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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Accessibility | Bigelow | I 126 Accessibility relation: can be restricted: for example, by the requirement that a possible world w from the accessible possible world u does not contain any individuals that do not also contain u. That is, that the one world is only a re-structured one of the other. This would e.g. contradict Lewis counterpart theory. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis. I 136 Definition weak centering/accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: we will say that degrees of accessibility are weakly centered if no possible world is more accessible from a given possible world than this possible world itself. This is best satisfied with: d(w, w) = 0. N.b.: this ensures that some additional sentences will be true in all possible worlds, in addition to those guaranteed by the above axioms. These are derivable as theorems if we take the following axioms: A9 (reflexivity) and A16. (B would > would g)> (b> g) Everyday translation: no world can be more accessible to a world than this world is accessible to itself. This leaves open the possibility that some possible worlds have the accessibility "zero-distance" from the world w. Definition strong centering/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (in the semantics for counterfactual conditionals): no possible world can be accessible from a given world as this world is accessible from itself. This is best satisfied: If w is not equal to u, then either d(w, u) is undefined or d (w, u) > 0. This semantic condition allows a completeness proof for the axiom system which we obtain by adding the axiom of the strong centering to the above axioms: (a ∧ b)> (a would > would b) >Completeness. Counterfactual logic/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: with these axioms, we get Lewis' favored counterfactual logic. BigelowVsStrong centering. Modal logic/Axiom system/Bigelow/Pargetter: our system will be the one Lewis calls VW: V ": "variably strict", "W". "Weakly centered". 139 Accessibility Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: we must restrict it, and for a proof of completeness for S5, we must show that it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. >Systems S4/S5. S5/Canonical Model/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not only contain the Leibnizian necessity (truth in all worlds). S5: is interesting because it allows a reductionist access to possible worlds. >Reduction. Necessity: in the canonical model a proposition is necessarily true if it is true in all accessible possible worlds. >Necessity. Possible worlds: when they are designed as the maximum consistent extensions of S5, they disintegrate into different equivalence classes. ((s) i.e. for each world there is an additional sentence describing an individual with possibly different descriptions which do not contradict the other sentences). >Possible worlds, >Equivalence classes. Equivalence classes/accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: within an equivalence class, all worlds are accessible to one another. But between equivalence classes there is no accessibility from one possible world to the other. ((s), then the maximum consistent extensions must be something other than I suspected, then an extension will modify all existing propositions and makes them incomparable with a subset of the previous consistent set). >Maximum consistent. Accessibility/canonical model/Bigelow/Pargetter: in a canonical model, not all possible worlds are accessible to one another. >Canonicalness. We show it this way: Fa: (spelling: latin a) be an atomic sentence that can be added to the axioms of S5, or its negation, whereby the result being a maximally consistent set or world. With this, we are constructing a world where Fa is true. If it were accessible from all other worlds, MFa would be true in all possible worlds. But a proposition which is true in all worlds must be a theorem. But we know that Fa is not Problem: R2 (universal substitution) would ensure that Mα would be true for every α, even if α = (b u ~ b). Interpretation/Bigelow/Pargetter: if the intended interpretation of S5 is Leibnizean, as we hope ((s) necessity = truth in all worlds) then it follows that this intended interpretation of S5 is not captured by the canonical model. Possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: that supports what we want to show, namely that possible worlds are not sets of sentences. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: ...and it also shows that the accessibility relation... I 140 ... which is relevant to alethic modal logic, is not an equivalence relation. Logical truth/Bigelow/Pargetter: is truth in all possible worlds (pro Leibniz!) not merely truth in all accessible worlds? >Logical truth. I 242 Accessibility Relation/Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, we do not believe that the accessibility relation supervenes to properties and relations of the first level of the possible worlds, but on higher level universes! >Universals, >Supervenience. Two worlds can be perfectly similar in terms of universals of the first level and still have different accessibility relations! Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is an example for the failure of the supervenience of the 1st level of the accessibility relation. >Humean world. For example, "all Fs are Gs", whereby F and G are universals of the 1st level, and higher-level universals that supervene on them. I 243 Counterfactual conditional: then also counterfactual conditionals should be valid like: "If this thing had been an F, it would have been a G". We would never be sure if it was a law, even if there were no exceptions. This uncertainty is reflected in uncertainty as to whether the counterfactual conditional is true. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditionals. Even if we live in a world with laws, we allow the possibility that this world is a Humean world. It might be that the generalization is correct, but without necessity. The world would look the same in both cases. Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is, with respect to the actual world, precisely a world, which is the same, without laws. For other worlds there would be other Humean worlds. I 245 Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe in a supervenience of the accessibility relation on the contents of the world. This allows us to assume that the contents of the 1st level do not exhaust all the contents of the world. Combinatorial theories. Therefore, must accept higher-level universals, and hence the property theory of the world's properties. Universals/Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Higher-level universals are the key to laws. >Levels/order, >Description levels. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Accessibility | Kripke | I Berka 161 Def Accessibility/possible world/Kripke/Berka: the relation R exists if the world w2 is possible with reference to world w1 in the sense that every sentence which is true in w2 is possible in w1. Necessity/Kripke: a sentence is necessary in a world w1 if it is true in all worlds accessible from w1. Def normal world/Kripke: a normal world has a maximum consistent quantity of sentences in which at least one statement is necessary. Definition non-normal world/Kripke: in non-normal worlds, every sentence of type LB is false. >Possible world/Kripke, >Normal world/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Canonicalness | Bigelow | I 137 Canonical models/Bigelow/Pargetter: deal with maximally consistent sets of sentences to provide completeness proofs. >Models, >Completeness, >Proofs, >Provability. Canonical models were discovered only after Hughes/Cresswell 1968(1), they were described in the later work (Hughes/Cresswell 1984)(2). Definition completeness theorem/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a theorem that proves that if a proposition in a certain semantics is guaranteed true this proposition can be proved as a theorem. How can we prove this? How can we prove that each such proposition is a theorem? Solution: we prove the contraposition of the theorem: Instead: If a is assuredly true in semantics, a is a theorem We prove If a is not a theorem, it is not assuredly true in semantics. >Semantics. Then we prove this by finding an interpretation according to which it is false. >Interpretation, >Valuation. Def canonical model/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides an interpretation which guarantees that every non-theorem is made wrong in at least one possible world. >Possible worlds. I 138 We begin that there will be a sentence a, for which either a or ~a is a theorem. This can be added to the axioms to give another consistent set of sentences. Maximum consistent set of sentences/Bigelow/Pargetter: it can be proved that for the axiom systems which we deal with, there is always a maximally consistent set of sentences. >Maximum consistent. That is, a consistent set of sentences to which no further sentence can be added without making the set inconsistent. That is, for each sentence g is either γ in the set or ~ γ. W: be the set of all maximally consistent extensions of the axiom system with which we have begun. >Expansion. 1. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M.C. (1968) An introduction to modal logic. London: Methuen. 2. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M.C. (1984) A companion to modal logic. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Expansion | Expansion, philosophy: when expanding theories it comes to the question whether a consistent theory remains consistent when it is expanded. Maximum consistent theories are not expandable. See also axioms, maximum consistent, theories, consistency, maximum. |
