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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics | Putnam | III 113f Ethics/concepts/Williams/Murdoch: ethical concepts are 1. porous: e.g. "good and right" are porous. More descriptive, less abstract: e.g."cruel", "chaste", and so on are more descriptive and less abstract. Murdoch: also descriptive components are interest-relative. VsNon-Cognitivism: his division into descriptive/prescriptive does not succeed because one cannot name the components, without even using a word like "cruel" (circular). >Noncognitivism, >Prescriptivism. Murdoch: the world is not analyzable into facts and values. Williams: pro, but we can transfer our concepts to each society. III 116 "Dense"/Williams: e.g. "chaste" can function both as a rating as well as a description. III 117 PutnamVsWilliams: it is absurd and still relativistic when "grass is green" is not to be the absolute truth (because I'm projecting colors like values). Values/Putnam: values are even worse off than colors, because after we figured out that we project them, we lose our ability to use them. >Values. III 128 PutnamVsWilliams: Williams is too complicated metaphysical. Definition ratings/Dewey: ratings arise from a critique of various problem-solving processes. >Dewey. --- V 190 Ethics/language/meaning/values/Putnam: e.g. Superbenthamian: approves the most cruel acts for "the good of the majority". After a while the language use in reference to "sincere" separates him from us. That does not mean that we and the superbenthamian agree about the facts and disagree with respect to the values. We live in different worlds. >Utilitarianism. V 208 PutnamVsBentham: we have a reason to prefer the poetry to the flea-hopping: the experience of great poetry and its aftermath. V 282 Ethics/PutnamVsBentham: (e.g. flea-hopping): there is no prejudice to prefer the poetry. The idea that values do not belong to the blocks in the world, and the idea that "value judgments" express "prejudices" are two sides of the same coin. PutnamVsSolipsism: solipsism is immoral, not everyone is trapped in a solipsistic hell, but we should participate in the discourse. >Solipsism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Norms | Cavell | II 192 Norms/Normative/Normativity/Cavell: Normativity is not in the assertions of the philosopher of the everyday language. >Everyday language, >Meaning/Intending/Cavell. II 193 Traditional problems with the concept of normativity stem from the following confusions: 1. the (wrong) idea, descriptive utterances are the opposite of normative utterances. 2. prescriptive utterances are typical examples of normative utterances. >Descriptive/prescriptive. Ad 1. typical of actions is that they can go wrong. But then descriptive statements do not represent the opposite of normative statements, but rather presuppose them. We could not do what we call describing, if the language did not comprehend us with consummation forms that are normative for describing. Ad. 2. If normative expressions are used to institutionalize rules, then prescriptive utterances are not examples of normative utterances. II 194 Formulating a norm does not mean to indicate how we should perform an action, but how the action is done! Specifying what we should do is not to institutionalize a norm, but rather presupposes the existence of a norm! Language/Norms/Cavell: We sometimes invoke standards which our interlocutor does not accept, but we do not try to institutionalize our own norms, nor to express our subjective views. >Convention. II 195 There are always different normative possibilities to fulfill the particular normative tasks. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Rules | Vendler | Z. Vendler, Die Linguistik und das a priori in: Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt 1974/1995 I 258 Rule/Vendler: in a concetual system of a language rules have two functions: a) normative (prescriptive) (philosophical) b) descriptive: describes the correct use (linguistic side). >Language use, >Language, >Correctness, >Norms, >Descriptive/prescriptive. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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