévi-Strauss: The terms (in the divinatory system) never have an immanent meaning; their meaning is connected with the "position", is on the one hand function of history and the cultural framework and on the other hand function of the structure of the system in which they are to be used. I 71 Order/System/Lévi-Strauss: in a system (looked at here) there are e.g. two axes, which differentiates colours on the one hand according to relatively bright and relatively dark, on the other hand according to whether they belong to fresh or dried plants. >Structure/Lévi-Strauss, >System/Lévi-Strauss, >Order/Lévi-Strauss. I 72 Example of a more complex classification: (the languages of Australian tribes of the Kimberley contain nominal classes): here there are three successive divisions: a) of things and living beings, b) of living beings into reasonable and unreasonable, c) of reasonable living beings into male and female ones. N.B.: Languages that have lost classes may combine animals and manufactured objects into one group.(1). >Classification/Lévi-Strauss. I 174 For example, the tribe of the Osage does not directly call the eagle, but rather depending on the circumstances different species, of which there are again young and old and different colour specimens. This three-dimensional matrix, a real system by means of an animal and not the animal itself, forms the object of thought and provides the conceptual tool. A native reports: "We do not believe that our ancestors really were quadrupeds, these things are just symbols of something higher.(2) 1. A. Capell, "Language and World View in the Northern Kimberly, W. Australia" in: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, vol 16, No. 1 Albuquerque 1960. 2. J. O. Dorsey,"Osage tradition", 6th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington D. C., 1897 |
LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966 |
| Concepts | Deleuze | Sokal I 177 Terms/Theory/Deleuze/Guattari/Bricmont/Sokal: (G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Qu' est-ce que la philosophie?, Paris 1991 - German: Was ist Philosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1996: page numbers here from the German edition): in the work, the two use a plethora of scientific terms that have been taken out of context, without any perceptible logic. Deleuze and Guattari are certainly free to use these terms in a different way: science does not have a monopoly on the use of words such as "chaos","limit value/limit" or "energy". >Chaos, >Limits, >Energy, Sokal I 178 SokalVsDeleuze/SokalVsGuattari: in our opinion, the two authors have a comprehensive but superficial education, which they present in their writings. For the correct use of the concepts of physics and mathematics see >Sokal/Bricmont and >Feynman. 1. G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Qu' est-ce que la philosophie?, Paris 1991 - German: Was ist Philosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1996: page numbers here stem from the German edition. |
Deleuze I Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Paris 1991 German Edition: Was ist Philosophie? Frankfurt/M. 2000 Hum I G. Deleuze David Hume , Frankfurt 1997 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Concepts | Sokal | I 26 Concepts/Science/Social/Bricmont: we criticize the use of scientific concepts by authors who have not understood the scientific meaning of these terms themselves. If, on the other hand, poets use terms such as "black hole" or "degree of freedom", we do not mind. The examples in our book(1), on the other hand, are only cases that have nothing to do with such poetic freedom. >Explanations, >Analogies, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Understanding. 1. A. Sokal und J. Bricmont. (1999) Eleganter Unsinn. München. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Concepts | Dworkin | Brocker I 596 Concepts/Dworkin: Moral content comes into law in the form of principles. (1) Morally meaningful constitutional concepts such as "equality" or "human dignity", however, are general and substantially controversial. We do not have unanimously accepted criteria for their correct or incorrect use. (2) Solution/Dworkin: One of the most important tasks for legal interpreters is therefore to find the best ideas (conceptions) for such terms (concepts). A conception of the concept of dignity must, for example, shed light on whether women have a valid right to physical self-disposal, which also includes a right to abortion. The concept of dignity itself does not provide a positive or negative answer. 1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 58-64 2.Ibid. p.304 Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“,in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Concepts | Allport | Corr I 95/96 Concepts/personality traits/lexicon/lexical approach/Allport/Deary: worried that traits might be loaded with the conventional meanings of the words allocated to them and that ‘It would be ideal if we could . . . find our traits first and then name them’ (Allport 1931(1) p. 371). Of course he also stated that the words might actually represent the true traits but, on the other hand, the ‘conventional meanings . . . [might lead us] away from the precise integration as it exists in the given individual’ (1931, p. 371). >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexicon, >Order. DearyVsAllport: Allport wanted to have his lexical cake and eat it here, and also begs the most profound question. He explicitly seems to recognize that our likeliest road into traits is from language terms. However, he hints at but does not directly address how one might craft a research programme to get at ‘the precise integration as it exists in the given individual’. Cf. >concepts/psychological theories. 1. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Concepts | Psychological Theories | Corr I 96 Concepts/psychological theories/Allport/Carr/Kingsbury/Deary: Allport’s (Allport 1931)(1) was not a lone voice in the inter-war years’ thinking about the conceptual nature of traits. >Concepts/Allport, >Lexical studies, >Lexical hypothesis. Carr and Kingsbury (1938)(2) recognized that there were trait names in everyday life, that we knew what we meant by them in practical terms, and that they had been introduced to psychology. They opened up by attempting a definition (p. 497): ‘A trait is a conceptual attribute or definition of the reactive nature of the individual. The nature of the individual is defined on the basis of certain observable behaviour characteristics.’ These characteristics, lexically, were nicely described: how an adverbial description of a response (acting persistently), can become a characteristic adjective if it is observed consistently (a persistent person), and how these can become abstracted from people as trait nouns (persistence). Conceptual nature of traits/Carr/Kingsbury: If we knew the ‘organic conditions’ underlying traits we should probably define traits in those terms; but we don’t, so we use ‘behavioural correlates’.(3) Deary: Carr and Kingsbury understood that some trait terms were universal, nomothetic. They saw that people could be located on a dimension made up from antagonistic trait names. They saw similarities in groups of trait words that would allow for groups of similar trait names. >nomothetic/idiographic. For the philosophical discussion cf. >projectivistic/detectivistic, >Euthyphro. 1. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 2. Carr, H. A. and Kingsbury, F. A. 1938. The concept of traits, Psychological Review 45: 497–524 3. Ibid. p. 510 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Concepts | McCrae | Corr I 153 Concepts/language/personality traits/McCrae: The people of two different cultures might have identical traits, but a factor that is richly represented in the vocabulary of the first culture might be missing from the vocabulary of the second. McCrae (1990)(1) noted that there are relatively few English-language adjectives that reflect O (>Openness). For example, there is no single term that designates sensitivity to aesthetic experience; ‘artistic’ comes closest, and it refers to the producer rather than the consumer of art. Yet surely English speakers are capable of responding to beauty (McCrae 2007)(2). Other researchers have argued that entirely new factors are needed. Cheung and her colleagues (Cheung, Cheung, Leung et al. 2003(3); Cheung, Leung, Fan et al. 1996)(4) developed an inventory based on indigenous Chinese personality characteristics, which was subsequently translated into English. 1. McCrae, R. R. 1990. Traits and trait names: how well is Openness represented in natural languages?, European Journal of Personality 4: 119–29 2. McCrae, R. R. 2007. Aesthetic chills as a universal marker of Openness to Experience, Motivation and Emotion 31: 5–11 3. Cheung, F., Cheung, S. F., Leung, K., Ward, C. and Leong, F. 2003. The English version of the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 34: 433–52 4. Cheung, F. M., Leung, K., Fan, R. M., Song, W. Z., Zhang, J. X. and Zhang, J. P. 1996. Development of the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 27: 181–99 Robert R. McCrae, “The Five-Factor Model of personality traits: consensus and controversy”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Concepts | Canguilhem | Foucault II 11 Concepts/Canguilhem/Foucault: here it is a matter of displacements and transformations of concepts: Caguilhem's analyses show that the history of a concept is not all in all that of its progressive refinement, its steadily growing rationality, its increase in abstraction, but that of its various constitutions and fields of validity, that of its successive rules of use, of the manifold theoretric milieus in which its elaboration took place and was completed. >Science/Canguilhem, >Order/Canguilhem. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogy | Nagel Vs Analogy | Frank I 150 Objectively/Experience/Appear/Nagel: why should experiences have an objective nature at all? For this question, the brain can be completely ignored. Does it make any sense to ask how my experiences really are as opposed to how they appear to me? Proposal: Shouldn't we try perhaps to bridge the gap between the subjective and the objective in a completely different way? At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective nature of experience without taking the perspective of the subject. I 151 Couldn't we try to form new concepts, an objective phenomenology which is independent of empathy? NagelVsAnalogies: E.g. that red is something like the sound of the trumpet has to appear absurd to everyone who ever heard a trumpet and saw something red. Objective/Nagel: whatever is said of physical things must be objective. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Analytic Philosophy | McGinn Vs Analytic Philosophy | I 198 McGinnVsAnalytic Philosophy: in his opinion, skepticism must be refuted from within our scheme of concepts of knowledge. McGinn: the more clarity we get about our concepts, the more merciless the skeptical problem looks. It looks as if we are unable to establish a theory that leaves the possibility of our knowledge simply by realizing that one remains within the conceptual set with which we approach our activities regarding knowledge. Transcendental naturalism (TN) counts this in its favor: TNvsSkepticism: the falsity of the skeptical position can be seen only from outside our system of concepts. It were to be explained rather psychologically, only this explanation is beyond our capabilities. McGinn: that does not mean that every epistemological problem need to be done in the style of the TN or even could, nor, that all forms of skepticism require that one must rely on transcendent facts to diagnose or defuse them. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Analyticity | Fodor Vs Analyticity | IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/gradual analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded. IV 185 Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well. Question: is this also possible together with systematicity (systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity? Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts? E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa. E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?. E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John? 29 IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: you may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (group), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity: IV 245 E.g. "brown cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar". IV 178 Fodor/Lepore/QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might have a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): this one has compositional meaning, but the inferential role is not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!". Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Aristotle | Putnam Vs Aristotle | VSA V 104 Similarity/PutnamVsAristotle: if, as it seems, the similarity theory has failed, can we not simply postulate an abstract isomorphism that ensures allocation of sensations and concepts? Abstract isomorphism: allows to make all theories compatible. There are too many relationships; to single out the appropriate ones we would already need to have a reference access to the mind-independent things. To recognize a privileged reference we would need to have access to the "noumenal" world. Every physical event can be described in two different ways: --- V 105 E.g. Remote Effect/Close-up Effect: The different physical theories are metaphysically incompatible. Mathematically, however, they translate into each other! If nothing more is needed than an abstract correspondence, then incompatible theories may be true! --- V 200 PutnamVsAristotle: if we think differently from Aristotle today, we do it in that we are more pluralistic than he was. Aristotle: seems to have believed that ideally there was a basic constitution everyone should have. Today we think that even be in an ideal world there would be different basic constitutions. The belief in a pluralist ideal is not the same as the belief that every ideal is as good as any other. --- V 201 If something like moral wrongness did not exist, then it would not be wrong if the government were to prescribe moral choices. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Aristotle | Simons Vs Aristotle | I 241 Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: the primordial matter fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) the substrate of change (change) and b) the carrier of properties. VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure, that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real. Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together. Primordial Matter/Simons: the primordial matter may well have its own special characteristics. Pro Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler. Diversity/tradition/Simons: diversity was explained by the combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This can already be found in the Tractatus. Foundation Stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): foundation stones are colorless. Simons: but the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars, but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal) or if they are accidentally real (Tractatus 2.0233). I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happen to it ((s) its life story!). SimonsVsFour Dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block. Universal Realism/Simons: universal realism could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics. Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary. Whole/Wholeness/Simons: the whole appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German Philosophy Between The World Wars). I 292 Whole/Aristotle/Simons: the whole seems to require inner relations towards a sum. Inner Relations/whole/Aristotle: e.g.: continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter. This includes species and genera. SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mention the most important relation: causation. Husserl/Simons: Husserl discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name. Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: the "pregnant whole" is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>Foundation/Husserl, Foundation/Simons). Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: a foundation can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD). Substance/tradition/Simons: the substance is (sort of) ontologically independent. Ontological Dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is ontological dependent. I 318 Independence/ontology/Simons: where independence is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) - as such many times in philosophy (rather theology) - is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: the substance is a very weak form of independence. Def primary: primary ist, what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it. SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Avramides, A. | Grice Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 164 GriceeansVsAvramides: The analysis in question was that propositional attitudes are relations to sentences in the theory language. This allows seeing semantics and psychology as interdependent and simultaneously attribute thoughts to speechless beings. GriceansVsAvramides: would look at the matter the other way around: the apparent entailment of ontological asymmetry to conceptual asymmetry should be taken as evidence that this type of analysis of propositional attitudes is fundamentally wrong. Because if you can attribute thinking without language (Thw/oL) in a sensible way, then it would seem as if our psychological concepts are independent of semantic ones. Avramides: No side has more than prima facie evidence. Anti-reductionism: can claim conceptual symmetry without being limited to ontological symmetry. And it can accept thinking without language. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Behaviorism | Sellars Vs Behaviorism | I 89 Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts. I 90 Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior. SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances. I 91 That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior. So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts. I XXIX Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism. I XXX Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form. I XXXI Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Berkeley, G. | Peacocke Vs Berkeley, G. | I 51 Meaning Space/Sensory Space/Perception Space/Peacocke: is undeniable, and it is neither just artificial nor derivative. It is obviously not populated by experience itself. Rather, there is a correlated space for each intrinsically spatial sense which is characterized by it. I 52 E.g. if we are touched at the neck, it is something else than if we see something in front of us. E.g. but it is the same sense of "closer" when we hear or see someone approaching. (Representational) and it refers to the same space. ((s) This is about a sense of the word, not perceptual sense). PeacockeVsBerkeley: wrongly inferred from the (correct) premise that vision and touch have no common ideas (ideas, notions) to the wrong conclusion: that a sense of dimension should have priority with respect to the philosophical explanation here. Asterisked Predicates/"Elliptical*"/"Red*"/Field of Vision/Asterisk/Peacocke: asterisked predicates are truly spatial in a way! They relate to size and shape in the visual field. There is no ambiguity here, because different spaces are affected. "Elliptical" makes sense for us in different arbitrary spaces. (Not only physical). If it was just about a single space, there would be problems: see above: Problems with the translation theory or additional representational content to explain "elliptical" only by public, physical space. Sensory Data/Peacocke: the sense data theory has characteristic spatial concepts such as square or elongated sensory data, etc. The insight consists in that these spatial predicates I 53 cannot be defined at the level of representational content. The space in which these additional spatial predicates are located, is the sensation space (non-representational). This distinction prevents us from committing the error of asking: "Are sensory data surfaces of physical objects?" "Can we perceive sensory data ?". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Block, Ned | Stalnaker Vs Block, Ned | I 222 Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content. E.g. if their experience when they see a ripe tomato is (and always has been) as mine when I see unripe pepper and vice versa, then the same experience that will represent the tomato as red to them will represent the tomato as green to me. We have then different experiences if we look at a ripe tomato but the tomato appears as red to both of us. Representational content/inverted spectra/Stalnaker: but the representational content (of whose ones spectrum is reversed) for the two persons is the same! ((s) Both have the experience "red"). ((s) representational/(s): here: on the word "red". So the language use plays a role. One can, for example, not say that the stimulus represents something neutral.) ((s) Representation/Stalnaker: appearance! ((s) So something more indirect than the phenomal experience "how it is".) Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: if that is correct then we cannot explain the qualitative character of visual experiences in concepts of properties that the things seem to have. Def representationalism/terminology/Stalnaker: thesis: that appearance is the basic, not "how it is". Representation: how things appear to us. Representative: Block. Stalnaker: it is here for me not about to defend the representationalism. StalnakerVsRepresentationalism/StalnakerVsBlock: I do not quite understand how representational content is to fully grasp the phenomenal character of experience. However, I believe that the strategy to explain qualitative content that way is the right one. Thought experiment/th.e./Stalnaker: I am skeptical about th.e. as the reversed spectra that want to separate representational and qualitative content. Inverted qualia/StalnakerVscommon sense-view: the common sense does not speak with one voice on comparison of qualia over time and between people. It can also be interpreted in a way that it supports a conceptual link between qualitative character and appearances (representation). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Boole, G. | Frege Vs Boole, G. | Berka I 57 Classical Logic/Berka: bivalent extensional logic: mostly created by Frege. Frege: clear distinction between variables and constants, laws and rules, created the concepts of logic functions (propositional functions) and quantifiers, the semantics of sense and meaning, also the first axiomatic system of classical logic. Russell: was the first to recognize Frege’s importance. Notation/Russell: was rather a follower of Peano. FregeVsBoole: pro clear distinction between statements and class logic. Sets the AL as a foundation. Truth Functions/Frege: their theory is of central importance for the propositional calculus. Truth Value Tables: already known by Boole, Schröder, and Peirce. Systematically elaborated first by Post (1921)(1), Lukasiewicz (1921)(2), and Wittgenstein (1921)(3). First transferred to the PL by Foster (1931)(4), later by Wright (1957)(5). 1. E. L. Post, Introduction to a general theory of elemantary propositions, American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1921) , 163-185 2. J. Lukasiewicz, Logica dwuwartosciowa, PF 23 (1921), 189-205 3. L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, Ann. Naturphil. 14 (1921), 185-262 4. A. L. Forster, Formal Logic in finite terms Ann. Math. 32 (1931) 407-430 5. G. H. von Wright, Logical Studies, London 1957 Frege IV 92 SchröderVsBoole: Vs"Universe of Discourse" (> Quine: "You can still hatch enough..."). Sectors Calculus/Sector Calculus/Manifold/Schröder/Frege: division of an area into sectors, so that no point is at the same time in two sectors. (Boxes). ((s) no overlap). Most important relation between sectors: the containment of one in the others: "classification" (both can simply coincide). This corresponds to the relationship part/whole. IV 93 Instead of "sectors" we can also say "classes". Instead of manifold: "main sector". Manifold/Schröder/Frege/(s): classes of classes. ("main sector" box which comprises one or more boxes). Classes/Individuals/Schröder/Frege: Schröder also refers to an individual as class, but which only contains this single element, the individual. But also a class with several elements (individuals) can be considered a "thought thing" and thus can be presented as an individual. FregeVsSchröder: the difference between individual and class becomes fluent here. IV 9 FregeVsBoole: he tries to "embed abstract logic into the guise of algebraic signs". Frege against: tries to establish a uniform formula language of mathematics and logic. IV 13 FregeVsBoole: discards his concept of "universal class" ("universe", "universe of discourse" coined by de Morgan). SchröderVsBoole: the zero class is contained in every class. I.e. also in the class of the classes that are identical with the universal class. I.e. zero classes (in Boole designated with "0") and universal classes (in Boole designated with "1") are equal. So we have both: 1 = 1 and 0 = 1, and that is not possible. Schröder: the universal class cannot contain classes as elements among themselves, which in turn contain elements of the same manifold. ((s) anticipation of the theory of types). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Bourbaki | Barrow Vs Bourbaki | Barrow I 63 BarrowVsBourbaki: the simplest conception of mathematics is the assumption that the world is really mathematical in some deep sense. The mathematical concepts exist and are discovered by mathematicians and not invented. The number pi, so to speak, is really hanging in the sky. For the mathematical realist the number seven exists as an intangible idea behind the seven mountains. Mathematical Platonism = realism! |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Brandom, R. | Verschiedene Vs Brandom, R. | I 168 Formalistic approach: understands material inferences as enthymems with suppressed justification. Attributes the mastery of a whole arsenal of logical concepts and rules (BrandomVs) to anyone who has any inferential abilities at all. Logic II 153 Statement/Hoyningen-Huene: a statement must be at least something that is capable of repetition, so that what is meant by the term "statement" cannot be a physical event like a concrete utterance (time and place)! Logic I 61 Menne: Statement: can be divided into individual words. Facts, sense, thought: cannot easily be subdivided into components. |
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| Brandom, R. | Newen Vs Brandom, R. | NS 163 Justification/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: may be an entailment in the opposite direction. E.g. expecting thunder when there was lightning. NS I 164 4) as a contact with the world: language entry rules (entry rules) and exit rules. As inferential roles. a) language exit rule: actions are referred to as adequate practical conclusions, e.g. "The pot is boiling over" >urges for the action of taking it from the stove. b) Entry rule: involves perceptions of both the environment and the own body states. This leads to perception reports. VsInferentialism/VsBrandom/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: 1) People make mistakes or they are differently well-informed or differently clever. Does that then not mean that people must assign different meanings to utterances? Solution: a certain externalism: sentence meanings do not depend on the individual speaker, but is the product of social interaction. Vs: 2) there are certainly known errors related to probabilities for which many people fall. Problem: how to avoid collective errors becoming meaning-constitutive? VsBrandom: Problems: A: how can semantic inferentialism explain compositionality? B: how can it explain the concepts of reference and truth which, after all, still play a central role? NS I 165 Ad A: inferentialism is committed to whole sentences, because only between them there are entailments. To explain the inferential role of the whole sentence Brandom must explain how it arises from the inferential roles of the components, and how these components are identified. E.g. distinguishing singular terms and predicates. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Brentano, Fr. | Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr. | VII 435 "Companions in guilt"-Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). ((s) "Companions in guilt"-Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend. Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties? >Irreducibility. PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question. Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, VII 436 or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if >moral realism has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged. Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values. Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains moral realist): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument). Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman) Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Brentano, Fr. | Chisholm Vs Brentano, Fr. | II 212 Psychology/Analytic philosophy/Marek: question: is the concept of the mental uniform? One can speak of things that are mental: e.g. properties, qualities, phenomena, states, events. And you can say of concepts and theories that they are not mental. II 214 Question: Are there purely logical features that are characteristic of the mental? Brentano: yes, intentionality Other authors VsBrentano: the search for characteristics is in vain, since the mental is not further defined. E.g. as you cannot give specific characteristics for the concept of phenomenal color. You can only specify subspecies (for color as for the mental). I 217 Everyday language to quickly left behind. II 253 Science/Language/Brentano/Hedwig: Thesis: we may think with Copernicus, however, we speak with Ptolemy. E.g. rising of the sun. II 254 VsBrentano: this thesis could put him on the spot himself: it might turn out that in a daily statement, if it were thought in terms of his philosophy, something else would be thought than said. (> concept change, > translation, > meaning, > language/thinking). II 256 Brentano justifies the modern-thinking Copernican who speaks in the Ptolemaic language. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Carnap, R. | Field Vs Carnap, R. | I 118 FieldVsCarnap: although my approach is similar to that of Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, 1) it does not refer to meaning at all. I.e. no "meaning relations between predicates" ((s)> meaning postulates). 2) my treatment of free variables does not require the introduction of "individual concepts" and is consistently anti-essentialist. (FieldVsEssentialism): no formula of the form "MB" is true in a model with view to an attribution function if it is not also true in the model in relation to any other attribution function. Nino Cocchiarella/Carnap/Field: Cocchiarella: ("On the Primary and Secondary semantics of logical necessity"): an approach similar to Carnap: FieldVsCocchiarella/FieldVsRamseyFieldVsCarnap: leads to Ramsey’s bizarre conclusion that E.g. "it is possible that there are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 objects" is logically false if the world happens to contain fewer objects (empirical). FieldVsCarnap: 3) his idea that modal concepts are derived from semantic concepts should be modified, Field: Just the other way around! (QuineVsField). II 186 Referential Indeterminacy/Reference/Theory Change/Reference Change/Semantic Change/Field: we now have all the components for the indeterminacy of reference: Only (HR) and (HP) remain, but are mutually exclusive. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. In fact there is no fact on the basis of which you could opt for one of two. Vs: it could be argued that we only lack additional information. FieldVsVs: but then it should be possible already to say what kind of information that is supposed to be. And we have already found that there can be no fact here. "Mass"/Newton/Denotation/Reference/Field: the issue is not that we do not know what Newton’s "mass" denotes, but that Newton’s word was referentially indeterminate. (Because we do not know which of the two, HP or HR should be excluded.) II 187 The truth and falsity of (4R) and (5P) cannot be explained on the basis of what Newton referred to. FieldVsReferential Semantics/FieldVsCarnap: this is excluded by this indeterminacy of reference. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Fodor Vs Carnap, R. | II 111 Formal Language/ideal language/Carnap: suppose we had three artificial languages L1, L2, and L3, each of which is considered as a possible idealization of the natural language L. The sentence S in the language L should be: - analytic in L1, - synthetic in L2, and - none of both in L3. How do we know whether S in reality is analytic, synthetic, or none? We ask of a theory that it answers this question. FodorVsCarnap: the theory would have to explicate the concepts of analytic in L, synthetic in L, etc. But none of the languages developed by Carnap and his successors does that. Therefore, they are not idealizations of natural languages. II 112 As long as, beyond that, these idealizations use terms that are not interpreted for natural languages, they claim wrongly to explain something. Then we have no way to detect deviations. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Carnap, R. | Goodman Vs Carnap, R. | II 67 GoodmanVsCarnap/Reduction Sentences: the whole thing is pretty absurd. In my opinion, philosophy has the task to explicate, not to describe science (and the everyday language). The explication shall refer to pre-systematic use of the expressions of consideration, but does not need to comply with the order. It s all about economy and standardization. Schurz I 219 Grue/Bleen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observes G*: grue) G*: ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: Emerald. Sample: {a:1 ‹ i ‹ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are equivalent b< definition. If we apply the inductive generalization conclusion both for "green" and for "grue", our sample results in the two universal hypotheses H: = "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are grue". Problem: H and H* imply for all emeralds not observed before t0 conflicting forecasts (green vs red). Schurz: the following relationship exists to subjective inductive exchangeability assumptions: for regular probability functions the exchangeability assumption cannot be valid at the same time for the predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*). Question: according to which criteria should we decide which predicates we consider as exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria were proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947.146 1976, 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "Positional" Predicate/Carnap, that is a predicate that refers to the time t0 in its definition. E.g. grue. Def Qualitative Predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75, 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): through reciprocal re-definition it is possible to move from our own language (with "green" and "red") to a language which is equivalent in its expressiveness and in which "grue" and "bleen"(G * x * x R,) act as basic concepts (basic predicates): Re-Definition/Language Dependence/Logical Form: Language L (Gx, Rx primitive) language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L Definitions in L* G*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 › Rx)) Gx: ‹› ((Bxt0 › G*x) u (~Bxt0 › R*x)) R*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 › Rx) u (~Bxt0 › Gx)) Rx: ‹› ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 › G*x)). Solution/Schurz: it is possible to distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates in terms of ostensive learnability independent of the language! I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: this does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending pattern that were so far observed as consistent into the future. To be able to formulate useful induction rules we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on the qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Important argument: the fact that individuals are "constantly" "grue" means that they change their color from green to red at t0 . In this case, we have carried out "anti-induction" and not induction. That is the reason why we (with Carnap) have basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features for induction rules. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Carnap, R. | Putnam Vs Carnap, R. | Goodman II Putnam Foreword V Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48). Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself, PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate. Lewis IV 85 Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts. IV 85/86 Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there. They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas". Putnam V 244 Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private. PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability. V 250 Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). Putnam I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful. There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them). Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions: 1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions. I 43 2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". Putnam I (a) 46 Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence. PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"! (I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term). I (a) 48 Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem. I (a) 49 Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Chisholm Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VIII 164 Pragmatics/ChisholmVsCarnap: his representation was over-simplified. Carnap: ditto. I have ignored possible effects of uncertainty and actual errors of the speaker. (> Radical Interpretation, RI). Chisholm: the analysis can be simplified by the concept of belief. Carnap pro. Belief/Pragmatics/Carnap: requires a conceptual framework of theoretical pragmatics. The basic concepts of pragmatics are best not behavioristically defined, but introduced as theoretical constructions in the theoretical language connected with the observation language on the basis of postulates and correspondence rules. Def Belief/Church: relationship between a person and a fact. Def Belief/Carnap: relationship between a person and a statement. The concept of Church is not pragmatic: (state which does not necessarily include language). VIII 165 It is neither implied that the person is aware of the belief, nor that they could verbalize it. Carnap: for the statement, verbalization is of course the condition. This corresponds to the believing-to-be-true. The pragmatic concept of intension serves the purpose of linking Churchian belief and believing of a statement. Chisholm II 68/69 Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: there is "no clear sense" in which such a sentence is related to words and their use! SauerVsChisholm: the objection is not severe: Solution: if ’(x) (Fx > Gx)’ is a meaning postulate in S, then one should not depart from this sentence itself, but from " ’(x)(Fx > GX)’ is a meaning postulate in S". That is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. II 71 Analytical/Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: do not secure that the definition of "square" means square is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Davidson Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 651 Self-attribution/External attribution/Wittgenstein: External attribution: based on behavioral criteria, self-attribution: without the benefit of such assistance. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: this is not satisfactory in response to skepticism: 1) it is a strange idea that the absence of clues should be better! Fra I 652 2) one would normally say that what is considered a clue will help to define the appropriate concept. Now, if the criteria are different, the concepts must also be different! Externally mental/External attribution/Self-attribution/Language/Error/Deception/Davidson: We should allow that the necessarily public and interpersonal character of language guarantees that we often apply mental predicates correctly to others, and therefore in fact often know what others think. Then the question is, what are the reasons you have for knowing yourself what you think. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: his answer may solve the externally mental, but creates the problem of the self-mental. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Hintikka Vs Chisholm, R.M. | II 197 Intentionality/Hintikka: I can best show in my criticism HintikkaVsChisholm that it has different dimensions: Various criteria for intentionality by Chisholm turn out to be criteria for different dimensions of intentionality. Terminology: "referential opacity": this is what Chisholm calls the failure of the substitutivity of identity (SI). Non-Extensionality/Chisholm: this is what he calls the failure of substitutivity of sentences on the basis of shared truth values. This is not a criterion of intentionality for him, because the concept of necessity also violates the non-extensionality. Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: at first we look at those criteria of Chisholm’s that are about the order of quantifiers and intentional operators: This is shown by the failure of the following implications: (1) a believes that every individual F-t > a believes of every individual that F-t. (2) vice versa A formalization of (1) would be (3) Ba (x)F(x) > (x)(Ey) (x = y & Ba F(y)) (4) formalization of (2) correspondingly vice versa. II 198 HintikkaVsChisholm: his explanations of his own criteria are not entirely clear. Chisholm: it may be that you mistakenly think of an incomplete set of things that it contains every individual, and vice versa, you can mistakenly believe that complete set does not include all individuals. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is clearer: (i) there may be individuals that do not exist in the world of someone’s beliefs (ii) there may be individuals in the world of someone’s beliefs that do not exist in the real world exist. HintikkaVsChisholm: he does not see that the failure of (1) and (2) can occur in a much deeper way: E.g. the values of the bound variables are politicians in California and I believe that they are all lawyers. Suppose also that I have no beliefs about what kind of other politicians there are, except the ones that I know. In particular, there is no set of politicians of which I believe that they exhaust the class of politicians. Question: does it follow that I believe that every politician in California is a lawyer? No, it does not follow. ((s) The belief of an absence cannot be inferred from the absence of a belief). HintikkaVsChisholm: according to its criteria, that would have to follow! Solution/Hintikka: there is a set of politicians about whom I have no belief, but I do not doubt their existence or their being lawyers. The question of what I do believe about them does not arise. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: here it means that there are elements of the actual world, which are not linked with my belief worlds by any world lines. Important argument: it does not mean that they do not exist in the worlds of belief, only that the question of their existence or nonexistence does not arise there. World lines: cannot be extended in that case: Chisholm: limits himself to nonexistence in doxastic possible worlds (belief worlds). HintikkaVsChisholm: For me, on the other hand, it is about the possibility to draw world lines, namely in this case from alternative possible worlds back to the real world ("home"). II 199 Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: his criteria are a mixture of my criteria (b) (i), (ii) and (d) (i),(ii). They get their plausibility rather from (d) than from (b). Nonexistence/World Lines/Definability/HintikkaVsChisholm: the collapse of world lines represents a much deeper divide between possible worlds than nonexistence. Nonexistence/Hintikka: is considered by contemporary philosophers as much decisive. Def Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: Chisholm is an operator intentional p iff. p(S) is contingent for every value of "S". HintikkaVsChisholm: this is unreasonable: then there would be no intentional concepts at all! E.g. p = John believes that S = (S1 & ~S1). I.e. for a belief concept to be intentional, it must be possible, according to Chisholm, to believe an explicit contradiction. Contradiction/Hintikka: you cannot explicitly believe a contradiction, only implicitly. ((s) >Cresswell: if you do not understand what proposition is expressed by a conflicting sentence.) Chisholm/Hintikka: certainly means something else: even if John does not believe an explicit contradiction (S1 & ~ S1), there are many logically equivalent sentences that are logically wrong, but that John can believe. II 200 HintikkaVsChisholm: but even then his criterion is not met: because then it is no longer the contingency of p(S), but the failure of the logical equivalence which is to guarantee the substitutivity of identity (SI). SI/Hintikka: if it is abandoned, I can at the same time assert the logical falsity of (5) John believes that (S1 & ~S1) and assert the contingency of (6) John believes that S2 as well! Intentionality/HintikkaVsChisholm: in contrast, we need a concept of intentionality which excludes logical omniscience. Def Intentional/Hintikka: is then a concept iff. logical equivalence does not guarantee the SI in a context that is governed by this concept. Proposition/Sentence/HintikkaVsChishom: therefore we cannot assume that we can save Chisholm’s criterion by assuming propositions instead of sentences as values of "S" ((s) because propositions are by definition understood sentences, and therefore John would have to have explicitly contradictory beliefs when we attribute propositions to him). Solution/Hintikka: logical equivalence no longer guarantees substitutivity of identity (SI). Hintikka: we can further analyze this corrected version of Chisholm’s criterion ((s) only implicit contradictions credible, no contradictory propositions): Equivalence/Hintikka: we can distinguish between those logical equivalences that allow SI in epistemic contexts, and those who do not (> Lit. Hintikka 1974 Logic and language games). +... |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism. Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Nominalism Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 260 Universals/VsChisholm/Heckmann: he represents an extreme Platonic universals realism. Thus he brings himself into a contradiction to both the moderate Aristotelian universals and to the ontological nominalism. I 261 Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contradiction to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the importance of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but that's no approach to universalism of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first and then express with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate can use it in compliance with the rules. I 262 Nominalism/Utility Theory/VsChisholm: the meaning of predicates and sentences cannot be explicated mentalistically (by resorting to intentional performance) >(Humpty Dumpty Theory). MentalismVsNominalism/Chisholm: everything semantic has its origin in the mind. Direct Attribution/Attribution Theory/VsChisholm: E.g. an infant recognizes his mother, but not by first judging that it recognizes the mother and then attributing this state to himself. (Chisholm: must actually assume that the mother is only an indirect object of attribution). I 263 Consciousness/Chisholm: emerges from an act of direct consideration of a self-presenting property. VsChisholm: this ignores a fundamental trait of any type of consciousness or fails to make it understood: the self-disclosure of the self-translucency of consciousness. Consciousness should be acquainted and familiar with itself whenever it occurs, and that in a pre-reflective and irreflexive way. (Frank, >Sartre). E.g. I have direct knowledge of my pain, not only by reflection and subsequent direct attribution. (That would be of a higher level). Consciousness/HeckmannVsChisholm: there is a third between the self-presenting and self-presented: the self present: the which has always been disclosed, known and familiar by pre-attributive knowledge. (>Background). Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Churchland, P. | Fodor Vs Churchland, P. | IV 189 Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 191 FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages! IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account. IV 193 Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies. IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language. IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. IV 196 Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions? IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. >State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. --- Metzinger II 466 "Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true. 2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes. II 467 "Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Churchland, P. | Pauen Vs Churchland, P. | Pauen I 99 Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories. I 100 VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis. All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though. I 101 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology. VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved. I 102 Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits... PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design. In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all. I 103 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry. In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro). I 104 3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts. He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness. I 188 Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology. Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge. Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible! The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. I 192 Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties: Levine: then there is a two-stage process: I 193 1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are. I 194 This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow Content/categories/twin earth/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Conceptualism | Place Vs Conceptualism | Arm II 159 VsConceptualism/Place: (extreme form): he says only particulars exist, and the classification ability of organisms that respond to similarities. PlaceVsConceptualism/Extreme Form: we can challenge this conceptualism by asking how it can be so sure that particulars exist independent from concepts if the question can only ever be asked when the particulars are subsumed as Inst under a universal (U). Classification Ability/Place: to avoid sliding into anti-realism (with regard to U) we need to ensure (like Martin) that the classification ability is vital for the organism. PlaceVsLocke: but it is not only biological plausibility that shows us that Locke was wrong: Locke: the behavior of the general idea shows the difference between humans and animals. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Copenhague Interpr. | Fraassen Vs Copenhague Interpr. | I 175 Copenhagen Interpretation/CI/Double Slit/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Fraassen: revolutionary: the number that results from the formula Pmw(E) is the conditional probability of a result that is within E, given that the observable m was measured in a system in state w - VsBorn: no trajectory through the upper slit: instead. I a I ² is the probability (prob.) that if a measurement is made, we obtain a light spot - to say that a system is in a certain state only indicates a relation of conditional probabilities of measurements - FraassenVsCopenhagen Interpretation: it is not certain whether the concepts of probability and conditional probability are applicable - I 177 but the Copenhagen interpretation allows viewing probability as a measure of objective variables: the frequency of results - problem: when no measurements are made. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Field Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 220 Problem of Quantities/PoQ/Modality/Field: but this does not exclude a possible modal solution to the PoQ: perhaps other operators can help? Anyway, I do not know how that could be excluded, even if I do not know what these operators should look like. I 221 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./PoQ/Field: one suggestion is to use Counterfactual Conditional to solve the PoQ: FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: 1) they are known to be extremely vague. Therefore, you should not rely on them when formulating a physical theory. Neither should we use Counterfactual Conditional for the development of geometrical concepts. 2) DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: They cannot be "barely true": if a Counterfactual Conditional is supposed to be true, then there must be some facts (known or unknown facts) that can be determined without Counterfactual Conditional, and by virtue of which the Counterfactual Conditional are true. (Dummett, 1976, p.89). Then the relationism cannot use the Counterfactual Conditional for the PoQ, because in that case the principle requires: if distance relations are counterfactually defined, then situations that differ in their distance relations (like situations A and B) must also differ in non-counterfactual respects!. Substantivalism: can guarantee that. Relationism: cannot, and if it could, it would need no Counterfactual Conditional. 3) VsCounterfactual conditionals: does not work for very similar reasons for which the version with impredicative properties (P3) did not work: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot also be counterfactually defined, (This is the formal reason for the metaphysical argument of Dummett, for why Counterfactual Conditional cannot be "barely true"). E.g. In order to prove the incompatibility of "double distance" and "triple distance" (given that z and w do not occupy the same point, i.e. given that zw is not congruent with zz - (logical form: local equality) - then you would need the incompatibility of the following: a) if there were a point u in the middle between x and y, then uy would be congruent with zw. b) if there were a point s between x and y, and a point t between s and y, so that xs, st and ty were all congruent, then ty would be congruent with zw. If these Counterfactual Conditional were somehow derivable from non-counterfactual statements, E.g. statements about spacetime points (ST points), then you could probably, and by way of derivation. I 222 Together with the demonstrable relations between the non-counterfactual statements win an argument for the incompatibility of (a) and (b). But if we have no non-counterfactual support, we would have to consider them as bare facts. That would not be so bad if you only needed a small amount of them, but we would need a very large number of them. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Counterpart Theory | Bigelow Vs Counterpart Theory | I 168 VsCounterpart theory/cth/Bigelow/Pargetter: can also be avoided differently. By conceiving properties as relations. Because properties are subject to change, we can consider them as a relation between an individual and a point in time. I 193 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity, because it presupposes modal concepts. That means it cannot justify modal logic. I 195 Counterpart theory/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his cth has two components that must fulfil the counterparts (CP): 1) sufficient similarity with an original in the actual world, i.e. there is a "threshold" value. 2) the world companions have to resemble the actual thing at least in the same way as the cp. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart theory: Problem: the threshold value again conatains presupposed modal concepts ((s) option to deviate from the real world). Ad 2) That excludes options that we do not want to exclude. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Counterpart Theory | Plantinga Vs Counterpart Theory | Black I 57 Counterpart Theory/C.Th./PlantingaVsLewis/PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory: (1974(1), p. 115 f, 1987(2), p. 209): According to Lewis, strictly speaking all things would then have all their properties essentially, because there are no possible worlds in which they themselves (not just any placeholders) have different properties. E.g. if it was one degree colder today, we would all not exist, because then a different possible world would be real, and none of us would be there. Kripke similar: KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: E.g. if we say "Humphrey could have won the election," according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And he could not care less. (Kripke 1980(3), 44 f). 1. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell Schwarz I 100 Properties/VsCounterpart Theory/Schwarz: if we reject counterparts and temporal parts, we have to conceive all properties as masked relations to times and possible worlds. Then there are obviously many more fundamental relations. Stalnaker I 117 Identity/Stalnaker: ...these examples remind us of what an inflexible relation identity is. Our intuitions about the flexibility of possibilities contradict this rigid constitution of identity. Counterpart Theory/C.Th./Stalnaker: tells us "Relax!". We should introduce a more flexible relation for the cross-world identity that allows intransitivity and asymmetry. Counterpart Theory/Stalnaker: the 3rd motivation for them is the one that is closest to the phenomena and makes the least metaphysical presuppositions. Vs: actualism and the representative of a primitive thisness may have difficulty with that. I 118 PlantingaVsCounterpart Theory/Nathan SalmonVsCounterpart Theory/Stalnaker: Counterpart Theory/Plantinga/Salmon: can be divided into two doctrines: 1) Metaphysical Thesis: that the realms of different possible worlds do not overlap ((s) >Lewis: "Nothing is in two worlds"). 2) Semantic Thesis: that modal predicates should be interpreted in terms of counterparts instead of in terms of the individuals themselves. Ad 1): seems to suggest an extreme essentialism, according to which nothing could have been different than it actually is. Extreme Essentialism/Plantinga: would the thesis that "~if a leaf had dropped a day earlier in the mountains of the Northern Cascades in October 1876 than it actually did, I would either be non-existent, or a person who is different from me. And that is certainly wrong". (Plantinga 1974)(4). can ad 2): Can the semantic part of the doctrine solve that? 4. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press Plantinga/Salmon: it cannot. It can only mask the metaphysical consequences. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Davidson, D. | Kripke Vs Davidson, D. | III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": A language cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be "first language". III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: We only need to demand that only a finite number of axioms possess "new" vocabulary (weaker). Horwich I 450 Reference/Radical Interpretation/RI/Field Linguist//Davidson/Rorty. Reconciles these two approaches saying that Strawson is right when his approach is seen holistically, i.e. if one places Aristotle’s formulation of the "whole and for the most part" first. Rorty Strawson: Yet his criterion cannot be applied to individual cases while being sure that one is right. Quine/Rorty: Stands between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of both, of the causation and of the reference, is equally a question of the conviction’s coherence of the native and the field linguist. Reference/Kripke/Rorty: His approach is a "building block" approach: Here we see causal paths of objects leading to individual speech acts. Conviction/true/Truth/KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: this approach leaves the possibility open that all our convictions could be wrong. Or that one basically does not know what he refers to (because one misunderstands all causal paths). KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: which makes it possible to completely separate the reference and intentional objects. DavidsonVsKripke / Rorty: Davidson warns exactly against this: The gap between scheme and content. Solution/Davidson: Reverse order: We must first maximize coherence and truth, and then the reference, as a byproduct, can be like as it wants to be! Important Argument: This ensures that the intentional objects of many convictions (the "most direct cases") are their causes. ((s) Vs: it would then still be possible according to Löwenheim that what appears to be direct to us is not the most direct. DavidsonVsKripke: Kripke’s gaffe, e.g. the Gödel-Schmidt case must remain the exception. I 451 Because if the gap between references and intentional objects (which one refers to, and the one of which one believes one refers to) would be the rule, then the term "reference" would have no content! He would be as useless for the field linguist as the term "analytic". Gavagai/RI/Communication/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: the field linguist can communicate with the natives when he knows most of his intentional objects. Therefore: DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The radical interpretation (RI) starts at home. Then we can assume for ourselves as well as for the natives that most of our beliefs are true. Rorty: Is this an answer for the skeptic or does it only express what JamesVsSkepticism says:that the question is a bad question? Language/Representation/Intermediary/Medium/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson rejects "intermediaries" (intermediate members) between the organism and its environment (to be able to perform RI). Intermediate links between the organism and object: e.g. "special meaning", e.g. "intended interpretation", e.g. "what stands before the mind of the speaker" Without them we can say "RI begins at home". I 453 Solution/Davidson:fulfillment/DavidsonVsSkepticism/DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: For his refutation we need Tarski’s fulfillment ratio (word-world) instead of "correspondence" (which would correspond to the truth of sentences) of the relation proposition world). ((S) Because only whole sentences can be true). RI/Gavagai/Field Linguist/Davidson/Rorty: The field linguist is going to connect individual words of the native with objects (pieces of the world). Translation/fulfillment/Davidson/Rorty: Problem: The fulfillment relation is not a basis for translations, the fulfillment is rather a byproduct of translations. Hermeneutical circle/HC/Gavagai/RI//Davidson/RortyVsKripke: To go back and forth in the HC is not a building block-theory. It corresponds more to the "Reflective Equilibrium" of Rawls. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | McDowell Vs Davidson, D. | I 42 McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.) I 41 McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)). I 168 Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so. I 172 Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control. I 86 Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs). I 124 The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable. I 216 McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons. Rorty VI 205 McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible. Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson). VI 206 McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good. VI 207 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world. Rorty VI 213 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world. Rorty VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education"). To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom. Rorty VI 217 McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | Avramides Vs Davidson, D. | Avra I 119 Antireductionism/Avramidis: the anti-reductionist does not need to deny thought without language (Thw/oL). But at least one anti-reductionist makes this position incompatible with ontological asymmetry: Davidson: a conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological involves an ontological symmetry. (compare Dav. 1984e and 1982). AvramidisVsDavidson: that does not work: Beliefs/Convictions/Davidson: is essential for all types of thinking. The system (of endlessly interlinked) beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. (94). ((s)> holism). Avramidis: with that he says that there can be no Thw/oL. 1) a being can only have a belief if it has a concept of belief, 2) a being can only have a concept of belief if it is part of a linguistic community. Davidson: more precisely: it does not need to have a concept of a particular belief, only a general one. In order to have a general concept of belief the being must be able to imagine what it is like to be wrong. (Dav 1984e, p. 157) I 120 That requires the idea of an objective public truth (to set up a context of interpretation). (Dav 1984e, p. 157). AvramidisVsDavidson: this can be can denied either by 1) arguing that one does not need the concept of belief to believe or 2) that being a member of a language community is not the only way to obtain the concept of belief. Detecting/Instantiation/Term/Davidson: because of the need of detecting the intersubjective truth we cannot instantiate the concept of belief without grasping itself and having it. I 122 AvramidisVsDavidson: there is a different way to be aware of the distinction subjective/objective I 123 a way which is also open to speechless beings (animals) (106): learning ability in animals. This applies to Bennett’s thesis. Bennett/Avramidis: the awareness of the distinction subjective/objective is sufficient for learning. (correcting things). To do that, speechless beings only have to be able to interact with their environment. VsDavidson; his strict requirement could be interpreted as anthropomorphism. DavidsonVsVs: it comes down to properties of certain concepts, not properties of people. (Dav 1982 S.319). Semantics/Psychology/Davidson: are interdependent. ((s) So no asymmetry but symmetry?). DavidsonVsontological asymmetry. Avramidis: for us, this is a rejection of conceptual asymmetry. (For Davidson as well). I 124 Davidson: rejection of the ontological asymmetry is a consequence of the rejection of conceptual asymmetry. AvramidisVsDavidson: it does not follow. (For the anti-reductionists). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. | Avramides I 115 Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently! Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism. Schiffer I 125 paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna. Ambiguity: E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna. Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here). Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!. false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement. I 126 A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief. (3) Galileo believed that the earth moves First, there are similarities: 1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same. Galileo believed this. The earth moves. 2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative 3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation. Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation. B(x,u) With an actual statement. E.g. Galileo said something If this is true, then (Eu) S(Galileo,u) I 127 But this does not work with Galileo believed something (Eu) B(Galileo, u) LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation. Schiffer I 131 3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types. possible solution: The earth moves Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement. SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties. Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept! Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this". Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here. B. Second problem paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle: I 132 Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“. singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar: (P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x. E.g. assumed I say: Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things. Alternative: Ralph said that she was driving George's car. Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George! SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson: (5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves. From Davidson's theory follows that the second occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence SchifferVsDavidson: 1. principle (P) 2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves." I 133 3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct. C. Third problem paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of (a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude) as (b) Sam PA that. flounders snore cannot be correct because (1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam (2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude. Schiffer: (1) seems correct. Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it. I 134 Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche Donald: Tarski said this. Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…). Schiffer I 135 SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows! I 136 (9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore. Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements. But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people! Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge. I 137 If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Definition Theory | Newen Vs Definition Theory | NS I 159 Predicate/Extension/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "cardioid": set of all creatures with kidneys Intention/Predicate/Carnap: in contrast the property of being a creature with kidneys. Formal: a function of possible worlds on the set of all creatures with kidneys. Intention: is the contribution to the sentence content that makes the difference between the sentences "Peter is a creature with kidneys" and "... with heart". Predicate/Meaning/Concept/Newen/Schrenk: we assume the background assumption that the meanings of predicates are concepts. Concepts/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: are then determined as properties with him. Property/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: for him it is fixed by what extension they have in a possible world. Problem: this is not sufficient for all mathematical predicates. E.g. "equilateral" and "equiangular" applies to the same sets of triangles. However, this is part of the basic question of what the meanings of predicates are. Definition Theory/Concepts/Criteria/Newen/Schrenk: classical theory: thesis: the meaning of a predicate is specified by a definition that provides necessary and sufficient conditions of use. VsDefinition Theory: Problem: 1) for most concepts we do not find such definitions and our everyday concepts do not have limits as sharp as definitions would require. 2) We usually only have partial knowledge or partially false knowledge about what we associate with an expression. NS I 160 3) typicality effects: i.e. some objects are typical examples of things that fall under a concept, others are less typical, even if they are both unambiguously subsumed under the concept. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Putnam Vs Derrida, J. | III 96 ff However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!" PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction? III 97 The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty. PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance. DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether. III 163 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed. III 164 Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate". III 165 Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case. III 168 Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism. By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of the rational justification. Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything." Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified". III 171 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists. I (a) 22 PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous. I (k) 266 Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case. I (k) 273 PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Rorty Vs Derrida, J. | III 222 Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all. Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words. Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers. IV 9 Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification. IV 118 Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause IV 119 arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy IV 120 and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses". IV 121 SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases! RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy. IV 122 RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object! IV 123 RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle. Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically. DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.). IV 126 Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language. IV 127 This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog". IV 129 RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal. IV 130 But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again. IV 129 sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra. IV 49 World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.). IV 131 Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced. IV 135 Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time. IV 136/137 RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being. IV 138 Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? IV 139 "Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept. IV 140 Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time. RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics. IV 142 RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. VI 475 Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.) VI 476 Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space. RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen! Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents". VI 477 RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played. Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot. VI 480 Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)! VI 500 Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Descartes, R. | Kant Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking. Kant I 73 Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing. Field I 80 KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral. But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle! For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.) Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise. Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence. Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here). Stegmüller IV 362 Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis. 2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed. 3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim). IV 364 VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic. 4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula). MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it? Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege. IV 365 MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this. Strawson V 22 "Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them. V 23 StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system! V 103 KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis. Strawson V 140 Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim. KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity. V 143 KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject. V 145 Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Descartes, R. | Quine Vs Descartes, R. | I 56 The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method. Stroud I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects. Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts. Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) science is true and gives us knowledge or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Dewey | Rorty Vs Dewey | VI 428 Phenomenon/Manifestation/Reality/Dewey/Rorty: a large part of Dewey's work is dedicated to the desperate and futile attempt to abolish this distinction. Instead, he wanted to distinguish more and less strongly targeted forms of empiricism. VsDewey/Rorty: the attempt was fruitless, because his colleagues insisted on the possibility of discussing losing "contact with reality". >Appearance. VI 429 Animal/RortyVsDewey: Dewey should have realized that a wide gap yawns between sensation and cognition. Cognition is not possible without language. >Cognition. VI 434 Purpose/Darwin/Rorty: Darwin banished purpose from nature as far as it goes beyond the needs of a specific organism. Purpose/RortyVsDewey: but as soon as purpose disappears from nature, there is no philosophical problem anymore, that would affect the "possibility of science" (of insight)! For then the reconciliation of the purposes of the subject with those of the object is no longer a problem. VI 435 The object is no longer the embodiment of a telos (of nature, Aristotle), but simply an object of handling. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dialetheism | Field Vs Dialetheism | II 145 Deflationism/Paradoxes/Kleene/Priest/Field: deflationistically, Kleene and Priest can be distinguished as follows: 1) Kleene: cannot assert of a differing sentence that it either has a truth value gap or not, not that it has a truth value agglomeration or not. 2) Priest: here, every single case can be asserted. Def "solely true"/Priest/Field: ("Solely true"): true and not false. This can be said of each differing sentence with Priest (E.g. liar sentence), and also that it is "solely wrong" (incorrect and not true). Opposition/Truth/FieldVsPriest/FieldVsDialethism: he often says that contradictions are "true". Field: It would be better to say that sentences of the form "p and not-p" are not always genuinely contradictory. FieldVsPriest: He also overlooks the fact that, according to his theory, the "true contradictions" are also not true!. Truth Value Agglomeration/Truth Value Gap/Kleene/Field: in both logics there is no distinction between agglomeration and gaps!. Paradoxes/Kleene/Priest/Field: the two theories differ only in the "threshold of assertibility". Differing sentences are always assertible with Priest and never with Kleene. Differing Sentence/Field: a sentence which attributes truth or non-truth, falsehood or non-falsehood to a differing sentence is differing itself. That means Kleene can never say anything about the truth value of differing sentences, Priest can say what he wants. Additionally: Paradoxes/Deflationism/Field: they do not undermine deflationism as reconstruction of our normal T theoretical concepts. Certainly not in the weak (Tarskian) version, but also not in certain stronger forms. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Doepke, F.C. | Simons Vs Doepke, F.C. | I 228 Composition/mereology/Doepke: e.g. the Ship of Theseus, but not the wood of the ship is composed of planks. Although each part of the collection of atoms of you is part you and each part of the wood is a part of the ship, you and the ship have additional parts that are not shared by the collection of atoms and of the wood. SimonsVsDoepke: if Cesar (C) and the collection of atoms or matter m to t coincide, that means that C t m then Cesar's heart h is part of m to t. ((s) that means that for every single moment it is no problem). Doepke: relies on intuition to deny it. Simons: we need good reasons to claim that the heart is not part of the matter. Pro CP: CP stands for simplicity but only at first glance. If coincidence is both necessary and sufficient for superposition,... I 229 ...then the relationship between mereological and spatial considerations are very direct. One can, for example, show that spatial extension is part of another, if one finds a continuant that occupied each one, so that the one continuant is part of the other (sic). Conversely, if s1 and s2 are regions, so that s1 < s2, then for every x, y, and t, so that s1 = rtx and s2 = rty: resulting sum x) does not tolerate the loss of a single part. It was a plural sum in the sense of SUM (see above). Problem: then it looks like that the wall may think in particular type changes, and therefore the wall would have to constitute the stones. This applies to everything that can lose parts without dying, e.g. snowball. Problem: then concepts such as "the stones that form the walls (compose) or "the snow that constituted the snowball" (sic) are time-variable designators. Constitution: we want to exclude reciprocal constitution. Solution: Def constitution/SimonsVsDoepke: :x constitutes y to t iff. x could be a substrate of y’s complete destruction. Complete destruction: what this means, however, varies with the context. I 240 Not every part has to be destroyed completely. Constitution/Simons: a constituted object can be destroyed completely by destroying a few components. This ensures the asymmetry of the constitution. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Dogmas (Quine) | Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine) | Brandom I 854 DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (>Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also >BrandomVsKant). >Scheme/Content ("Third dogma"). I 85 The idea of a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme. We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data." I 89 Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content. I 91 If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective. DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Duhem, P. | Hacking Vs Duhem, P. | I 219 Observation / Hacking: Vs "theory ladenness of observation" (.. Duhem, Putnam et al) all observation is theory-laden, concepts derived from theories, etc. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Dummett, M. | Brandom Vs Dummett, M. | I 202 BrandomVsDummett: if he see the problematic aspect of the concept "boche" in that it causes a non-conservative extension of the remaining language, it is not right. The non-conservativity merely shows that the concept has a substantial content which was not already included in other concepts. E.g. Temperature: was introduced with certain criteria, with the introduction of new measurement methods, the complex inferential definition developed that determines the significance of today (> Measuring). Introduction: it is not to be asked if the conclusions were already accepted, but whether this conclusion is one that should be accepted! The problem with "boche" and "nigger" is not the novelty, but the unwanted conclusions. Brandom II 173 But there are other ways of justification than showing that we’ve already been on them determined implicitly, even before the term was introduced. Background of material inferential practices. Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: this disregards the specific nature of the sentences of being able to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregian power). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dummett, M. | Schiffer Vs Dummett, M. | I 221 Verificanistical semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): verification conditions instead of truth conditions. Dummett: (like Davidson): we must ask what form a meaning theory (m.th.) would have to take to find out what meaning is. This M.Th. should be able to specify the meaning of all words and propositions. (Dummett 1975, p. 97). Dummett: pro compositionality (with Wittgenstein): no systematic meaning theory is possible without explaining the understanding of infinitely many sentences. Therefore one must, like Chomsky and Wittgenstein, accept that we have an implicit capture some general principles. (Dummett 1978, p. 451). DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain any truth theory (tr.th.). Verification condition/verification conditions/Dummett: (for propositions) the verification conditions are also recursively specified. Schiffer: but that does not follow that a compositional truth-theoretic semantics does not exist as well. I 222 Dummett: with the specification of the verification conditions the meaning theory could at the same time specify the truth conditions (Dummett 1978 Foreword). Verification conditions/SchifferVsDummett: it is not clear how the verification conditions should look like. Relation theory/meaning theory/Schiffer: when I argued VsRelation theory, I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics (tr.th.sem.). Otherwise, it would be true!. Verificationist meaning theory/Verif. m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: with a verificationist meaning theory could the relation theory maybe also be true?. I 225 Use theory/Dummett/Schiffer: for Dummett the point of use theory is: "the meaning of a word is uniquely determined by the observable characteristics of its linguistic use". (Dummett 1976, 135). SchifferVsDummett: but what counts as "observable characteristic" and what as "openly shown" ?. Does Dummett think that a description of the use in purely behavioral, non-semantic and non-psychological terms would be sufficient that a word has a specific meaning? That would be too implausible as that Dummett would accept that. Still, he notes that the description should not use any psychological or semantic terms. Meaning/Dummett/Schiffer: should therefore also become understandable for beings who have no semantic or psychological concepts themselves! So even for Marsians. (Also McDowell understands him like this, 1981, 237). McDowellVsDummett: according to Dummett it must be possible to give a description of our language behavior that is understandable for extraterrestrials. That does not work, because the intentional "(content-determining) is not reducible to the non-intentional. Content/McDowellVsDummett/SchifferVsDummett: is not detectable for extraterrestrials. ((s) Not "speechless", but only those who do not share our intentional vocabulary). I 226 Ad. 4: ("To know which recognizable circumstances determine a proposition as true or false"). Schiffer: that means how do we get from behaviorism to anti-realism?. Manifestation/SchifferVsDummett: this one makes do here even with pronounced psychological terms!. 1. Recognizing (that the conditions are met) is itself a form of knowledge, which in turn contains belief. You cannot describe that non-psychologically. 2. How can one then achieve the further conclusion that a purified attribution should ascribe a skill that can only be "openly shown"? (The showing understood behavioristically). Behaviorism/Dummett/Schiffer: However, I am not ascribing any behaviorism to Dummett, I ascribe him nothing, I just wonder what his position is. meaning theory/m.th./Dummett: thinks that natural languages have a m.th.! Their core will be recursively definable verif. cond.. Anti-Realism/Schiffer: here Dummett is uncertain whether the m.th. should have falsification conditions, but that will not affect my subsequent criticism. 1. Whether the knowledge that a state of affair exists, counts as verification of a proposition. I 227 Could depend on extralinguistic knowledge and not by the understanding of the proposition! We usually need background information. Understanding/SchifferVsDummett: then it should not be about verification conditions!. Direct verification conditions/Dummett: has to exist for each single proposition!. QuineVsDummett/Schiffer: (Quine 1953b): direct verification conditions cannot exist for every proposition. ((s) ~Theories are not verifiable proposition by proposition). 2. Surely there are meaningful propositions that have no recognizable conditions that would turn out this proposition as true or false. Dummett/Schiffer: insists, however, that a proposition must be shown as true or false and in fact "conclusively" (conclusive verifiability). (1978, 379). This leads to anti-realism. ((s) Def anti-realism/Dummett/(s): is exactly to demand that the verification must be performed in order to understand a proposition. The realism would waive the verification.) Anti-realism/Dummett: you still should not rely too heavily on the anti-realism! Because often a "conclusive verification" is not to obtain!. Schiffer: so Dummett itself holds the verification conditions contestable!. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett quotes Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behaviors can be refuted. (Dummett 1978, S. XXXV) SchifferVsDummett: then the m.th. needs contestable criteria as well as contestable conditions!. Problem: this applies to most empirical judgments E.g. "That is a dog". 3. We know what kind of semantic values we must attribute to the non-logical constants (predicates and singular term) in the conditional sentences in a truth-theoretic semantics. But how shall that look like in the alternative with verification conditions instead of truth conditions?. Solution/Dummett: the verificationist semantics will make every predicate an effective means available, so that it can be determined for each object whether the predicate applies to the object or the singular term references to the object. I 230 Relation theory/SchifferVsDummett: the by me disapproved relation theory for propositional attitudes (belief as a relation to belief objects) seems inevitable for Dummett. ((s) because of the relation of predicates to objects to which they must apply verifiable). Problem: that can only happen in a finite theory, and for propositional attitude it would have to be infinite, because for each prop the VB would have to be found individually. Relation theory/Schiffer: has to assume propositional attitude as E.g. "believes that Australians drink too much" as semantically primitive - namely, 2-figure predicate between believer and content). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Empiricism | Strawson Vs Empiricism | IV 98 British Empiricism: thesis: the general structure of our imagination must be derived in any way from a small part of themselves. StrawsonVsEmpiricim, British: narrow-minded reduction of sensory experience on impressions or images of simple sensory qualities. IV 99 1. After one of these directions our general thought structure is something like an elaborated theory based on subjective state of affair sequences. It therefore needs a rational justification. 2. Hume: thinking that we are inherently subject to. Explanation only by basic materials. 3. All concepts constructed of basic elements. The basic elements are the subjective states of affair themselves. (conceptual atomism). IV 101 Justification/StrawsonVsEmpiricism, British: there is no justification of a theory due to a part of this theory. (Here: the subjective state of affair sequences). What is to be explained, is assumed here. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Empiricism | Barrow Vs Empiricism | I 39 ff VsEmpiricism: the inquiring scientist is disturbed by the thought that a theory could never aspire to be anything but a description of data. No particle physicist would confuse a theory of elementary particles with a list of the properties of the particles. I 40 What do we do if we follow empiricism in the view that only facts lay a claim to existence, with the most important thing about the accumulation of facts being that they are in many ways interrelated and have common properties? Empiricism may sound like a harmless sophistry at first. But it has inconvenient consequences: It excludes many useful physical concepts, because they are not observable. First, it prohibits any universal law of nature! Because its validity can only be confirmed in a few practical cases. This seems to lead to the downfall of science. The first retreat tactics, then, is to consider a statement as useful if it can have verifiable consequences in connection with others, but then nothing will be excluded anymore in the end. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Evans, G. | Dummett Vs Evans, G. | Davidson I 58 In a distal theory, the meaning is directly linked to the conditions which make sentences intersubjectively true or false. Here Quine sides with Dummett (DummettVsEvans) and opposes to aligning the meanings with the truth conditions. QuineVsEvans, DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions. Dummett I 11 Language/Evans: New Current: Gareth Evans argues that language could only be explained by means of concepts for different types of thoughts that are considered regardless of their linguistic expression. I 115 In his book "Varieties of reference" Evans tries to analyze language-independently different ways of thinking about an object in order to explain various linguistic means of referencing with the help of these ways of thinking about the object. DummettVsEvans: therefore, Evans is no analytical philosopher for me anymore. The anal. ph. came about as soon as the "turn to language" was completed. Earliest Example: Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884. DummettVsEvans: If thinking about an object only existed if you think something specific with regard to this object, then Frege’s answer would have been that the numbers are only given ,because we grasp complete thoughts about them. Evans: Language explainable by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (also Frege) Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is still the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different from inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you want to turn around the priority of the language over the thought like Evans and others. (Risk of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable.) I 131 The meanings cannot depend on what happens in our consciousness. They could not if these inner processes were communicable! DummettVsEvans: at risk of deriving such an unauthorized view. The meaning is objective, because it is included in the use which a competent speaker has to make of this expression. Stalnaker II 1 Def Analytische Philosophie/Dummett/DummettVsEvans/Stalnaker: Thesis: die Philosophie des Denkens kann nur über die Philosophie der Sprache erfasst werden. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Evans, G. | McDowell Vs Evans, G. | I 73 Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: but the judgment only introduces new types of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that originates from experience! Justification/McDowell: does not exist in a derivation of one content from another. A typical perceptual judgment makes a selection from a richer content, which is provided by experience. I 75 Experience/Evans: although it is non-conceptual (and therefore must be blind, according to Kant) he wants to protect it by claiming a "content." That is, the subject is to have an objective property of reality. Namely as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: doesn't make sense without concepts. Evans: contrasts this with the demand: objects of perception must be supported by an "accompanying theory." McDowell: just that is spontaneity. Spontaneity/animal/McDowell: distinguishes us from animals that have no terms. I 80/81 Experience/Evans: their richness of detail cannot be captured by concepts! Ex many more shades of color perceptible than terms available. (S) maybe the term difference suffices if samples are available. McDowellVsEvans: Ex colors: fine grain: we should not assume that there is always a proof-sample. I 86 There must also be recognition involved. Thinking: certainly, there are thoughts that cannot necessarily put into words in a way that their content would thereby be completely determined. Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue. If anyone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. I 87 Experience/judgment/McDowell: the connection between the two is that experiences provide grounds for judgments. That is, the tendency to use concepts does not mysteriously hover independently of the situation as in Evans. I 89 McDowellVsEvans: there is no reason for a disection into factors of similarity and difference. Instead, we can say that we possess something that animals possess too, namely the sensitivity of the perception of the characteristics of our surroundings. We are different from animals only in the sense that our sensitivity is incorporated into the realm of spontaneity. I 91 Sensuality/concepts/McDowellVsEvans: Sensuality is conceptual. Without this assumption one lapses into the myth of the given if one tries to look at the rational control of empirical thinking. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Extensionality | Simons Vs Extensionality | I 116 Extensionality/Simons: we leave extensionality with the rejection of ≤. I 117 ≤: the relation ≤ is not antisymmetric, it is a partial order, that means it is reflexive and transitive. In terms of it one can define a symmetric predicate: Def coincidence of parts/mereology/spelling/Simons: SD16 x ≤≥ y ≡ x ≤ y u y ≤ x. Coinciding individuals are perceptually indistinguishable for their period of coincidence. They are in superposition. Def superposition/mereology/Simons: they occupy the same place at the same time. Question: (see below): do all superposed objects coincide mereologically? By rejecting the proper parts principle we receive an abundance of descriptions and explanatory power. SimonsVsExtensionality: extensionality is too ascetic for mereology. I 251 Part/SimonsVsExtensionality/VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: we see which abundance we have to give up if we want to remain extensional, because now we have three concepts of part instead of one, which throws together the SSP and there may be even more. CEM/Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is actually a substantive thesis: individuals who are of the same material are identified. Coincidence-Principle/Simons: 1. For the two more powerful coincidence concepts of identity and the strong coincidence we refuse it. 2. For weak coincidence we allow it, provided we consider only superimposed material individuals. Strictly weak inclusion: e.g. there is no reason to deny that Caesar's heart is weakly included in the matter of Caesar. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Externalism | Stalnaker Vs Externalism | II 170 Externalism/Stalnaker: this had amazing paradoxical consequences: 1. If what we think is not in the head we cannot know what we mean or think. Or at least not have the authority of the first person. Note: not necessarily: what follows is that the intrinsic state is not authoritative which means it does not follow that if the head of someone is in an intrinsic state that he has a certain conviction. But this does not mean that he does not have the authority of the first person. 2. The externalism threatens the explanatory role of mental states. We explain the behavior of people in the way that they believe and want something. Problem: how can mental states be causally relevant if they themselves depend on something outside? VsExternalism/Stalnaker: some grant it truth but deny its significance. It would only show that our normal concepts are inappropriate for behavior explanation. This suggests that we need to make only minor revisions. Solution/some: the def "organismic contribution": that is the component which is dependent or supervenient on internal states. VsExternalism/revisionism/terminology/Stalnaker: the revisionist objection against the externalism makes a positive and a negative assertion. a) negative assertion: there can be no behavior explanation which is not individualistic (non-externalist). b) positive assertion: although the normal psychological concepts are not individualistic, they can be reinterpreted to preserve the structure of intentional explanation. narrow content/Stalnaker: first, I examine a very simple causal analogue of the narrow content: a "narrow footprint". Example normal footprint: is a causal-relational concept. Something is a footprint by virtue of the manner in which it was created. It is not with the sand intrinsically. Versus: "Narrow footprint"/twin earth/tw.e./Stalnaker: e.g. here a footprint that is similiar to the one of Jone was accidentally created by a wave. Pointe: so there is something on the tw.e. which is intrinsically indistinguishable from a footprint, not a footprint. Then a philosopher might say with a sense for grip formulations: "Externalism": "Divide the cake in whatever way you want, footprints are not in the sand!". VsExternalism: revisionism might reply that this would only apply to colloquial terms and these are of no interest to science. Scientifically only states that are intrinsically with the sand count. Solution/revisionism/VsExternalism: the concept of narrow content (here: e.g. "narrow footprint"). narrow concept: here the relevant state is independent from the causal history. E.g. narrow footprint: is a foot shaped impression, howsoever caused. Then we could isolate that component which is intrinsically with the medium (here: the sand). II 172 ExternalismVsVs: pointe: the new concept is still a relational one! E.g. narrow footprints are now not anymore dependent on a specific cause but are still dependent on general causes which are extrinsically with the sand. E.g. assuming normal feet on the TE have a different shape. Then the footprint which was caused by a wave is not only not a normal footprint but also no narrow footprint. Then the footprint in the sand is just not in the shape of a foot. ((s) only if you transfer the shape from the actual world to the twin earth). Stalnaker: there are still a lot of everyday examples for this strategy: Disposition concept/Stalnaker: we begin with a causal interaction e.g. water solubility then we use counterfactual conditionals (co.co.) to obtain a stable property that the thing has no matter whether it comes to the interaction. intrinsically/Stalnaker: water solubility may be a purely intrinsic property, others not: e.g. observability also depends on the skills of the observer. Narrow concept/Stalnaker: e.g. belief may be a narrow description of the concept of knowledge in the sense that the dependence on special causes between facts and knower was replaced by a more general of patterns of causal relations between facts and internal states. Alternative: Def narrow footprint: "foot-shaped impression" is now reference-determining definde: it shall now mean, formed in the way how feet are formed in the actual world (act.wrld.). Important argument: then the by the wave formed impression on the TE is still a narrow footprint. intrinsically: so, it seems we have isolated a purely intrinsic state of the sand. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Goodman Vs Feyerabend, P. | IV 202 VsFeyerabend: The statement "Nothing goes" is just as feasible as the statement "anything goes". And just as feasible as the statement "something goes". The main objective of our proposal is not to avoid difficulty, but to develop a wider range and more sensitive instruments. First: what is wrong with some familiar core concepts? |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P. | V 156 Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." >Incommensurability, >observation language. Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true. V 156/157 According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail. Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there. However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so. PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same. How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual? --- V 158 Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference. V 160 Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference. --- I (c) 83 Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. I (c) 84 Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Field, H. | Quine Vs Field, H. | Field I 128 Quine-Putnam-Argument/VsField: we must assume the truth of mathematical statements in order to be able to do academic work. >indispensability argument). FieldVs: the only way around this: show that the nominalistic resources for good science are adequate. This is not a consequence of conservatism. Field II 202 Partial Signification/Field: is not so unusual: we often apply it implicitly in the case of vague expressions. Ex what is the extension of the term e.g. "big man" in German? There is no fact which decides whether 185 or 180 cm. Solution: "big man" partially signifies a set and partially other sets. Namely, the sets of shape {xI x is a person taller than h}. FieldVsQuine: that is quite unlike in Quine. QuineVsField: it is not necessary to abandon the normal semantic concepts of denotation and signification. Instead, we can make them relative. (1) for a foreign language: here we do not have to refrain from talking about the signification of a foreign word. But we must say that relative to the obvious translation manual ... FieldVsQuine: but apparently that makes no sense. (1) seems to suggest that we could explain relative signification as: (2) saying that a term T used in one language signifies the amount of rabbits, relative to a ÜH M, actually means that M translates T as "rabbit". FieldVs: that is not sufficient. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Stalnaker Vs Field, H. | Field II 28 Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning. FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider". Field II 94 StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language. A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant. StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states. Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this: FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that. Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations. 2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms. Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Pollock Vs Field, H. | Field II 384 Rules/Standards/Evaluation/PollockVsRelativism/PollockVsField: even tries to avoid the weak relativism: Thesis: the concepts of each person are so shaped by the system of epistemic rules which applies them that there can be no real conflict between people with different systems. I.e. the systems themselves cannot be considered as being in conflict. FieldVsPollock: that is quite implausible: sure, it may be that someone with slightly different rules of induction has a slightly different concept e.g. of ravens. But not so much that one would say that there is no conflict between his belief: "The next raven will be black" and my belief "... not black ...". Concept/Pollock: at the object level, our concepts are determined by our rule system. Concept/FieldVsPollock: more plausible: our epistemic concepts like "reasonable" are determined like this: "reasonable means" "reasonable in terms of our rules." |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Field, H. | Soames Vs Field, H. | I 467 Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth. Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things: (i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages. (ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically (iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes. Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example (1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true. b. Church's theorem is true c. Everything he said is true. I 468 SoamesVsPropositions. Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists. Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example). Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say: (6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all.... I 470 SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise: (7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S. I 472 Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar. 2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation. The result is a sentence of the metalanguage: (8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S). FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong! Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions I 474 of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation. Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct. FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient. "Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9): (9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only) c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent) Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now. Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage). Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different! N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts. Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept. Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses). I 475 Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages: 1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above) 2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory. Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent. Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts). 2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference. SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)! Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1). Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except: L1: here "R" applies to round things L2: here on red things. Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages: (11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red. Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list. FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers. SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski I 476 in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true, L2: ...if A and B are true. FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning). FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior). Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts: (13) the term of a name referring to an object The term of a predicate that applies to an object. The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms ... I 477 Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b: (14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s). b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is .... Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary. SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price. Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition). New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories. SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms. Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either a) define about truth, or b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms. SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now! a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular. b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s]. Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing. Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent. Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable. SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough. I 478 It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior). Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer). (15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals). (16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc. ((s) Both times reference) Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16) that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition. I 481 Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms. Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories. Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects. ((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence). Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language). I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions. I 483 SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities. I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example Negation/Field (21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence). SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts). Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have. Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar: Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage. Solution/Soames: (22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence). "Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Fodor, J. | Churchland Vs Fodor, J. | Lanz I 303 Learning / Fodor: represent and examine hypotheses about which parts of the natural language correlate with which parts of the innate "language of thought" (Mentalese): acquisition of the native language. ChurchlandVsFodor: it would follow that one can not learn new concepts in a certain sense. If opinions are relations to sentences of the "language of thought", then a sentence must be stored for each opinion somewhere. Must then for every opinion also a tacit record be saved in the "language of thought"? That would exceed the capacity limits. But this storage would not be sufficient for the sentences to be accessible and available at the right time. In addition, the links must be transparent for the organism (though not the consciousness). (ChurchlandVsMentalese). |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Fodor, J. | Davidson Vs Fodor, J. | I (b) 36 DavidsonVsFodor/Dennett/Kaplan/Stich: I for my part believe that the concepts of the belief, desire, intent, etc. are not suitable for a science of the type of physics. One of the reason for this is that mental states are identified in part on the basis of their causes and effects. The same is true, however, for human behavior. Therefore, I see no chance to offer scientific explanations in terms of it. Not to describe behavior as a law in analogy to physics. Even Jerry Fodor thinks (like Searle) that holism or the indeterminacy of translation constitutes a threat for the realism with respect to the prop. att.s DavidsonVsFodor: The same error: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. Glüer II 139 A suitable law would be the so-called "bridge law" required for a reduction. Whether there can be such a bridge laws, according to Davidson is not an empirical question, but can be decided a priori. Glüer II 135 The individuation procedures of the intentionalist and physicalistic discourse show a general incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates essentially include normativity. Therefore, no bridge laws possible. (> anomalous monism, > have incidents of reasons, not caused). Anomalous monism/AM: mental incident tokens are as individual each identical with physical incident tokens, but without mental incident types being nomologically identical with the types of physical incidents. Glüer II 147 Fodor: Mental or physical incidents are covered by different laws, i.e. they have different effects. That means, intentionalist descriptions mark a causally important difference. DavidsonVsFodor: To say that this difference is ultimately owing to the physical nature is absurd, because the causal relations are description-independent. Rorty VI 162 Mind/Davidson/Rorty: false concept of the mind: with private states and objects. Source of the harmful dualisms scheme/content, objective/subjective VI 163 DavidsonVsFodor/Rorty: the scientific nature of psychology turns into a search for internal propositional states that should be independent of the rest of the world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Goodman Vs Fodor, J. | IV 141 GoodmanVsFodor: Contemporary theorists assert that language proficiency is based on a dictionary and a grammar inside the consciousness. (Chomsky, GoodmanVs) The mental dictionary defines the meaning of the individual words. The mental grammar defines the manner in which the meanings of significant word sequences are derived from the meanings of their constituents. IV 143 As if the consciousness were a digital computer. The charm lies in the seductive analogy to everyday machines and even the computer. According to Jerry Fodor, the computer is the only model of consciousness at our disposal. But introspection does not bring us even remotely close to a verification: the proponents of the view to be tested admit that access to the internal code is a deeply unconscious process. The reason for the belief that it does occur is that it is embedded in a high-performing linguistic theory. We are to believe that speakers "have access" to an internal syntactic and semantic code, and that is due to an analogy to the mutual attraction of bodies. I can know that ’elm’ and ’beech’ are separate classes of deciduous trees without having an idea of how to tell them apart. Goodman: my language proficiency is not endangered by my ignorance. I can connect with other members of the linguistic community to fill my gaps. In addition, the knowledge in question is not primarily linguistic, here is rather botanical or biographical. Fodor gives in on this point, and draws the conclusion that the dictionary is referentially opaque. His entries define the concepts in which we think, but not what we think about. IV 144 The analogy to the computer model is ambiguous, because it has a referential and a computer-like interpretation. I 145 Of course, the computer knows nothing of the referential interpretation. - Accordingly, we would not know that a computer simulation represents a molecular interaction - But according to Fodor, this is exactly our situation in terms of sentences that we understand. - Questions about the truth value of sentences are inappropriate according to the computer-like reading. Fodor’s theory can neither explain how we know what new phrases rep nor what trusted ones rep. The role of the dictionary has emerged to serve other purposes. The linguists cannot explain understanding of metaphorical language. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Fodor, J. | Newen Vs Fodor, J. | NS I131 Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis 2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. NS I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states. Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax). It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories. VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language. NS I 133 b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early." Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed. Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills. - - NS I 160 Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional. Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate. VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow." NS I 161 Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case. VsFodor: 1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried. FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept! Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of FodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. FodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Foster, J.A. | Davidson Vs Foster, J.A. | II 35 DavidsonVsFoster: my mistake was not assuming that any theory that gives the correct truth conditions could serve as an interpretation. My mistake was, however, (like Foster says) to overlook that someone could have a sufficiently clear theory without knowing that it is there! It was easy for me to overlook this, because I departed from the one who constructed the theory himself. FosterVsDavidson: Question: whether Davidson made clear enough what a competent translator must know. FosterVsDavidson: Davidson’s theory is in ruins because in order to secure the translation II 38 an intensional expression like "determines" (or "asserts") must be used. DavidsonVsFoster: But I’ve never tried that! My attempt at finding access to language and meaning, makes significant use of concepts such as belief and intention, but I do not think that these concepts can be reduced to something behavioristic or scientific. I avoid substantial use of unexplained linguistic concepts. Saying that an interpreter necessarily must know a so-called intensional concept does not ruin my theory. (Beliefs and intentions are also intensional). DavidsonVsFoster: has not exactly distinguished two problems: 1) whether the paratactical analysis can be applied here at all. (Marginal). 2) whether the radical interpretation is threatened if the relevant concept "determines" obscures an unanalysed linguistic concept. Davidson: I propose paratactic semantics for "determines", unless it can be shown that it is not working. Reference/DavidsonVsFoster: it cannot be sufficient to maintain the same reference, because then all true propositions would assert the same fact. II 40 DavidsonVsFoster: ...this is not a "notational variant", notation has nothing to do with it. Both accept the same notation, the possible-world semanticist and I. We differ in the semantic analysis. Reference/Translation/Token reflexive/Davidson: the fact that the reference is changed in translation often occurs in token-reflexive sentences (so-called by Reichenbach). (E.g. snow ... snow, this ... this). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Foucault, M. | Habermas Vs Foucault, M. | I 317 Will to Knowledge/Foucault: intervenes in the constitution of the scientific discourses. He determines the exception of the rules by which true is distinguished from false. (Power). HabermasVsFoucault: the so disguised origin of the concept of power from the metaphysics-critical concept of the will to truth and to knowledge also explains the systematically ambiguous use of the category "power". On the one hand, the innocence of a concept that can be used descriptively, on the other hand, a constitution-theoretical basic concept which only gives analysis its reason-critical meaning. I 318 HabermasVsFoucault: paradoxical combination of positivist attitude and critical aspirations. I 320 Foucault Thesis: Power and knowledge formations form an indissoluble unity. I 321 HabermasVsFoucault: this strong thesis can certainly not be justified with functionalist arguments alone. Form of Thought Proof: HabermasVsFoucault: he would have to prove that specific power strategies implement themselves in relevant scientific strategies of the reification of everyday language experiences, and thus preempt the sense of using theoretical statements about such constituted object areas. HabermasVsFoucault: he has not taken up this approach later, otherwise he would have noticed that objectivist approaches no longer dominated the field in the human sciences in the seventies. They compete rather with hermeneutical and critical approaches. I 322 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy appears in a confusing double role: on the one hand, the empirical role of an analysis of power technologies, on the one hand, a transcendental role of the same analysis of power technologies that are supposed to explain how scientific discourses are possible at all. The forced connection of the idealistic notion of transcendental synthesis with empiricist ontology is not a way out of the philosophy of the subject: the concept of power is taken from the philosophy of consciousness itself! I 323 HabermasVsFoucault: he turns the truth-dependence of power into the power-dependence of truth without further ado! Power becomes subjectless. HabermasVsFoucault: however, nobody escapes the conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject solely by performing inverse operations of the basic concepts. I 324 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy turns out to be exactly the presentistic, relativistic and normative cryptographic pseudo-science it does not want to be! It ends in hopeless subjectivism. I 325 HabermasVsFoucault: 1) involuntary presenteeism 2) unavoidable relativism of a present-oriented analysis which can only consider itself to be a context-dependent practical enterprise. 3) arbitrary partisanship of a criticism that cannot document its normative foundations. (Foucault is circumstantial enough to admit this. I 326 HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historicist can explain power technologies and domination practices only in comparison with each other and not every single one as a totality of itself. I 327 HabermasVsFoucault: caught up in exactly the self-reference he fought: the truth claims are not limited only to the discourses in which they occur. I 328 Even the basic assumption of his theory of power is self-referencing; it must also destroy the validity, the basis of of the research inspired by it. I 330 HabermasVsFoucault: Foucault’s concept of power does not allow such a privileged notion of counter-power (E.g. the workers). Every counter-power already awakens itself in the horizon of power. I 336 He fights against a naturalistic metaphysics, which reifies a counter-power. HabermasVsFoucault: but therefore he also has to refrain from answering the question of the normative foundations of his criticism. HabermasVsFoucault: undialectical! Leveling of ambiguous phenomena - (Foucault admits weaknesses in earlier works) |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Frege, G. | Field Vs Frege, G. | I 89 Knowledge of Consistency/FregeVsDeflationism: (Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, §95): We can only determine that a concept is consistent by first producing something that falls under it. (Frege, p. 106). FieldVsFrege: this is obviously not literally correct: E.g. we can see that the concept of a "winged horse" is consistent without producing such a horse. But you can weaken the argument: then it acknowledges that there is knowledge of possibility that does not arise from a knowledge of actuality, but from the reflection of the logical form of the concepts. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Russell Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 59 RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) --- Stepanians I 44 Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient. --- Stepanians I 87 Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis. 2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above). --- I 88 VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one. Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this. Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope. I 88 Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). I 91 Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V": The scope of F = is the scope of G bik All Fs are G and vice versa. Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F. It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty. I 92 RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is. If so, it includes itself, otherwise not. Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat. On the other hand: Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat. Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition. I 96 Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. I 97 VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. I 114 Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence). Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing. Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something. --- Horwich I 57 RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Newen I 61 Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence. b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence. Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance. --- I 62 RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually). Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme). --- Quine II 103 Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction a) expression, b) what it means, c) that to what it (if at all) refers to. This is not natural for Russell. RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C? QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Frege, G. | Patzig Vs Frege, G. | IV 20 Judgment/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable and logically simple. IV 21 The introduction of a name for this is not possible. Function/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable: because concepts are a particular class of functions. PatzigVsFrege: there may be different areas that each select different things as the fundamental concept. This does not lead to a circle. There do not need to be concepts that are "indefinable by principle". IV 22 Def Fact/Frege: a true thought. PatzigVsFrege: exaggerated if the concept of fact is now to be explained by that of the "true thought". IV 27 Thought Structure/PatzigVsFrege: his view, the six two-digit thoughts structures formed a "complete whole" is no longer accepted today. You could rather introduce 16 instead of 6 (>Mail). |
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| Freud, S. | Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. | Derrida I 101 Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud). Derrida I 101 ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers. Lacan I 41 LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying. I 122 LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind"). Rorty V 42 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". (Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.) V 62 Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual. V 63 MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view. Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings. V 64 "Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires. V 65 RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre. V 66 We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts. V 67 Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre. V 67/68 Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view". V 69 Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism. V 70 What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Functionalism | Putnam Vs Functionalism | V 112 Psychology/Putnam: psychological properties exhibit the same characteristic. Ex being angry: may be a property of the relatives of thousands of different species with possibly very different physical and chemical structure. V 111/112 Def functionalism: the view that the most plausible 'monistic' theory (that avoids the division of mind and matter as two separate types of substances) is the one that states that psychological properties and functional properties are identical. Putnam: functionalism already supplies the correct naturalistic description. There are other "mentalist" descriptions of this relationship which are also correct, but can not be traced back to the worldview that we call "nature"! The concepts "rationality", "truth" and "reference" belong to such a "mentalist" version. VsFunctionalism: the qualitative character of sensations proves difficult for this theory. Equating emotional states such as jealousy or anger with functional states of the overall system is plausible, but Ex the experience of a particular shade of blue is problematic if one wants to equate it with a function. V 112/113 Inverted spectra/Locke: how would one ever experience it? If someone sees something blue with inverted spectrum, then it looks red, but since childhood that person was taught him to call this color blue. So one would never know it. Putnam: Description: Ex just imagine that one's own spectrum is reversed at a certain time, but one remembers how it was before. The functional roles have reversed themselves. V 114 If we now adopt the "functionalist" theory of subjective colors "a sensation is exactly then a blue sensation, if it has the role to signal the presence of objective blue in the surroundings". This theory indeed detected a meaning of the expression "Blue sensation", but not its desired "qualitative" sense. If this functional role is identical to the qualitative character, one could not say that the quality of the sensation has changed. But the quality has changed. In this case, the quality does not seem to be a functional state. (VsFunktionalismus). V 155 Feyerabend/Putnam: (Against methodological constraints): the determinants of our conceptions of scientific rationality are largely what we would call irrational. He suggests that the modern scientific and technological rationality is a scam according to its own standards. (Similar tendency in Foucault). But Feyerabend goes far beyond Kuhn and Foucault. He claims that quacks that lay on hands can do more to relieve pain than a doctor. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Glanzberg, M. | Stalnaker Vs Glanzberg, M. | I 105 Infinite language/infinite/Stalnaker: we assumed here one with infinite quantification-prefixes and infinite Boolean combinations. Michael GlanzbergVsStalnaker: (2001) showed that only finite quantifications are sufficient. In such a language one can express that there are infinitely many different to each other objects by saying that there are at least n objects for each n. I 106 Stronger/weaker/language/Glanzberg: problem: such a language is too strong to deliver the kind of supervenience that we need for our philosophical discussion. A supervenience basis due to an infinite language will be too weak because then one can define arbitrary properties. Relevance/Glanzberg: to build an interesting concept of supervenience we need restrictions that exclude arbitrary properties. Only then we will get a strong thesis. (> stronger/weaker: >Strength of theories). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: I think our thesis is as strong as we need it. Namely because the strong supervenience from A to B’ is equivalent to the global one from A to B. This is the converse of the main thesis that was proved in the appendix. This follows from the following three facts that apply to any three sets of properties X, Y and Z where X' is the set of properties that can be defined in concepts of X properties in the infinite language. 1. If X strongly supervenes on Y, then X supervenes globally on Y ((s) strong supervenience implies a global one). 2. if X supervenes globally on Y and Y globally on Z then X supervenes globally on Z ((s) transitivity of global supervenience). 3. X’ supervenes globally on X. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: is clearly never trivial. It is obviously not true for arbitrary sets of properties A and B that A supervenes globally on B and is therefore also not generally true that A globally or strongly supervenes on the infinite closure (infinitary closure) B'. How expressive the infinite language may be it is not give us the strength to define properties that distinguish between B-undistinguishable possible worlds (poss.w.). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: with him it only seems so because his formal argument assumes that a full B-description of a poss.w. completely describes it but that is only true if all the properties globally supervene on the B-properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Goodman, N. | Putnam Vs Goodman, N. | III 145 Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte! III 146 Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is. III 147 If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other. The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major". III 148 That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one disappeared, we undoubtedly still spoke of Ursa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously. Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist. The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list! No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star. In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain! III 149 Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius. Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor! Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. III 154 Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one. Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. III 157 Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark. I (k) 257 Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit. Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"! PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun. It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars. Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation. We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same. Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation! Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists. I (k) 257/258 The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"! Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"! Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Grice, P.H. | Loar Vs Grice, P.H. | I 1 Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief. Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist: 1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice). LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical: LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!) 2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on I 2 Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning. Belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics. Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication: Belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state. Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects. Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Habermas, J. | Brandom Vs Habermas, J. | Seel III 149 HabermasVsBrandom: "turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down". His "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human insight. The place of confrontation is taken by a mere replica of in-themselves-existing contents BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom refutes the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Haecceitism | Stalnaker Vs Haecceitism | I 115 Thisness/actualism: that means that there is no "thisness" beyond the instantiated properties. ((s) actualismVsThisness/ActualismVsHaeceitism). Stalnaker: it does not follow directly from it that individuals can only exist in a possible world (poss.w.) but it seems to follow that the identity relation between worlds must be explained in concepts of qualitative equality. Identifications must supervene on a kind of counterpart relation between poss.w.-bound parts of individuals. This metaphysical thesis is independent from the dispute between actualism and possibilism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Harré, H.R. | Nozick Vs Harré, H.R. | II 121 Inegalitarian Theories/IGT/Inegalitarianism/Existence/Explanation/Nozick: IGT: they assume that a situation or a small number of states are privileged or natural, and therefore require no explanation, while other states or situations have to be explained as deviations from them. E.g. Newton considered idleness or uniformity of movement of the natural state, and everything else had to be explained by the assumption of forces. Aristotle: Idleness. Nozick: but that is not limited to theories of motion. (Footnote). IGT: distinguish two classes of states or situations: 1) those requiring an explanation 2) those that do not need an explanation, and do not allow one! IGT: are particularly suitable for questions such as: "why does X exist and Y not?" That also means that there is rather a non-N state (not nothing) than an N state. IGT: leave two questions unanswered: 1) Why should N be the natural state, and not perhaps a different species, a species N'? 2) Given N be the natural state, why are there forces that are assumed to be F and should provide deviations, and not other forces, perhaps '? Natural State/Nozick: to assuming something as nZ also means attributing a specific content to it! But here one should be careful with a priori arguments in favor of certain content. II 122 Declaration/R.Harré: Thesis: that something remains the same does not need to be explained: that is the most fundamental principle. (1970, p 248) NozickVsHarré: But do we not need an explanation of why one thing is considered as the same for the purposes of this principle, but another is not? The principle is trivialized if we say that what is always assumed as not needing no explanation, is thought to be constant with respect to a set of concepts that are fitting. ((s) circular). IGT: the question of "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" is set against the backdrop of an assumed IGT. If there was nothing, the question would have to be asked just as well (even there were nobody to ask it). "Why is there nothing instead of something?" Problem: then any causal factor that is in question for the nothing is itself a deviation from nothing! Then there can be no explanation as to why these forces F exist which does not introduce these Fs itself as explanatory factors (circular). II 123 Nothing/Nozick: now we might assume that there is a special force that produces nothingness, a "nothinging power". In the film "Yellow Submarine" there is a vacuum cleaner that absorbs everything and also absorbs itself in the end. Then there is a "pop" and a multicolored scenery emerges. According to this view, nothingness has produced something by destroying itself. Nozick: perhaps nothingness only destroys a little and still leaves room for a force for real nothing. Let us imagine a nothinging force that operates at an angle of 45°, and alternative stronger and weaker forces ...+... II 124 the nothinging force will eventually take over itself and slow itself down or this is somehow prevented... Problem: even if there was an original nothinging force, the question is still, at which point it became effective and at what angle it operated! Somehow, a 45° curve seems less random, but that is only because of our representation system: on logarithmic graph paper it looks completely random! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Frege Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Tugendhat II 55 FregeVsHegel: his logic is based on certain concepts, but words have a sense (= meaning) only in complete sentences. Tugendhat II 51 Being/Hegel/Logic: "the pure being", "the indeterminate immediate", it cannot have a determination against other things. That with which the beginning of science must be made. II 52 Borderline case of quality as result of an abstraction. II 53 Since being is not part of the verbal system, there is no "being thing". Thus the "contemplation of being" as a "void" is in itself already nothing more than the contemplation of "nothing". II 54 But still immediate. No opposition, abstract immediate negation. II 55 FregeVsHegel/Tugendhat: only sentences can be negated! (Frege). This crashes Hegel’s entire logic from the start. II 56 Tugendhat: this discussion (if being and nothingness are the same thing and the same time different) starts at a far too high level: It is assumed that nothing is already something provable. TugendhatVsHegel: he remained rooted in the prejudices of formal logic of his time: that judgments are consist of concepts. FregeVsHegel: the primary logical and ontological unit is the sentence! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Wessel Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 221 Identity/Hegel: rejected the sentence "a = a". "No object remains the same to itself". WesselVsHegel: Error: confusion of word and object. I 222 ...+... Z. Numbers/Wessel: In mathematics numbers are objects which are introduced by definition. They exist only if one introduces signs for them. A distinction is made between digits and numbers, but without designations (digits) numbers do not exist as abstract objects either. As a result, numbers and number terms are often indistinguishable. Identity/Hegel: for example "The tree is the tree" expresses "not the view of it", because it "does not represent it as something reflected in itself". (WesselVs). Identity/WesselVsHegel: 3. Error by Hegel: to not regard identity and difference as two-digit predicates (relation) but on the one hand as a subject term and on the other as a one-digit predicate. Diversity is simply the negation of identity! WesselVsHegel: is also wrong in limiting himself to the trivial identity a = a in his discussion. This identity would be the only one really superfluous. We cannot draw any conclusions from it or describe any change. I 365 Being/Nothing/Hegel: tries to define the concept of "becoming" through the words "being" and "nothing". WesselVsHegel: that is doomed to failure: without any recourse to the empirically given, terms of change cannot be introduced. (>Change/Hegel). I 365/366 Similar to the existential predicate, change terms cannot be introduced purely logically. Empirical conception of change is already assumed to be known in logic. For example, concepts of time are defined by change. I 366 Change/Wessel: can be introduced in two ways, 1. using time terms - 2. without using time terms. I 367 Problem: two possibilities: properties on an object can modify themselves, disappear completely or emerge anew. Accordingly, one can also distinguish between transition states or static states. s(s~E(a) => sE(a)) an emergence of a s(sE(a) => s~E(a)) a vanishing of a s(S~A => sA) an emergence of sA s(sP(a) => s -i P(a) a loss of the property P. Paradox of change/Wessel: "a changing body possesses a property p and does not possess it at the same time". Dialectical Identity/Hegel/Wessel: logical form: there is a property P such that P(a1) u P(a2) applies, and there is a property Q such that Q(a1) u -i Q(a2) or -i Q(a1) u Q(a2) applies. ((s) Something remains and something changes). Change/Predicate/Wessel: so far we have considered the two-digit predicate =>: something becomes something else. But there is also the one-digit predicate llv (arrow down) "something changes", "something becomes true" or untrue. Example: "The water is moved". WesselVsHegel: this makes it clear how unfounded the opposition of being and becoming terms is. Change/event/predicate/Wessel: with the change predicate sA => sB subject terms can now be formed: s(SA => sB). This is what events are called! (s) Event: singular term, which is formed from a predicate for change. Wessel: for such predicates, however, it must be proved in each case whether they may link with subject terms of this type. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Heidegger, M. | Derrida Vs Heidegger, M. | I 29 DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeidegger's Van Gogh interpretation. Heidegger: sees reliability in the strength and robustness of build shoes. Derrida wants to go further: he sees a cipher for the reliability of being. But he can only do this by thinking about the reliability of the farmer's wife at the same time. I 43 DerridaVsHeidegger: is not consistent on his way to leave metaphysics. He remains arrested because he demands of thinking to be cruel to the "voice of being". This seems to presuppose an instance that speaks. The Christian God is associated. On the other hand, for Heidegger the "voice of being" is naturally silent, silent and wordless. I 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: does not pay enough attention to the difference between man and animal. Heidegger emphasizes the hand as the organ of showing as the property of humans. Heidegger: "what is world ?": "1. the stone is worldless 2. the animal is world poor 3. the human is world forming". Rorty III 202 Language/Primordial Words/DerridaVsHeidegger: his litany is only his own, by no means that of Europe. There is also no "universal name". III 203 Vs Myth of a "hidden language". (Vs superpersonal power, the gives certain words power) III 207 DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: one can escape Heidegger's "we" and the trap into which he ran - when he wanted to lean on something greater than himself through affiliation - through avoiding by what Gasché (his biographer) calls "wild private thought games". III 208 Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: degrades language to a language game, degrades wave to sign, thinking to metaphysics. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: the problem is not to touch the essence of language without hurting it, but how to create one's own style that makes it impossible to compare oneself with one's predecessors. Language/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: has as little a "nature" as a "human" or "being". III 213 Primordial Language/DerridaVsHeidegger: the day on which a most elementary word would be found, through which there would be only one possible reading of the "Map of Oxford", would be a tragedy! The end of the story! Rorty IV 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: "There will be no unique name, even that of being". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a group of metaphors that he and Husserl have in common. These metaphors indicate that we all have the "truth of being" deep within us! Calling and listening do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. IV 137 Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: being has always had only "meaning"; it is always thought only as hidden in being. The "differance" is in a certain and extremely strange way "older" than the ontological difference or as the truth of being. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Heraclitus | Quine Vs Heraclitus | I 296 ff Everyday language has the annoying habit of grammatically highlighting time relations at the expense of relations relations of weight or color. In the canonical notation you usually drop the temporal distinctions. Even in mathematics: we feel the "is" differently after "seven" than after "Maria". Re-forming. E.g. "I called him, but he is asleep" becomes: "I call him then, but he sleeps at that time". E.g. "Earlier than now George marries Maria and now Maria is a widow, therefore Georg earlier marries someone who is now a widow." I 298 QuineVsHeraclitus: It's not a bigger problem to step twice into the same river than it is to do so twice at two different locations. (Goes back to the different weighting in our grammar). III 270 Identity/Time/Change/Transformation/Heraclitus/QuineVsHeraclitus: how can you say that a thing that changes its substance does not remain identical with itself? The key is not in the concept of identity, but in the concepts "object" and "time". Def Object/Object/Thing/Quine: in every moment the sum of the simultaneous current states of atoms distributed in the area or other small physical particles. And over time it is the sum of its successive current states. QuineVsHeraclitus: we can step into the same river twice. What we cannot do is step twice into the same temporal stage (time stage) of the river. (At least not if this part is shorter than the time we need to climb into it ((s)(twice)). III 271 ((s) Transformation/Change/Quine/(s): depends on the choice of the time periods under comparison.) Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is an ordinary relative term (rel term). The equal sign is necessary, because two variables may relate to the same or to different objects. From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not between singular terms. V 186 Ontology/QuineVsHeraclitus: we forced his talk of time and river into a clear structure of general term and singular term and the reference to objects. Thus we have a simpler ontology. VII (d) 65 Identity/Heraclitus/Quine: E.g. you cannot bathe in the same river twice. Solution: you can, but not twice in the same "river stages". A river is a process in time. Unlike its stages. Water: to be a multiplicity of water molecules. VII (d) 66 River Stage: is simultaneously a water stage. But two stages of the same river are not always stages of the same water. ((s) division into two types of stages to explain the change). Quine: in our fast-paced world you could bathe twice in the same water but in different rivers! A: current stage of the river Cayster in Lydia b: stage of the Cayster two days later c: Current (two days later) state of the water molecules from river stage a. Half of them is further downstream, the other half in the Aegean Sea. a and b: are in "river relation". a and c: are in "water relation". River: as an entity is thus introduced as a single thing, namely as a process or time-consuming object that you say identity instead of "river relation". Identity: but you cannot say that a and b are the identical, they are merely river-related. But if we point to a and after two days to b, then we should express that we do not point to stages, but to the same river, which contains both. The assumption of identity is essential. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hilbert | Frege Vs Hilbert | Berka I 294 Consistency/Geometry/Hilbert: Proof through analogous relations between numbers. Concepts: if properties contradict each other, the concept does not exist. FregeVsHilbert: there is just nothing that falls under it. Real Numbers/Hilbert: here, the proof of consistency for the axioms is also the proof of existence of the continuum.(1) 1. D. Hilbert, „Mathematische Probleme“ in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935) Bd. III S. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301) Thiel I 279 Hilbert: Used concepts like point, line, plane, "between", etc. in his Foundations of Geometry in 1899, but understood their sense in a hitherto unfamiliar way. They should not only enable the derivation of the usual sentences, but rather, in its entirety, specify the meaning of the concepts used in it in the first place! Thiel I 280 Later this was called a "definition by postulates", "implicit definition" >Definition. The designations point, line, etc. were to be nothing more than a convenient aid for mathematical considerations. FregeVsHilbert: clarifies the letter correspondence that his axioms are not statements, but rather statement forms. >Statement Form. He denied that by their interaction the concepts occurring in them might be given a meaning. It was rather a (in Frege’s terminology) "second stage concept" that was defined, today we would say a "structure". HilbertVsFrege: the point of the Hilbert’s proceeding is just that the meaning of "point", "line", etc. is left open. Frege and Hilbert might well have been able to agree on this, but they did not. Frege: Axiom should be in the classical sense a simple, sense-wise completely clear statement at the beginning of a system. Hilbert: statement forms that combined define a discipline. From this the "sloppy" figure of speech developed E.g. "straight" in spherical geometry was then a great circle. Thiel I 343 Formalism: 1) "older" formalism: second half of the 19th century, creators Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "Formal arithmetic", "formal algebra". "Object of arithmetic are the signs on the paper itself, so that the existence of these numbers is not in question" (naive). Def "Permanence Principle": it had become customary to introduce new signs for numbers that had been added and to postulate then that the rules that applied to the numbers of the original are should also be valid for the extended area. Vs: that would have to be regarded as illegitimate as long as the consistency is not shown. Otherwise, you could introduce a new number, and E.g. simply postulate § + 1 = 2 und § + 2 = 1. This contradiction would show that these "new numbers" did not really exist. This explains Heine’s formulation that "existence is not in question". (> "tonk"). Thiel I 343/344 Thomae treated the problem as "rules of the game" in a somewhat more differentiated way. FregeVsThomae: he had not even precisely specified the basic rules of his game, namely the correlation to the rules, pieces and positions. This criticism of Frege was already a precursor of Hilbert’S proof theory, in which also mere character strings are considered without regard their possible content for their production and transformation according to the given rules. Thiel I 345 HilbertVsVs: Hilbert critics often overlook that, at least for Hilbert himself, the "finite core" should remain content-wise interpreted and only the "ideal", not finitely interpretable parts have no directly provable content. This important argument is of a methodical, not a philosophical nature. "Formalism" is the most commonly used expression for Hilbert’s program. Beyond that, the conception of formalism is also possible in a third sense: i.e. the conception of mathematics and logic as a system of action schemes for dealing with figures that are free of any content. HilbertVsFrege and Dedekind: the objects of the number theory are the signs themselves. Motto: "In the beginning was the sign." Thiel I 346 The designation formalism did not come from Hilbert or his school. Brouwer had hyped up the contrasts between his intuitionism and the formalism of Hilbert’s school to a landmark decision. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Mill Vs Hobbes, Th. | II 43 ff Def Name/Hobbes: "an arbitrarily chosen word, which serves as a feature to evoke in our mind a thought which is like a thought that we had previously, and that, expressed towards others, is a sign of a thought, the speaker had in mind earlier. " Name/Mill: what is more reasonable: regarde the name as an object or as an idea of the subject matter? MillVsHobbes: idea too metaphysical. II 44 MillVsHobbes: the word sun denotes the name of the sun and not our idea of the sun. ((S) The idea or concept could change). Mill: For, the names not only convey our ideas, but instruct the listener also about our faith and this is a belief about the matter itself, not about the idea! Ex "The sun is the cause of daylight." This does not mean that the idea of the sun brings about the idea of daylight. Name/Mill: different kinds: some words are only part of the name: Ex from, to, often, truly, also pronouns like me, him, "Johanns", even adjectives. These words express nothing that can be affirmed or negated. Exception: Ex '' 'heavy' is an adjective": here "heavy" is a full name. Name of this sound sequence. ((s) >mention / >use.) Prior I 119 Name/Hobbes: are names of our ideas (imaginations) and not of the imagined objects. Name/MillVsHobbes: (as Reid): names are not only there to make the listener think what we think, but also to inform them about what we think. Therefore: if I use a name to express a belief, this is a belief about the thing itself and not my image (idea) of the thing. Proposition/Mill: are not assertions of ideas (imaginations) but relate to the things themselves. Ex to believe that gold is a yellow metal, although I need to have the notions of gold and yellow, my belief refers to the things themselves. Just as I cannot dig the concept of soil with the term of the spade. I 120 The idea of fire does not causes the idea of heat. Even if I can not have my thoughts without concepts or ideas (ideas). As Reid: nevertheless we can make concepts and ideas into objects of thought in particular situations. Judgment/Johnson: (as Mill): correlates two objects of thought, but not the thoughts themselves. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Holism | Dummett Vs Holism | Fodor/Lepore IV 8 Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. Fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interpersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing. Fodor/Lepore IV 9 And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction. Horwich I 459 Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about"). DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German." T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again. Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers". Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto). DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible. RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty I 289 Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | McGinn Vs Hume, D. | I 86 Main tradition: retains the mentalist conception of self but explains self identity with the help of certain psychological conditions. (Hume) Russell: characterizes "the self as a series of classes of mental individual things" (as opposed to the "Needlepoint self"). The temporal identity exists then because there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the self. The individual states of a person, etc. are connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. I 87 A mysterious substance that were constitutive for the self does not exist. Only the continued existence of the psychic relationships. McGinnVs: there are systematic problems with the concepts of necessity, sufficient condition and circularity. It is also easy to come up with counterexamples. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Idealism | Carnap Vs Idealism | VI 219 Identity/CarnapVsAvenarius: is not a "pure experience", because it is not originally given. VI 29 Identity/CarnapVsFechner: the finding with respect to the body-soul problem remains an empty word, what is actually meant by "underlying" or "inner and outer side." VI 253 Experience/Carnap: Task: Investigation of non-constitutional properties and relations of objects. Knowledge/Marburg School/Natorp/Carnap: the article is "the eternal X", its purpose is incompletable. (> Positions) CarnapVsNatorp: a final number of provisions is sufficient. According to this, the article is not an "X" anymore, but something unambiguously determined, whose complete description admittedly remains incompletable. II 195ff Def Constitution/Carnap: of a concept a from different concepts or objects b and c: the indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the concept a can be reformulated so that they only contain b and c. Construction of the numbers as a model for constitution. The model of the constitution is neutral towards realism/idealism. (CarnapVsIdealism/Realism debate: meaningless dispute over concepts). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Ideas | Quine Vs Ideas | III 254 Singular Term/Existence/Quine: can designate an object, or not, but in any case it has a meaning. E.g. "Cerberus" ((s) >Unicorn example). Derivation: our techniques of QL (precisely with free variables) are very favorable for conclusions in which singular terms occur. III 255 But only if we are sure that the objects really exist! Existence/Ontology/Quine: the question of existence therefore moves (for reasons of logical deduction) into the focus. a) narrow view: existence as concrete presence in space and time. I.e. "exists" is equated with "is". Advantage: then no difference needs to be placed in "being", when it is about e.g. the Parthenon or the number 7. This is at most a difference in the type of object (concrete/abstract), but certainly not in the sense of "to be". Unicorn/Quine: E.g. there is nothing the word "Cerberus" denotes, neither in the past nor in the present nor in the future. III 256 But this is not about a "shadowy existence" for fear the word might lose its meaning. Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer; it would also be impossible, e.g., to express the simple fact of the non-existence of Cerberus. ((s) difference reference/meaning - Terminology/Quine: speaks of designating instead of reference). Idea/QuineVsIdea: false solution: speaking of Cerberus as an "idea": that would be doubling the existence: one in Athens and one in imagination. Or one in mythology, and one in the world. QuineVs: there is only one world) Solution/Quine: Parthenon "refers to the Parthenon and only the Parthenon, while" Parthenon idea" refers to Parthenon idea and only Parthenon idea. "Cerberus idea" does not denote Cerberus! Idea/Psychology/Quine: from the standpoint of practical psychology an idea could perhaps be explained as a tendency to certain reaction schemes to words. We can be as generous as we want with that. But to equate "Parthenon" with "Parthenon idea" would simply mean confusing one thing with another. And wanting to secure the existence of a thing like Cerberus through identification with an idea would be the same confusion. IV 399 QuineVsIdeas: the idea of the idea is of evil, because its use (just like a virtus dormitiva in Moliere) creates the illusion to have explained something. IV 400 Explanation/Sense: ideas neurophysiology is in charge of the explanations. Our mentalistic concepts can likewise not gain importance by the fact that they "ultimately refer" to neural states. We learned this vocabulary on the basis of behavior, and to know something of neurological issues. You can master it completely and simultaneously have a wrong or no opinions about the brain! Brain Condition/Predicates: with our predicates (folk psychology) things can be classified together that, seen neuro-physiologically, may be worlds apart! IV 401 QuineVsIdeas: reliance on the "ideas" has other drawbacks: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another. IV 402 2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would simply obtained to link words with previously existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning are degraded to idle questions about the causal connection of ideas. 3) The wrong tendency to handle the different parts of speech as semantically identical is reinforced. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Individualism | Burge Vs Individualism | Stalnaker II 169 Externalism/Anti-Individualism/Burge/Stalnaker: (Burge 1979) further developed Putnam's approach: 1) not only meaning and other semantic properties, but also intentional psychological properties are dependent on external conditions. Wishes, fears, intentions, hopes, etc. 2) Social Conditions - facts about language use in a community - are external conditions that determine mental states. 3) The dependence on external conditions is a penetrating phenomenon, not limited to few terms and expressions, not only to de-re attitudes or names, natural kind concepts and index words, but also attitudes de dicto and all kinds of expressions. Def Individualism/Burge: Thesis: that intentional mental states are intrinsic properties of the individuals that have them. BurgeVsIndividualism. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Inferentialism | Fodor Vs Inferentialism | Esfeld I 71 Semantics of the Inferential Role/communication/proposition/Esfeld: the semantics of the inferential role implies the thesis of the primacy of beliefs: primarily beliefs have conceptual content. I 72 Important argument: hence, conceptual content is identical with propositional content, since the content is of beliefs of propositional nature. Problem: how can beliefs of different people have the same content if they never share all beliefs and the content in turn is determined by the entire system? This is the interpersonal problem of communication. I 73 Intrapersonal Problem of Communication: it is a problem of the change of beliefs over time: every slightest change would have to change the whole system and each other belief. Solution: Block: (1986 and 1995): strategy: distinguishing two factors in semantics: I 74 1) Narrow Content: depends only on the physical and psychological condition of the person. 2) Reference to something in the world that is not affected by holism. Narrow, inferential content along with reference leads to wide content. Because of the reference the wide content is not subject to the problem of interpersonal communication. Another prominent strategy (Bilgrami) replaces equality of conceptual content by similarity, i.e. "local contents", although concepts are never shared altogether. I 75 FodorVs: similarity cannot be understood without recourse to equality. FodorVsInferential Semantics: it cannot make such a concept of equality available. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Instrumentalism | Chisholm Vs Instrumentalism | III 132 ChisholmVsPragmatism/ChisholmVsInstrumentalism: even refinements of these theories do not eliminate the problem of the lack of clarity of the application of the concepts of satisfaction and frustration. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Internalism | Nozick Vs Internalism | II 280 Knowledge/Nozick: we conceive knowledge as based on an independent reality (externalism). But how does it feel from the inside? How does a person form their knowledge? (FN 105). II 281 We may be mistaken about every single fact, there is a distance, perhaps a gap. Knowledge should, however, bring us in touch with the facts. Skepticism: if he's right, nothing shows us that the connection exists. "Internal"/"External": are unclear concepts. Internalism/Knowledge/Nozick: believes that if q is implied by the knowledge of p, and S knows that p, then S knows that q. NozickVsInternalism: if that is true, then we know all implications and consequences of our knowledge (absurd). ((s) >logical omniscience/Nozick). Externalism/Nozick: but must not be exaggerated. Even if the external fact that p is connected to us, then the connection is still external. It is beyond our horizon. II 282 Reductionism/Nozick: E.g. phenomenalism or Berkeley. NozickVsPhenomenalism: we say that they do not take us where we want to be, to external reality. Any theory that wants to connect us with external facts has to make the connection partly externally. If our belief would co-vary with the facts over a broader span than over conditionals, would the connection seem closer to us? If we had a complete connection, would it still be external? Is there not still a gap between it and us? Or is the absence of a complete connection a sign of externality? Is something external by its lack of complete covariance? (FN 105). II 283 Perhaps it would be better if our beliefs co-varied less closely than with conditionals. But that would not satisfy NozickVsInternalism that wants to eat the external reality and keep it. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Internalism | Stalnaker Vs Internalism | II 212 Externalism/causal theory/Stalnaker: VsInternalism: it is here not so much about to reject that reference comes about by the speaker's intention but more about that intentions do not have to be explained by general terms! Intention/reference: intentions already played an important role but they could be directed at individuals and did not have to be mediated by general terms. ((s) >direct reference). It was not about to make oneself independent from intentions but to explain the intentions in causal concepts! |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Intersubjectivity | Brandom Vs Intersubjectivity | I 823 Vs I-we conceptions of social practices: they do not meet the adequacy condition. They found a distinction between what individuals consider as proper use and what is right on the comparison of the views of the individual and society. (VsInter-subjectivity) I 824 This is the usual way to treat objectivity as inter-subjectivity. The excessively high price is the loss of the ability of giving a sense to the distinction on the part of the entire community. This conception unduly assimilates the language communities to the individuals involved in it. It treats the community as something that brings forth and assesses performances. ((s) I.e. as a subject that it is not. Brandom: It is not the community that agrees on definitions, but individuals.) Objectivity: the fact that our concepts are about an objective world, is partially due to the fact that there is an objective sense of rightness to which their application is subjected. I 825 A propositional or other content can only be specified from one point of view, and that is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in a very practical sense. (score-keeping subject). I 832 VsInter-subjectivity (I-We style) it is flawed, since it cannot give room to the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective! LL. The community (as composed of individuals) thus has a privileged perspective. In the face of it, one cannot take a third-person point of view as an individual and therefore one cannot judge from the outside, what is actually true. This leads to a full frame. (BrandomVs). I-you conception of inter-subjectivity: no perspective is privileged. Perspective form instead of cross-perspective content. The common aspect of all perspectives is that there is a difference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kant | Brandom Vs Kant | I 852 Kant: dualistic character of his distinction of the conceptual and non-conceptual (BrandomVs). I 853 Kant: 1) Judgments are the basic form of consciousness. 2) Recognition and action are determined by normative assessments in conscious beings as opposed to non-conscious beings. 3) Dualism spontaneity and receptivity. I 855 Brandom: For Kant, concepts relate to views 1) like shape to matter - 2) like the general to the specific - 3) like the work of spontaneity or intellectual activity to that of receptivity Brandom: these are real differences, but they are independent and orthogonal to one another. None of the above differences is understood between the conceptual and something non-conceptual in the judgment. That which a judgment expresses, its content, is conceptual through and through. So Kant threw together the second and the third point, by systematically not distinguishing between representations of the individual and individual representations. (see BrandomVsKripke) II 13 Kant and Descartes: Mind primary, language secondary - BrandomVsKant and Descartes. II 123 Law/action/BrandomVsKant: Proposal to replace "image of a law" with "recognition of a determination". |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Frege Vs Kant | I 30 HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature! I 30 Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious. I 41 Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds I 42 Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!. I 43 A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity. I 120 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 121 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. IV 61 Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic. I 119 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 120 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection. I 121 The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. Stepanians I 34 Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. Stepanians I 34 pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view. I 36 Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic. Newen I21 Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical. Quine X 93 Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory. Tugendhat II 12 "Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kant | Quine Vs Kant | Danto I 132 QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear. Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant. Quine IV 407 Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans." c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here. Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! Quine VII (b) 20 Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and Relations of facts. Leibniz: distinguishing Truths of fact and Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!) VII (b) 20/21 QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form 2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level. Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts. Quine XI 72 Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation. Stroud I 210 Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge. Stroud I 211 Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world. All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference). Stroud I 214 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here. Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct. Stroud I 215 Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem. Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc. Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings. Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon. Stroud I 248 Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and b) what is true or false about the world on the other side would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above). StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true. Stroud I 249 QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts? StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else. Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces. Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge). Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Rorty Vs Kant | I 166 Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas. >Cartesianism, >dualism. I 169 Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here). I 171 Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between persons and >propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box. I 173 Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us. RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal. a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction! I 174 Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making. IV 117 Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual). VI 256 Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria. VI 257 This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand. They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer. VI 263 Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers. RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment. VI 264 RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of "purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre: Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Strawson Vs Kant | Rorty VI 359 StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). --- Strawson V 9 StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. --- V 16 Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe. --- V 19 StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. --- V 23 StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. --- V 25 StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". --- V 37 Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge. E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas"). StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it? --- V 29 StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. --- V 32 Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle. --- V 33/34 Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. --- V 35 Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. --- V 36 Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. --- V 49 Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening. --- V 50 StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. --- V 58 StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills. Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves. StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us. --- V 66 Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite. --- V 73 StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. --- V 75 StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? --- V 83 StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge? Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made? E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles. --- V 84 Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object". StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two. --- V 106 Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences. --- V 107 StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. --- V 116 Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one. --- V 118 Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects. --- V 124 Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves. --- V 128 StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. --- V 157 StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. --- V 163 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. --- V 164 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. --- V 178 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. --- V 184 Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action. --- V 194 StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. --- V 222 Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our". --- V 249 StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Wittgenstein Vs Kant | Brandom I 75 WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. --- Münch III 327 WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Kant I 12 I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. --- Kant I 13/14 The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. --- Kant I 14 WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." --- Putnam III 220 WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed. Wittgenstein II 35 There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. --- IV 109 Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kant | Verschiedene Vs Kant | Kanitscheider I 434 KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Kanitscheider I 441 EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached. Kant I 28 VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause. I 47 Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori." I 49 Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events. I 53 Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object). I 52 For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent. I 66 SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity. I 67 Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68 I 69 MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods". I 104 Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes. Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral constitution of bourgeois society. Menne I 28 Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion. Vaihinger I 333 Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical). Vollmer I XIV World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Kant | Stroud Vs Kant | I 145 Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)). I 146 StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise. I 159 Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism. I 160 Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition. StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle): to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental. I 161 2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions? a) empirically: For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens. b) transcendental: other language use: here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth. ((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant). StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language. KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible. I 162 StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism: Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level? Why does Kant reject empirical idealism? ((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.) Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first). StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us? Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental? Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true. 2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists: This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism. KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence. Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses. Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them! StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something? StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism? Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one. The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently. Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us". StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here again: I 164 shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken. StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects. Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge. StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained. Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known? Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge. Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.). Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of. StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible". I 165 Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences. StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic. Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all. I 166 Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description. Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me. I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity. Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism. I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level! I 167 Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes. StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity. I 168 Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below). KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Vaihinger Vs Kant | Vaihinger I42 ff Def Practical Fiction/Freedom/Vaihinger: it does not correspond to anything in reality, but it is a necessary fiction. False concepts also have the value of an ideal. Ideal/Vaihinger: For example the unity of good and true is an ideal. Kant/Vaihinger: Freedom: "the idea", i.e. as fiction. VaihingerVsKant: the reactionary trait, which one also finds elsewhere with Kant, induced him to turn fiction into a hypothesis again, which was then transformed into a dogma by the epigones. I 77 Thing/Kant/Vaihinger: assumed that the real world consisted of things in themselves, which were understood in mutual influences. VaihingerVsKant: made a hypothesis out of the fiction of the thing itself. (Wrong). I 148 VaihingerVsKant: what Kant saw in others, he did not see clearly in himself that his thing itself was also a fiction. I 173 Categories/Tradition/Vaihinger: the original psyche had more categories than today. Their traces can be found in all languages, they are simply analogies. So the categories are by no means innate. They have been applied and selected over the course of time. They have very different analogies in different languages. (VsKant.) |
Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Kaplan, D. | Stalnaker Vs Kaplan, D. | I 206 Def character/Kaplan: (= proposition meaning): a function of context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered poss.w.). Centered world/centered possible world/ poss.w./Stalnaker: shall represent the context here. I 207 Content: is here represented by propositions Proposition: function of poss.w. to truth values. Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is then a two-dimensional intension. (Kaplan 1989b) StalnakerVsKaplan: this paradigm does not answer the questions of basic semantics to the facts that determine the semantic values. It belongs to the descriptive semantics. That means it is not a theory on the interpretation of thoughts. Thoughts/interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics that means of the facts. Character/content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts. Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intension. Content/Kaplan: that what is being said. The thought, the information that the speaker intends to transmit. I 208 Solution/StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan's approach must be expanded by a theory of thoughts and a language theory. This allows us to treat a wider domain of expressions as context-dependent than normally. II 5 Double indexing/double index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan Demonstratives, 1968): thesis: 1. a) the meaning of a proposition determines the content relative to the context but b) the content determines a truth value only relative to a poss.w. Stalnaker: so Kaplan's theory was two dimensional or double indicated. Context/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was represented by an index like the one of Montague and propositions were interpreted relative to this index Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the actual values of the interpretation function were then, however, the contents and not the truth values, while Def content/Kaplan: a function of poss.w. on truth values. 2. Kaplan second modification: Index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was limited: Index/Montague/Stalnaker: only a list of time, speaker, place, maybe poss.w.) Index/Kaplan: only: the relations between these must also be considered. That means an index can represent the content only when the agent is actually at the location in the poss.w.. II 6 Context dependence/Stalnaker: is, however, pervasive: adjectives like e.g. "large" are interpreted relative to contextually specific comparison classes. Likewise e.g. "I", "here", "now" (index words). StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan (1968) says nothing about this. II 10 Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan was about proposition types. Propositional concept/p.c./StalnakerVsKaplan: are, however, associated with certain statement tokens. This p.c. is dependent on the semantic properties that these tokens have in the poss.w. in which they occur. This is no contradiction to Kaplan's and my theory. It is simply about different issues. II 162 de re/belief/ascription/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Ascription/Kaplan: (like Quine) is not ascribed to a certain conviction. de re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-ascription: existence quantification. Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: ascriptions de re are only then true if the believer has to be in a relation with the knowledge. Intensification: the name must denote the individual. E.g. "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt, but there are additional conditions 1. for the content 2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. Pointe/Stalnaker: it is still possible that all the conditions are fulfilled by two different names. Thus, the examples can be described without having to ascribe conflicting belief. KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases in which Quine's analysis was too liberal. StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise. Knowledge/ascription/Stalnaker: in the semantic analysis knowledge is self-evident without it you cannot believe anything. You cannot believe a proposition without having detected the expressions occurring in the concepts in which they are defined. StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. but the need for knowledge loses its motivation when it is grafted to Quine's approach. 2. Kaplan keeps the artificial assumption that de re-ascriptions ascribe no particular belief and he is bound to the sententialism (propositions as belief objects). II 163 At least it have to be proposition-like objects with name-like constituents. de re/ascriptoin/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we instead accept propositions as sets of poss.w.. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kepler, J. | Newton Vs Kepler, J. | Kanitscheider I 116 NewtonVsKepler: false explanation approach, based on the Aristotelian dynamics: Kepler's laws used as initial hypothesis by Newton. Newton: introduces new, abstract dynamic concepts, which do not relate themselves to the observable movement of particle paths, but use the invisible forces of the masses as the cause for motion. I 117 transition from empirical hypotheses to a closed theory. Basic Law: notation: K=f m1m2/r² x r/r. (Special characters: K gothic, last r gothic)) |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Frege Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stalnaker II 14 Diagonalized Proposition/Stalnaker: is not actually a special type of proposition, but only a way of how a proposition is determined or represented. FregeVsKripke/Stalnaker: in Frege, a sense is interposed which determines the reference as a function of certain empirical facts about the use of names. Contingent A Priori/Necessary A Posteriori/Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: in such cases the modal status of the horizontal and diagonal proposition diverges. Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: does not disclose anything about the nature of such cases, it only shows an abstract property of such propositional concepts. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Cavell Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 216 Kripke's Wittgenstein: skeptical paradox: nothing, no rule, no presence can control the meaning of my words. That is the end of the possibility of meaning anything at all. Solution: Introduction of socially sanctioned conditions of assertiveness. Kripke: Main point: the absence of meaningful facts. CavellVsKripke: 1. probably Wittgenstein himself did not see the paradox that way. Nor would he demand such facts that guarantee meaning, and that should be more stable than our practice. I 217 CavellVsKripke: 2. Kripke goes unnoticed from "being inclined" to "being entitled": Wittgenstein: "I've exhausted the reasoning, I'm inclined to say." Kripke seems to believe (unlike Wittgenstein) that agreement is something like a contract. I 218 His solution is more skeptical than the problem it is supposed to solve. I (c) 220 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: for Kripke, rules are more fundamental than criteria for Wittgenstein's scepticism about meanings. CavellVsKripke: the problem of the ordinary remains underexposed. I (c) 221 For me, conversely, the rules are subordinate to the criteria. Kripke: E.g. "Tisuhl" Suppose I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table standing at its foot. Do I know how to answer the skeptic who assumes that I meant "Tisuhl" in the past, that is, something that is a table not at the foot of the Eiffel Tower or a chair located there? Did I explicitly think of the Eiffel Tower when I first "grasped the concept of the table" and did I give myself instructions as to what I meant by "table"? CavellVsKripke: we can say with Wittgenstein: we are not equipped for all possibilities with rules and we come to an end with our reasons. Localization in the Eiffel Tower, like any other criterion, would be like a reason I can have to name any object as I call it outside the tower. I (c) 248 But I do not have any criteria yet, so I have not come to an end with my explanations, I have not even started with explanations yet. CavellVsKripke: what skepticism brings us to is something like a compulsion to remove criteria from us, but not, like Kripke, to arbitrarily handle criteria. I (c) 255 CavellVsKripke: he says that we "come to agreement" with regard to our criteria. But that would be a rejection of Wittgenstein's idea of agreement. For Wittgenstein, this lies in our reactions. We agree in walking, but that has not been attained. We have come to walk. I (c) 256 Concept/Wittgenstein: concepts lead us to investigations, they are the expression of our interest and guide our interest. Cavell: common terms have a history, mathematical ones do not. These have a before and after, no past and no future. Example "Tisuhl": shows that we can subject our ordinary concepts to a special form of mathematization. I (c) 257 CavellVsKripke: he robs us of our criteria, so he is too skeptical. Why should the answer not be: "So be it! |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Field Vs Kuhn, Th. | II 183 Theory Change/Semantic Change/Reference/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962.101): The references of Einsteinian concepts are never the identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. Newton’s mass is maintained, Einstein’s can be converted to energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, because Einstein showed that there is no "Newtonian mass"! Semantic Change/Kuhn/Field: I do not deny that Newton’s "mass" meant something else, but I also do not deny Kuhn’s assertions about meaning, but about reference or denotation. Kuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts have a different meaning and therefore no reference at all. FieldVsKuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts do have different meanings, but they refer to a set of objects where the present terms only refer to a subset of these objects. (see below). II 184 FieldVsKuhn: I deny that there ever was such a thing as "Newtonian mass" or ever will be. And therefore Newton himself can never have referred to "Newtonian mass". Therefore, no further positive analytic hypotheses are possible other than merely (HP) and (HR). (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. Problem: now we have to consider the negative (HA): that Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing, just as "Nicholas" denotes nothing. (HA) Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing at all. Problem: then we have to attribute false truth values to Newton’s (indisputable) sentences (sentence tokens). Nicholas/Unicorn/Solution/Frege: Some phrases have truth value gaps. Newton/Field: E.g. undeniably true statement by Newton with which every physicist agrees: (7) In order to accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of various speeds more force is required if the mass of the body is greater. That certainly seemed to be true in Newton’s time. And the RT agrees with him (both for net mass and relativistic mass). II 195 Theory Change/Denotation/FieldVsKuhn: one should not say that Newton’s "mass" did not denote anything. In that case, a sentence like E.g. "The mass of the Earth is less than that of the Sun" would not have been literally true if Newton had expressed it. Solution/Field: you should at least speak of a "conveyance of information". (Also FieldVsLanguage Rules). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Leeds, St. | Field Vs Leeds, St. | II 281 Indeterminacy/Own Language/Theory Change/Leeds/Field: (Leeds, Steven 1997), Section IV) LeedsVs indeterminacy within a theory (within one language): Field: Leeds view seems to be disquotational, i.e. the reference of our own expressions should be determined according to the following scheme: (R) if b exists, then "b" refers to b and nothing else. Foreign Language/Theory Change: In this case, it only makes sense relative to a correlation between the concept of the two theories. More Moderate View/Field: we might as well have an unrelativized concept of reference that extends beyond our own concepts, this will, however, be very vague. FieldVsLeeds: it seems very reasonable to assume that the concepts of our currently best theories are vague. Simply because many aspects still have room for improvement. E.g. Ricci tensor: will probably not just refer directly to something, but it will not be without any reference either. Falseness/Theory/False Theory/Field: E.g. "mass"/"weight" makes it clear that if a theory is false, it is often because of the vagueness of terms. Correctness/Translation/Theory/Field: the concept of a "correct translation" is nonsense: E.g. root -1, "i"/"-i" "/" / "" (see above). This is not about an epistemic limitation. There is no "subtle fact" that we cannot know, it is rather the case that there is no certain fact that makes a difference. The example is interesting in the context of Leeds: it seems as if also our own terms "i" and "-i" would be indeterminate, because: Chauvinism/Theory/Theory Change/Asymmetry/Field: it would be chauvinistic to assume that our own theory is determined if we attest indeterminacy to the other theory. FieldVsLeeds: he cannot avoid the accusation of chauvinism, because he denies our own theory indeterminacy. II 282 Solution: In the process of language acquisition (learning, use) we learn to accept (R) and that creates no connection between "refers" as applied to "/" and "i". Asymmetry/Chauvinism/Field: we get this asymmetry without chauvinism: our term "i" is as indeterminate as the foreign term "/", it is just that the indeterminacy is "hidden" in our normal semantic statements, because these semantic concepts contain a compensating indeterminacy! (f..o.th. compensation). Indeterminacy/FieldVsLeeds: this dissolves the doubts regarding the indeterminacy of our own language. The fact that "i" refers to i does not show that "i" is determined, it is therefore compatible with the fact that "i" and "refers disquotationally" are both indeterminate. Caution: This only shows how a prior indeterminacy of "i" would lead to an indeterminacy of "refers disquotationally". Indeterminacy/Own Language/FieldVsLeeds: the possibility of indeterminacy of our own language can also be shown regardless of the theory of reference, and thus also of disquotationality: surely, vagueness is a kind of indeterminacy, and that is everywhere. Vagueness: it can also be problematic itself: Vagueness/Williamson’s Riddle/Field: (Williamson 1994): there are people who consider the riddle to be so serious that it would be doubtful whether II 283 the phenomenon of vagueness (or, more generally, of indeterminacy) would be a real phenomenon. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 31 Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1 one can prove it, in a way.: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true. I 44 Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc. Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing. (see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant) FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable. Leibniz I 38f Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences". Contrast: Prove by reason. I 46 "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones. I 48 "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning? |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 139 Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic. Descartes I 142 KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion". Kant I 34 Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made the subject of metaphysical teachings. I 85 Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity. Strawson V 227 Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist. V 228 KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist. V 228 Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning. V 229 Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But: V 230 KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts. I 234 Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Berka Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Berka I 7 Leibniz/Logic/Berka: three requirements: 1. characteristica universalis: a system of signs whose basic signs are characters of basic concepts and whose combination should result in the characters of all other concepts. 2. calculus ratiocinator: calculus which allows a purely mathematical treatment of all statements expressed in the characters of the characteristica universalis. 3. ars iudicandi: a decision-making procedure to determine from the statements whether they are true or false. This corresponds today to: "Leibniz Program"/Modern: 1. Establishment of a system of definition rules 2. Logic Calculus 3. Decision Procedure VsLeibniz: the program is not realizable, i.e. not in application to an entirety, an area understood as totality, but only to partial areas. ((s) Otherwise circles, paradoxes). I 84 FregeVsLeibniz: his project of the calculus philosophicus (ratiocinator) was too huge. He underestimated the problems. Solution: his project can be realized for single areas: e.g. geometry, chemistry, arithmetic. Begriffsschrift(1) (Concept-Script): should then fill the gaps. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Lewis, D. | Kaplan Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 43 Possible World/Schwarz: one can perhaps imagine possible worlds as a kind of contingent extension of reality. Kaplan: Possible World/Telescope/KaplanVsLewis/Schwarz: (1979(1),93) for possible worlds we need special modal telescopes: Def "Verneoscope" (terminology), also: "modal intuition". This may tell us that there are universes with talking donkeys, but none where Kripke has other ancestors. (Plantinga 1987(2),212, Skyrms 1976(3)). Possible World/LewisVsKaplan/LewisVs Telescope Theory: possible worlds cannot be any different than they are, (i.e. not contingent) they cannot be explored with verneoscopes. 1. David Kaplan [1979]: “Trans-World Heir Lines”. In [Loux 1979], 88–109 2. Alvin Plantinga 1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 3. Brian Skyrms [1976]: “Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics”. Philosophical Studies, 30: 323–332 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Plantinga Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 168 Content/Proposition/TraditionVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis/Schwarz: This construction does not meet all the traditional requirements of propositions and content: (Plantinga 1987(1), 208 f): we must be in an interesting relation with the object (acquaintance or grasping), content must be directly causally implicated in acts. Classes of possible situations don't do that. Lewis (1983b(2), 375 Fn 2) compares them with figures in the indication of physical quantities. 1. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Lycan Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 66 Reductionism/Modality/LycanVsLewis: it has no reductive explanation of modality because it can only say "all possible" when asked what possible worlds there are. Recombination Principle: only explains what kinds of possible worlds there are if there are certain others. For example: if there are possible worlds with unicorns and possible worlds with gods, then there are also possible worlds with both ((s)) Problem/Lycan: whether there are the starting worlds ((s) thus whether the premises are true), we do not find out. (Lycan 1991a(1),1991b(2),224f,Divers/Melia(3) 2002,§3). LewisVsVs/Schwarz: that does not matter, because modal realism is not a decision-making procedure to answer questions about possible worlds. Not all questions can be answered: e.g. Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Lewis: no answer about the existence of different, but qualitatively identical possible worlds. (1986e(4),2214,114). Decision Procedure/d.p./Schwarz: e.g. is also not used by the behaviorist: he simply says that statements about mental properties can be reduced to statements about dispositions. For example mathematical platonism: does not need a decision procedure for arithmetic. 1. William G. Lycan [1991a]: “Pot bites Kettle”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69: 212–213 2. William G. Lycan [1991b]: “Two – No, Three – Concepts of PossibleWorlds”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91: 215–227 3. John Divers und Joseph Melia [2002]: “The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism”. Mind, 111: 15–36 4. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Loar, B. | Avramides Vs Loar, B. | Avramidis I 29 Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111 Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Luhmann, N. | Habermas Vs Luhmann, N. | I 426 Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies. I 430 HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment. I 431 Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life. Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true). I 434 HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself. I 435 Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that! I 437 HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution. I 438 HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events. I 441 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension. Luhmann II 136 Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness." II 141 HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice. II 165 System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action. AU Cass.12 HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Kanitscheider Vs Mackie, J. L. | I 465 God/Creation/John Leslie Mackie: sharp criticism of the conventional doctrine of God: Thesis: to explain the fine tuning of all necessary preconditions for the existence of life by a neo-Platonic assumption of ethical being-demanded instead of the usual many-worlds hypothesis. Theology/KanitscheiderVsMackie: did not distinguish between two concepts of creation: 1. creatio originans 2. creatio continuans, support of the legal structure, permanence. I 467 Laws of Nature/Kanitscheider: there is no point in imagining how to pull the laws out of the corset of the world like fish bone sticks, and then watch them collapse. ((s) According to which laws would the collapse take place?) The conceptual separation between the world and its laws leads to emptiness. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Materialism | McGinn Vs Materialism | II 33 McGinnVsMaterialism: intuitive answer: if materialism is right, I am despite all not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia! ((S) Because the physical processes remain the same.) - According to materialism we would all be zombies who imagine to have a consciousness. II 34 That leads to an argument VsMaterialism: Ex assuming I know all about your brain what there is to know in neurological terms. Then, do I know all about your mind? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How then both can be declared identical? MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one matter and knowledge of facts is another matter. McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to discriminate between mental and physical concepts without demanding a distinction at the level of facts. What differentiates the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that the focus of both concepts are quite different properties, and thus we can not say, both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the idea that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations in turn is beased on the fact that in relation to manifestations there are facts that they can not be explained by facts about the brain. II 42 McGinnVsMaterialism: he tries to construct the mind from properties that are not suitable for it. He assumes that enough drops of neuronal water will light the fire of the mind. He's right that some property of the brain is responsible for consciousness, but he is mistaken about the nature of this property. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| McDowell, J. | Rorty Vs McDowell, J. | I 111 McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. >Space of reason, >space of nature. VI 201 McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly. RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory). VI 203 Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor. VI 204 "Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all. RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary. VI 208 RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts: 1. "Crass naturalism" 2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom" Vi 210 Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning." >Second nature. VI 211 RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"! Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of law each are sui generis. RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it. With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes. VI 212 Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms. Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech! McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of "memorizing facts". RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric. VI 214 RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us. VI 215 Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one. VI 217 "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature". VI 216 VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons." VI 219 Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this. >Scheme/Content. James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| McGee, V. | Field Vs McGee, V. | II 351 Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism. II 352 in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory. (ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it. Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number. Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated. McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity. Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification). Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation. Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?. "Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy. McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise. FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy. "Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!. Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!. All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate. Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything. II 353 McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: (*) We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of F. ((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown). Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification. FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept. FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range. Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself). FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh (*) is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here. FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!. II 355 Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts. McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it. FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end). Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics. McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly. Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models". McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number". Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models. FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language. Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong). FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number". Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help. Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension. II 356 Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic. FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here). Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition. FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy. FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mentalism | Black Vs Mentalism | II 215 Mentalism/Black: "mental units": images, ideas, thoughts, thoughts or concepts. BehaviorismVs: unverifiable. Charles Morris: with mentalism a science of signs would not be possible. II 216 BlackVsMentalism: How can I determine the occurrence of the right idea in a listener? Not by transfering my idea to yours: how will that work? |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mentalism | Field Vs Mentalism | I 246 FieldVsMentalism: mentalist concepts may not be basic concepts. II 167 FieldVsIntentional Entities: their introduction seems more explanatory than it is. This danger becomes acute when writing our theory of truth and reference in the form of (TG) and RG). (TG) Pp["p" is true iff p]. (RG) for each term t ... when t means (b), then for each x: t (...) refers to x (...(iff xis b(...). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel, E. Vs Metaphysics | Horwich I 128 Ernest NagelVsTarski: (among others) his truth concept (or the whole theoretic semantics) had something metaphysical. (Ernest NagelVsSemantics). I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsVs: the concept as such is too vague. Some cynics say Z, this is how the philosophers called their unborn children. VsMetaphysics: some think it crept in on the way through the definitions, namely, if the definition does not provide us with criteria for deciding whether an object falls within the definition or not. VsTarski: and the concept of truth is simply too general to prevent that. I 130 Truth Criterion/Criteria/TarskiVsVs: it's true, we will probably never find a truth criterion. (see above, Kant ditto). But this is not how the truth concept differs from almost all other concepts, especially in theoretical physics (TT). Metaphysics/Tarski: the concept is used in such a broad sense that it certainly encompasses methods of logic, mathematics or the empirical sciences, and thus a fortiori also semantics! |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Modal Realism | Verschiedene Vs Modal Realism | Schwarz I 61 VsModal Realism/VsLewis/Ontology/Schwarz: (many authors: he mistakes the essence of modality, creates a basis for skepticism, nihilism and moral decay.) Real existence of all these "parallel universes" is completely implausible. LewisVsVs: the problem with common sense is to be taken seriously, but the methodological advantages of theory prevail. (1986e(1): vii) Solution/Lewis: Limitation of quantifiers: because we limit ourselves to our world, it is right to say that there are no talking donkeys. VsLewis: his possible worlds (poss. w.) are epistemically inaccessible. How do we know they exist? In principle, we could never learn anything about them! LewisVsVs: the objection presupposes that knowledge is acquired causally (causal theory of knowledge) ((s) that possible worlds are not researched logically). If that were correct, we would have no mathematical knowledge either. (1986e(1):109). Schw I 62 VsLewis: this applies only to mathematical Platonism (Group: Lewis: mathematical Platonist - FieldVsLewis). Sv I 64 Modal Realism/Possible World/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible world should be part of reality, because "world" and "reality" are synonymous expressions for the totality of all things. (Plantinga 1976(2), 256f Lycan 1979(3), 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent. Reality/World/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "real world" refers only to a small part of all things (reality includes world, world only part of reality). Thus the contradictions dissolve. Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what should the reality of maximum objects in space-time have to do with modality? Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: this is about what our world could have been like, not about what any of our isolated things are like. (1885(4), 119,1986(5), 226, Plantinga 1987(6)). LewisVsVs: Modal operators are quantifiers about such things. Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: For example, suppose there are exactly 183 spatiotemporal maximum objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator. Schw I 65 So it might be true or it might not. Lewis seems to claim that there can be as many space-time maximum items as there are sets. VsLewis: with it the whole of the worlds has become contingent! Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: he has to avoid this, because he wants to analyze contingency over possible worlds. ((s) i.e. contingency means that there are deviating possible worlds, i.e. not first the set of the Possible World (= maximum objects in space-time) and then say that this is the contingency, because then the contingency is not contingent, because it would be a non-contingent limit, if there are only 183 possible worlds. (van InwagenVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis). ((s) if it were contingent, one could not simply say "there are 183 possible worlds". In other words: "how many possibilities there are depends on the possibilities": circular - but: e.g. "how long it takes depends on the possibilities: e.g. how many attempts you make. Different and also correct: e.g. how many possibilities there are, depends (not on the possibilities) but on the properties, e.g. how wearable the object is. (Lewis ditto). Contingency/Schwarz: means that there are different possible worlds. But the totality of all possible worlds does not exist in single worlds. Therefore the totality itself cannot be different than it is! (s) The totality is not the object of consideration in a possible world.) Totality/Modal Logic/Lewis/Schwarz: unrestricted statements about possible worlds are unrestricted modal statements ((s) shift of the range then not possible! see above). Schwarz: as such, they elude the influence of modal operators: Example: "There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak" is equivalent to "there is a possible world in which donkeys can speak": "N There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak". And with "M There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak." (s) Logical form: Mp > NMp. (S5). Mp > MMp. (neither T nor S4, reduction law, > Hughes/Cresswell(7) p. 34)). Modal Realism/VsLewis/Schwarz: Problem: how the non-contingency of the possible world fits with its characterization as parallel universes. Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: either we talk about the totality of reality: then the number of the possible worlds is not contingent - or we talk about reality ((s) Real World), then there is necessarily only one universe (because in every world there is only one, the world itself). Contingency/Schwarz: empirical problem: according to the relativity theory, two universes could be connected by a wormhole. But it is contingent whether this occurs. LewisVs: that is absolutely impossible! ((s) Problem: one would have to claim before the wormhole that there are two universes that can be connected, and that would be a statement about (further) reality and not about (narrower) reality (=Real World) (in which there can only be one universe). (1986e(1):71f) Note: this is the "island universe" (Richards 1975(8),107f, Bigelow/Pargetter 1987(9)). Island Universes/Bricker: (2001(10),35 39): (completely different version: recombination principle: there is a possible world w, which contains a duplicate of the mereological sum of Hume and Lewis and nothing else - also no space-time between the Hume duplicate and the Lewis duplicate. Consequently, w contains two spatially isolated parts. SchwarzVsBricker: this assumes that space-time relations necessarily require substantial space-time. ((s) >Substantivalism). Solution/Lewis/Schwarz: (1986e,72) Replacement Possibility: his theory allows worlds in which several four-dimensional universes are connected only along an additional fifth dimension, but are isolated in the four normal dimensions. If this is not possible, we must loosen the criterion of spatio-temporal connectedness. Schwarz I 66 Two alternatives: (1986f(11), 74f) a) Worlds are connected by relations analog to space-time relations. b) The inhabitants of a possible world stand in any perfectly natural external relation to each other. Schwarz: However, the spatial-temporal distance is the only clear example of this. SchwarzVsLewis: that does not solve the general problem: that things (totality of the possible worlds) could also be different. Schwarz I 68 VsModal Realism/Schwarz: ontological overload. Alternatives: a) "ersatz worlds" - b) fictionalism. Def ersatz world/Ersatzism/Terminology/Lewis: tries to replace possible worlds with sentence sets or facts. Def Fictionalism/VsModal Realism/Schwarz: here no special entities come into play when interpreting sentences about (possible worlds). 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] 3. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316 4. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel 5. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001] 6. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 7. Hughes, G. E., and M. J. Cresswell. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. New York, NY: Routledge. 8. Tom Richards [1975]: “The Worlds of David Lewis”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53: 105–118 9. John Bigelow und Robert Pargetter [1987]: “Beyond the Blank Stare”. Theoria, 53: 97–114 10. Phillip Bricker [2001]: “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality”. In [Preyer und Siebelt 2001], 27–55 11. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Realism | Stalnaker Vs Modal Realism | Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/closeness/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any at all, there are also sets of them. And for each set of propositions it is definitely true or false, that all of its elements are true. And this is of course again a proposition. (W5) Closeness-condition: for each set of propositions G there is a proposition A so that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: that means that for each set of propositions there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. So I suppose that the world-stories-theorists wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s) > hyperintensionalism/ hyperintensionality): propositions that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, VsPossible worlds semantics). I 40 modal realism/MR/Lewis/Stalnaker: by Lewis the actual world (act. wrld.) is only a real part of a reality which consists of many parallel universes which are spatially and temporally separated. Actual world/Lewis/Stalnaker: is then indexically defined as the part that is related to us. Unrealized possibilities/Possibilia/Lewis/Stalnaker: then actually exists, but in another part of the reality. Its non-actuality only exists in its localisation somewhere else. ((s) This is only a polemical presentation: Localization must be more than "somewhere else". Localization may be not carried out by us for areas that do are not related to us because we have then no knowledge.) Modal Realism/MR/Stalnaker: divides into 1. semantic thesis: assertions about what is possible and necessary, should be analyzed in concepts about what is true in some or all parts of reality 2. metaphysical thesis: about the existence of possible worlds (poss.w.). Semantic MR/Stalnaker: problem: VsMR it could be argued that it is not possible to know the metaphysical facts about it even if the semantic part was true. I 41 Lewis: there is a parallel here to Benacerraf's dilemma of mathematical truth and knowledge. I 42 EpistemologyVsModal Realism/Stalnaker: the representatives of the epistemological argument against the MR reject the parallel between mathematical objects and realistically construed possibilia. They insist that reference and knowledge require causal relation of concrete things even if that does not apply for abstract things (numbers etc.). Knowledge/LewisVs: why should the limit between what for knowledge and reference requires a causal relation to be made in concepts of the distinction abstract/concrete? Knowledge/Lewis: instead we should say that reference and knowledge require a causal relation of contigent facts but not the one of modal reality (knowledge about what is possible and necessary). Modal Realism/knowledge/Lewis: thesis: in the context of MR, we can say that indexical knowledge requires causal relation, but impersonal knowledge does not. I 43 Platonism/mathematics/Stalnaker: pro Lewis: here knowledge does not have to be based on a causal relation. Then Benacerraf's dilemma can be solved. EpistemologyVsModal realism/Stalnaker: but I still feel the force of the epistemological argument VsMR. Reference/knowledge/Stalnaker: problem: to explain the difference between knowledge and reference to numbers, sets and cabbages and so on. I 49 Possible worlds/pos.w./MR/Vsmodal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist can cite no verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot say on the one hand that poss.w. things are of the same kind (contingent physical objects) like the real world and say on the other side that poss.w. things are of what we know in the same kind as of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) The latter are not "real" things). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Montague, R. | Hintikka Vs Montague, R. | II 97 Quantifier/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of his treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are connected to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond on a one-to-one basis to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. I.e. the semantic rules work from inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: E.g. "a girl", E.g. "every man". II 98 Behave semantically like singular terms. I.e. E.g. "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is the basis of the possible worlds semantics. (It is a generalization of Carnap’s approach). ad (ii) is a form of Frege’s principle (compositionality). ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica(1). Individuals Domain/Possible World/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: this is precisely what leads to problems. In particular, in belief contexts. Individual/Montague: individuals are the range of functions that operate as a sense of a singular term. Belief Context/Opaque Context/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague dedicates no special treatment to contexts with propositional attitudes (attitude contexts). E.g. "knowing who", E.g. "remembering where," E.g. "seeing what". This is a deficiency, because Montague had admitted his interest in propositional attitudes. W-Questions/Who/What/Where/Hintikka: Thesis: are nothing more than quantified phrases. II 99 logical form: (1) John knows who the prime minister of Norway is analyzed as a that-construction: (2) (e.g.) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto) Problem: you have to specify the individuals domain over which the variable "x" goes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka). de re: (de re interpretation of (1)): (3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway & (Ey) John knows that (x = y)) De Re/De Dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2). ((s) Because otherwise omniscience would follow again). Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not need to analyze it here as the relation to the alternatives, which singles out one and the same individual in each possible world compatible with the knowledge. HintikkaVsMontague: problem: all this does not work in the context of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of Montague semantics, which we are considering here, the following sentences are all valid: (4) ((x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z))) II 100 Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows of every currently existing individual who that is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z))) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose identity is known to John who this individual is (again de re). Problem: both are blatantly false. Non-Existence/Hintikka: However, that is not a problem as long as we do not need to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds. Hintikka: Problem: but that does not change the problem. Possible Non-Existence/Hintikka: we do not allow it here, i.e. every individual is somehow linked to one or another individual in every possible world. Terminology/Kaplan/Hintikka: "TWA" "Transworld Heir Line" ((s) same pronunciation) world line that links an individual between possible worlds. Individual: it follows that every individual is well-defined in all possible worlds. This means that the sentences (4) and (5) are valid in our extension of Montague semantics. TWA/World Line//Hintikka: therefore, we must also allow the world lines to break off somewhere and not to be continued ad libitum. Non-Existence/Intensional Logic/Montague: according to Montague’s thesis we need not worry about possible non-existence. For one and the same individual occurs in every possible world as a possible denotation of the same name (name phrase). ((s) Because the individuals domain remains constant). HintikkaVsMontague: that is precisely why our criticism applies to Montague. Non-Existence/Montague Semantics/Hintikka: how can his semantics be modified to allow for possible non-existence in some possible worlds?. II 101 Important argument: Knowing-Who/Knowledge/Hintikka: for John to be able to know who Homer was, it is not necessary that his knowledge excludes all possible worlds in which Homer does not exist. Quantification/Opaque Context/Belief Context/Hintikka: therefor,e we need not assume with the quantification in intensional contexts that a world line exists that connects an existing individual in all knowledge worlds accessible to John. Solution: All we need is that we can say for each of these possible worlds whether the individual exists there or not. ((s) I.e. we do not allow any possible worlds in which the question of the existence or non-existence is meaningless.) E.g. I.e. in this example we only have to exclude those worlds for John, in which it is unclear whether Homer exists or not. World Line/Hintikka: this shows that world lines are independent of the question of the possible non-existence. Quantification/Intensional Contexts/Epistemic/Hintikka: i.e. an existence theorem with quantification in an epistemic (opaque) context E.g. (6) (e.g.) John knows that F(x) can be true, even if there is no world line that singles out an existing individual x in any knowledge world of John. Important argument: but it must always make sense to ask whether the individual exists in a possible world or not. Non-Existence/Hintikka: So there are two possible ways of failure of existence: a) non-existence b) Non-well-definedness (i.e. it does no longer make sense to ask whether an individual exists). World Line: breaks off in both cases, but there is a difference. TWA: can only be drawn if there is comparability between possible worlds, and that is no longer the case in b). II 102 Comparability/Hintikka: always needs regularity (continuity). E.g. spatiotemporal continuity. HintikkaVsMontague: with this distinction we move away from his oversimplified semantics with constant individuals domain. W-Questions/Non-Existence/Hintikka: Variant: Problem: (7) John knows that Homer did not exist. I.e. in every epistemically possible world of John Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask about the existence. Uniqueness/Existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between existence and uniqueness (determinacy) of an individual. Non-Existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the identity of the individual unknown. ((s) otherwise the question would not make sense). II 103 Non-Existence/Not Well Defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague semantics does not allow the question of the existence or non-existence to be pointless, because an individual in a possible world is not well defined. ((s) Because the individuals domain is assumed to be consistent in Montague). Individuals Domain/Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow the domain of individuals to be inconsistent. But problem: Quantification/Belief Context/Existence/Truth/Hintikka: In the following example, we must presuppose existence, so that the sentence can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is, too. ((s) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural interpretation of (11) it must be assumed that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a longer range than "is looking for". ((s) I.e. both are looking for the same unicorn. Problem: how can you know whether both subjects believe in the same individual or have it in their heads?) ((s) >Geach E.g. „Hob, Cob, Nob, Hob/Cob/Nob E.g. (Geach 1967, 628) Cresswell. II 142 (Needs quantifier that is simultaneoulsy inside and outside the range of the attitude verb). Hob/Conb/Nob-E.g./Geach/(s): ~Hob believes that a witch killed his sow and Nob believes that it is the same witch who bewitched Cob’s horse: problem: the sentence must be true in order to preserve the ordinary language meaning of "believe". On the other hand, it must be wrong, because there are no witches, exacerbation: "the same witch" poses an additional condition to the truth of the sentence. The demanded identity makes it harder to simply say that the three believe something wrong). II 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless, example (11) shows that the reading should not oblige us to assume the existence of unicorns. Non-Existence/Epistemic Context/Intensional/Belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can seek the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some possible worlds. For this purpose, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: in more complex sentence, all the problems resurface: II 104 E.g. John does not know if unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn, because Mary is looking for one. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a particular unicorn. (because otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true) although he is considering possible non-existence. World Line/Hintikka: to expand the Montague semantics we have to allow more or less unnatural world lines. HintikkaVsMontague: according to his semantics all sentences of the following form would be valid: (8) John knows that (Ex) (x = a) > (Ex) John knows that 0 (x = a) ((s) i.e. conclusion from de dicto to de re.) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows the reference of a name immediately if he knows that the name is not empty. That is, of course, often wrong. World Line/Hintikka: therefore, the world lines cannot be identical with lines that connect names with their references. ((s) Otherwise again a kind of omniscience would follow. Moreover, it implies that names are non-rigid.) Species/Common Noun/Hintikka: the same applies to common names (generic names): They cannot identify the same individuals in all possible worlds, otherwise sentences like the following could not be analyze in the possible worlds semantics: E.g. (9) John holds this bush for a bear. Perception Concepts/Perception/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsMontague: here there are further problems: E.g. all sentences of the following form become contradictory accoridng to Montague semantics: (10) (Ex)(Ey)(x = y & it appears to John visually that x is right of y). I 105 SIolution: It may well be that John sees an object as two. World Line: can split or merge. But according to Montague semantics they are not allowed to! World Line/Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there were two sets of world-lines for one set of possible worlds, these also connected every individual with an individual in another possible world, but the two sets differed in which individual is connected with which. Perception: we need such a possibility for perception verbs ((s) because it may be that you confuse one object with another. Elegance/Theory/Cantor/Hintikka: elegance is something for taylors, not for mathematicians. II 106 Quantification/Quantifiers/Ambiguity/Any/HintikkaVsMontague: All in all, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity is caused by the interaction of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: only explains why certain expressions may be ambiguous, but not which of them actually are. In general, he predicts too many ambiguities. Because he does not consider the grammatical principles that often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Range/Hintikka: determines the logical sequence. Quantifier/Quantification/Each/He/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he exerts himself, he will be happy (15) If everyone exerts themselves, they will be happy. Problem: in English "if" has precedence over "every" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: So we need additional rules for the order of the application of rules. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Moore, G.E. | Danto Vs Moore, G.E. | I 92 Argument of the open question/Intuitionism/Morality/G.E. Moore: should "causes joy" be all that what "good" really means? No, then it would say: does "causes joy cause joy"? And the answer would be absolutely meaningless. Known as the "open question argument". Moore used it to show that "good" is indefinable. Good/Definability/Moore: "Red" is a quality or property of things themselves, simple as yellow. Based on our "intuition" we can say if something is good, just as we can say that something is yellow. We do not argue, even indirectly, that something is good or bad, we just see that it is! I 108 DantoVsMoore: VsArgument of the open question: becomes blunt when we assume complete expressions - example "good husband". I 95 DantoVsMoore: Can we even imagine that two things can be exactly the same, with the only difference that one is good and the other is not? I 112 Would goodness be some kind of scent? Could the good be absent without the bad being present? This shows that something must be wrong, an idea that the good is simple and therefore indefinable. The two things have to be different somehow. DantoVsMoore: his argument of the open question becomes blunt if we assume complete (syncategorematic?) expressions like "good husband" instead of the fragment "good" alone. I 108 DantoVsMoore: he approaches moral questions too cognitively: the question which things are good in his view depends too much on whether they are recognized as such. I 119 Moore: seems to have had the feeling to have found a point in the basic inventory of the world itself. That the term "good" belongs to the atoms of reality itself and that the understanding, the knowledge and the world have the same architecture. DantoVsMoore: but if this turns out to be an illusion, whole contingents of philosophy sink. This gives the term "definition" an even greater weight, because definitions integrate the basic concepts into larger contexts. They must not be vulnerable. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Myth/Given | Sellars Vs Myth/Given | Esfeld I 145 Def actuality/myth of the actuality/Sellars: everything that shall be something epistemic and thus a kind of knowledge on the one hand without requiring concepts on the other hand. I 146 The myth includes the idea that there is a foundation of our knowledge which requires no justification. McDowell: (1996,S. 31): that means to assume that the space of reasons, the space of the justifications extends further than the domain of the conceptual. SellarsVsMythos: Sense-data is thus attributed to two incompatible functions: 1. simply given without concepts, 2. epistemic status: perceptual beliefs exist in concepts being applied to sense-data. To be in the mental state, to have a sense-data can be the same as to be in the epistemic state, to know that you have a sense-data. naturalistic fallacy/Sellars: a naturalistic fallacy would correspond to suppose that you can derive from the description of a causally caused mental event an epistemic relation. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Nagel, Th. | Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th. | I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke Vs Observation Language | I 88 Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts/Peacocke: the distinction can be defended. The attacks against it fall into two groups: 1) VsObservational Concepts/some authors: Vs allegedly too casual, arbitrary (permissive) way to make the distinction. E.g. one and the same device can be seen as an x-ray tube or a Geiger counter. These concepts enter the representational content. I.e. experience itself represents something as X-ray tube. So there is no conscious inference taking place! Theory Ladenness/Hanson/Peacocke: most provocative formulation: that theoretical concepts determine the content of experience; milder formulation: theoretical assumptions can determine some reasons to express a sentence typically classified as observation sentence. Theoretical Concept/Tradition: X-ray tube is one typically considered a theoretical concept. If it now enters the representational content, it meets certain standard conditions for observability. Observability: again depends on the ability (sophistication) of the observer. 2) VsDistinction Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts: the classical approach to observability is empty: nothing really fulfills the conditions. In reality, theoretical considerations do indeed play a role. Both criticisms can be represented together, although that means claiming that the distinction simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Operationalism | Verschiedene Vs Operationalism | Münch III 270 Theory/Observation/Measurements/Concepts/Kosslyn: most psychologists have been satisfied with transformation operations to define unobservable entities. Garner, Hake, Erikson even stress that uniform operational terms should be avoided as they mix the entity to be measured with the measuring instrument! The object should be "approximated" by independent operations. Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 Kanitscheider I 218 Operationalism/Definition/Measurements/Kanitscheider Vs: the so-called operational definitions do not actually exist, because a measuring rule can only be described by a series of sentences, but never by a single term. |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Peacocke, Chr. | McDowell Vs Peacocke, Chr. | I 192 Concept/experience/Peacocke: prerequisite for the subject to have a concept of a square is the non-conceptual content (the experience). I 193 This property (the concept) has also a condition of accuracy, which relates to the world. McDowellVsPeacocke: that's no proof that the non-conceptual content is eligible as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. Perhaps the subject does not even have reasons! Ex an experienced cyclists makes the right movements without the need for reasons. A description also does not require reasons. McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: that qualifies neither to assume that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor, that beliefs are founded on experiences "as reasons." I 194 McDowellVsPeacocke: flatulently abstruse conceptual apparatus: "protopropositional content", "experiential content", etc. McDowellVsPeacocke: he has to dissolve the alliance between reason and language, which has existed since Plato. (One word for both: "Logos") He has to dissolve the tie between the reasons for a subject to think how it thinks and the reasons it can give (articulable reasons). (Absurd). I 195 Experience/world/McDowellVsPeacocke: Ex Square: reason: "because of what it looks like." This is quite ok and just one reason for a conviction and not merely a "part of a reason ..." Ostension/concept/McDowell: Ex "It looks like ..." - need not be any less conceptual than that for which there is a reason. We can only get the rational relationship under control if we understand it conceptually, even if according to our theory (Evans) the content would be non-conceptual. Circle/Peacocke/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe, that in experience there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is outside? He thinks he has to avoid a circle. To explain the prperty of an obersvational concept we can not perceive the contents as conceptual fromthe very beginning (according to Peacocke). Ex colors: then, not only the term "red" is presupposed but, even worse, the "concept of the property of "Red."" Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: that only shifts the problem. Why should we assume that we would always be able to explain what it means to have a concept? Ex neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks if they think that something is red. (This is exactly what Peacocke wants). Circle/McDowell: the explanation of observational concepts must always be located outside the space of concepts. (also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective." |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Peacocke, Chr. | Verschiedene Vs Peacocke, Chr. | I 15 "Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property which differs monocular from binocular vision is present, that there is an impression of depth, but depth is a sensual property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is not purely representative! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representative, there must be sensory content). Depth/perception/concept/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: Depth is never a sensory property: Concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1. Any depth perception depends on viewing one's visual depth perception as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance from one. 2. Monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations could be indistinguishable and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, produce different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different depth sensations, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually seen surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: this is confirmed by the optical facts, but he only takes into account the bundles of rays falling into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains depth perception, but also why it decreases at great distances. |
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| Phenomenalism | Danto Vs Phenomenalism | DantoVsphenomenalism: Problem: There is an immense number of possible sense-data, even with the simplest objects. Every experience is thus incomplete. I 218 Problem of translation: The question is, if I need physical concepts to explain perceptions at the end. I.e. physical terms in order to eliminate physical terms. That would make phenomenalism as a feasible way impossible. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Phenomenalism | Nagel Vs Phenomenalism | I 109 Def Phenomenalism/Nagel: the analysis of all statements about the physical world with the help of concepts for real and hypothetical sensory experiences. NagelVsPhenomenalism: assumptions about an unperceived content of the refrigerator are incomprehensible as long as no non-conditional facts concerning the outside world are used for their explanation due to which these statements are true. I 110 Any attempt to explain a section of our worldview by others has to leave us with a world view that is compatible with the fact that we have this precise worldview! It cannot contain any description of ourselves that contradicts what we know, e.g. that there are infinitely many natural numbers. I 112 The question "How is it possible that people add?" does not equal the question "How is it possible that computers add?". In the first case, I ask about my own ability to follow a rule, in the second one I ask about a law of nature. |
NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Phenomenalism | Stalnaker Vs Phenomenalism | I 221 Phenomenalism/Stalnaker: thesis: the qualitative experiences are more essential - modern form: internalism. VsPhenomenalism: thesis: essential be our ability to represent the world. We project our image of the world back to us. Appearance/VsPhenomenalism: we understand the world in concepts of how the things appear to us not to have "as it is"-experiences. Representatives: Harman, Lycan, Dretske, Michael Tye. Intentionality/advantage: with the anti-phenomenalist view materialism and functionalism can be better understood in terms of intentionality. Functionalism: in terms of intentionality ((s) what can we say about something) is better understandable as in terms of phenomenal consciousness ("as it is"). Qualia: are then more comprehensible to analyze if you represent the world in concepts like experience ((s) "about"). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Piaget, J. | Pinker Vs Piaget, J. | I 375 Piaget: compared children with young scientists - Pinker pro: we all think scientifically from childhood on - but for primitive humans it was more difficult to survive than for the people of today I 391 PinkerVsPiaget: considering knowledge strategies as innate is something else than presuming science I 392 Piaget: children are sensorimotoric beings and unaware that objects are related and persist, and that the world obeys external laws and not the actions of a child. I 414 Logic/Human/Child/Development/Evolution/Pinker: children use "and", "or", "if" properly before they turn three. I 418 Maths/Child: three-week-old babies notice when they first see a scene with three and then one with two objects, and vice versa. Ten months: they remember how many (up to four objects) are presented to them, and it does not matter whether the objects are homogeneous, grouped or spread, also sounds. Arithmetic: Five months: surprised when suddenly on object is missing. I 419 18 months: Babies know that there are different numbers and that they belong in a particular order. Question: can these children and animals count without having words? Pinker: counting does not depend on language. Adults: use several representations for quantities. Preschoolers: even before they fully see through counting and measuring, they understand a lot of the logic and try to split a sausage fairly by cutting it. I 421 E.g. even a blind toddler knows that the straight line from A to B is the shortest and a turn to C is longer. I 422 School/TIMMSS: American students' performance is extremely poor. PinkerVsPiaget: mathematical education follows constructivism: a mixture of constructing while the social institutions are at odds about these concepts. "Holistic" method. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Plato | Chisholm Vs Plato | III 59 Necessity/Plato/Chisholm: can only be seen when one turns away from growth and decay and towards the absolute and eternal, the unchangeable. AristoteleVsPlato/Chisholm: one must look at the particulars in order to learn something about the necessity. From this we learn what it means, for example, to be blue. The same goes for red, and then we learn that red and blue cannot be in the same place at the same time. Induction/Aristotle: 1. Perception of individuals 2. Abstraction: what does it mean for a thing to be blue, or to be a human being. 3. intuitive grasp of relations between properties. III 60 4. with the intuitive knowledge we have the truths of reason and attribute necessities. Intuitive induction/Terminology/Chisholm: we better call induction like that in Aristotle, because it differs from the later concept. A priori/Chisholm: the proposition on the properties (that a thing is not blue when it is red) and the universal generalization are known a priori. So they differ from the induction by enumeration. On the other hand: Enumerative induction/Chisholm: this is about justifying the conclusion. III 61 Intuitive induction: here the connection between individual examples and conclusion is much less strong. It may be enough to imagine a single thing. Essence/Husserl: can be exemplified even with fantasy situations. III 62 Necessity/Tradition/Chisholm: once we acquire some concepts, (i.e. once we know what it means that something has these attributes) we will be able to know according to this traditional conception what it means for a proposition or fact to be necessary. A priori/Tradition/Chisholm: this is what the tradition called the a priori. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Platts, M. | Avramides Vs Platts, M. | Avramides I 91 DavidsoniansVsGrice/Avramidis: E.g. Mark Platts: thinks that he can discredit the entire program of Grice with Davidson’s doubt: Platts: Consider the following two statements: (1) The term of sentence meaning can be defined in terms of the speaker’s intentions (2) The meaning of each sentence in a language can be determined by reference to the intentions with which it was expressed. (Platts 1979 p.92)(1). AvramidesVsPlatts: he relies the mistakes of superficial epistemic asymmetry (that psychological concepts are more fundamental than semantic ones) in order to discredit (2). Then he connects the weakened assertion (2) with (1). Platts: if (1) is to have any meaning at all, it must have implications for the determination of the meaning of individual sentences. But what else could these implications be than what we have already seen to be inadequate? ((s) the fact that the RI cannot explain language by intentions). Platts: therefore (1) is either uninteresting or wrong. (1979, p.92.)(1) AvramidesVsPlatts: he does not distinguish between reductive and non-reductive interpretations of Grice’ analysis. He simply decides that the entire analysis by Grice was wrong or uninteresting, namely on the basis of superficial epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVsPlatts: he overreacted. 1) It is not clear why a non-reductive Gricean should be committed to (2). 2) Platts assumes that (2) is important without explaining why. Reductionism/Avramides: no reductive Gricean known to me really relies on the superficial epistemic asymmetry. 1. M. Platts, Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language, 1979, p. 92 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Positivism | Fodor Vs Positivism | II 107 Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages can be constructed so that they have any desired property. II 108 When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem. II 109 Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica(1). This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic. II 110 FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply. II 112 Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally. II 113 Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously. II 117 Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before. Fodor/Lepore IV 49 Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Principia Mathematica | Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica | II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity. II 352 Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned. II 353 The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down. II 402 Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. II 415 Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing. The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate. Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads. WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class? II 416 It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica(1), there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations") 2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs. WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one. --- IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. IV 73 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica(1) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic. 5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here. 5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity. People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and IV 74 lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth). Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations. IV 84 Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form "a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing. WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p" and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences. That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical. 5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there IV 85 would be things but these were not identical with themselves? IV 85/86 Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). IV 87 Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number. IV 98 Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. IV 99 Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Privileged Access | Ryle Vs Privileged Access | I 65 Privileged Access/RyleVsPrivileged access/Ryle: it will be shown later that you do not judge your own performance in a different way than other people's. But if someone were to be enlightened about how to apply concepts of mental activity (which do not exist) to his own actions, he would be completely wrong in his supposed analogy with others. --- I 218 It is no contradiction to say that one has misunderstood his emotional state (VsPrivileged access). One continually deceives one's own motivations, one is surprised that the clock has ceased to tick, without believing to have been aware of its ticking. --- I 306 Outside world/perception/RyleVsPrivileged access: in fact, there are birds and games that we observe, and sensations we can never observe. There is no central and "one" problem of perception. --- I 307 The question is not to be asked in the paramechanical form: "How do we see robins?" But in the form: "How do we use descriptions" like "he saw a robin"". E.g Someone has discovered a mosquito in the room, what do we say, except that he had a certain buzz in his ear? He identified something. We are inclined to say in general terms that he subsumed something and drew a conclusion. We have a foot on the right track, but also one on the wrong! There were no ghostly wheels turning when he heard the mosquito. --- I 308 What we want to know is the logical behavior of "He discovered a mosquito" and how it differs from "he had a buzz in his ear". He might have mistaken something for a mosquito, or the wind whispering in the telephone wires. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Propositions | Schiffer Vs Propositions | I XVII SchifferVsPropositions: (For reasons that have nothing to do with the mind-body-problem): Belief/Schiffer: (late): cannot be a relation to propositions: E.g. Tanya's belief that Gustav is a dog: Proposition: if the propositional theory is correct, the proposition has to, in order to present the full content, so to speak contain doghood or a manner of the representation of doghood. I 43 SchifferVsPropositions: if a functional theory can also be set up with sentences or even uninterpreted formulas, propositions are surely completely superfluous. I 44 Why should an arbitrary formulation that uses propositions to index functional roles, be considered as determination of the extension of the colloquial "believes"?. I 51 Proposition/Schiffer: There are several things that can be taken as propositions: rough-grained: propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values. These have no structure as functions. fine-grained: Complex that contain individuals (as components) and properties as structure. (E.g. situation semantics, Barweise/Perry 1983, Bealer 1982, Adams 1974, Lewis 1970a, Loar 1981, Plantinga 1974). SchifferVsPropositions: no matter whether to accept propositions as fine-grained or rough-grained, there are problems: E.g. Suppose (a) Ralph believes that snow is white and all theoreticians agree that one can analyze it like this: (b) B (Ralph, the proposition that snow is white). FN I 277 But they are all not obliged to (b). I 51 But they will agree that the expression "that snow is white" in A functions as a complex singular term that refers to this proposition and that the reference of this singular term is defined by the references of its components. ((s)> compositionality of reference). I 52 Then the proposition is necessarily true if snow is white. Schiffer: the two theorists may differ in whether the propositions contain their speakers as components. Function/Structure/Schiffer: if propositions are functions of possible worlds in truth value, they contain their references not as components. They do not include the entities they determine. I 70 SchifferVsPropositions/As belief content/SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsPropositional Theory/Conclusion: if the theory were true, the proposition would contain as belief content either doghood itself or a BT of it But if there were a truly language-independent property of doghood, they would belong to the biologically determined natural type and E.g. show "shmog" I 71 That doghood itself cannot be the component of propositions that we seek. That the content of natural-type-concepts should include BT, is only credible if there was a specific approach for what those BT should be at all. And we have not found such an approach. So the propositional theory (propositionalism) is wrong. Another reason against propositions as belief content: Property/Doghood/Schiffer: if there should be a non-pleonastic, voice-independent 1. property of being a dog that it would have to be the only one. But there is not. If it existed, it might not be irreducible. 2. if there were a reducible such property, there would be a property that is specifiable in phenotypic and/or genetic etc. terms that would be this property of being a dog, 3. but there is not such a property: none of Gustav's properties, however complex. But that is not so important. It only later plays a role for the existence of language-independent belief properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Propositions | Mates Vs Propositions | I 24 Proposition/Mates: should be so-called abstracts, without a spatial temporal structure. The structure of the proposition must not be confused with the structure of the corresponding statement. But this happens frequently in the literature! Problem: how to find out the structure of a proposition that depends on the statement? MatesVsPropositions: Assertion/Mates: (what is claimed by the proposition or statement): corresponding problems as with proposition: The same statement with the same meaning (!) can make different assertions: Example He won the election. Reference: if I ((s) implicitly) refer to Kennedy, or to Nixon, I make different assertions with the same statement (sentence)! Mates: conversely, I can make the same assertion with different statements (sentences): Example Kennedy has won the election. I 25 Thus, I have made the same assertion as above with "he", but I have used another statement with a different meaning. MatesVsAssertions: its structure cannot be determined simply by looking at the corresponding statement (sentence). Nevertheless, the "friends of assertions" have no inhibitions to classify assertions as singular, universal, particulate, conjunctive, hypothetical, affirmative, necessary, etc., or to say: "Assertions have subject predicate structure". Or "assertions contain descriptions". MatesVsPropositions: due to the different structure compared to the corresponding sentences, you cannot do it there either. Thoughts/Mates: the same applies to thoughts. Because of the different structure (compared to the corresponding sentences) it is pointless to say, for example, they contained descriptions, or would be negative. MatesVsThoughts: we should not use them in logic. Just so that logic is not understood as "laws of thought". Judgement/Mates: the same applies to judgments, which are the most dubious of all terms here: there are hardly two authors who say the same thing about them. For example "activity of mind"; "comparison of two concepts or objects obtained by simple perception, etc.". MatesVsVerdict: we should not use them in logic, because logic does not deal with "mental acts". I 26 Proposition/judgement/thought/statement/Mates: much of what we say about the logical properties of statements (sentences) we can easily transfer to propositions, assertions, thoughts and judgements. We only want to avoid index words like "I", "here", "now" etc... Solution: by independence through completion by place and time indications. Assertion/statement/Mates: here the equivalence between both helps: a statement is true iff the assertion made with it is true. The same applies to thoughts and judgements. The rest can be forgotten! |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Propotype Theory | Fodor Vs Propotype Theory | NS I 160 Prototype Theory/Concepts/Criteria/Newen/Schrenk: (literature (13-24) tries to find the solution for the following: Thesis: Concepts as meanings of predicates are essentially characterized by prototypes E.g. A prototype for a table is one with four legs and a quadrangular plate. In the sense of the later Wittgenstein, this specifies no definitional, but only characterizing properties. VsPrototype Theory: Problem: 1) in many cases, there are no prototypes, E.g. for the complex concept "grandmother of a bank employee with four black-haired children". 2) The prototype theory cannot reduce complex concepts to simple terms. FodorVsPrototype Theory: concepts are compositional Prototypes are not compositional Therefore, concepts cannot be prototypes. >conceptual atomism. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Psychofunctionalism | Schiffer Vs Psychofunctionalism | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): should be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology). SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief property of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block must say that there must be a theory Ts nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: to be a token of the z-type, that has the Ts-correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). That means the role that is indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a posteriori knowable after the theory Ts was excavated. Science: might just might find all phenotypic (apparition moderate) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from it, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion of to be a dog = to be of this and that genotype, if... and b) includes in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be of this and that genotype. ((s) without additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there should be a philosophical theory of this strength, it is not known to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.type concepts, are unsuitable for belief predicates. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Psychology | Quine Vs Psychology | XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sense irritation (stimuli) are the only thing, why should we not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: that used to look circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we must simply refrain from deducing science from observations. If we want to understand only the connection of observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also from science which examines precisely this connection. XII 91/2 Rational Reconstruction/Epistemology/Quine: pro: creativity should be appreciated that lies in the possibility to translate science into logic, set-theoretical and observation terms. Important argument: this would show that all other scientific concepts are superfluous. Psychology/Quine: cannot preform such a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observational concepts, because we did not grow up with learning this. That is why we should insist on the rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalist concepts superfluous at the end. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Putnam, H. | Millikan Vs Putnam, H. | I 328 natural kind/Putnam/Millikan: (Meaning of Meaning): thesis: at least in the case of concepts of natural kinds the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions. Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings can not be in the head. I 329 Putnam/Millikan: his argument here is that of a realist. Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that may determine the reference or the extension. natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to appearances concepts of natural kinds are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with that. Extension/Putnam: thesis: the extension of "water" and "Gold" is determined by a relation between the token of expression and the extension. MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he thinks erroneously that concepts of natural kinds would be indexical. Thereby no problem is solved, but only named. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Carnap Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 173 Analytic/Synthetic: CarnapVsQuine: trying to overcome the difficulties in order to maintain the distinction. Restriction: the distinction should apply only to the so-called constructed languages. Here there are clear rules as to when a composition is allowed.(1) 1. J. R: Flor, "Ernst Mach: Der Vater des Wiener Kreises" in: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 VII 147 Pragmatics/Carnap: additional problem: whether the objects exist. Quine: doubts that in the case of absence an explication of the words is possible, since he requires clear behavioral criteria. So these words become meaningless. CarnapVsQuine: it is theoretically possible to show the fruitfulness of semantic concepts through the evolution of language systems without pragmatic basis (language use, behaviourist). (operational procedures). VII 151 Intensionalist thesis of pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the language habits. Extensionalist thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste; the linguist is free, because it cannot be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise, either. Quine: the completed lexicon is e.g. pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the foot. But we can draw an advantage from that. On the other hand, if we postpone a definition of synonymy in the case of the lexicon, no problem appears as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. VII 152 Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist must provide not only the real cases, but also the possible ones. VII 153 CarnapVsQuine: The extensionalist thesis is inappropriate: E.g. entry in the lexicon: (3) Einhorn, unicorn Kobold, goblin On the other hand the wrong registration: (4) Einhorn, goblin Kobold, unicorn Carnap: The two German words here have the same extension, namely the zero class (Carnap pro). If the extensionalist thesis is correct, then there is no essential, empirically verifiable difference between (3) and (4). VII 154 QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man in the street was unwilling to say anything about nonexistent objects. VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man in the street is very well able to understand issues related to assumed counterfactual situations. Quine XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things is only to choose a certain language. It does not mean to believe in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be a value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning as it only expresses a choice of language. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be so separated. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. Stroud I 221 Dream/Quine/Stroud: Quine does not exclude the possibility that we dream all the time. (>Descartes). Skepticism/Empiricism/Carnap: cannot be answered empirically. Knowledge/Carnap: however, there may be empirical studies that show how we arrive at knowledge. Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: is supposed to do that. CarnapVsQuine: N.B.: precisely because it is an empirical investigation, it cannot answer the traditional question of the philosopher. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson I 55 CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) Kanitscheider II 23 Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme. Quine VI 36 VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place. VI 51 Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism. VI 52 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is! Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations Quine XI 146 Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction). Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. Quine X 83 Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth. Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability). Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then: Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps. Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences. Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions, X 84 namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs. 1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth! 2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place. Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important. But even mere terms can be better or worse. Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems. 3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped. QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 184 Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds. Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based: 1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional. II 185 Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception. 2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds. I 186 Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are. DavidsonVsQuine. QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality. 3) E.g. Probability/Probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective. Def Probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space. Samples: are "small possible worlds". II 187 Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings. Probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case). Gradually/Degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual. Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term. II 188 Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions. Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world. Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristoteles: cannot be considered independently of the way objects are specified. Wiggins: Quine mocks essentialism. WigginsVsQuine: is his critique on the level of an unreflected acceptance of Aristotle's three-dimensional fiction of our world? Or does he claim that, even if we remain in this provincial ontology, we have the choice to choose whether we want to discriminate or not to discriminate in favor of some of the concepts under which the things we perceive fall? II 286 Concept/Language/WigginsVsQuine: Quine's attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of concepts of substance and against chance formations could explain the certainty with which our culture deals with questions of identity in time or permanence. II 303 WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: there is the question if we can evaluate sentences with names for all possible worlds ("necessary existence") Problem: Cross-world identity |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 71 Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism". I 72 Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz. Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w.. I 201 Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable. II 24 Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition. Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided. StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case. De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague, II 25 but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it. Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content. II 160 Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions). Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual. Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual. StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine. II 161 De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way? Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe? bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here. Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them. 1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it. 2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions. Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible. Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself. b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts. 1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat 2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach. II 162 Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between. II 163 De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship. That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition. Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set. Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Simons Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 60 Ontology/variables/quantification/Lesniewski/Simons: because of his understanding of quantification Lesniewski can quantify over variables (otherwise 2nd order logic). I 61 But by this he does not enter into any commitment. Quantification/Lesniewski: quantification was described by Quine as substitutional quantification but... SimonsVsQuine: ...Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions and he also does not assume an infinite number of expressions. That would be implausible for him as a nominalist. Küng/Canty/solution: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions but on their extensions. Thus, abstract entities are still allowed through the back door. Simons: you could say that Lesniewski developed a combinatorial semantics, that is based on a simple idea of an "extensional" meaning so that an expression of the form "Π ... [__]" is true iff. the matrix is true regardless of the meaning of the variables. "∏"/Lesniewski/ordinary language translation/Simons: "∏" simply means "for all". I 123 Four-Dimensionalism/Quine: (1960, W. + O.): physical objects in four-dimensional space-time are not distinguishable from events (more concrete: from processes). I 124 Substance/Quine: a substance differs from other physical objects in that there are relatively few atoms that (temporary) lie partly in it partly outside of it. Substance/SimonsVsQuine: this is simply wrong: material substances are not simply those who win or lose a few atoms. I 128 Extension/Quine: Quine called their occupants: "content of a portion of space-time". SimonsVs: instead, we assume superposition (different individuals with identical parts in the same place at the same time). Continuants/SimonsVsQuine: if such occupants exist at all, they have to be continuants. Events/Simons: events seem at least to have a chance to meet the extensionalist principle no matter whether arbitrary sums are approved. Here, we need definitions of the concepts of temporal and spatial part. Masses: here, we need different meanings of "part" to capture the relations between individuals, between classes or between masses. But this is different than the criticism in the last chapter because here it is about that there may be various analog applications. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Newen Vs Quine, W.V.O. | New I 129 Concept/Holism/Quine/NewenVsQuine/Newen: not all concepts are linked to all others. E.g. color concepts are independent of the concept of the electron. NS I 68 Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: Quine is a meaning skeptic. His raw material for a reconstruction of a theory of meaning are the empirical sciences. Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: is Quine's largest "Wrecking Ball". NS I 69 Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Dogma: distinction analytic/synthetic 2. Dogma: reductionism: any meaningful synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms all refer to the sensory experience. Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine: the concept of meaning is not well defined. Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 1) Experimental Definition: "... true because of the meanings of the words in it, regardless of empirical facts. Vs: Problem: the transition from e.g. "every unmarried man is unmarried" to "every bachelor is unmarried". Analytical: its definition thus depends on the concept of meaning. Meaning/Quine: Problem: reference objects cannot always serve: e.g. creatures with heart/kidneys. Same Extension. But only because of the (random) evolution), not because of the meaning of words. It cannot always be true solely on the basis of the meaning of words, because the words are different ((s) and "heart" and "kidneys" just are not synonymous.) NS I 70 Today: VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: recent developments have advanced: although meaning is not the same as the reference object, the reference object may be part of the meaning. (see below >natural kinds). Synonymy/Quine: is closely linked to the concept of meaning. If you wished that the meaning was an abstract object, then the class of all synonymous terms/sentences can serve as this abstraction. It follows a new definition: Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2) Experimental Definition: a statement is analytically true if it is true because of synonymy relations and regardless of facts. Point: "meaning" does not occur here anymore. New: the class of the synonymous sentences of w.g. "every bachelor is unmarried" contains the sentence "all unmarried men..." NS I 71 Dictionary/Two Dogmas/Lexicon/Quine: the dictionary already presumes the concept of synonymy. Dictionaries are empirical hypotheses about the use. Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: example Bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability salva veritate is not given, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: e.g. heart/kidneys Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks... Solution: for example heart/kidneys, because it was not necessary but contingent that living creatures with hearts have only evolved if they also had kidneys. NS I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle. Essentialism/VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: in modern metaphysics and philosophy of science essentialism is experiencing a comeback. (Lit 4-4). NS I 74 Analyticity/Synonymy/Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: these expressions are not well defined. Solution/Quine: stimulus meaning: consists of positive and negative stimulus meaning: also contains irrelevant stimuli, i.e. the total package of stimuli on one occasion that lead a particular speaker to accept or decline. It is only a pale imitation of the original concept of meaning. This is part of Quine's meaning nihilism. NS I 75 Stimulus Synonymy: only for defined speaker. The same stimulus meaning. Stimulus Analyticity: only for defined speaker. Agreement with each stimulus. Differs from the original analyticity concept. NS I 76 Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1) inscrutability of reference: E.g. unseparated rabbit parts comply with the same observation situations 2) indeterminacy of translation: E.g. unseparated rabbit part: can a) "be the same" b) "belong to the same thing" (both in the foreign language! This goes beyond the inscrutability of reference 3) underdetermination (of a theory) by the data: (corresponds to translation indeterminacy): there may be rival theories that match the same number of observations. VsQuine: some argue that it never comes to radical translations, because many aspects of language are evolutionarily enscribed in the brain and cannot vary so widely (literature: 4-2). I.e. only the third uncertainty remains. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Rationalism | Kant Vs Rationalism | Danto I 193 Rationalism: starting from our concepts attempts to initially imagine the existence and nature of the real world. By applying pure, irrefutable reasoning, he tries to determine how the world should be. KantVsRationalism: shows the mistake: Existence is not a property, therefore no essential feature. Fundamental error: to treat the predicate "exists" as if it was something like "blue" or "round". Kant I 39 KantVsConventional philosophy: Areas of expertise: "rational psychology," "rational cosmology" and "rational theology". Kant: "sophistical conclusions": deceptive because something given is subsumed under mere idea to give them objective reality. But all that is there is conditional: 1. an imaginative I 2. the indefinite world of experience 3. the fact that everything is in necessary order. Chisholm II 76 analytical judgment/Kant: a judgment in which the "mind is concerned only with what is already thought of in concepts" (CPR, B 314) Sauer: So in his truth, independent of the existence. KantVsRationalism: illusion: to foist a transcendental possibility of things from the logical possibility of the concept. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Rationalism | Millikan Vs Rationalism | I 325 Intension/meaning/knowledge/meaning/Wittgenstein/Quine/Millikan: the two can be understood as such that the knowledge that an expression or a proposition has meaning is knowledge a priori. I call that the Def "Meaning Rationalism"/Millikan: thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning, is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge of judgments, this is empirical. ((S) Because it indeed is about the meaning of our own expressions and our own use.). MillikanVsMeaning Rationalism. Main representatives: Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam. I 326 Synonymy/Putnam: thesis: the knowledge of synonymy is also a priori. Millikan: that is, all this should be armchair reflection. I 327 Criterion/Millikan: Problem: if all this is supposed to be so sure there can always only be one criterion for a concept, not several. And all the terms may only have one intension, never multiple, except if they are "logically equivalent". "Necessary and sufficient" conditions/Millikan: allegedly distinguish neatly not only between actual things that fall under a concept and those who do not fall under it, but also between all "logically possible" things. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: thesis: the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless should be a priori. I 328 Error/Millikan: according to that only possible in judgments. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: Ex I can not meaningfully ask myself if my idea of Shakespeare might not be of Shakespeare. Judgment/Millikan: but judgments can not be made without using any concepts. Concept/Millikan: So at least some concepts have to stand on their own two feet. Tradition/Millikan: according to tradition these concepts would be those of properties. Meaning Rationalism/Millikan: thesis: all our real concepts are of things with a special ontological status, namely things that exist and can be known, and yet not necessarily have a relationship to the real world (actual world). Ex Platonic forms or "reified meanings" or "reified possibilities". NominalismVs: corresponds to nothing. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Redundancy Theory | Kant Vs Redundancy Theory | Metz II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Regularism | Brandom Vs Regularism | I 308 Regularity theories: attempts to define boundaries of terms, difference between correct and incorrect use - Assessment of truth based on the application of concepts. I 309 Problem: gerrymandering: there is an infinite number of patterns to describe a regularity Regularity: can only achieve something if some regularities are privileged over others. I 313 The terms of regularity and reliability cannot do the work alone: The concept of regularity cannot distinguish regularities. And the concept of regularity with respect to the reference classes cannot distinguish reference classes. I 823 Regularism: (BrandomVs): Conceives implicit standards as mere regularities in practice. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Relativism | Field Vs Relativism | II 204 FieldVsQuine: However, (4) For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation hypothesis M: T signs {x I Fx} relative to M gdw. M T maps to a term that signs y. (or {x I Fx}). only defines Quine’s relativized concept of signification in terms of an unrelativized concept of signification, applied to our own language (into which we translate). So we need to understand the unrelativized concept before we can understand the relativized one. >Reference systems. Underdetermination/Reference/Quine/Field: this was responsible for the fact that the unrelativized concepts of denotation and signification are not physicalistically acceptable. FieldVsRelativized Denotation: now we see that the relativized concepts do not help either. FieldVsQuine: with the relativized signification and denotation Quine himself has become a victim of his >museum myth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Brandom Vs Representation | I40 VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes). I125 BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression! I 132 Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough." I 292 Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.) I 404 BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege) I 405 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel. 4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates. I 412 BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 690 Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental. II 69 Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. Rorty VI 181 BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty: instead: "making real inferential connections between claims". If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers". Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Davidson Vs Representation | I (e) 93ff Scheme/Content: came into play as a pair (C.I.Lewis) Now we can let them get out as a pair as well. Then no objects are left behind in terms of which the question of representation could be raised! Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing! With that we are also getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth. It is faith in it which gives rise to relativistic thoughts. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something may be a map of Mexico, but only with respect to the Mercator projection or a different projection. Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental sign system whose object reference is yet under discussion,... language has inherently no other function than making the world accessible". Glüer II 126 Davidson: There are no facts! (as Frege: all true sentences have the same meaning: compliance with all the facts of the world). ("Big Fact"). Davidson: There are no representations that could be t/f - beliefs are true if they are caused correctly. II 127 A true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world. Horwich I 454 Dualism/Scheme/Content/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the main criticism is the dualism of scheme and content. Dualism: that of scheme and content has the following possible forms, with the sides not being causally linked: "Tertia": like E.g. "conceptual framework" E.g. "intended interpretation": they are not causally connected with the things they organize or intend. They vary independently from the rest of the universe, just like the relations of the skepticist, the "correspondence" or "representation". Horwich I 454/455 Representation/DavidsonVsRepresentation/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: if we do not have "Tertia" such as "intended interpretation" or "conceptual framework", we have no concepts that could serve as representations and then we also do not need to ask whether they represent the world properly. Important argument: we still have beliefs, but they are now viewed from outside, just as by field linguists. Without the "Tertia" we have no "third way" anymore to see things differently. Language/Davidson/Rorty: then we see language just as we see beliefs: not as a "conceptual frame", but rather as causal interaction with the surroundings described by the field linguists. Then you can no longer ask if the language "does or does not fit" the world. At the same time you cannot formulate skepticism any longer. Scepticism cannot express itself. ((s)> Nagel: ditto, but other reasons). Tertium/Tertia/Davidson/Rorty: therefore will not be relevant for truth claims. And the fact that there is none will not be a result of an empirical study nor an "analysis of meaning". Correspondence/Rorty: the fact that it is delivered by coherence, according to Davidson, then comes down to the fact that from the perspective of the field linguists nothing is needed but word meaning and the world. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 194 DavidsonVsRepresentation/Rorty: encourages us to cultivate our "realistic intuitions" (Crispin Wright). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rorty, R. | Millikan Vs Rorty, R. | I 88 Sentence/world/meaning/MillikanVsRorty/Millikan: 1. Let's assume that a sentence belongs to the world (at least, if it is true). Mathematical equation: here, it is perhaps different. Truth/Millikan: let's assume it has to do with some projective relation or projective rule. Pointe: this can not be a natural state (status within the natural world). Ex false sentence: projects nothing, but still has a meaning. But if it has a meaning, it must mean something. But not something actual. So, not something in the natural world. Pointe: then even what a true sentence means cannot be anything that is in the actual world. Solution: the relation of a true sentence to something undoubtedly actual in the world is mediated by a relation which is itself not in the world... This relation is the meaning. Meaning/Millikan: is not itself in the world, but the relation between a true statement and what is in the world. Therefore, this relationship is not causal. Truthmaker/Millikan: not to be found in the sentences. And we don't understand false sentences by simply saying that ithey are not true. Meaning/Millikan: must be something that true and false sentences have in common. Projection/meaning/Millikan: meaning seems to be irrelevant for the actual projective relation. Solution/Millikan: our concepts of "intrinsic ..." and "Normal". True and false sentences "should" ("are supposed to") to correspond to the facts in the world in accordance with specific projective rules. This can be explained with the concepts of normality and the eigenfunction. I 89 Falsehood/false sentence/Millikan: is then just as unproblematic as Ex a chameleon, which does not adopt the color of its surroundings. ((S) defect, error, mistake). Meaning/Millikan: 2. sounds turn into sentences with meaning if they are interpreted. Intentionality/language/tradition/Millikan: is therefore dependent intentionality (on interpretation). ((s) > derived intentionality). Sentence/object/world/Millikan: without intentionality a sentence would be an ordinary object. Thought/thinking/intentionality/Millikan: Pointe: then the intentionality of thoughts can not be interpreted as the one of sentences. Otherwise we would have a regress. Representation/Millikan: those who view sentences as internal representations forget that sentences and images are derived intentionally. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Russell, B. | Frege Vs Russell, B. | Read III 149 FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are quite contradictory concepts, just no contradictory objects - logic can only determine the limitation of concepts, i.e. for each object, whether it falls under the concept, or not - a contradictory concept is needed to prove that there is no corresponding object. Russell/Read: statements, meanings of sentences, and objects of belief: have individual things and universals as constituents. "Socrates is wise" literally has Socrates and wisdom as constituent elements. The meaning of "Socrates" for him was the philosopher himself. (>Meaning). Russell: (naive realist: meaning = extension or reference, FregeVs). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Russell, B. | McGinn Vs Russell, B. | I 86 Main tradition: retains the mentalist conception of self but explains self identity with the help of certain psychological conditions. (Hume) Russell: characterizes "the self as a series of classes of mental individual things" (as opposed to the "Needlepoint self"). The temporal identity exists then because there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the self. The individual states of a person, etc. are connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. I 87 A mysterious substance that were constitutive for the self does not exist. Only the continued existence of the psychic relationships. McGinnVs: there are systematic problems with the concepts of necessity, sufficient condition and circularity. It is also easy to come up with counterexamples. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Russell, B. | Putnam Vs Russell, B. | I (e) 135 Name/reference/PutnamVsRussell: Vs synonymy of general term and necessary and sufficient conditions for a belonging in the corresponding class: E.g. Multiple Sclerosis: the underlying status is caused by a virus. The interesting question is not the >"extension" of the expression, but what (if anything) is in correspondence with our >concept of multiple sclerosis. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Donnellan Vs Russell, B. | I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did..."). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Hilbert Vs Russell, B. | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 1 Epsilon/Heusinger: brings a new representation of certain and undefined NP: these are interpreted like pronouns as context-dependent terms, which are represented by a modified epsilon operator. This is interpreted as a selection function. VsRussell/VsIota Operator: this operator is less flexible because it is subject to the uniqueness condition. Context Dependency: is also dynamic in that the context reflects the advancing state of information. I 30 EO/Hilbert/Bernays/Heusinger: term building operator that makes the term x Fx from a formula F and a variable x. It can be understood as a generalized iota operator to which neither the condition of uniqueness nor the condition of existence applies. Iota Operator/HilbertVsRussell: has no contextual definition for Hilbert, but an explicit definition. I.e. ix Fx may be introduced if the condition of uniqueness and existence expressed in (48i) is derivable for the formula F. Problem: this is impractical because you do not always see if the formula meets the conditions. Eta Operator/Solution/Hilbert: may be introduced as in (48ii) if there is at least one element that makes F true. Its content is interpreted as a selection function. Uniqueness Condition: has therefore been replaced by the selection principle. Problem: also this condition of existence cannot be seen in the formula. Solution/Hilbert: Epsilon Operator/EO: is defined according to (48iii) even if F is empty, so that an epsilon term is always well defined. I 38 Determination/VsRussell/Heusinger: this means that determination is not attributed to uniqueness (>Iota operator) but to the more general concept of salinity (according to Lewis). Generality/(s): whether salience (which is itself context-dependent) is more general than uniqueness is questionable). Determination/Heusinger: is either a) a global property, such as it applies to unique and functional concepts (deictic use), or b) local: determined by the context. (anaphoric use) Both have a dynamic element. Rucker I 263 HilbertVsRussell: improved shortly after the publishing of Principia Mathematica(1) the techniques to elaborate with their help his idea of the "formal system". Mathematics/Logics/Hilbert: idea to understand all relations like x = y, x = 0, and z = x + y as special predicates in predicate logic: G(x,y), N(x), and S(x,y,z). Then the axioms of mathematics can be regarded as formulae of predicate logic and the proof process becomes the simple application of the rules of logic to the axioms. I 264 this allows mechanical solution methods. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
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| Ryle, G. | Rorty Vs Ryle, G. | Frank I 597 Sensation/Thought/RortyVsRyle: his approach encounters the difficulty that our everyday language seems to support the Cartesian notion of two series of events persistently. >Cartesianism, >Dualism. Fra I 598 That is not the problem with opinions, feelings, etc. Here we are not tempted to consider them as episodes instead of dispositions. Mental/Rorty: only the first class a) (thoughts, feelings) generates the contrast to the physical, which is more than a mere linguistic contrast. (see below) They are paradigmatic for a separate area. b) (moods, feelings, etc.) these are such that in no way would bring forth the idea of a separate area if we had not heard of thoughts and feelings. If we had no mental concepts, but only concepts of opinions and desires, then we would have no >mind body problem. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Ryle, G. | Schiffer Vs Ryle, G. | I 266 Meaning Theory/M.th./Schiffer: some of them offer a reductive analysis of semantic terms, but that does not work. I 267 We learn more about our cognitive apparatus, if we ask why our m.th. fail. We also learn something if we only try a concept analysis. E.g. if we try to complete the following scheme, which is impossible: "x presents in y gdw ..." But:. SchifferVsRyle: "Analytical" connections between concepts do not bring us much further. It would be nice if we knew everything about the conceptual roles of our semantic and mental terms, but I do not see how we could find out more. M.th./Schiffer: some philosophers see it here just as their task to give an "explanation" rather than a conceptual analysis or meaning analysis of semantic concepts. E.g. M.th./Semantics/Devitt: (Devitt 1981,68): the problem of semantics is given in part by human speech behavior. The main problem of semantics is to explain the semantic terms that occur in the semantic theory. What is it for an inscription to have meaning? Why is this sound sequence true?. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Salmon, N. | Stalnaker Vs Salmon, N. | I 138 Vague identity/SalmonVsVague identity/vagueness/Stalnaker: Salmon's argument shows that if we manage to pick out two entities a and b, that there then has to be a fact whether the two are one thing or two. (Stalnaker per Salmon, Nathan). Inverted: if it is vague whether a = b, then it is vague what "a" refers to or what "b" refers to. I 139 StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: but that gives us no reason to assume that facts together with concepts have to decide whether an identity statement is true. All that Salmon's argument shows is that when facts and concepts do not decide about identity it is vague to what the expressions refer. wrong solution: e.g. building (see above) someone uses a demonstrative with ostension: it is wrong to say that Salmon's argument shows that our concept of buildings decides whether the two are one. StalnakerVsSalmon: all that his argument shows is that a prima facie vague identity is in reality a prima facie vague reference. Problem: our problem is to find the source of the vagueness. temporal properties/Stalnaker: with them we can distinguish e.g. statue/clay (heap). Or e.g. between a person and her body. Vague identity/StalnakerVsSalmon: the concepts need to do more work than it seems with him. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Sellars, W. | Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. | Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other. I 207 Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism. I 208 SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the: Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities. Sellars I 34 Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content. 2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism. I 34/25 3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time. Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content? Sellars: admitted. I 35 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content! I 36 Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sense Data | Millikan Vs Sense Data | I 302 Contradiction/Millikan: can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Subject: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object. Sense data/MillikanVsSense data theory: sense data can therefore not be the object because a sense date can not be given in several ways. ((S) There is only one givenness of a sense datum, otherwise it is several sense data). Sense datum/Millikan: each sense datum presents itself only to one sense (Ex touch, Ex sense of smell). ((S) that is, one can not say that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object, respectively.) Millikan: one would need a fully developed theory of law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you can not test them! And hence you can not develop concepts from them. But that would violate the first condition, that the concepts to be tested should form only small groups. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Peacocke Vs Shoemaker, S. | I 145 Demonstratives/VsPeacocke: other extreme perspective: "view of the differing concepts"): according to this view these judgments ("here", "now", "I") are not based on identification, PeacockeVsShoemaker: because there are no q memories in our world that are not memories and this fact is partly constitutive of our concept of self. Q Memories/Shomaker/Parfit: in possible worlds of the kind that are described by Shoemaker and Parfit, our concepts would then not have an application, concepts in such circumstances would be different from ours. I 146 This view would also have to argue that judgments about someone's past, which are based on memory-like images, are non-inferential and that it is doubtful that someone whose non-inferential judgments have no corresponding sensitivity for the causality has a complete concept of the first person. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Simons, P. | Wiggins Vs Simons, P. | Simons I 216 Superposition/Simons: it is not just a pragmatic resistance that lets us assume that two objects cannot be superposed and yet have no common part. Simons: nevertheless pro, WigginsVsSuperposition/WigginsVsSimons: he makes this clear in the following principle: Principle/Wiggins: A and a real part or component B of a third thing C, where A unequal C and A ≠ B and where no part or component of A is a part or component of B or of C, cannot completely occupy the same space at the same time. Simons: where does this lead? rta: be the container from a to t. This means that space can become the object of timeless operators and predicates of extensional mereology. Frame of Reference: we assume it as fixed, so that identity of spaces can be determined. Then we can apply all axioms of CEM (Extensional Mereology), also the Sum-Axiom and the SSP are not contradictory. (…+…) I 217 SimonsVsWiggins: that does not seem particularly frightening. It even seems to be able to be amplified. For example, we can assume a Strong Supplement Principle (SSP) that is relativized to times: (…+…) SimonsVsCoincidence Principle: if it were correct, it would establish a very close conceptual link between mereological relations and spatial relations between continuants. Simons pro Wiggins: in any case we can agree that "space" can only be mapped by reference to its occupants. ((s) >no "empty space"). Thus, the conceptual utility of the part-whole relations between continuants will consist in their necessity for the formation of spatial concepts. Coincidence Principle/Simons: it is neat and it provides a seductive simplification. SimonsVsCoincidence Principle/SimonsVsWiggins: one pays too high a price. I 218 But with his rejection we must also reject one of the premises, WP, PP or SSP. Which one? I would reject SSP (see below). But first we want to test WP against a hypothetical counter-example from Sharvy. I 220 WigginsVsSuperposition/Simons: his argument for WP goes like this: Suppose A and B were distinct and at the same place at the same time. Then they cannot be distinguished by location. Then they have to be distinguished by their properties. Problem: no space region (volume) can be described simultaneously by different predicates (be it color, form, texture etc.). (s) It cannot be spherical and cube-shaped at the same time). I 221 Simons: the latter may be true, but that does not speak against the possibility of a perfect mixture, because its qualities do not have to be those of its ingredients in isolation, which is proved by the imperfect mixtures every day. ((s) Contradiction to above I 218: there mixture of compound is distinguished by the fact that the properties of the ingredients are largely preserved in the mixture.) Superposition/Simons: Assuming that it would be possible that the occupation of space by a mass would be a gradual matter, then it would be possible that different masses occupy the same region Simons: although the occupation would have different intensity distributions. Simons: if this were the case, Wiggins' principle would be wrong and then we would have to doubt its necessity. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Skepticism | McGinn Vs Skepticism | I174 Skepticism: a) first person perspective: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience. b) third person perspective: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat permeated by nerve get an image of the outside world? I 176 McGinnVsSkepticism: uses the idea that there is a metaphysical gap between the subject and the object of knowledge. a) for the first-person stance: between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world. b) for the third person: the gap is to be perceived as if a part of the objective world opposed another part of the world, while both parts each have their own characteristics. We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps are not as detrimental to knowledge as it seems. I 191 McGinnVsSkepticism: its brittle core consists of two problematic ideas: 1. The idea of a possible content of attentive consciousness. 2. concept of the rationality of our inferences. I 193 If the premises are not enough logically, we are worried about the underdetermination through evidence. Often we intuitively deem a certain conclusion correct. This intuitive accuracy is an example of a classical philosophical riddle: there is an inexplicable transition from one kind of things to another type without clear principles being available to justify this stretch. Then we talk about innovation and creativity. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: the skeptic misinterprets our principle inability at the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basic level. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: a 3rd point is the viability of our cognitive practices. Does the way how we arrive at our beliefs entail a clue that this were deeply irrational? If it were, the problem would be far more drastic than the mere absence of justifications. I 199 transcendental naturalismVsSkepticism: the falsity of the skeptical position can only be seen from outside our system of concepts. It has to be explained psychologically, only that this explanation is beyond our capabilities. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Smart, J. C. | Quine Vs Smart, J. C. | II 118 ff The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics). There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism. Smart's materialism is more robust than that. II 119 Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance. SmartVsEmergence. They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.) Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth. II 120 Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins. On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory. II 121 Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent. Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work. Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances. Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of ignorance, disregard details. There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute. Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle. They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al. As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added. II 122 Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Smart, J. C. | Peacocke Vs Smart, J. C. | I 103 Instrument/Smart: (Between Science and Philosophy, 1969) Thesis: extension of the senses. We du use theory, but it corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects at a distance. PeacockeVsSmart: nevertheless, the cases are different from the perspective of the subject: for seeing a number of objects in the distance we do not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc. Even if you have these concepts, they are not analogous to the epistemic possibility I 104 which are needed like active current for theoretical concepts. "Extension of the senses" should not be merely metaphorical. But this would require the existence of a way of thinking, that there is a physical property x [a current flows through x], and that it is not epistemically possible that under normal circumstances..., etc. and yet there is no current. I am not saying that such concepts are impossible, but this is about different concepts. Those concepts would take other places in the net of epistemic possibility. Better instruments never give us new concepts by themselves. ((s) We would also need to know that they are better or that e.g. that a higher resolution of a microscope simply shows similar structures in a better way, and not entirely new structures. >Presupposition.) |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Sophists | Plato Vs Sophists | Gadamer I 351 Sophisten/PlatonVsSophisten/Platon/Gadamer: Das Urbild aller leeren Argumentation ist die sophistische Frage, wie man überhaupt nach etwas fragen könne, was man nicht wisse. Dieser sophistische Einwand, den Plato im „Menon“(1) formuliert, wird dort bezeichnenderweise nicht durch eine überlegene argumentative Auflösung überwunden, sondern durch die Berufung auf den Mythos der Präexistenz der Seele. Das ist freilich eine sehr ironische Berufung, sofern der Mythos der Präexistenz und der Wiedererinnerung, der das Rätsel des Fragens und Suchens auflösen soll, in Wahrheit nicht eine religiöse Gewissheit ausspielt, sondern auf der Gewissheit der Erkenntnis suchenden Seele beruht, die sich gegen die Leerheit formaler Argumentationen durchsetzt. Gleichwohl ist es kennzeichnend für die Schwäche, die Plato im Logos erkennt, dass er die Kritik an der sophistischen Argumentation nicht logisch, sondern mythisch begründet. Wie die wahre Meinung eine göttliche Gunst und Gabe ist, so ist auch das Suchen und die Erkenntnis des wahren Logos kein freier Selbstbesitz des Geistes. Rechtfertigung durch den Mythos: (...) die mythische Legitimierung, die Plato der sokratischen Dialektik hier gibt, [ist] von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung(...). Bliebe das Sophisma unwiderlegt - und argumentativ lässt es sich nicht widerlegen -, würde dieses Argument zur Resignation führen. Es ist das Argument der „faulen Vernunft“ und besitzt insofern wahrhaft symbolische Tragweite, als alle leere Reflexion ihrem siegreichen Scheine zum Trotz zur Diskreditierung der Reflexion überhaupt führt. Vgl. >Reflexion/Gadamer; HegelVsPlaton: >Reflexion/Hegel. 1. Menon 80 d ff. Bubner I 37 DialekticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the effect-oriented speaker is mired in the illusion of words. (VsSophists). Bubner I 50 Sophists/PlatoVsSophists: the sophist oscillates intangibly between different beings. The diaireses (distinctions), however, do not function by themselves, but only with the use of prior knowledge. Since the diaireses (distinction of genus and species) fail with the sophists, the insight into the inappropriateness of the method grows after a number of runs. The specifying of general terms cannot handle the sophists. This leads to a reflection on the appearance which always appears different from what it is, and thus remains elusive. I 51 Logic/PlatoVsSophists: now, formal logic does not preclude pointless links. This results in the abandonment of the distinction between the philosopher and the mere sophist. I 52 PlatoVsSophists: the ratio of the linked concepts to each other possibly obscures the relation between speech and thing. Closely related to the problem of otherness. The complex relation of otherness is no longer determinable with the sophists. Thanks to his dialectical ability, the philosopher keeps track. Thus, dialectic is not a neutral method, either. I 98 PlatoVsSophists: coherence theory instead of correspondence theory: not empiricism, but incompatible concepts criticize judgment |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Stich, St. | Stalnaker Vs Stich, St. | II 189 Def principle of autonomy/principle of autonomy/Stich/Stalnaker: thesis: psychological states should be those that supervene on current internal (intrinsic) physical states of the organism. StalnakerVsStich: that is a strong thesis (see above). But even with Stich a causal language creeps in: historical or environmentally relevant facts are irrelevant unless they affect the current physical states. Replacement argument/replacement argument/Stich: e.g. suppose someone had made an exact copy of me. Psychology/Stich: should explain the behavior that I do not have in common with my copy. Identical behavior must be irrelevant to psychology. nonautonomous description/principle of autonomy/Stich: e.g. nonautonomous: a robot is described as just successfully completing its millionth workpiece. Problem: a copy of this robot could break beforehand. Therefore, the description is "conceptually hybrid" (mixed of autonomous and historical). autonomous: would the description "successfully produce a workpiece" and purely historical II 190 to have "previously already produced 999,999 other workpieces". Problem/Stich: if we are looking for a generalization for the declaration of robot behavior it would be perverse to describe it (simultaneously autonomous and historical) with hybrid concepts. StalnakerVsStich: plus we have to assume in addition that the historical properties are causally irrelevant. Fatigue would not be a perverse explanation that the robot gives up the ghost. Substitution argument/Stich/Stalnaker: his argument requires the replacement with exact replicas, not identical robots. Generalization/StalnakerVsStich: a generalization is not immediately refuted by exceptions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Millikan Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 175 Denotation/Millikan: for us the goal here is to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite denotations is. We have to proceed on our own. We can not rely on the tradition Russel-Strawson-Donnellan. Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we have to assume that there are not only speakers who makes references, but must assume that the linguistic expressions make references themselves, too. I 272 Subject/predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (S a P in "Logic and Grammar" Millikan: "general concept" is replaced by "characteristics". Fundamental asymmetry: Individual things: in space and time, exemplify characteristics that come from a particular area. Then we know for every property that it is in competition with others. Asymmetry: no such competition applies for individual things. No individual competes with others for characteristics within an area. No things are related to each other in such a way that for each property, which exemplifies one thing, it would follow that the others do not exemplify it (not simultaneously). MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? For concepts it is traditionally accepted, but we can not apply that to properties and relations. Concept/property/predicate/Millikan: the relation between one word and the world lies between the head and the world and can not be internalized. (see above). I 273 Therefore, there is not even a one-to-one relation between concepts and properties. Two concepts could correspond to one property and a concept (if it has ambiguous Fregean sense) may correspond to two properties. Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, that is never a priori knowledge. Properties/a priori/knowledge/Millikan: on incompatibility or compatibility or identity of properties, there is no a priori knowledge. At most there is a natural necessity. "Competition" between properties/MillikanVsStrawson: is just another type of "natural necessity" besides causality and identity. No "logical competition". Logic/concept/necessity/Millikan: also "logical possibility" and "logical necessity" between concepts are ultimately natural necessities between concepts. Logic/Millikan: should furthermore be understood as an empirical science. Ex "S can not simultaneously be P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Supervenience | Stalnaker Vs Supervenience | I 93 Def Global Supervenience/Stalnaker: new: A supervenes globally on B iff for every two possible worlds (poss.w.) that are B-indistinguishable are relative to a mapping function from one poss.w. to the other, they are A-indistinguishable relative to the same mapping function. Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: is sometimes used to make a stronger statement than possible with global supervenience. E.g. a materialist who is also an internalist regarding intentional or experiential properties. He argues that intentional or experiential properties are supervenient on intrinsic physical properties VsGlobal supervenience: would not be sufficient: because it would be so compatible that the mental properties of an individual vary with the intrinsic physical properties of another individual. But: while a) the strong supervenience thesis is not generally equivalent to the global between A and B, it is b) in the case of a set A and another set B' in a specific closure (closure) on the set of the B properties. B’/closure: the set of B properties: the set of properties that can be defined from B properties with quantifiers, identity and finite and infinite Boolean combination. B’/Stalnaker: properties defined in physical terms (instead of B: physical properties). Global supervenience/Stalnaker: so is ultimately very strong: Kim has shown that if A strongly supervenes on B, then each A property is necessary equivalent for a property that is defined in concepts of B properties. Conclusion: it is also true that if A globally supervenes on B, then each A property is necessary equivalent to a property, I 94 that is defined in concepts of B properties. Necessary equivalence/identity/Stalnaker: if necessary equivalence is sufficient for identity, we can say that if A globally supervenes on B, all A properties are properties that can be defined in concepts of B properties. Necessity/Stalnaker: which of course is to maintained only with an extremely strong necessity concept. Global supervenience/identity/properties/supervenience/Stalnaker: whatever they say about the identity of properties, seems to show this equivalence that globally supervenience is suitable for most supervenience theses. Materialism/Stalnaker: it cannot assert anything stronger than global supervenience, E.g. suppose a philosopher represents the global supervenience but denies at the same time the strong one. Then he has to assume that the set of physical properties is not closed under definability. ((s) that means that you can define from physical concepts also nonphysical ones). 1. perhaps because he thinks that physical properties are not defined themselves in concepts of physical properties, or 2. because he has a robust concept of properties, after some well-defined attributes (Def attribute/Stalnaker: here: neutral to single out individuals) absolutely no properties - physical or not - correspond.) Ad 1. because he rejects the strong supervenience both for A (mental) on B (physical properties) as well as A on B' (properties definable in physical concepts) he can still assume all the properties as defined in physical concepts. Then the rejection of strong supervenience is more terminological than substantial, because it is not based on a thesis about what exists or is instantiated, but only whether to categorize certain properties or not whose physical definitions are unquestionable. Ad 2. it is more difficult here: here we need to know more about the robust theory of properties. The representative probably believes that mental properties are real properties and because she accepts the global supervenience of the mental on the physical she acknowledges that for every mental property there is a physical attribute (to single out) that is necessary and sufficient for her. She will probably think that these new nonphysical properties emerge from physical non-properties. Physical non-properties/Stalnaker: complex combinations of physical properties and relations (see below example golden mountain). Dualism/Stalnaker: she is maybe a dualist but regardless of her rejection of the strong supervenience: even if she allowed that complex physical attributes are physical properties (so that the strong supervenience were true) she might still say that mental properties are separated, I 95 they only needed to be always co-instantiated. Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: allows that complex (composite) physical attributes are physical properties. Emergence: would say that the new properties emerge from the fact that the complex are realized. Dualism: this dualism does not arise from the rejection of strong supervenience but from the rejection of the reductionist conception of supervenience. Materialism/Global supervenience/Kim/KimVsGlobal supervenience/Stalnaker: Kim has to accept another reason that global supervenience is not strong enough for materialism: Problem: global supervenience is compatible with the fact that the great and serious mental differences depend on quite trivial and irrelevant physical differences. Kim: e.g. a hydrogen atom in outer space which is changed in its position: a world that is different in this point from the real, actual world could be so different in mental terms, as you like! And without violating the globally supervenience thesis. KimVsGlobal supervenience: therefore it is too weak. Reason/intuition/Stalnaker: a "reasonable materialist" would not represent that mental properties depend on distant hydrogen atoms. He is not reasonable because of the choice of strong or global supervenience but because of his intuitions. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: I believe that it is strong enough for the materialism. But we should still look for a stronger. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Tarski, A. | Field Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 68 T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics"). Bre I 69 FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc. Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is. Bre I 70 Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is. Field I 33 Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences. a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities. That does not look as contradictory as Fie I 34 John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms. VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation". FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction. Field II 141 T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more. Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands. Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory. Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks. Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences. Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above). II 142 TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered. 2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better. 3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences. Putnam I 91 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form "Electron" refers to electrons "DNS" refers to DNS "Gene" refers to genes. etc. this is similar to (w) "Snow is white" is true iff.... (s)> meaning postulates) Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because: Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it). Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ... Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment): Def Criterion F/Putnam: (F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn). Then we reformulate: "Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron. PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F. This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically. Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tarski, A. | Prior Vs Tarski, A. | I 98 Truth/Falsity/PriorVsTarski: the concepts of truth and falsity discussed in the last chapter are not the concepts of Tarski. Prior: ours could be described as properties not of sentences, but of propositions. I.e. quasi-properties of quasi-objects! Not adjectives "true", "false", but rather adverbs "correctly" (accurate, truthful, rightly) and "falsely". I 99 PriorVsTarski: (A) If someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully iff. snow is white. Tarski: (B) The sentence "snow is white" is true iff. snow is white. The truth of all true sentences of a language can be derived from Tarski's definition with normal logic. And that is for him the criterion of satisfiability of the truth definition. Quotation Marks/Truth/Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski: for me there are no quotation marks. But in Tarski, these belong more to informal preparation than to strict theory. Use/Mention/Tarski/Prior: left: the sentence is mentioned (by the name of the sentence) right: used. Prior: in my version () there is no mention, only use. (A) is not about sentences from start to finish, but about snow. (B) is about the sentence "snow is white". Self-Reference/Foreword Paradox/Tarski/Paradox/Prior: it remains the case that it looks as if self-reference were involved when we speak about people and what they say, think, fear, etc., which seems to exclude Tarski's semantics. But we must take a closer look: In Tarski, the predicates "true" and "false" do not belong to the same language as the sentences by which they are stated. I 103 PriorVsTarski: we say instead "x says something true if..." Or: "x says during the interval t t'that __" If we abbreviate this last phrase as "Sx!, "Sxp", then we could insert it in theorems like: CSx∑pKSxpNp∑pKSxpNp. Problem: (see above) If I says that he says something wrong between t and t', then it cannot be the only thing he says. This is a problem for very short intervals. How about if poor old x had to express theorems, and only had such a short time available for it? To the above theorem he would also have to express the consequent ∑pKSxpNp, and for that he might not have time! Above all, it may be that I will not do it ex hypothesi! Metalanguage/Point: this means that the language in which these theorems are expressed cannot be the same language that is used for that at some other occasions! |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Tarski, A. | Putnam Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 70 Truth Def/theory of truth/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is counterintuitive from the outset: this also applies to the model theoretical variants. They do not do our intuitive concept of "true" justice. Brendel I 71 His concept of truth is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" itself is quite unclear. Brendel I 72 "True-in-L"/PutnamVsTarski: doesn't consider the speaker nor their use of expressions. It depends only on syntactic features. Problem: Then "snow is white" is also true in such possible worlds in which the words have an entirely different meaning! Then they correspond to another issue. Then what is semantic about it? And what does it mean that in a counterfactual situation a sentence is true-in-L, but not "true"? It must then be said, in what language the phrase is "not true". Brendel I 73 It should also be explained why such a "counterfactual situation" shows that "truth" was not analyzed conceptually. E.g. I1: "Snow is white" here means that snow is white (L1). I2: here that water is liquid. I2: in a trivial sense "snow is white" is also L1-true! This is the case even if in a world "snow" and "white" are interpreted in a way that they express a false sentence in this possible world. Ex ""The earth is at rest" is true in a geocentric worldview" is true also in the heliocentric worldview. Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: here, the expressions are supposed to have a different meaning, and the issue to continue to hold that snow is white. Brendel I 73 Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: expressions have a different meaning, but the SBV are equal. I (a) 16 PutnamVsTarski: it must be added a certain substantial understanding of reference and truth, in which both are not made conditional on the possibility of human knowledge. (That would be the case of instrumentalism which thinks a sentence must be true if certain criteria are met, such as "sensations xyz are present."). Truth has to go beyond basic recognizability according to realism. I (b) 66 PutnamVsTarski: many think that he has completely and precisely defined reference, I do not. Truth/reference/Field: (1972) has shown that the "definitions of truth" and "definitions of reference" of logic did not do their job at all. PutnamVsTarski: his "Convention T" does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the terms of the designation of a sentence and "following from something". These concepts are closely related to truth and reference, but need to be clarified. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Tarski, A. | Loar Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 149 LoarVsTarski: there is an intensionalist counterpart to his theory: semantic concepts are completely definable in terms of abstract correlations between expressions and certain intensional entities. Assuming that we should understand language as a function of sentences on sentence-like intentions (which in turn we can identify with functions of possible worlds on truth values). Would we define a semantic concept in this way? Is it the case that everything that gives meaning to a sentence can be mapped to an intension by an abstractly defined function? |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Tarski, A. | Hilbert Vs Tarski, A. | Horwich I 127 Truth/Philosophy/Mathematics/HilbertVsTarski: (only "philosophical" objection at all, from a mathematician!): the truth definition would have nothing to do with the "philosophical problem". But that should not be a criticism. Term/TarskiVsHilbert: I never understood what the "essential" of a term should be. ((s) >Frege: Concepts have characteristics that can be considered necessary, because otherwise it is another concept, in contrast to objects that can turn out to be something else, but are still the "object considered". Truth/Tarski: I don't think there is a "philosophical problem" here. |
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| Theory Ladenness | Wright Vs Theory Ladenness | I 204 Fashionable Thought/Realism/Theory/Science/WrightVs: every observation is "theory laden". Perception/Theory: 1. Observation equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensory perception, because it is conceptually coined. (McDowell pro). This now provides a good basis for the view that the conceptual equipment of the subjects is different. I 205 2. Every pre-philosophical utterance about the material world reaches beyond experience in an infinite number of ways. 3. The coverage of terms does not consist merely in classifying. They contain the possession of beliefs. (e.g. that things form a species at all). WrightVs: that is certainly all right. The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not, however, be to question the opposition between data and theory. I 206 Concept/Wright: a) Beliefs should not be assumed a priori for the concepts. This is not appropriate. Concepts are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. b) The everyday content of experience is not an obstacle for pre-theoretical data. It can always happen that one agrees to an experience pattern against his background beliefs, even if this can be cancelled later again. Theoreticity of Contemplation/Theory/Wright: 4. The kind of theory ladenness needed to get the distinction data/theory into difficulties is rather the following(see above): It must be shown that the conditions for assertion (assertibility) are necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experiences, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs. I 207 WrightVsTheoreticity of Observation/VsTheory Ladenness/Wright: if all observation theory is laden, there are no statements to which any subject is obliged to agree. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). Wright: the justified assertiveness is rather a four-digit relation between: Statement - Subject - Course of Experience - Background Assumptions. I 208 Theory/Observation: Example A and B disagree on the stature of a theory Ho based on the observation Oo. B evaluates the same observations under a theory H1. A agrees that if H1 is accepted, his experience does not give enough reasons to accept Oo. Then it is not about vagueness, it is about status. This status question continues now, if it is about H1 instead of Ho: B accepts H1 because of O1, but A represents a theory H2...(I 209+) about O1. I 209 The other agrees that, if the other theory applies, the reaction of the other is appropriate. Divergence on each point, but agreement on conditional acceptability. I 210 We determine that the respective observation reports are correct in terms of experience and background theory. If everyone works with incorrect data, the result is that they create their reports in the context of an incorrect background theory. If he works with materially incomplete data, he necessarily works with a true background theory, which he does not agree with! Problem: can it be certainly considered a priori that there are nevertheless cognitive deficits regarding the theoretical background obligations? (Can only mean that one accepts a wrong theory). Evidence: whether a theory is erroneous or flawless must now (see above) at least in principle be recognizable! Such a confirmation, however, could ultimately only be provided by independently credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation). I 211 However, the example shows the possibility that this remains undecidable. Vs: the relationship between experience and observation reports can plausibly be described as that of a "positive presumption". I.e. it is not as if experience tends to confirm or refute a report only in the context of appropriate empirical background beliefs, there is rather a Def default relation of confirmation between experiences and statements. Example "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification insofar as it concerns the color. An appropriate justification by experience can be overridden in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but is otherwise presumably valid. ((s) As long as nothing else "appears"). Question: can one now assume cognitive deficiency after all? A theorist who accepts O n 1 may either do so because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or he may prejudice the validity of the evidence. If now there is no other support for Hn, the assumption of Hn by the first theorist remains unjustified, and the denial in law. I 212 VsVs: this does not take into account that the regress of theories can interlock backwards. Therefore, one cannot claim that both theorists are to blame either for defending unsupported theories or for being cognitively deficient. Problem: Evidence/Theory/Observation: if the truth is limited by evidence and all observation is theory laden, then differences of opinion cannot certainly be traced back to cognitive deficiencies. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Holz Vs Thomas Aquinas | I 33 Recognition/Aquinas: "For everything that is ordered to a goal, the rule of its guidance and order must be taken from the goal". ((s) What is to be thought determines thinking). HolzVsThomas/HolzVsAquinas: therefore the method of recognition and the order of concepts must be determined by the object. This is naively realistic! According to Descartes, i.e. when everything is doubtful except thinking itself, the method and order of concepts must be determined by thinking! So it is possible that the world is set only by the form of our thinking.(>Husserl). Husserl: "the natural soil of being is secondary in its validity and presupposes the transcendental". |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Tooley, M. | Lewis Vs Tooley, M. | Schwarz I 119 Natural Laws/Law of Nature/Reductionism/LewisVsTooley: this is the price for anti-reductionist intuitions: it sounds nice and good that laws of nature do not supervene on local events, that our concepts of counterfactual truths and causality cannot be reduced to something outside. (Tooley 1987(1), 2003(2)). Problem: the most obvious features of laws of nature become incomprehensible! Lewis: (as a reductionist) can explain why one can empirically discover the laws of nature, why physics is on the way to it, why it is useful to know the laws of nature, and why all Fs are Gs, if "all Fs are Gs" is a law of nature. As an anti-reductionist, one just has to acknowledge all this with humility. Lewis: the assumption of a primitive modal fact which ensures that in every possible world in nature (F,G) exists, also all Fs are Gs, is obscure and almost pointless: if there is no possible world in which nature (F,G) exists, but some Fs are not G, then this must have an explanation, then the idea of such worlds must be somewhat incoherent. Possible worlds cannot simply be missing. Laws of nature/LewisVsArmstrong: perhaps better: regularities that are additionally blessed by a primitive relationship between universals, a relationship that also exists in possible worlds where the law of nature does not apply. That's even more obscure, but then it's at least no wonder that all Fs are Gs if a law of nature demands it. 1. Michael Tooley [1987]: Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. Michael Tooley [2003]: “Causation and Supervenience”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Tradition | Kant Vs Tradition | Bubner I 105 Logic/KantVsTradition: ancient way: While the conventional logic prefaces the concept theory of the theory of judgment, which is build on it, the new way is: the transcendental logic proceeds reversely and already orientates the fundamental categories towards the synthesis power of the judgments. I 106 Categorical prestructuring by a priori concepts constituted objects as objects and "makes" them to be topic of possible knowledge judgments. ((s) reflexive, criticism). E.g. the "black man" and "the man is black": In the first example, he is merely thought as black (this is problematic). In the second instance, he is recognized as such! In both cases, however, it is the same mind by the same actions. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tradition | Pinker Vs Tradition | I 367 Mental Image/Concept/Pinker: memories must come with a conceptual label. But you cannot have an image of the concept "man". E.g. a chess master cannot remember meaningless constellations better than a layperson. E.g. most give the wrong answer when asked if Madrid is north of Washington, etc. Images can serve neither as concepts nor as a word meaning in our mental dictionary Tradition: mental images as bad and multiply superimposed copies of visual perceptions. Colors were supposed to mix and contours to dissolve. PinkerVsTradition: how should abstract ideas then be represented? Even something as simple as triangles? I 368 Locke: "a triangle is the at same time everything (equilateral, right-angled, etc.) and none of them". Berkeley: took Locke's word and demanded to imagine all this together. But instead of rejecting the theory, he concluded that we had no abstract ideas! I 368/369 Mental Image/Introspection/Titchener: (early 20th century): closely scrutinized his own mental images, claiming they could represent even the most abstract idea: rectangular and equilateral triangles, etc. "Something flashing" E.g. horse: sweeping curve and ready to jump position... Cow: elongated rectangle with pout ... I 370 Image/Thought/Pinker: images are ambiguous, but thoughts cannot be ambiguous by definition! A mental image must be provided with a caption for the representation of a thought. These captions may not be any images themselves. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Tradition | Sellars Vs Tradition | I 57 Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association). I 62 Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report, a) without that this is a public language implementation, and b) without speaker/listener! Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought. I 65 Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits. Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions. I 84 Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas. I 88 SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical. I 86 Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists. I 87 Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing. SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Tradition | Peacocke Vs Tradition | I 4 Perception/Peacocke: Thesis: sensation concepts (sensory perception, sensations) are indispensable for the description of any perception. VsTradition: against the view that sensations are not to be found in the main stream if the subject is to concentrate on its own perception, I 5 or when sensations occur as a byproduct of perception. Perception/Sensation/Tradition/Peacocke: historical distinction between perceptions (perceptual experience) that have a content, namely being propositionally (representational) about objects in the surroundings that appear in a certain way, and sensations: that have no such content, e.g. the sensation of smallness, which can be determined nonetheless. Content/Peacocke: I only use it for the representational content of perceptions. Never for sensations. PeacockeVsTradition: it used to be reversed and "object" or "meaning" were used for representational content. I 10 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: the adequacy thesis is obliged. Because if the adequacy thesis is wrong, there are intrinsic properties of visual perception that are not covered by the representational content. Representatives: Hintikka. Hintikka: the right way to speak about our spontaneous perceptions is to use the same vocabulary and the same syntax that we apply to the objects of perception. We just need to determine the information! Information/Hintikka: unlike here: no informational content, but information given by the perception system. I 11 extreme theory of perception: main motivation. If the adequacy thesis is false, then there are intrinsic properties of an experience that can never be known by the person who makes the experience! PeacockeVs: this may be strengthened by the following argument that superficially seems correct: we can tell what experiences someone makes if we know which are his desires or intentions. Or if he is so and so predisposed. Or his behavior: E.g. if he suddenly swerves, he may have perceived an obstacle. Point: this can only ever discover representational content! I.e. never the intrinsic (perhaps sensory) portion of the experience. Peacocke: there must be a gap here. Three counter-examples are to show this. (see below). Perception/Peacocke: is always more differentiated than the perception concepts! Qualia/Criterion/Goodman: identity conditions for qualia: >N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1951 p.290 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: claims that the intrinsic properties of a visual experience are exhausted in determining the representational content along with a further-reaching determination of the properties mentioned there. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Three counter-examples: 1) E.g. road straight to the horizon with two trees. We perceive the trees as different in size, but we know (or assume) that they are the same size and at different distances from us. Both versions are equally properties of the experience itself! For this we do not need concepts like perception field (visual field), which is more or less cut out by the tree. You simply have the experience. VsAdequacy Thesis: no true-making experience can represent one tree as larger and farther away or the other as a smaller and closer. Problem of additional characterization. Form of thought: added second or third. VsTheory of Perception: the challenge for the perception theorist is that has to hold on to the adequacy thesis (all intrinsic characterization given by "appears to the subject that...") even if he has to admit these facts about the size of trees. I 13 2) Additional characterization: can vary even if the representational content remains constant: E.g. seeing with one eye closed or with both eyes open: the difference in perception is independent of the double images of binocular perception. I 14 Depth Perception/Peacocke: a) It would be incompatible with our view to say that there is an additional way in which the depth is represented, with this additional feature being purely representational. b) The difference between monocular and binocular vision is both representational and sensory. (Peacocke pro). Vs a): here it would be unthinkable that there are cases where the alleged sensory property exists, but the representation of certain objects was not present behind others in the surroundings. pro b): according to this version that is conceivable. I 15 Peacocke: and it is also conceivable. E.g. TVSS: a system that "writes" information from a TV camera on the back of blind persons: idea of depth and spatial perception. Intrinsic! "Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property is present that distinguishes monocular of binocular vision, then a sense of depth is present, but depth is a sensational property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is precisely not purely representational! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representational there must be sensory content). Depth/Perception/Concepts/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: depth is never a sensational property: concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1) every depth perception depends on you considering your visual sensation of depth as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance. 2) monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations might be indistinguishable, and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, evoke different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different sensations of depth, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually viewed surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: that is indeed confirmed by the optical facts, but he only considers the beams that fall into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains the sensation of depth, but also why this property decreases at large distances. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: 3) E.g. tipping aspect, wire cube, first seen with one eye, and then without any modification of the cube with reversed front and rear: Wittgenstein: "I see that it has not changed"! Peacocke: another example of non-representational similarities between experiences. The problem for the extreme perception theorist is to explain how these non-representational similarities came to pass without abandoning the adequacy thesis. He could simply introduce a new classification of visual experience, I 17 that refers to something before the event of experience, for example, the fact that the surroundings have not changed. PeacockeVs: but this is based on the character of successive experiences! Then we would still have to say on which properties of these experiences this "new property (classification)" is based. This does not work with memory loss or longer time spans between experienced: because this does not require the sensation that the scene has not changed. Nor does it explain the matching non-representational experiences of two different subjects who both see the other side of the cube as the front. Rabbit-Duck Head/Peacocke: why do I not use it as an example? Because there is nothing here that is first seen as a rabbit and then as a duck, but rather as a representation of a rabbit than as a representation of a duck, while nothing changes in the network of lines! So this example cannot explain that there may be non-representational similarities between experiences. Because someone who denies them can simply say that the component of the representational content that relates to the lines remains constant thus explaining the similarity. E.g. wire cube: here this explanation is not possible: because the network of lines looks quite different afterwards than it did before! I 17/18 Translation/Theory of PerceptionVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements which seem to be in conflict with the adequacy thesis could be translated into statements that add no properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. E.g. "to cover the nearer tree, a larger area would have to be put between the tree and the viewer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsTheory of Perception/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this is supposed to work against the second type of example. But is it effective against the first one? What should the translation explain? 1) It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and for the field of vision. That is also sufficient for "above" or "next to". But the adequacy thesis needs more than that! It needs an explanation for why something is bigger than something else in the field of vision. Therefore: 2) Problem: as approach which introduces meanings the approach of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. E.g. disturbances in the visual field, curved beams ...+... counterfactual: problem: whether an object is bigger in the visual field of a subject is a property of its experience that in the real world counterfactual circumstances are what they want to be. One approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the reference and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: E.g. we could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by the fact that demanding that he should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: E.g. Julius, the inventor of the zipper). Point: yet the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the nearer tree in the field of vision is bigger is consistent with the fact that a larger area has to be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the experience type does not satisfy the condition! Just like Bright would not have needed to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Translation: provides no access that leaves open the possibility that the experience type that actually meets the conditions of the translation, might as well fail. I 22 Sensational Content/PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: these points refer to the first counter-example against the adequacy thesis, but they also apply to the second one: for that purpose, we introduce the asterisked predicate behind*: it refers in terms of physical conditions that normally produce this sensational quality binocular seeing of objects at different depths. ad 3): non-representational similarity of experiences should consist in sameness or equality of sensational properties. Reversible Figures: in all standard cases, successive experiences have the same asterisked sensational properties: namely, those that can be expressed by the presented interposed coverage area. E.g. suppose someone wakes up in unfamiliar surroundings: initially he has a minimal representational content: he perceives all objects as surfaces with different angles. I 23 Suddenly everything shifts into place and he has a rich representational content. But in the scene nothing has changed in the sense in which something changed in the wire cube. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Tradition | Stalnaker Vs Tradition | II 7 Presupposition/StalnakerVsTradition: should not be explained in concepts of semantic content: the truth conditions (tr.c.) of the propositions that contain these presuppositions. Thesis: instead, they should be understood independently of the tr.cond. as a propositional attitude, not as a semantic relation. Things that we - in certain contexts - take for granted. Präsupposition/Stalnaker: is context-dependent. Def Presupposition condition/Stalnaker: that a speaker would not use a propositoin S which presupposes that P, if he does not accept P in this context. II 8 But this describes only a surface phenomenon, it is not a theoretical concept. II 130 Index words/indexical convictions/ascription/belief ascription/Stalnaker: the problems of ascriptions in which index words occur were lately treated by Lit: Castaneda 1966, 1967, Perry 1977, 1979, Lewis 1979a. Belief object/index words/StalnakerVsTradition: thesis: we need a against tradition radically altered conception of the belief objects when index words are in the game. Proposition/abstract object/Stalnaker: I understand a proposition as an abstract object abstract object/object/abstract/Stalnaker: e.g. a proposition is an abstract object. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Tradition | Millikan Vs Tradition | I 13 classical realism: thought and knowledge are separated and intentionality is transparent. Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: intentionality is not transparent: many processes which are "about" something, are not done consciously. Ex von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, but bees do not know. Bees merely react adequately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the reference is identified. Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are. That's why they are representations. Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in what general structure the world has to have so that subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. can be projected onto it. Realism/Millikan: properly understood realism does not require that the world must be "allocated correctly" for that. I 17 Eigenfunction/Millikan: Ex heart has something to do with the fact that it pumps blood. But what kind of connection to the blood pump must be given? Some hearts are malformed and can not pump, others, Ex water pumps could perfectly pump blood, but they are not hearts. Ex artificial hearts: do not belong to the biological category. So it's not the actual constitution, the actual forces, dispositions etc that make something an element of a biological category. Eigenfunction/Millikan: causes to submit something into a biological category. It has nothing to do with forces and dispositions, but with history. Having an intrinsic function means to be "slated for something", "to want" something ("supposed to", designed to "). We must now examine in a naturalistic, non-normative way. Language/propositional attitude/Millikan: So we have to ask, "what are they good for." Sentence/Millikan: Just as a heart sometimes may be deformed, a sentence can also not be well-formed. Other sentences are simply wrong. Tradition/falsehood/Millikan: the tradition was obliged to accept that false beliefs are beliefs. Then we also have to have the forces to influence our dispositions. MillikanVsTradition: but a broken kidney does not have the power to fulfill its function. I 18 And wrong and confused thoughts also do not have such forces. Tradition: here has more to do with input-output relations. Millikan: thesis: we are dealing with the biological functions, the functions that "something thought for". Millikan: thesis: by focusing on the intrinsic function (biological function), we are free to find the defining characteristics between true convictions and the world outside. Eigenfunction/Millikan: 1. direct eigenfunction: the first part of the theory relates only to the functions of things that are members of families that are similar to each other Ex hearts, or are similar to an archetype Ex sentences, words, Ex shaking hands. 2. derived eigenfunction: here we have to show that new things can have eigenfunction: Ex new behavior, new bee dances, new convictions. I 133 Intension/tradition/Millikan: always has to do with the application criteria. 1. set of properties or characters that are associated in the mind. 2. this criterion defines what the term is applied to - the extension! Extension/intension/tradition: the two are connected in spirit. Intension/MillikanVsTradition/Millikan: instead, it is the evolution that defines the connection between intention and extension. Sense/Millikan: results from the combination of term and reference, how the term "is intended to project". We still need the concept of testing. I 157 Rationalism/rationalist/tradition/Millikan: (similar argument): what a term means in one idiolect must be known to the speaker of this idioleckt a priori. But all that can be known a priori is whether two expressions in the idiolect have the same intension. If a term now has more than one intension, one can not know a priori whether the intensions will converge in the application. Therefore, each unambiguous term must have only one intension. meaning/sense/MillikanVsTradition: importance of Frege'ian sense, not intension. Then emptiness is the primary type of insignificance and neither ambiguity nor synonymy are determined by reasoning that is purely a priori. Intension/Millikan: is only the secondary meaning. I 158 They can be meaningful only insofar as these intentions are explicit and have meaning themselves. I 171 Error/delusion/to show/indexical word/Millikan: Ex there are two items on the table, an ashtray, which I do not consider an ashtray and a thing that is not an ashtray but I think it is and say "This is a nice Ashtray". Question: have I thereby said that the ashtray is nice, although I meant the other object? Ex I hold up a book and say, "This belonged to my grandfather." However, I am mistaken and am holding up the wrong book. I 172 What I have said, of course, is wrong. What is not so clear is whether what I meant is something other than what I said. Millikan: thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" have meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous with respect to Frege's sense. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have so often ignored that. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead us to temporary concepts. temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: intensions are then linked to our ability to pursue things and to re-identify them. preliminary concept: Ex this coffee mug for me is totally indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it's my cup. I 173 Question: whether that even counts as a concept. Ability to track the object leads to an interior concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: if thinking is not mediated by perception the objects one thinks of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are provided with an index. I 174 Error/delusion/indexical word/perception/misidentification/Millikan: Ex Suppose I'm wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived meaning from the ability to track the object. 2. inner concept I already had previously. "This" is therefore ambiguous. I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. in order to give them a content a "standard observer" must mean more than "observers to whom red things appear red under standard conditions". And accordingly for "standard conditions". Solution: standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no one has any idea how that could work. Problem: if you have every reason to believe that to be a standard observer, there are circumstances in which an object seems to have a different color than it has. But one would not conclude that the thing would not be red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must be able to identify these opposite characteristics, also. And it may be that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify to the oppositeness of red and green? Many authors: think that one could never argue that red and green could even be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: but that is not true, in fact there are many ways, Ex strabismus. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certitude/Millikan: our trust in the fact that red and green are opposites (perhaps incorporated into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is exactly the objective validity of these concepts, of the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Truth-conditional Sem. | Katz Vs Truth-conditional Sem. | Cresswell II 145 Semantics/Katz/Cresswell: (Katz 1972 and many other articles). KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics: 1. (Katz 1982): all other approaches except Katz's own reduce meaning to something else, including truth conditions. VsKatz: his own critique depends on the fact that he already knows that truth conditions are something other than meaning. ((s) So the approaches he criticizes cannot be circular). CresswellVsKatz: his semantics are not wrong, but they are incomplete. Semantics/Cresswell: "semantic data": e.g. meaning of sentences, e.g. synonymy of pairs of sentences, etc. Cresswell II 146 KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics/Cresswell: 2. it results in all logically equivalent propositions having the same meaning. Especially in the version of possible world semantics. (1982, 190): Katz acknowledges that there are attempts at a solution. Example Lewis (1972). KatzVsLewis/Cresswell: Katz's approach seems to demand structured meanings. Lexical Decomposition/Katz/Cresswell: this is used by Katz to trace meanings back to semantic basic concepts. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Type Theory | Gödel Vs Type Theory | Russell I XXV Type Theory/Gödel: in the realistic (intensional) interpretation there is an additional assumption: "Whenever an object x can replace another object y in a meaningful proposition, it can do so in every meaningful proposition". The consequence of this is that the objects are divided into mutually exclusive areas of meaning. GödelVsRussell: suspect that his assumption itself makes his formulation as a meaningful principle impossible: because x and y then have to be narrowed down to definite realms of meaning that are either the same or different and in both cases the statement does not express the principle or even part of it. Other consequence: the fact that an object x is of a given type (or not) cannot be expressed by a meaningful proposition either. I XXVI A solution is not impossible. It might turn out that any concept is meaningful everywhere except for certain "singular points" or "boundary points" so that the paradoxes appeared as something like the "division by zero". I XXVI Axioms/Russell/Gödel: Question: are they analytical (as Russell claims here?). Analyticity/Gödel: can mean two things: 1. purely formal, eliminable. In this sense, even the theory of integers is non-analytical, provided one requires the elimination to be carried out in a finite number of steps. ((s) Otherwise e.g. for each number individually). But the whole of mathematics as applied to propositions of infinite length must be assumed to prove this analyticity, e.g. the axiom of choice can only prove that it is analytical if it is assumed to be true! I XXXIV Analyticity in the 2. sense: "Due to the sense of the terms occurring in it". Thereby this "sense" is perhaps indefinable (i.e. irreducible to something more fundamental). For example, if one defined "class" and "" as "the concepts (terms) which satisfy the axioms", one would not be able to prove their existence. "Concept" could perhaps be defined in terms of "proposition", but then certain axioms about propositions become necessary, which can only be justified by reference to the undefined sense of this term. This view of analyticity in turn makes it possible that perhaps any mathematical proposition could be reduced to a special case of a = a. I XXVII Russell: went the way of seeing both classes and concepts (except for the logically uninteresting basic predicates) as non-existent and replacing them with our own constructions. Russell/Gödel/(s): constructivist. Reducibility Axiom: is provably wrong in the case of infinitely many individuals, unless one assumes the existence of classes or infinitely many "qualitates occultae". The actual development of mathematical logic has gone the way of the existence of classes and concepts, and Russell himself was later forced to go that way. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Universalism | Schiffer Vs Universalism | I 41 Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) but it must be translatable into everyday language. > Universalism of everyday language: it must be possible to translate any formalism or formula into normal language. > Formalism). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of normal language: the colloquial concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "there is just nothing that corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: this misses the decisive factor in our everyday language psychological concepts. (see below 6.4). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Universals | Nominalism Vs Universals | Frank I 261 Nominalism/VsUniversals/Attributes/Properties/Quine: ontological: attributes have no clear identity conditions. Epistemic/Heckmann: our cognitive approach to attributes is unclarified. In the end, they are entities which elude the natural world of creation and decay whose mode of being therefore excludes that they have a causal influence on us (or we to them). Question: Why should we be able to know anything about such entities at all? Solution/Chisholm: attributes as undefined basic concept. (>Ontology). Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contrast to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the meaning of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but this is no approach to universals of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first before expressing it with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate, use it in compliance with the rules. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Use Theory | Rorty Vs Use Theory | III 36 Use Theory/RortyVsUse Theory/RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >Vocabulary. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Various Authors | Carnap Vs Various Authors | II 205 Content speech: expressed in pseudo-object sentences (quasi-syntactic sentences). formal speech: uses parallel syntactic phrases. CarnapVsTradition: generally used neither object nor syntactical phrases. To be scientifically useful, the sentences used should be expressed as syntactic phrases in a substantive speech. Carnap: the content of speech must not be eliminated. One must be only aware that they are used to avoid endless pseudo discussion. VI 219 Identity/CarnapVsAvenarius: is not a "pure experience", because it is not originally given. VI 29 Identity/CarnapVsFechner: the finding with respect to the body-soul problem remains an empty word, what is actually meant by "underlying" or "inner and outer side." VI 253 Experience/Carnap: Task: Investigation of non-constitutional properties and relations of objects. Insight/Marburg School/Natorp/Carnap: the article is "the eternal X", its purpose is incompletable. (> Positions) CarnapVsNatorp: a final number of rules is enough! According to this, the article is not an "X" anymore, but something unambiguously determined, whose complete description is admittedly incompletable. II 195ff Def Constitution/Carnap: of a concept a from different concepts or objects b and c: the indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the concept a can be reformulated so that they only contain b and c. Construction of the numbers as a model for constitution. The model of the constitution is neutral towards realism/idealism. (CarnapVsIdealism/Realism debate: meaningless dispute over concepts). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Various Authors | Frege Vs Various Authors | Brandom II 83 FregeVsBoole: no material contents, therefore unable to follow scientific concept formation. Boole: "scope equality". Frege I 32 Addition/Hankel: wants to define: "if a and b are arbitrary elements of the basic series, then the sum of a + b is understood to be that one member of the basic series for which the formula a + (b + e) = a + b + e is true." (e is supposed to be the positive unit here). Addition/Sum/FregeVsHankel: 1) thus, the sum is explained by itself. If you do not yet know what a + b is, you will not be able to understand a + (b + e). 2) if you’d like to object that not the sum, but the addition should be explained, then you could still argue that a + b would be a blank sign if there was no member of the basic series or several of them of the required type. Frege I 48 Numbers/FregeVsNewton: he wants to understand numbers as the ratio of each size to another of the same kind. Frege: it can be admitted that this appropriately describes the numbers in a broader sense including fractions and irrational numbers. But this requires the concepts of size and the size ratio!. I 49 It would also not be possible to understand numbers as quantities, because then the concept of quantity and the quantity ratios would be presumed. I 58 Number/Schlömilch: "Notion of the location of an object in a series". FregeVsSchlömilch: then always the same notion of a place in a series would have to appear when the same number occurs, and that is obviously wrong. This could be avoided if he liked to understand an objective idea as imagination, but then what difference would there be between the image and the place itself?. I 60 Frege: then arithmetic would be psychology. If two were an image, then it would initially only be mine. Then we could perhaps have many millions of twos. I 64 Unit/Baumann: Delimitation. FregeVsBaumann: E.g. if you say the earth has a moon, you do not want to declare it a delimited one, but you rather say it as opposed to what belongs to Venus or Jupiter. I 65 With respect to delimitation and indivisibility, the moons of Jupiter can compete with ours and are just as consistent as our moon in this sense. Unit/Number/Köpp: Unit should not only be undivided, but indivisible!. FregeVsKöpp: this is probably supposed to be a feature that is independent from arbitrariness. But then nothing would remain, which could be counted and thought as a unit! VsVs: then perhaps not indivisibility itself, but the be considering to be indivisible could be established as a feature. FregeVs: 1) Nothing is gained if you think the things different from what they are!. I 66 2) If you do not want to conclude anything from indivisibility, what use is it then? 3) Decomposabiltiy is actually needed quite often: E.g. in the problem: a day has 24 hours, how many hours have three days?. I 69 Unit/Diversity/Number/FregeVsJevons: the emphasis on diversity also only leads to difficulties. E.g. If all units were different, you could not simply add: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1..., but you would always have to write: 1" + 1"" + 1 """ + 1 """", etc. or even a + b + c + d... (although units are meant all the time). Then we have no one anymore!. I 78 ff: ++ Number neither description nor representation, abstraction not a definition - It must not be necessary to define equality for each case. Infinite/Cantor: only the finite numbers should be considered real. Just like negative numbers, fractions, irrational and complex numbers, they are not sense perceptible. FregeVsCantor: we do not need any sensory perceptions as proofs for our theorems. It suffices if they are logically consistent. I 117 - 127 ++ VsHankel: sign (2-3) is not empty, but determinate content! Signs are never a solution! - Zero Class/FregeVsSchröder: (> empty set) false definition of the zero class: there can be no class that is contained in all classes as an element, therefore it cannot be created by definition. (The term is contradictory). IV 14 VsSchröder: you cannot speak of "classes" without already having given a concept. - Zero must not be contained as an element in another class (Patzig, Introduction), but only "subordinate as a class". (+ IV 100/101). II 93 Euclid/FregeVsEuclid: makes use of implied conditions several times, which he states neither under his principles nor under the requirements of the special sentence. E.g. The 19th sentence of the first book of the elements (in each triangle the greater angle is located opposite the larger side) presupposes the following sentences: 1) If a distance is not greater than another, then it is equal to or smaller than the first one. 2) If an angle is equal to another, then it is not greater than the first one. 3) If an angle is less than another, it is not greater than the first one. Waismann II 12 FregeVsPostulates: why is it not also required that a straight line is drawn through three arbitrary points? Because this demand contains a contradiction. Well, then they should proof that those other demands do not contain any contradictions!. Russell: postulates offer the advantages of theft over honest work. Existence equals solvability of equations: the fact that √2 exists means that x² 2 = 0 is solvable. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Various Authors | Wright Vs Various Authors | I 256 Expression Theory/Wright: wants to persuade us to reclassify certain propositions in a theoretical framework of solid concepts of "real" assertions, "real" truth, etc., in order to convince us that mathematical propositions actually function as imperatives. Wittgenstein/WrightVsExpression Theory: but one can show that precisely this distinction between "genuine" truthful contents and "merely grammatical" assertions does not exist! Rather, the merely grammatical ideas are the only general ideas, the truth and the assertoric content that we have! Of course, a philosophical discourse can be motivated by making differences disappear. I 257 But differences that merely call a philosophical picture into question must not have a significant influence on the integrity of the language game in question. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Various Authors | Peacocke Vs Various Authors | I 59 Representational Content/Peacocke: the acoustic experience itself could have a representational content, ((s) namely, the that-sentence that a sound comes from the left.) weaker: in conjunction with the other attitudes of the subject. But for that the subject needs spatial concepts. Bower: his problem is, what it means to have spatial concepts. Stimulus-Response Scheme/S-R System/SR Psychology/Peacocke: a distinction is made between mental states with content and those that can only be explained by the stimulus-response scheme. But stimulus-response systems have complex internal information processing. Nor os it about the distinction conscious/unconscious. A stimulus-response psychology can reduce reactions not only to physical stimuli, but also to sensations! And these can also have a primitive form of consciousness. This is about the problem of the attribution of propositional content. Not all sensations do indeed have representational content. Bower: appropriate spatial response confirms the attribution of spatial content. Peacocke: is that correct? Causality/Psychology: Problem: There are several levels of incoming causal chains and also several levels of outgoing causal chains (input/output). I 60 Some of these levels, apart from the external objects, have the ability to involve objects that can play a role in both inbound and outbound in causal chains. E.g. the retina. Proposition/Propositional Content/SR System/Peacocke: we must first assume propositional attitudes about objects and places in the vicinity of the subject, which do not yet constitute an stimulus-response scheme, and motor instructions that actually consist in spatial reactions acting over a distance to be able to ascribe spatial terms. PeacockeVsBower: of course it goes without saying that if the child intentionally puts out its hand, it then there sees the object. The problem is what constitutes the intention with the content: "reach out to the object"? A spatial response that is supposed to be caused by the spatial properties of the object is not an explanation for an intention. Nor is it an explanation for the intention that the subject is disappointed if the object is not located there. (!) Whether there are innate, half-wired or acquired connections, you just need not assume any spatial concepts to explain the disappointment . I 61 Content/Attribution/PeacockeVsBower: if you want to attribute content, you should always ask: could a stimulus-response system do that as well? If so, we do not need content. Or the conditions are not sufficient to attribute content. Def Registering/Bennett/Peacocke: ("Linguistic Behavior", Cambridge, 1976): Def "a registers that p": if a is in an environment that is similar in relevant respects with an environment where p is clearly the case, then a registers that p. Def Relevantly Similar: an environment that does not differ in any respect in which a is sensitive (of an environment in which p is present). There is also room for learning and curiosity: Trainable: such an organism will respond quickly. Curious: such an organism will try many different reactions. Perspective/Peacocke: there are also complementary characteristics to investigate in perspective sensitivity: E.g. when the subject as is familiar, e.g. with the types of objects in its environment, it requires less efferent information. Def Efferent: from inside, from the central nervous system. In our oversimplified model here we assume subjects with perfect memory and a single goal. I 70 But there is independent evidence for memory errors and assumed obstacles or multiple goals. Such assumptions do not empty the thesis of perspective sensitivity. Perspective sensitivity is necessary to attribute attitudes in the basic case. But that is a weaker necessity than we need. E.g. (see above) the animal that eats fruits: the food could be covered and after a period of training the animal manages to solve this problem. Namely, by the shortest route, regardless of the angle at which it had originally perceived the food. That would be a case of perspective sensitivity. Nevertheless, it is possible that this is merely a stimulus-response system! Therefore, we do not know fully what the requirement of perspective sensitivity is. We cannot exclude this possibility by referring to past experiences or beliefs of the subject. Proposal: that the behavior of the animal is not causally sensitive to past spatial experiences that are currently not perceived, Vs: but this condition would also be met if the animal turned its head on its way to the food without interrupting its way. So this cannot be the crucial difference for the attribution of spatial Concepts. I 71 We would like to say that a person's behavior with attitudes about objects depends on how these objects are arranged around him. PeacockeVsBower: but we have already seen above that this leads to nothing. I 76 Mental Map/Perspective/Peacocke: initially it is harmless to attribute spatial behavior to the existence of an "internal map". But from this do not follow two stronger assumptions that want to derive perspective sensitivity from this: 1) Ulrich Neisser: every living being that can anticipate an environment has cognitive maps. PeacockeVsNeisser: it is not plausible that "cognitive maps" should be a particular type of image. 2) even if someone has a real, physical, external map, it cannot be a general explanation of the perspective sensitivity of his behavior. To use the map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. But then you already have the perspective sensitivity that should be explained first. (Circular). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Various Authors | Stalnaker Vs Various Authors | II 48 Presupposition/Stalnaker: 1. as semantic relation (StalnakerVs) between sentences or propositions. Here we have to distinguish between presupposition and assertion in concepts of content or truth conditions ((s) truth-conditional semantics). Def presupposition/semantic/logical form/Stalnaker: a proposition that P presupposes that Q iff Q must be true so that P has a truth value (tr.v.) at all. That means presuppositions are made necessary by the truth and falsity of the proposition. If any presupposition is wrong the assertion has no tr.v.. StalnakerVsSemantic presupposition: although suitable for theoretical explanations, but requires complicated ad hoc hypotheses about the semantics of individual words and constructions. II 49 Def pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: (provisional version): a proposition A is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context precisely in the case that the speaker assumes or believes that P, accepts or believes that the listeners assumes or believes that P and accepts or believes that the listener realizes that he makes these assumptions or has these convictions. II 50 So it are the speakers, not the sentences that make the presuppositions ((s) unlike the semantic approach). logical form: there are three possible definitions of pragmatic presupposition: a) proposition x presupposes that Q exactly in the event that the use of x appropriate (normal, acceptable) is only in contexts where Q is presupposed by the speaker. b) a statement that P (in a particular context) presupposes that Q just in case that one can reasonably conclude that the speaker presupposes Q from the fact that he made the statement. c) ... when it is necessary to assume that the speaker presupposes that Q to properly understand or interpret the statement. Important argument: we do not need an intermediate step of an assumed relation that should exist between propositions (StalnakerVsSemantic approach). II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can change without the truth conditions changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such a third person and ask questions without postulating different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 69 Similarity metrics/similarity/next poss.w./most similar world/Stalnaker: it will always be true that something is more similar to itself than to anything else. Therefore, the selection function must be one which picks out the real world, whenever possible. (poss.w. = possible world). StalnakerVsSemantic approach: nothing can further be said here about what are the relevant aspects of similarity. Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatic approach: here we can explain how the context determines the truth conditions at least for indicative conditionals. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Verificationism | Horwich Vs Verificationism | Horwich I XII Truth/Peirce/Horwich: (Peirce 1932): if correspondence is problematic, why should we not simply identify truth with verifiability? I XIII a) Verification holistic/Bradley/Hempel: (Chapter 5): a belief (conviction) is justified if it is part of a whole consistent and harmonious belief system. b) Verification Method/Dummett/Putnam: (Dummett: Chapter 16, 1978; Putnam: Chapter 21, 24, 1981). Horwich: so truth corresponds to provability. Verificationism/Horwich: verification is much clearer than correspondence theory. HorwichVsVerificationism: the postulated link between the concepts of truth and verification is much too strong. VsCoherence Theory/Problem: there may be multiple coherent systems that are mutually incompatible. Thus, consistency does not guarantee truth. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Vollmer, G. | Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. | Putnam I 196 Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical. Vollmer I 275 VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation. However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption). I 290 DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6) I 292 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule. I 293 VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. I 298 Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti) 2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus 3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized. This is a genetic fallacy. VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused! The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view! Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage. Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails. I 300 Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently. Lotze: Validity Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc. Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity. Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity. Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity. I 309 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular. I 310 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers. Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: Explication of concepts and knowledge Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems. Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements. Illumination of the conditions for cognition. Demonstration of cognitive boundaries. I 315 Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature 2. thinking category 3. this category of thinking is the result of selection. Therefore, causality generates causality via causality. a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75). b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6). I 316 VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience. I 318 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization". Vollmer I 313 Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation". Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception: I 323 Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles": |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Whitehead, A.N. | Simons Vs Whitehead, A.N. | I 94 Bowman L. Clarke/topology/mereology/Simons: formal objections against his system cannot be put forward. It is based on Whitehead's basic concept of compound, the relata are informally understood space-time regions. I 95 Def connected/connection/Clarke/Whitehead: connected means sharing a point ((s) common point). But the points and all the other borders are no individuals. Limit/Whitehead/Clarke: the limit is no individual. Individuals/Whitehead/Clarke: individuals have no interiors. This leads to a non-classical mereology. Connection/spelling/Clarke: it is written as a small diamond with double tails up and down. Separated/disconnected/external connection/spelling/Clarke: >< y”: x is externally connected with y, = "x touches y". Non-classical mereology/Simons: here o (overlap) and < (part-relation) do not interact in the way as in the classic. Only when an object touches nothing (that means intuitive, if it is open, see above) we can treat its parts as in classical mereology. I 96 "Quasi-topologically"/Clarke: (Because there is no zero element and no boundary elements): e.g. concepts: "interior of x", "closure (completion, final, closure) of x", "outside of x", "x is open", "x is closed". Product: a product of any two open individuals is again open. Axioms: (...) I 97 Bowman L. Clarke: "Just as the linguistic domain of the classical individuals calculus is a complete Boolean algebra without zero-elements, our theorems are a closing-algebra without zero elements and without boundary elements. It is interesting that this much topology can be operated with as minimal assumptions. SimonsVsClarke: the idea of "removing" the boundary elements can be understood in two ways: a) that they "really exist" and we have an artificial limit by that I 98 (This would explain why the mereology is non-classical.) b) that these elements do not exist at all, then we miss the remainder principle (Principle Remainder, RP, see above). If we remove the interior (of a non-open individual), nothing will change! In fact, nothing is left. Closure/SimonsVsClarke: if we take any individual, its interior is a real part of its closure but there is no real part of its closure that is separate from the inside. So we have not even the weak supplement principle. We should therefore think that there are two types of individuals: a) "weak" (open) that do not touch anything and b) "strong" that are in contact with something. Nevertheless, we must not believe that there are any individuals who reconcile the difference again. We can distinguish individuals who differ only in one point but cannot determine the point. SimonsVs: this is not satisfactory. Nevertheless, if we want to perform topology without points and other limits, it is difficult to see how we can solve the problem. Solution/Simons: a philosophical approach must be more complex and allow vague approximations of sharp boundaries (> Menger, 1940, 107). |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Williams, B. | Putnam Vs Williams, B. | III 107 Ethics/relativism/Williams, Bernard: if an approximation of positions is really taking place in ethics, it is not because of a steering by the way things really are, whereas in the sciences this could actually be explained in this way. III 108 Reality/Williams/Putnam: We can select some of convictions of which one could say that they are maximally independent from our perspective. "The world as it appears to us" is interpreted as "the world as it appears to us in particular". For such a description only primary qualities should be chosen. III 263 footnote: Ex further terms can be derived therefrom: Ex "impulse" is defined by "mass" and "speed" whereas "speed" is defined by "time" and "location". III 109 How would we describe the world and imagine how it would be if there were no observers. In colloquial descriptions we could, of course, also include secondary qualities and speak of green grass and warm weather. According to Williams, we can readily be brought to the conclusion that we only describe how the grass had appeared to observers. Williams: thesis: our world (with observers) emerged from a world without observers. The laws are exactly the same. III 110 Therefore a description with primary qualities only should be possible. PutnamVsWilliams: enchanting, but it is true? Through evolution, no new laws of physics have emerged. But our predictions refer to phenomena that are described in the language of physics, not in the language of biology, psychology or economics. Once living beings and societies appear on the scene, actually new laws come to light, but they do not contradict the laws of physics. "Offer" and "demand" can not be described in terms of physics. III 128 Values/Williams/Putnam: even if it turns out that the color of a surface is an objective property of reflectivity, that does not impair the contrast between color characteristics and values, which Williams wanted to highlight. Putnam: but to demonstrate that the evaluation does not emerge from one eye from the nature of the eye, the complicated metaphysical explanations of Williams are unnecessary. Def values/Dewey: Evaluation results from the critique of various problem-solving processes. Absoluteness/Williams: contains ideally a "theory of knowledge and error"; contains both the possibility of the local views, as well as its own possibility. Is being eliminated virtually immediately by Williams: "this view of the world must enable to explain the possibility of their own existence". Later: withdrawal: "... which may be subject to the radical indeterminacy of interpretation ..." III 129 Austin: "this is the point at which the philosopher says it, and then comes the point at which s_he withdraws." III 130 PutnamVsWilliams: Problem: for the absolute conception, there is only one way to explain the possibility of local views and their own possibility: an prediction of future occurrences of characters and sounds. III 135 ff RelativismPutnamVsWilliams: the outright "truth of relativism" by Williams is not more coherent than the "absolute conception of the world". Williams/truth: rather carefree use of the term. Sometimes something that is "detected by the procedural manners of a linguistic community" (same perspective as Rorty, who Williams considers an opponent). II 136/137 Truth: According to Williams in the purely academic conflict "not really a problem." He believes that the members of other communities have ethical knowledge, and their beliefs are true, if they use their concepts carefully. PutnamVsWilliams: striking contradiction: Ex "right, her sitting together with her boss alone in the office is unchaste, but we do not consider chastity a virtue". In contradiction to Williams assertion that "true" and "false" could only be used in case of a real conflict. III 140 PutnamVsWilliams: Opposition: Williams would like to acknowledge the involvement of facts and values, and at the same time hold on to the "absoluteness" of scientific knowledge. Putnam: but that's impossible. It's not possible that science is absolute, but nothing else. I (k) 253 Norms/values/Bernard Williams: presumes the perspective of "some social world". On the other hand (according to Putnam) physics proposes an absolute metaphysical truth. PutnamVsWilliams: the talk of the "content" of a conviction that would be "perspective", is lacking any clear sense. That was grist to the mill of deconstructionism. Rorty VI 64 PutnamVsWilliams/Rorty: "approach to the big picture": purely dogmatic. The notion of absoluteness is incoherent. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Brandom Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 92 Wittgenstein: the fact that there is a conception of a rule is not the interpretation, it manifests itself from time to time what we call "following the rules" and what we call "acting against it". That means there must be something like practice-implicit standards. I 94 BrandomVsWittgenstein: worrying that the normative attribution here requires a range of regularities of behavior and dispositions. Moreover, that the existence of these regularities is not part of what is asserted by such attributions. An analogy to length measurement assumes the rigidity of the world. But we learn practically immediately to apply new concepts. I 820 BrandomVsWittgenstein: W. had insisted that explicit standards are intelligible only before a background of practice-implicit standards. (see above regress - prevention). II 26/27 Brandom: He was wrong to say that this principle is incompatible with understanding the discursive practice in a way that it involves interpretation at every level (in his sense), including the most basic one. Double score keeping: an assertion is seen in the face of further determinations assigned by the score keeper as well as the stipulations entered into by himself. BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification asserts that the language has a center. Assertions are not just things that can be done with language. Rather, they are that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Davidson Vs Wittgenstein | I (a) 6ff Many philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein: recognition of the mind of another person: difference in the way we recognize our own mind and how we recognize the one of another person. In the first case there is no evidence needed, in the second case: the behavior must be observed. (not own behaviour) Davidson: As regards the use of these concepts of the mental, I agree with this distinction. But: DavidsonVsWittgenstein: The description of our practice does not constitute a solution to our original problem. Our practice has never been in doubt. Two questions: 1) Why should evidence-based knowledge not have greater certainty? 2) boils down to: we have no reason to believe that we are dealing only with a single concept. Why should one believe the other one has the exact same mental states as he himself? Rorty I 230 Truth Function/ Wafu / extension / intension / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are characterized not in a particular way of reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality", do not in the intensional vocabularies this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional / intensional is not more interesting than between nations and people. She’s just apt to evoke emotions reductionist. Rorty I 230 Truth function/tr.-fnc./Extension/Intension/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies do not stand out by reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality" in a particular way in which intensional vocabularies do not do this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional/intensional is not more interesting than that between nations and people. It is only apt to evoke reductionist emotions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Dummett Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 490 Wittgenstein (according to Dummett): There is no single means of derivation of all other properties from one. (Use only) DummettVsWittgenstein: If there is no key concept anymore, then we do not know what the meaning of a word is as opposed to the meaning of a sentence. Dummett I 31 DummettVsUse Theory: The downside is that this is essentially unsystematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, this is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness is not everything, though, the use theory is likely to assume that a significant portion of language is already understood. Only a systematic theory might explain in how far linguistic meaning can be explained without a previously given stock of semantic concepts. Ideally, no semantic concepts are needed in advance. From the elusiveness of truth (Frege) does not follow the inexplicability. Dummett I 83 Understanding/Wittgenstein:> understanding is not a mental process, but an ability (dispositional).LL. FregeVs: the grasping of a thought is an act of consciousness. And one that is directed towards something outside of the consciousness: (episodic). DummettVsWittgenstein: hard to see why no episodic sense of understanding should be possible if E.g. you can be stunned at first hearing of a sentence!. I 145 Private Language: WittgensteinVs - Dummett artificial private language possible and learnable. I 156 DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsUse Theory: Failure to assume a complete representation of language understanding is given as soon as its statements that express themselves in the use are described. For this reduces command of a language to having a practical ability. I 161 Animal: question: whether we can attribute thoughts to animals. Wittgenstein: "The dog is afraid that the master will strike it, but it is not afraid that the master will strike it tomorrow". DummettVsWittgenstein: this depends to a much lower degree than Wittgenstein would like on memories, but rather on a theoretical apparatus. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wright, Cr. | Frege Vs Wright, Cr. | Field I 166 Existence/Logic/Context Principle/Frege/Wright: the natural view is that simply an implicit existence assumption is built into ( =), i.e. the assumption that if Fx is a (finitely instantiated) concept, there will be a thing, so that x:Fx. And that is conceptual and not logical. I 167 FregeVsWright/Wright: he would say, however, that the fact that it is possible to form a sortal concept of a number by reference to concepts of a higher-order logic, is enough to reveal implicit existential stipulations in the statements whose truth we can regard as necessary and sufficient for statements about numerical equality. (?). (>Sortal). Wright: So there are no existence assumptions! The existence of x:Fx for a given Fx is no assumption, but a question of the truth of statements in higher-order logic. Form of thought: higher-level truth instead of existence of objects. Which view is correct? Context Principle/Frege/Wright: (p. 148): does x simple smuggle existence in, or does the principle (as Frege would prefer) discover a real definition? Wright: neither! Field: its intermediate position consists in that it is not pure logic, but a disambiguation from which existence flows. Ontology/Existence/Explanation/Logic/FieldVsWright: this is just as mysterious and criticism of this approach corresponds to the criticism of the ontological proof of God: The existence of God also does not follow from the disambiguation of the word "God". |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Wright, Cr. | Peacocke Vs Wright, Cr. | I 102 Def Verification/Wright: (("Strict Finitism", 1982) the concept "is a phrase that can actually be verified": at first, we believe the truth of a proposition due to certain studies, later we question the belief. The basis on which we question it must accept the presupposed conditions as true in order to maintain the initial investigation procedure. Peacocke: this is similar to our condition of epistemic possibility. Difference: Wright's criterion also includes unobservable particles. The fact that the instrument is functioning properly is then one of the presupposed conditions of the investigation procedure. I 103 Wright: his approach also includes the possibility that past-sentences can actually be verified. It is presupposed that the memory is functioning properly, in accordance with the supposed correctly functioning perceptual apparatus. Peacocke: for me it's about concepts, not about propositions, and I use properties of demonstrative perception judgments. Memory/PeacockeVsWright: no way of givenness of objects (intension), which is made available by memory seems to be connected to the same strict observation concepts. The ability to form memory images is not required by the observation concepts! |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phenomenalism | Danto2 I 218 Phenomenalism / Danto: the reference to objects is always eventually reference to the sensory experience. The whole theory is a kind of translation program. E.g. beeswax: the whole process of melting can be expressed in terms of actual and possible sense-experience. The phenomenalism made the assumption of divine omniscience superfluous. VsPhenomenalism: Problem: there is an immense number of possible sense-data, even with the simplest objects. Every experience is thus incomplete. Problem of translation: the question is whether or not I end up needing physical concepts to explain perceptions. So physical concepts to eliminate physical concepts. That would make the phenomenalism useless as a feasible way. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Radical Interpretation | Avramides, A. | I 85 Def superficial epistemic asymmetry/radical interpretation/Avramides: Thesis: that we can solve the problem of radical interpretation by understanding the foreign language by first experiencing the belief attitudes ("belief") and intentions ((s) without language, because psychological concepts are more fundamental) - DavidsonVs: this will not work. I 85 Propositional Attitudes/Intention/Belief/Significance/Radical Interpretation/Davidson: Thesis: One cannot gain a particular meaning from someone's intentions and beliefs, regardless of the meaning of his utterances. (Da. 1984d, p. 144) |
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| Interpretation | Bennett, J. | Rorty VI 360 Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today if we can clearly indicate, with the help of today's concepts, what his problems were, which of them are still problems today, and what Kant contributed to their solution. VI 361 M. AyersVsBennett: that would mean that it would be impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: "we should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself". RortyVsAyers: You do not get far with that if you do not believe in terms like "mental faculty" anymore. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" concepts. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Pickwick. Meaning | Broad, C.D: | Wittg II 94 Def Pickwickian meaning / Broad / Wittgenstein: Broad thesis: there is an ordinary and a special meaning of an expression. The Pickwickian is the everyday meaning, not yet precisely analyzed. Broad thesis: even after the analysis, we could use the ordinary. WittgensteinVs. II 93 + + II 98/99 Broad distinguishes a priori and empirical concepts and calls "Ideal boundaries" (perfect circle, etc.) and categories (causality, etc.) the only "plausible" Examples of a priori concepts. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Concepts | Carnap, R. | Quine IV 404 Empiricism / Carnap: (»Der logische Aufbau der Welt«): Thesis: it is fundamentally possible, to reduce all terms to the immediately given. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Theoret. Term. | Cartwright, N. | I 18 abstract concepts / theoretical terms / Physics / Cartwright: have only an organizing role. |
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| Cognitivism | Danto, A. | I 88 Def Cognitivism/Morality/Danto: The thesis that there are real moral statements that are true or false and can be empirically verified. According to it, we have a moral knowledge. With regard to the definability of moral concepts, divided into "intuitionists" and "naturalists". The question is whether moral concepts are defined in such a way that we do not have to use any other moral concepts for them. It is therefore a question of whether moral concepts are basic concepts. I 106 Danto: Thesis: Non-cognitivism is philosophically irrelevant, and the utility theory of meaning is a diversionary maneuver - the speech act theory has failed. |
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| Language | Davidson, D. | II 54 Language/Davidson: Thesis: The concept of language is superfluous! "There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists think."(1986, 446) Fra I 625 Language/Mind/mental/thinking/Davidson: Thesis: The mental area is not superior to the linguistic, the connection between subjective mind and interpretable language is theoretically unsolvable. Seel III 28 Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium. But mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world. Seeing: we do not see through our eyes but with them. VsMentalese: There is no language like mentalese. Language is part of us. It is an organ of us. It is the way we have the world. Medium/Davidson/Seel: used very closely here. Medium/Gadamer: not instrument, but indispensable element of thinking. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Interpretation | Dennett, D. | Fod / Lep IV 139 Def Interpretation Theory / Dennett: Thesis: there are beliefs, desires, etc. but they are not really (ontologically). They exist only as epistemically useful concepts. |
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| Meaning Theory | Dummett, M. | EMD II 110 Dummett: Thesis: the intuitionist explanation of logical constants provides a prototype for a meaning theory in which truth and falsehood are not the central concepts. The basic idea is that to grasp the meaning of a mathematical proposition is not to know what must be the case (fact) but to recognize the construction and determine whether it is evidence or not. The assertion of a mathematical proposition is then not the claim to be true, but that a proof for it exists. Therefore the comprehension of the meaning of a mathematical proposition is shown by the mastery of the mathematical language in use and not every proposition must be decidable! It is sufficient if we recognize the proof. Negation: we understand the mathematical proposition when we recognize what proof is for it. Dum I 150 ff Dummett: in earlier writings. Thesis: the theory of meaning was a theory of understanding. Today: Relationship is more subtle. Neither can be explained by the other. Shi I 3 Dummett: Thesis: meaning theory and theory of understanding are identical. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Logical Const. | Evans, G. | EMD II 216 Constants/Quine: could be considered to be integrated into the construction (1970). Evans: if we look at it this way, the difference between inferences that are valid due to the semantic significance of the grammatical construction and those that depend on constants would disappear. But, as Quine also acknowledges, we have no real reason to distinguish them in this way. This does not mean that we cannot find access to the constants, or that there is no well-defined concept of logical form, logical reasoning, or logical validity. It is just that there is a deeper concept, namely that of semantic structure and structural validity from which these concepts should be distinguished. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
| Meaning Change | Field, Hartry | II 177 Change of meaning / Field: thesis: when we change theories, the reference of scientific concepts (theoretical terms) is indefinite - there is no fact which decides - e.g. in Newton and in the Special Relativity Th. "mass" had no specific denotation. |
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| Linguisticism | Field, Hartry | II 158 Def Linguistic View/Meaning Attribution/Field: (thereby we neglect doubts about the clarity of inter-personal synonymy for the moment): Thesis: to say that a word means simply to say, II 159 that it means the same as "rabbit" as I understand it right now. ((s) In the real world, in my idiolect). Linguistic View: Thesis: instead of a mind-independent entity (meaning), the attribution ascribes to the word only another word from the interpreter's words. Or at most to a "mental symbol" of the interpreter, if this is correlated with his use of (his) word. II 165 Linguistic View/Field: I do not think it would be indispensable. a) Alternative: to it: the thesis that sentences: do not denote at all! Also other expressions with quotation marks in parentheses: "Means that/believes that/means": are operators instead. Operator: does not denote. They create predicates whereby the partial expressions are semantically empty. II 166 Linguistic View/Field: b) another alternative to it: the thesis that sentences and bracketed expressions may refer to something, but they are a kind of intentional entities: propositions, concepts, etc. Field: if this is carefully formulated, I am not completely against it. |
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| Physicalism | Field, Hartry | II 13 Physicalism / Field: strict variant (Quine): irreducible semantic basic concepts are illegitimate. We should get rid of them. |
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| Structuralism | Field, Hartry | II 271 Mathematical Structuralism: Thesis: Concepts have a certain reference only within structures. Problem: for "i" there is an indeterminacy, which position is denoted here. II 326 Def structuralist insight/terminology/Field: Thesis: It makes no difference what the objects of a given mathematical theory are, as long as they are in the right relations to each other. I.e. there is no reasonable choice between isomorphic models of a mathematical theory. |
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| Tarski | Field, Hartry | II 3 Truth Theory/Tarski/Field: he did not use any undefined semantic terms. Many say: he thus made the concept of truth suitable for the scientific discourse of his time. FieldVs: Thesis: this is all wrong. In reality, Tarski has managed to trace the concept of truth back to other semantic concepts. II 141 Truth Theory/Tarski: Thesis: We do not get an adequate truth-theory if we only take all instances of the scheme as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens gets the truth. FieldVsTarski. Horwich I 358 Truth Definition/Tarski/Field: (Field 1973): Tarski's thesis: truth definition was partly motivated by the desire to support physicalism. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Concept | Fodor, J. | Newen/Schrenk I 160 Prototype Theory/Concepts/Concept/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature (13-24) tries to find the solution: Thesis: terms as meanings of predicates are essentially characterized by prototypes. FodorVsPrototype Theory: terms are compositional. I 160 Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: Example "pet fish": typical pet: dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: goldfish. So no compositionality. Thesis: Having a term does not depend on having other terms. In other words. Thesis: Terms have no structure. |
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| Empiricism | Fodor, J. | F / L IV 204 Empiricism / "empiricist principles" / Fodor / Lepore: Thesis: all our concepts are functions (Boolean or statistical) of our psycho-functional terms. |
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| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Bat | McDowell, J. | I 149 + Example Bat / McDowellVsNagel: Nagel thesis: bats possess a mature subjectivity, whose character is beyond our concepts. McDowellVsNagel: false picture of the "non-conceptual content," we could cahnge into terms. |
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| Reasons | McDowell, J. | I 17 Logical space of the reasons/logical space of nature/McDowell: thesis: besides the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: the laws of nature, not normative relations. a) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts. b) logical space of nature: objects, sensory impressions. This is not a division of "natural and normative". Esfeld I 146~ McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: space of reasons (justifications) further than that of the conceptual. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Theory of Sense | McDowell, J. | II 42 McDowell: Thesis: wants a theory of sense (ST), (Theory of sense) which is at the same time a meaning theory. A theory of sense ascribes a suitable property first to the components and establishes rules according to which the whole proposition is then true or false. Then it shows how for an indicative proposition a theorem of the form "s is true if and only if p" whereby "s" is replaced by an appropriate description of the sentence and "p" by a sentence. EMD II 43 It would be nice to have a general condition for the relation between the substitutions for "s" and "p" of this form: "s is f if and only if p". The hope is then that one replaces "f" with "true" by the general rule. That would seem to be the desired answer to what a truth theory is. II 44 McDowell: Thesis: a theory of sense (ST) and a theory of force in combination makes it possible to determine from a complete description of the utterance to come to it: "He claims that p" or "he asks that p" etc. whereby what replaces "p" is the sentence used on the right side of the theorem. I.e. we have a two-sided theory from the theory of sense and the theory of force. Acceptability in this theory would require that the descriptions of propositional actions fit into a wider context. II 46 Thesis, then, is not the illumination of the concept of meaning by other concepts and even less reduction, but simply a description of its relation to these other concepts. II 47 Sense/Truth/McDowell: Thesis: Sense is not what a truth theory is about, but rather truth is what a sense theory is about. The gap could also be filled quite differently, the above considerations ensure that the theorems would continue to be acceptable if this other filling were again replaced by "true, if and only if". Thus, as Frege thought, a sense theory will specify the truth conditions for sentences, either directly or by justifiable transformation. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Reference | Putnam, H. | Horwich I 394 Reference/Putnam: The thesis is determined by social practices and actual physical paradigms. III 208 Reference/Field: Thesis: If we could establish a "basic reference", then we would have a Tarskian theory of reference - average of the extensions of the connected expressions - PutnamVs: the reference does not establish the connection! - We need a theory of reference by description. V 55 Putnam Thesis/Reference: the reference of individual expressions remains indefinite even if we have preconditions of any kind that determine the truth value of every sentence of a language in every possible world! The whole language can be interpreted in a variety of ways. V 75~ Reference/Putnam: Thesis: Input is formed by concepts - there are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| History | Rorty, R. | VI 355 History of Philosophy/interpretation/past/change of meaning/change of concepts/Rorty: Dilemma: either, a) we impose on the dead, in an anachronistic manner, sufficient problems and vocabulary of our time to make them interlocutors, or b) we limit our interpretive activity to making their false sentences less foolish by placing them in the context of the backward times in which these sentences were uttered. This is not a dilemma at all: we can do both, but we must strictly separate them! >Interpretation/Bennett VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: Thesis: with such attempts at approximation, of course, anachronistic methods are used. But if this happens consciously, there is nothing wrong with it. VI 375 Interpretation/Reconstruction/History/Philosophy/Rorty/RortyVsCanon: Thesis: RortyVsHistory of Philosophy as Doxography: triggers despair in us. There is no possibility to carry out a real rational reconstruction through hierarchy and the eternally same "important philosophers" and "important problems". The thinkers are being robbed of their salaries. Problems are imposed. Mistakes: to present Leibniz and Hegel, Mill and Nietzsche, Descartes and Carnap as if they were talking about the same topics. Mistakes: half-hearted attempt to tell development only from today's perspective. VI 395 Jonathan Rée/Rorty: Thesis: "No convincing reasons have been given for the importance of a historical consciousness for the philosopher". VI 395 Margaret Wilson/Rorty: Thesis: "It could well be that the real opinions of the great philosophers, if one compares them with those they have in mind, turn out to be rather meager." Rorty pro. |
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| Mind/Psyche | Ryle, G. | I 270 f Ryle's main thesis: showing that "psychic" does not denote the status of a thing or event, that one cannot meaningfully ask whether it is psychic or physical, or whether it is "in the soul" or "in the outside world". I 303 et seq. Ryle's thesis: the book is intended to prove that many epistemological theories or perception theories are or contain paramechanical hypotheses. Typical questions of such thinking are: "How are past experiences preserved in the mind?" (>Memory, Remembrance). "How can the mind grasp the external physical effect through the barriers of sensations?" "How do we subsume the sensory data under concepts and categories?" (Ryle: All nonsense!) |
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| Meaning | Schiffer, St. | Field II 65 Def Meaning/Sentence Meaning/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer early, 1972): the meaning of sentences in spoken and written language can be explained by concepts of belief (and desire), namely those that are conventionally correlated with these sentences. II 66 Representation Meaning/FieldVsSchiffer: Thesis: part of what it is that a symbol in my representation system stands for Caesar is that it has acquired its role there as a result of my appropriation of a name that stands for Caesar in public language. II 66 Meaning/Representation/VsSchiffer/Field: a reverse approach to Schiffer's thesis would reduce the semantics of the representation system to the semantics of the public language. Graeser I 116 Meaning/Stephen Schiffer: ("The Remnants of Meanig, 1987): provocative book: Thesis 1. There is no correct theory of meaning Thesis 2. The questions that determine the current philosophy of language are based on false assumptions. Schi passim Meaning/Schiffer/Bio: I was a student at Oxford in the 60s. SchifferVsGrice: Representation of the speaker meaning is inadequate (incomplete), but pro Thesis: Reduction of semantics to psychology (like Grice) + reduction to physicalism. > 1972 "Meaning". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Relation Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 49 Thesis: the "propositional" theory of belief as relation to propositions needs natural art concepts. (see below). I 54 Classical Propositional Position/Schiffer: Thesis: predicates in that-sentences simply refer to the properties and relations they express and introduce directly into the propositions. I 55 2. Possible position: Frege's view: Thesis: the proposition provides the whole content of belief, but does not contain dog-ness but a way of being given dog-ness that is not explicit in (2). But that is how Tanya imagines dog-ness. (Frege is concerned with belief de re of normal physical objects.) A representative of this view would deny that the that-sentence in (2) refers to the full content. According to him, (2) is best represented in this way: (Em)(m is a way of givenness of dog-ness & B (Tanya, )). I 93 Relation Theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: new thesis: a sentence S has its truth condition 1. by the bR of some of its parts and properties - 2. by certain causal relations to things (for the explanation of reference and denotation) - thus ultimately reliability determining for the truth conditions, because the combination of bR/causality plays a role in the maximization of reliability - this also explains the nature of reliability. |
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| psycholog. Nominalsm. | Sellars, W. | Rorty VI 183 psychological nominalism / Sellars: his thesis paves the way: if anyone can make use of semantic concepts, he already has everything necessary to intentional speech. > Intentionality. I 56 psychological nominalism / Sellars: Thesis: there is no consciousness of a logical space that precedes the acquisition of language and would be independent of it. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sortal | Simons, P. | I 195 Sortal concept / Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts, which are subject to the conditions that determine what is to count at one time or over time as one thing or as several things are rather true of mereologically constant objects (Chisholm ) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: his thesis is that most people mostly use their concepts in a wrong way, if not always. |
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| Person | Strawson, P.F. | Graeser I 224 Person / Strawson (individuals): particulars are fundamental in our system of concepts. Special particulars: people. Person: not "ensouled body" nor "embodied soul". Strawson / Graeser: does not ask for the ultimate constituents of the universe and does not search for new truths concerning the reality. He elicited the conditions of our speech about the world. ((s) > language / thinking). Individual things have priority of processes or events that we could not identify without them. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Concepts | Wiggins, D. | EMD II 286 Term / language / WigginsVsQuine: Quine s attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: Only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of substance terms and against random formations could explain the certainty of our culture treated with issues of identity in time or durability. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | II 94 Def Pickwick's Meaning/Broad/Wittgenstein: Broad thesis: there would be an ordinary and a special meaning of an expression. The Pickwickean would be the everyday, not yet precisely analyzed. Broad thesis: even after the analysis we could continue to use the ordinary. WittgensteinVs. II 93 ++ II 98/99 Broad thesis: distinguishes between a priori and empirical concepts and names "ideal boundaries" (the perfect circle, etc.) and categories (causality, etc.) as the only "plausible" examples of a priori concepts. |
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| Nonfactualism | Wright, Cr. | Rorty VI 54 Nonfactualism/irrational/Wright/Rorty: (with Kripke's Wittgenstein): Wright considers the possibility that the thesis that there is no "relevant fact" with regard to rules and meaning grows out with necessity to a global unrealism: there are nowhere relevant facts at all. Wright I 271 The thesis of nonfactualism can then be formulated in such a way that any discourse on meaning and related concepts is at most capable of being correct and is not suitable for more substantial properties. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time | Assmann, J. | Luhmann AU Cass 9 Time / Jan Assmann, Egyptology, Heidelberg: thesis: the Egyptians had two concepts of time: 1st time as something that has a result 2nd time as virtuality (option). |
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| Artwork | Croce, B. | Graeser I 216 Artwork/Croce/Collingwood/Graeser: artworks have a mental or spiritual structure. GraeserVs: 1. Although no one will deny the importance of ideas and concepts, in the philosophical discussion one is reluctant to to attach structures of this kind a lot of weight. > FregeVsPsychologism. Vs: 2. precisely because the study of works of art presupposes their accessibility, they cannot have a purely mental constitution. I 217 VsVs: But that idea is linked to the existence of subjects does not mean that ideas would be subjective. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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