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| Incompleteness | Wessel | I 200 syntactically incomplete: a sysstem that is syntactically incomplete is expandable without contradiction. In contrast: Maximum (e.g. a system can be maximum consistent). >Syntax, >Extension, >Completeness, >Systems, >Consistency, >Contradictions. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Negation | Cresswell | II 73 Double Negation/possible worlds/Proposition/indirect speech/Cresswell: Solution: if propositions are nothing but sets of possible worlds. Then not-not-a means the same as a - (because of the complement formation of the set). >Double negation, >Possible worlds. Indirect speech: problem: if propositions should be something else than sets of possible worlds: then it may be that the speaker has said nothing at all. Then the double negation is something else. ((s) "He has not said anything to this" does not mean that he rejects a.) >Indirect speech. II 73 Problem: but then the truth value differs against the logic. >Truth values. Solution/Cresswell: Hyperintensionality: hyperintensional propositions express (despite the same intension of a and not-not-a) different propositions. ((s) Then intension is unequal proposition). >Hyperintensionality. Solution/Cresswell: Structural ambiguity: "saying" is sometimes applied to whole sentence, sometimes to parts. VsHyperintensionality: before, the meaning of "not" was clear, it is now unclear. II 74f Double Negation/Cresswell: another problem: we can add to maximum consistent sets of propositions further inconsistent propositions. - The sets are then equal with respect to the consistent propositions and differ only in the inconsistent ones. >maximum consistent. N.B.: if there are only possible worlds (no impossible world), a and ~~a are equal. Impossible world: if they are admitted, there is a difference between position and double negation. - that is because "~" is then no real negation. >Impossible world. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Possibility | Adams | Stalnaker I 34 Possibility/Robert Adams: Thesis: Possibility is rather holistic than atomistic in the sense that what is possible is only part of a possible totally determined world. ("Possible completely determinate world"). >Possible worlds/Adams. Stalnaker: so far, however, our reflections do not imply that any consistent set of propositions is a subset of a world history. For the following (W4) does not follow from them, but must be added as an addition: (W4) Each consistent set is a subset of a maximum consistent set. Possible world/proposition/reduction/Stalnaker: we have two types of reduction: a) Reduction of possible worlds on propositions. b) Reduction of propositions to possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Propositions, >Reduction. The two are not equivalent. Of course, they differ in terms of what is to be the basic concept. >Possible worlds/Adams, >World-story theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Bigelow | I 138 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: a possible world e, in which a sentence a is true, is then defined as the maximum consistent set containing a as an element. >Modalities/Bigelow. Possible world/(s): Possible worlds are then completely described in all details, nothing is unmentioned and no detail is described contradictory. N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: the wit is that then every non-theorem in any possible world is wrong. It will be wrong in a maximum consistent extension. There will be a maximum consistent extension in which the sentence is wrong, i.e. a world in which it is wrong. Theorem: is then a sentence that is true in all possible worlds. And that is what a completeness theorem is supposed to show. >Completeness. Maximum Consistent Extension/Bigelow/Pargetter: a consistent set of sentences is extended by adding either a or ~a if it does not become inconsistent as a result. The extension is maximally consistent if a (or ~a) was the last sentence that could be added. >Maximum consistent. ((s) there may be many extensions depending on whether an individual is described differently in the sentence added. This provides equivalence classes. I 206 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a maximum consistent property that includes all the things and properties of a world. World/Properties/Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do the previous theories in philosophy history look like, in which one tried to describe the world as an aggregate of properties? E.g. Wittgenstein, Tractatus E.g. Carnap, The logical structure of the world. .... >L. Wittgenstein, >Tractatus, >R. Carnap, >Properties, >Facts, >Circumstances, >World, >Reality, >Ontology, >Atomism. Bigelow/Pargetter: we could consider the space-time points as the last individuals of the world. Each of them can either have a certain property or not. >Space-time points. Then we can construct sets of ordered pairs ‹assigned, x› Democritus' world/Terminology/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: that is how Cresswell called worlds constructed from such points. (Cresswell 1972(1), 1973(2)) >M. J. Cresswell. That is roughly the same as Russell's logical atomism. An n-digit predicate, followed by n individuals. >B. Russell, >Predicates. Atomism: we should assume that such atomic sentences are logically independent of each other. >Atomism. I 207 If it is only a question of whether a point is occupied or not, the corresponding sentence set will surely be consistent. Book: a complete "book of the world" would not be a world, but only a representation. Properties: then arise from books as follows: instead of the atomic sentences, we form longer sentences from combinations of descriptions of points by ordered pairs. This simply leads to a longer book. I 208 Points: instead of them we could