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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aesthetics | Kant | Gadamer I 47 Aesthetics /"Urteilskraft"/Kant/Gadamer: What Kant for his part legitimized and wanted to legitimize through his critique of aesthetic judgement was the subjective generality of aesthetic taste, in which there is no longer any knowledge of the object, and in the field of the "fine arts" the superiority of genius over all rule aesthetics. Thus, Romantic hermeneutics and history find a point of reference for their self-understanding only in the concept of genius, which was brought to bear by the Kantian aesthetics. >Urteilskraft/ Kant. That was the other side of the Kantian effect. The transcendental justification of aesthetic judgement established the autonomy of the aesthetic consciousness, from which the historical consciousness should also derive its legitimation. The radical subjectivation that included Kant's re-foundation of aesthetics has thus truly made epoch. By discrediting any theoretical knowledge other than that of the natural sciences, it pushed the self-contemplation of the humanities into following the methodology of the natural sciences. At the same time, however, it facilitated this dependence by providing the "artistic moment", the "feeling" and the "attitude" as a subsidiary achievement. See >Method/Helmholtz, >Humanities/Gadamer. Truth/knowledge/episteme/art/Kant/GadamerVsKant: The transcendental function that Kant assigns to aesthetic judgement is capable of distinguishing it from conceptual knowledge. and in this respect to satisfy the definition of the phenomena of beauty and art. But is it possible to reserve the concept of truth for conceptual knowledge? Should one not also acknowledge that the work of art has truth? We shall see that an acknowledgement of this side of the matter puts not only the phenomenon of art but also that of history in a new light. >Truth of art/Gadamer. Gadamer I 48 Knowledge/Taste/Gadamer: one will be able to recognize that Kant's reasoning of aesthetics is based on the judgement of taste Gadamer I 49 does justice to both sides of the phenomenon, its empirical non-generality and its a priori claim to generality. But the price he pays for this justification of criticism in the field of taste is that he denies taste any meaning of knowledge. It is a subjective principle to which he reduces the public spirit. In it nothing is recognized of the objects that are judged beautiful, but it is only asserted that a priori a feeling of pleasure in the subject corresponds to them. Purposefulness/"Zweckmäßigkeit"/Kant: As is well known, this feeling is Kant was founded on expediency (...). This is the principle that Kant discovers in aesthetic judgment. It is here itself law. In this respect it is an a priori The effect of beauty, which is somewhere between a merely sensual-empirical agreement in matters of taste and a rationalistic generality of rules in the middle. The taste is "taste of reflection". Content/taste/Kant/Gadamer: (...) the culture of moral feeling [is] described as the way in which genuine taste can take a certain unchanging form(1). The content-related determination of taste thus falls outside the scope of its transcendental function. Kant is interested only in so far as there is a principle of aesthetic judgement of its own, and therefore pure taste judgement alone is important to him. >Beauty/Kant. 1.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, S. 264. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Constitution | Husserl | Gadamer I 252 Constitution/Husserl/Gadamer: The principle of idealism to go back everywhere to the constituent acts of transcendental subjectivity must apparently enlighten the universal horizon consciousness "world" and above all the intersubjectivity of this world - although what is thus constituted, the world as the world common to many individuals, in turn comprises subjectivity. >Horizon/Husserl, >World/Husserl. The transcendental reflection, which is supposed to abolish all the world-value and all pretence of something else, must in turn think of itself as being surrounded by the world of life. The reflective ego knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the lifeworld is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes. >I, Ego, Self/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Covering Laws | Hempel | Wright I 23 Covering Laws/Hempel/von Wright, G. H.: the name for this approach by Hempel comes from a critic of this theory: William Dray(1). I 24 Subsumption theory/terminology/von Wright, G. H.: I choose this expression instead of the term of Hempel's Covering Law theory. There are two options: a) deductive-nomological: in this variant, all subsequent events logically follow from the existence of a situation and from laws. I 25 b) inductive-probabilistic: here there is a general law, the "bridge" or the "ribbon", which links the basis of the explanation to the subject matter. This is a probability hypothesis according to which, if events E1... Em (the base) are given, it is very likely that event E will take place(2). G. H. von WrightVsHempel: in what sense - if at all in one - can one speak of explanation? I 155 Hempel's terminology fluctuated. He called non-eductive explanations alternately inductive, statistical, probabilistic and inductive-statistical explanations. >Terminology/Hempel. I 156 von Wright, G. H.: The arguments of Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Sriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization(3)(4). I 26 Wright: the two schemes differ more than expected. WrightVsHempel: one should not speak of an explanation for the inductive-probabilistic model, but rather of the fact that certain expectations are justified. I 28 Wright: a test on the Covering Law approach would be to ask whether the law scheme of the explanation also covers teleological explanations. Teleology/von Wright, G. H.: there are two sections: a) the field of the term function, goal (purposefulness) and "organic wholeness" ("systems"). b) purposefulness and intentionality. See also >Feedback/von Wright, G. H., >Teleology. 