Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basic Concepts | Schiffer | I 10 Basic concept/Schiffer: a theory cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. - E.g. therefore "Kripke refers to Kripke" cannot be a primitive, naked fact. >Naked facts, >Bare facts, >Definitions, >Meaning theory, >Theories. I 216 Basic concept/Schiffer: for a basic concept there must be an axiom and a set of conditions. >Axioms, >Rules. Problem: therefore, "believes" cannot be a basic concept, because there are infinitely many conditional clauses or axioms needed. >Propositional attitudes/Schiffer. "Thinks" is not a basic concept, yet semantically simple, but does not fulfill certain conditions and denotes nothing. >Denotation, >Thinking. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Dispositions | Esfeld | I 289 Bare dispositions/Esfeld: bare dispositions have no non-dispositional basis. >Bare particulars, >Bare facts, >Foundation, >Actions. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Explanation | Nozick | II 10 Explanation/Nozick: not based on arguments - and not on evidence - because an evidence provides no understanding. >Understanding, >Argumentation, >Proofs, >Provability, >Evidence. Hypotheses that are needed in an explanation must not be known to be true. >Hypotheses, >Knowledge. II 12 Explanation/Nozick: locates something in the topicality. >Actuality. Understanding: localizes something in the space of possibilities. >Possibility, >Truth conditions, cf. >Understanding/Dummett. II 115 Existence/explanation/Leibniz/Nozick: each factor that should explain why there is anything at all, will be part itself of what needs to be explained. cf. >Existence/Leibniz. Explanation: always happens in terms of something else - one cannot explain everything, but nothing is inexplicable in principle. >Concepts, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 116 Explanation/Nozick: is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive: - irreflexive: nothing explains itself. Asymmetrical: if X explains Y then Y does not explain X (not reversible). II 117 Transitive: if X explains Y and Y explains Z, then X explains Z. - With that a strict partial order is established. >Partial order. II 118f Explanation/existence/Nozick: another possibility: explanation from laws or theories. >Laws, >Theories. Question: why is there then such theories and laws. Ultimate justification/self-explanation: could one last law subsume itself? >Ultimate justification. Last law: must have any characteristic C - all other laws. Problem: truth is not proven from form. >Truth, >Proofs, >Provability. II 120 Explanation/level/stage/Nozick: some authors: the statement must be deeper than the explained. KripkeVs: new theory: statements themselves seek the appropriate level - the highest level/stage/Kripke: those to which the sentence to its reference is applied to. >Truth/Kripke, >S.A. Kripke, >Fixped points/Kripke. Nozick: then P has to be, when used in a deduction, one level lower than its instance - then a deduced statement is lower when it subsumes something than when it is subsumed. >Deduction. II 120 Self-explanation/Nozick: self subsumption explains itself in the quantifier logic - Otherwise:. explanation is irreflexive - that means, it cannot explain itself. Bare facts/Nozick: a) something that cannot be explained by something else b) weaker: something that cannot be explained by something else. Then the explanatory self subsumption is a bare fact that explains itself. >Bare facts. II 305 Explanation/Nozick: one says, an explanation should not have less (for example, semantic) depth than the explained. >Semantics, >Semantic facts. II 308 Causation/Descartes: cannot be less deep than the effect (principle). >Cause, >Effect, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Principles. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Facts | Simons | I 317 Mere fact/Simons: e.g. that something happens to be a part of something else is a mere fact. >Bare facts, >Mere facts, >Coincidence. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Facts | Vendler | Z. Vendler, Die Linguistik und das a priori in: Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt 1974/1995 I 252 Naked fact/bare fact/Vendler: e.g. in chess: move a piece of ivory across the board. There are no bare facts of language here. - You can not step out of the language. >Exterior/interior, >Language, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Metalanguage. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Mind Body Problem | Putnam | IV 146ff Mind Body Problem/Leib-Seele-Problem/Putnam: you can no longer see the mind body problem as a real theoretical problem. A "solution" would not throw the least light on the world. The identity of logical and structural states of machines is also not important at all - even if everything is accurate, it would only be a discovery about the language. IV 147 Mind Body Problem: it is the question whether or not mental events can be identified with physical events in connection with it. >Identity theory, >Type/Token identity, >Type/Token, >Token-physicalism. Question: can a logical analogue be constructed? Carnap: partially interpreted calculation: machine: state A, when flip-flop circuit 36 is on. Theoretical Language: for the machine: "flip-flop circuit 36 is on." Observation Language: for the machine: "I am in state A". Here, the theoretical language is partially interpreted by the observation language. >Observation language, >Interpretation, cf. >Theoretical term. IV 148 Putnam: thesis: all considerations for or against the identification of body and mind can be parallelized with considerations for or against the finding that state A is actually identical to the flip-flop circuit 36 being on. State A : is directly observable. Flip-flop circuit: the flip-flop circuit can only be determined indirectly via highly complicated conclusions. (1) "synthetic" statement: "I am in state A exactly when the flip-flop circuit is 36 on". (2) also synthetic: "I have pain exactly when my C fibers are irritated." IV 148/149 A synthetic statement cannot have an identity, otherwise it would be analytical. >Analyticity/syntheticity. This traditional argumentation for dualism does not use "bare facts of direct experience" at all, but is a complicated train of thought that includes: a) an objectification of universals (properties, states, events) and b) a sharp analytical/synthetic distinction. >Dualism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Qualities | Field | IV 409 Primary qualities/Locke: E.g. length, size, shape - secondary: e.g. color. Secondary quality/Locke: do not resemble our ideas directly. Putnam thesis: Kant has that what Locke said about secondary qualities extended to primary qualities. Field: many say that today because the imaging theory is dead. FieldVsPicture theory. >Picture theory. Locke: color is a force to affect us. Putnam: this also applies to size, charge, mass,...etc. Putnam: Putnam even extends this to properties of sensations. - But this force is not a noumenon, but the world itself (= Vs correspondence theory - ((s): Forces instead of objects). >Noumenon, >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Problem/Field: if electrons do not exist as noumena, they do not exist at all. IV 410 Qualities/Locke: secondary qualities are founded in primary: the objects have the power to affect us by the length, size, mass, etc. of the corpuscles - otherwise there are bare facts. "Things for us"/Putnam/Field: according to the limits of scientific research. IV 412 I.e. shape, etc. are only dispositions; we will never represent the last properties, to appear so and so. - We will never represent the last properties. FieldVsPutnam: that can never be proven. >Representation, >Properties. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ultimate Justification | Nozick | II 131 ff Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing 2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist. Richness: all possibilities are realized. Cf. >Possible Worlds/Leibniz, >Possible Worlds. Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds. >Possibility, cf. >Real world. In addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance). >Invariance, >Bare Facts, >Existence/Nozick. II 137 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. >Reflexivity, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 138 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). >Circular reasoning, >Lists. Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation. >Sufficient reason. II 278 Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. >Wholes, >Totality. A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence. >Justification, >Explanation, >Evidence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counterfactual Conditional | Field Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 220 Problem of Quantities/PoQ/Modality/Field: but this does not exclude a possible modal solution to the PoQ: perhaps other operators can help? Anyway, I do not know how that could be excluded, even if I do not know what these operators should look like. I 221 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./PoQ/Field: one suggestion is to use Counterfactual Conditional to solve the PoQ: FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: 1) they are known to be extremely vague. Therefore, you should not rely on them when formulating a physical theory. Neither should we use Counterfactual Conditional for the development of geometrical concepts. 2) DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: They cannot be "barely true": if a Counterfactual Conditional is supposed to be true, then there must be some facts (known or unknown facts) that can be determined without Counterfactual Conditional, and by virtue of which the Counterfactual Conditional are true. (Dummett, 1976, p.89). Then the relationism cannot use the Counterfactual Conditional for the PoQ, because in that case the principle requires: if distance relations are counterfactually defined, then situations that differ in their distance relations (like situations A and B) must also differ in non-counterfactual respects!. Substantivalism: can guarantee that. Relationism: cannot, and if it could, it would need no Counterfactual Conditional. 3) VsCounterfactual conditionals: does not work for very similar reasons for which the version with impredicative properties (P3) did not work: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot also be counterfactually defined, (This is the formal reason for the metaphysical argument of Dummett, for why Counterfactual Conditional cannot be "barely true"). E.g. In order to prove the incompatibility of "double distance" and "triple distance" (given that z and w do not occupy the same point, i.e. given that zw is not congruent with zz - (logical form: local equality) - then you would need the incompatibility of the following: a) if there were a point u in the middle between x and y, then uy would be congruent with zw. b) if there were a point s between x and y, and a point t between s and y, so that xs, st and ty were all congruent, then ty would be congruent with zw. If these Counterfactual Conditional were somehow derivable from non-counterfactual statements, E.g. statements about spacetime points (ST points), then you could probably, and by way of derivation. I 222 Together with the demonstrable relations between the non-counterfactual statements win an argument for the incompatibility of (a) and (b). But if we have no non-counterfactual support, we would have to consider them as bare facts. That would not be so bad if you only needed a small amount of them, but we would need a very large number of them. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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