Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Copenhagen Interpretation | Genz | II 116 Copenhagen interpretation/Bohr/Genz: the Copenhagen interpretation was an interpretation not as a physical, but as a logical theory. Thesis: no object can have a certain location and speed at the same time. >Quantum meachanics, >Uncertainty principle. II 117 Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen/EPR/EPRVsQuantum Mechanics/Genz: it is possible to determine both the location and the speed. Genz: today VsEPR: the EPR was refuted by Bell. >Bell's inequality. EPR: supplementation of the microscope with a thought device which, at any distance from the device, determines location and speed individually and independently of each other, so to speak, by remote investigation using quantum mechanics. Reality/EPR/Genz: thesis: if one can predict the value of a physical quantity without disturbing the observed system, then an element exists in reality that corresponds to this quantity. >Measurements, >Predictions. GenzVs: it turned out that this is not the case. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Bohr, N. | Barrow Vs Bohr, N. | I 244 Measuring: Major problem with the Copenhagen interpretation: What is a measurement? Bohr: a measurement is done when the infinitely spreading wave function "collapses" at a certain place at a certain but unpredictable state. (E.g. double-slit). Question: Does the wave function of the neutron collapse when it hits the photographic plate, which plays the role of inanimate observer, or does it collapse, because a physicist observes the entire system of the interaction of the wave function of the neutron with the film? Where and when does the wave function actually collapse? VsBohr: the problem of Bohr's interpretation is that it does not really pretend to describe what quantum states and measuring devices are, but only how they relate to each other. The only thing that is clear is that the measurement process has properties that are diametrically opposed to those that are present when no measurement is made. I 245 While the wave function is deterministic, linear, continuous and local, and does not know any determinate time direction, the measuring process is almost random, non-linear, discontinuous, non-local and irreversible. Schrödinger never accepted the Copenhagen interpretation. E.g. Schrödinger's cat: a cat is locked into a steel chamber together with a Geiger counter and a weak radioactive source. If the counter registers one of these decay coincidences within an hour, it releases poisonous gas that kills the cat quickly. If during that hour no atom falls apart, the cat survives. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, as Schrödinger asserts, the cat is a mixture of dead and alive before we look into the steel chamber. When and where changes the state of neither alive nor dead to either one or the other? (Variant of the example with a space capsule in which the cat has been dead for years from one moment to another.) I 246 Schrödinger wanted to show that the quantum theory does not fully describe the reality. We should see our knowledge of the cat in a confused state, not the cat itself. BohrVsSchrödinger in contrast would have claimed that there is no such thing as "the cat itself". The only existing reality is our knowledge about the cat. In addition, the macroscopic scale reduces the importance of the example. Vs: We could argue that we do not know whether a cat is in a mixed state if we see one. Now, if lasers could be made to show us mixed states, they would not be macroscopical, however. Eugene Wigner, John v. Neumann: Thesis: only certain instruments can collapse the wave equation, namely those that have a consciousness similar to that of humans. (Somewhat surprising for logicians). This could be construed as an argument against quantum computers. Barrow: before we have those, we cannot say anything about them... +... I 247. Paradoxically, if conscious observers are split into microscopic particles, we reach levels of the quantum structure, at which only an observer can give meaning. (.. + ..>Consciousness) >Consciousness means that we do not have to learn by trial and error. I 247 Wheeler: almost all astronomical observations are made with radiation, quantum waves whose wave function is collapsed by the detectors and astronomers. Does this mean that we bring these astronomical objects and the universe itself to life, in a way, if we observe them today? VsBohr: main problem is that he attributes a special role to measurement. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Copenhague Interpr. | Fraassen Vs Copenhague Interpr. | I 175 Copenhagen Interpretation/CI/Double Slit/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Fraassen: revolutionary: the number that results from the formula Pmw(E) is the conditional probability of a result that is within E, given that the observable m was measured in a system in state w - VsBorn: no trajectory through the upper slit: instead. I a I ² is the probability (prob.) that if a measurement is made, we obtain a light spot - to say that a system is in a certain state only indicates a relation of conditional probabilities of measurements - FraassenVsCopenhagen Interpretation: it is not certain whether the concepts of probability and conditional probability are applicable - I 177 but the Copenhagen interpretation allows viewing probability as a measure of objective variables: the frequency of results - problem: when no measurements are made. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Everett, H. | Putnam Vs Everett, H. | I (i) 225/226 Many Worlds Interpretation/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Everett/Putnam: should restore the "perspective of God." The universe evolves deterministically, there is no "reduction of the wave packet" (no "collapse of the wave equation"). Putnam: as a philosopher I am fascinated by that as a cultural phenomenon. I (i) 228 The space-time structure is the one of relativistic physics (hence it is so attractive for cosmologists). The logic is classical logic. Only problem: the whole speech of the "many worlds" is just a picture. I (i) 251 Another problem: how the concept of probability is to interpret if all the worlds are "equally possible". I (i) 229 PutnamVsMany worlds interpretations/PutnamVsEverett: requires signals that are faster than light. But instead of considering a "conflict between realism and locality", I'd rather go back to Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation. Realism/Quantum Mechanics/Putnam: although the debate in the past decade has been staring at the locality and Bell's Theorem, you look at these things best as the technical background of the problem. Paradox is the result, the need to recognize a cut between observer and system. I (i) 229/230 This seems paradoxical, because the old dream of the independent reality must be abandoned. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 54 FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT. I 55 PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses. I 56 Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Copenhagen Interpr.. | Bohm, D. | Gribbin III 226 BohmVsBohr / BohmVs Copenhagen interpretation: the particles have a specific place and a certain speed - measuring only changes the master shaft and all particles under its influence - (Hidden Variable) - III 227 master shaft: interaction of waves and particles - they could be faster than light - it connects everything with everything. |
Gribbin I John Gribbin Schrödinger’s Kitten and the Search for Reality, London 1995 German Edition: Schrödingers Kätzchen und die Suche nach der Wirklichkeit Frankfurt/M. 1998 Gribbin II John Gribbin In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat, London 1984 German Edition: Auf der Suche nach Schrödingers Katze. Quantenphysik und WIrklichkeit München 1987 |
| Spin | Kopenhagener Deutung | Gribbin III 45 Copenhagen interpretation / Gribbin: thesis: after the collapse, the photons are in no particular spin - III 49 Aspect / experiment: proved that always the rarer case is measured - (if a pattern should arise more often according to common sense). |
Gribbin I John Gribbin Schrödinger’s Kitten and the Search for Reality, London 1995 German Edition: Schrödingers Kätzchen und die Suche nach der Wirklichkeit Frankfurt/M. 1998 |
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