1. W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957, p. 1. 2. C. G. Hempel: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: "Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science", New York 1965. 3. M. Scriven: Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation, in: P. Gardiner (Ed.), 1959, p. 467. 4. W. Dray: The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered, 1963. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Feedback | Wright | I 28 Feedback/Teleology/Wright, G. H.: a key concept in the "causalist" theory of purposefulness is the concept of negative feedback. (Compare R. Taylor 1950a(1) - R. Taylor 1950b(2), - A. Rosenblueth and N. Wiener, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior(3), - A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow 1968(4)) I 156 TaylorVsRosenblueth/TaylorVsWiener/TaylorVsBigelow/Wright: Taylor calls the views of Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow a "mechanistic" conception of purposefulness. >Goals, >Action, >Purposes, >Procedural rationality, >Purposive action. Wright: However, the term "mechanistic" must be used in a broader sense, that is I think, better understood by the expression "causal". >Causality, >Causal relation. The authors themselves do not call their view causal. They are on the contrary cautious... I 157 ...to differentiate between causality and their concept of teleology. >Teleology. WrightVsBigelow/WrightVsWiener: this seems to be a too strong limitation of the expression "causal". Teleology/Wiener/Bigelow/Wright, G. H.: Bigelow and Wiener want to restrict "teleological behaviour" to "targeted reactions controlled by trial and error". This means it becomes equal in meaning with behaviour controlled by negative feedback. (A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow 1943 (5)). >John Bigelow. 1. R. Taylor Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purpusefoulness, 1950a 2. R. Taylor, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder, 1950b 3. A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow „Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“; 1968. 4. A.Rosenblueth and N. Wiener, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior 5. A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow „Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“, 1943, S. 23-24. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| I, Ego, Self | Husserl | Gadamer I 252 I, Ego, Self/Husserl/Gadamer: It is clear that the lifeworld is always at the same time a community world and contains the coexistence of others. It is a personal world, and such a personal world is always assumed to be valid in a natural attitude. >Lifeworld/Husserl. But how is this validity to be justified from a performance of subjectivity? Constitution/Phenomenology: For the phenomenological analysis of constitution [this, the justification of validity], represents the most difficult task, the paradoxes of which Husserl has tirelessly reflected upon. How can something arise in the "pure I" that has no objective validity, but wants to be itself? >Constitution/Husserl. The reflective I knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the living world is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes. Idealism/HusserlVsIdealism: [Husserl] himself assures that as a result of his thinking he has thoroughly overcome the fear of generational idealism. His theory of phenomenological reduction rather wants to bring the true meaning of this idealism to the first implementation. Transcendental subjectivity is the "primal ego" and not "one ego". For it, the ground of the given world is suspended. It is the irrelative par excellence, to which all relativity, including that of the researching ego, is related. Gadamer I 253 Idealism/Husserl/Gadamer: Meanwhile, there is already a moment in Husserl's work that threatens to constantly break this framework. His position is in fact even more than a radicalization of transcendental idealism, and the function that the term gains with him is characteristic of this. >Life/Husserl. Husserl I 102 I, Ego, Self/principle of unity/Husserl: the I, ego or self remains identical through different acts of consciousness. I-Pole/Husserl: the I-pole means to be attentive, to be focused on, to be busy with, to take a stand. Here the ego centers functions. Stream of consciousness: is a temporal stream. The ego is identical. See also Person/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Method | Menger | Coyne I 7 Method/Menger/Coyne/Boettke: (…) Carl Menger provided a unique set of methodological principles that are at the foundation of what makes Austrian economics distinct. These principles are grounded in the core purpose of economics, which is the intelligibility of the world in which we live. Further, since their goal is to understand the human world, economists must render the events under examination intelligible in terms of purposeful human action. This leads to the recognition that only individuals face decisions and make choices, though undoubtedly conditioned by their social surroundings. >Decision, >Decision making process, >Actions. Methodological individualism: Therefore, social phenomena are only rendered intelligible if the economist traces those phenomena back to individual decisions. This is the concept of “methodological individualism,” which holds that people, with their unique purposes and plans, are the beginning of all economics analysis. Groups and organizations, which consist of people, do not engage in choice and do not have purposes and plans absent the individuals that constitute the group. This involves starting with the individual choosers and tracing out the implications of their decisions in light of their desired ends. Analysis: These core principles - methodological individualism and purposive behaviour - have important implications for the way that we engage in economic analysis. We are interested in explaining a variety of complex phenomena - for example, exchange, price formation - and to do so we appreciate that these phenomena are composed of the actions of numerous individual actors. It is only by appreciating the purposes and plans of individuals that we can hope to make sense of the world. The theorems of economics - that is, the concepts of marginal utility and opportunity cost, and the principle of demand and supply - are all derived from reflection upon purposefulness in human action. >Marginal utility, >Opportunity cost, >Demand, >Supply, >Price, >Exchange. Economic theory does not represent a set of testable hypotheses, but rather a set of conceptual tools that aid us in reading and understanding the complexities of the empirical world. This is fundamentally different from the scientific method employed in the natural sciences. >Human Action/Austrian School. |
Meng I K. Menger Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics (Vienna Circle Collection) 1979 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 404 Cosmological proof of God/Stegmüller: Laws of nature do not explain anything. 1. these laws of nature could also have been different. 2. it could also have been that nothing exists. >Existence, >Ontology, >Necessity, >Contingency. Stegmüller IV 406 God/Swinburne: our background knowledge contains all knowledge about the world, but no religious assumptions - then it is more likely that there is God than that there is none. >Background, >Knowledge. Stegmüller IV 408 Proof of God/Swinburne/MackieVsSwinburne/Stegmüller: if you want to explain the order of the natural world by divine plan, you have to explain the order in the divine plan. >Order, >Structures, >Explanation. Stegmüller IV 419 Order/God's proof/Stegmüller: a spiritual order needs no less explanation than a material one. Stegmüller IV 427 Proof of God/Stegmüller: ontological: on reason alone cosmological: with empirical premises teleological: on structures of order, appearance of purposefulness moral proof: not only theoretical knowledge, but also second-order moral assumptions. >Morality, >Ethics , >Levels. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Swinburne | Stegmüller IV 404 Cosmological proof of God/Stegmüller: Laws of nature explain nothing: 1st These laws of nature could also have been different. 2nd it could also have been that nothing exists. >Existence, >Ontology, >Necessity, >Contingency. Stegmüller IV 406 God/Swinburne: our background knowledge contains all knowledge about the world, but no religious assumptions - then it is more likely that there is God than that there is none. >Background, >Knowledge. Stegmüller IV 408 Proof of God/Swinburne/MackieVsSwinburne/Stegmüller: if you want to explain the order of the natural world by divine plan, you have to explain the order in the divine plan. >Order, >Structures, >Explanation. Stegmüller IV 419 Order/God's proof/Stegmüller: A spiritual order does not need less explanation than a material one. Stegmüller IV 427 Proof of God/Stegmüller: ontological: on reason alone cosmological: with empirical premises teleological: on structures of order, appearance of purposefulness. Moral proof: not only theoretical knowledge, but also second-order moral assumptions. >Morals, >Ethics, >Levels. |
Swinburne I R. Swinburne Justification of Induction Oxford 1974 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Solipsism | Husserl | Gadamer I 252 Solipsism/Husserl/Gadamer: It is clear that the lifeworld is always at the same time a community world and contains the coexistence of others. It is a personal world, and such a personal world is always assumed to be valid in a natural attitude. The reflective "I" knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the lifeworld is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes. >Life world/Husserl. Paradoxes/Husserl: According to his belief, they dissolve when the transcendental sense of phenomenological reduction is held with real consistency and if one is not afraid of the bugbear of a transcendental solipsism. Gadamer: In view of these clear tendencies of Husserl's thought formation, it seems absurd to me to attribute to Husserl any ambiguity in the concept of constitution, an in-between of definition of meaning and creation(1). [Husserl] himself assures that, as a result of his thinking, he has thoroughly overcome the fear of the idealism of creation. Gadamer I 260 Gadamer: I would like to remind you that Husserl himself faced the problem of the paradoxes that arise from the implementation of his transcendental solipsism. HeideggerVsHusserl/Gadamer: It is therefore factually not easy to describe the point from which Heidegger could confront Husserl's phenomenological idealism. Indeed, one must even admit that Heidegger's draft of "Being and Time" had not completely escaped the realm of the transcendental problem of reflection. The idea of fundamental ontology, its foundation on the existence that is concerned with this, and the analysis of this existence seemed at first to measure only a new question dimension within transcendental phenomenology(2). And if Heidegger's methodological program was critically directed against the concept of transcendental subjectivity, to which Husserl referred back all of his final justification, Husserl would have called it a misjudgment of the radicality of transcendental reduction. He would certainly have asserted that transcendental subjectivity itself already had all the implications of substance ontology and with it the objectivism of the tradition had been overcome and eliminated. Husserl also saw himself in opposition to the whole of metaphysics. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity, >Objectivism. 1. Like E. Fink in his lecture: »L'analyse intentionnelle et le probleme de la pensée spéculative«, in Problemes actuels de la Phénoménologie, 1952. 2. Like O. Becker emphasized in the Husserlfestschrift, p. 39. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Teleology | Jonas | Brocker I 614 Teleology/Purposes/Nature/Existence/Ultimate Justification/JonasVsAristoteles/Jonas: Jonas Thesis: We must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (1) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (2) Context: the question is how to justify that we should limit our lives today for the sake of future generations. See Intergenerational Justice/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Responsibility/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas. Jonas speaks of the "superiority of purpose per se over futility" and adds: "In purposefulness as such, whose reality and effectiveness in the world according to the previous [...] is to be considered established, we can see a fundamental self-affirmation of being, which sets it absolutely as the better against non-being. In every purpose being explains itself and against nothingness" (3). 1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 138. 2. Ibid. p. 142f. 3. Ibid. p. 155. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Teleology | Nagel | Wright I 28 Teleology/Balance/Homeostasis/Feedback/Cybernetics/Naqel/Braithwaite/Wright, G. H.: Example: Regulation of the temperature of a system by a thermostat. In this case, the rise or fall of the temperature is considered to be a "defect" or "correction" of a subsystem. The effect factor of the second system gives the effect of the cause factor of the first system an "appearance of teleology". However, both systems work according to causal laws. >Causal laws. Rosenblueth/Wiener/Bigelow: Thesis: Purposefulness can generally be explained with the help of such a chain of causal systems. --- Wright I 29 Braithwaite: Thesis: Teleological explanations, both of intentional target-oriented activities and of target-oriented behaviour in general can be reduced to (forms of) causal explanations.(1) Ernest Nagel(2): More cautious than Braithwaite: Thesis: Nagel sees teleological explanations in biology as "reducible" to causal explanations. Wright: this is a cautious reproduction of Ernest Nagel's view. 1. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, 1953 Kap X 2. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, 1961, Kap XII |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Teleology | Wiener | Wright I 157 Teleology/Wiener/Bigelow/Wright, G. H.: Bigelow and Wiener want to restrict "teleological behaviour" to "targeted reactions controlled by trial and error". This means that it is equivalent to behavior controlled by negative feedback.(1) >Feedback/Wright, G. H.. Wright I 28 Teleology/Balance/Homeostasis/Feedback/Cybernetics/Wright, G. H.: Example: Control of the temperature of a system by a thermostat. In this case, the rise or fall of the temperature is considered to be a "defect" or "correction" of a subsystem. The effect factor of the second system gives the effect of the cause factor of the first system an "appearance of teleology". However, both systems work according to causal laws. >Feedback, >Causal laws, >Causal relation, >Causality, >Cybernetics. Rosenblueth/Wiener/Bigelow: Thesis: Purposefulness can generally be explained by such a chain of causal systems. 1. A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow „Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“, 1943, S. 23-24. |
WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Teleology | Wright | I 28 Teleology/Wright, G. H.: two sections: a) the domain of the terms, function, goal (purposefulness) and "organic wholeness" ("systems"). b) Purposefulness and intentionality. >Intentionality, >Goals, >Function, >Systems. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Vitalism | Mayr | I 29 Vitalists/Vitalism/Mayr: Appropriateness (before Kant). >Purposefulness. "Protoplasm": a special substance that inanimate matter lacks. I 31 Vitality, "élan vital". Fluid: (no liquid) Debate "Preformations/Epigenesis Theory 2nd half of the 18th century. Preformationists: believed that the parts of an adult individual were already present in smaller form at the beginning of its development. (Caspar Friedrich Wolff refuted preformation, needed causal power "vis essentialis"). I 33 Epigenetics: assumed that they appeared as products of a development, not at the beginning. >Terminology/Mayr. Blumenbach, rejected "vis essentialis" and spoke of "educational drive" that plays a role not only in the embryo but also in growth, regeneration and reproduction. I 35 Selection theory: made vitalism superfluous: Haeckel:"We recognize in Darwin's selection the decisive proof for the exclusive effectiveness of mechanical causes in the entire field of biology... definitive end of all teleological and vitalistic interpretations of organisms".(1) I 35 Protoplasm: the search for it promoted a flourishing branch of chemistry: colloid chemistry. It was finally discovered that there is no protoplasm! Word and concept disappeared. Life: it became possible to explain it by means of molecules and their organisation! Organic/inorganic: in 1828 urea was synthesized: first proof of the artificial conversion of inorganic components into an organic molecule! I 38 Vitalism: Strange phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century vitalistic ideas arose. Bohr: in organisms, certain laws could have an effect that cannot be found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and drew on some desperate analogies. MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing that can be considered.(Unclear only in the subatomic field). Cf. >Eccles/Popper. 1. E. Haeckel (1869/1879). Über Entwicklungsgang und Aufgabe der Zoologie. In. Jeanuische zeitung 5 s. 353-370. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
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