also take waves, or elementary particles. Properties: instead of the property of a space-time point to be occupied we could also choose properties such as charge, mass, and so on. From these we can make sequences: ‹P^1, P2,... x› this represents a point with several properties. Mass: is of course a determinable (see above).), i. e. we still need real numbers to indicate the proportion that determines the D-able. >Determinates/determinables. Therefore, we are dealing with a sequence that relates an individual to its properties: ‹r1, r2,... x› wherein ri is a real number. Def possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: a lot of such sequences... {‹r1, r2,... x›, ‹r' 1, r' 2,... y›,... }} I 209 ...then represent a possible world (which is much richer than a Democritical world). >Democritus. 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1972). The world is everything that is the case. Australasen Journal of Philosophy 50, pp.1-13. 2. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). ogic and languages. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Possible Worlds | Kripke | I 51f The expressions "winners" and "losers" do not refer to the same objects in all possible worlds. >Rigidity. I 51 Proper names are rigid designators: Nixon is Nixon in all possible worlds, but he is not the winner of the election in all the possible worlds (descriptions are non-rigid designators). >Names/Kripke. I 54 Possible worlds are no foreign countries. A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate it with. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 55 Possible world/Lewis: possible worlds are counterparts, not the same people. Kripke: then it is not about identification but about similarity relation. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 90/91 We do not demand that the objects must exist in all possible worlds of course. Possible world/counterparts: strict identity: are molecules. Counterparts: are for example, tables (not identity of qualities, but of individual objects). Counterpart/Lewis: representatives of the theories that a possible world is only given qualitatively to us ("counterpart theory", David Lewis) argue that Aristotle and his counterparts "in other possible worlds" are "to be identified" with those things that Aristotle resembles most in his most important characteristics. I 123 ff Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that would be used by people in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but situation possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Nonexistence. I 143 Epistems: epistems are a different concept of possibility than in logic. The designation is done by us. >Naming/Kripke. --- Berka I 161 Def normal world/Kripke: a normal world is a maximum consistent set of sentences in which at least one statement is necessary. Def non-normal world/Kripke: in non-normal worlds each sentence of the type LB is false. Berka I 179 Definition possible world/Kripke: old: (1959)(1) a world is possible with the complete attribution of truth value, i.e. it is impossible to find two possible worlds in which each atomic formula is attributed to the same truth value (absolute concept of the possible world). New definition: (1963)(2): a world is possible in relation to another world (relatively possible world) Hughes/Cresswell: > accessibility relation. Reflexive accessibility: each possible world is in itself, i.e. that each statement that is true in H is also possible in H. Definition necessary: a formula A in H if it is true in every (possible) world accessible from H. Definition possible: dual to this: if A is possible in H1, iff a world H2 exists, which is possible in relation to H1, and true in A. Transitivity: H2RH3: any formula that is true in H3 is possible in H2. Problem: for traceability to H1 we need a reduction axiom: "what is possibly possible is possible" - you can also set the equivalence relation as accessibility relation. --- Hughes/Cresswell I 243 Non-normal world/possible world/Kripke: non-normal worlds are worlds in which each statement is possible without exception, i.e. including those of the form p. ~p rating: like in normal worlds (p ~ p.) Never 1 - but for modal formulas V (Ma) is always 1 in non-normal worlds, and hence V(La) is always 0, i.e. there are no necessary statements in non-normal worlds. this n-n world is at least accessible for a normal world, but no world is accessible to a n-n world - not even for these themselves. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true, e.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz: they it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analog: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. 1) S.A. Kripke (1959): "A completeness theorem in modal logic", in: The journal of symbolic logic 24 (1), pp. 1-14. 2) S.A. Kripke (1962): The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantification Theory, in: Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Vol. 8, pp. 113-116. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Terminology | Bigelow | I 40 Spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: 0 Individual (o) Property of the individual (o, o) Relation of individuals (2-digit) (o, o, o) three-digit relation ((o)) Property of property or (s) set of properties (o, (o)) Relation between individual and property I 43 Note: Universals/Terminology/Putnam/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Putnam 1975)(1) Differentiation a) 2nd degree: properties of properties b) 2nd level: properties of individuals who have these properties by virtue of their properties. (see below: Section 2., 4). I 43 Universals/Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Frege 1884) would describe our universals as "objects" and not as "concepts". I 137 Definition Book Theories/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see below Chapter 4) are reductionist possible-world theories that identify possible worlds with entities as they occur in canonical models: maximum consistent sets of sentences. 1. Putnam, H. (1975). On properties. In: Philosophical Papers, Vol 1. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Adams, R. | Stalnaker Vs Adams, R. | I 32 Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Robert Adams: if there are true sentences in which the existence of non-actual possible worlds is mentioned, it must be possible to reduce them to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned that are not identical with non-actual possibilities. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why that should be necessary. World Stories/Possible Worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world story is a maximum consistent quantity of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent and contradictory. Propositions/Adams/Stalnaker: can be language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: is a property of sets of propositions. They can be defined in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Every subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff {A,B} is not consistent and for each set of consistent propositions Γ either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} is consistent. The theory assumes: (W3) Every proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on the propositions except what is needed for the sake of compatibility, implication and equivalence. And to ensure, for example, that the right kind of implication exists. E.g. implication: Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. This minimal theory is suited to support the view of Adams: Possibility/Robert Adams: Thesis: possibility is rather holistic than atomistic, in the sense that what is possible only exists as part of a possible completely determinate world. ((s) there are no isolated possibilities). Stalnaker: so far, our considerations do not imply that every consistent set of propositions is a subset of a world story. For the following (W4) does not follow from them, but must be added as an addition: (W4) Every consistent set is a subset of a maximum consistent set. I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: in contrast, an analysis of propositions as possible worlds provides definitions of consistency and so on in terms of set-theoretic relations between sets of possible worlds. World Stories Theory/Possible World/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of the world stories is weaker, because it leaves open questions that are clarified by the analysis of propositions as possible worlds. The following two theses are consequences of the possible world theory, but not of the world stories theory: (W5) Closure Condition: For each set of propositions Γ there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. for each set of propositions, there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Bradley, F.H. | Rescher Vs Bradley, F.H. | I 370 Def Truth/Bradley (Idealist): "Truth is an ideal expression of the universe, coherent and comprehensive at the same time. I 371 RescherVsBradley: But "coherence" is a transitive verb. Any coherence must be coherence with something. Coherence/Rescher: is a property that cannot have individual propositions but only sets. In a truly coherent system, we can infer from the falsity of any proposition within the system the falsity of any other proposition. (Arithmetic). I 373 E.g. Multiplication of false results is itself a contradictory procedure. I 374 We cannot therefore argue that none of the coherent propositions can be false without all being false, but only that none can be false without some others also being false. Unless the propositions are simply redundant, they cannot all be true or false at the same time. ((s) thus not maximum consistent). |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Lewis, D. | Blackburn Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 57 Counterpart/cp/RosenVsLewis/BlackburnVsLewis: the counterpart theory turns our emotional attachment to the counterfactual facts into a mystery. Why should we, worry about things that happen to other people in other universes? LewisVsVs/Schwarz: why should we care about the elements of maximum consistent sentence quantities or the counterfactual properties of abstract facts? Counterfactual/Bennett/Schwarz: one reason why the K interests us is that we want to avoid future mistakes. (Bennett, 1988(1), 62). Existence/SchwarzVsLewis: imprecise formulation: for Lewis Humphrey only exists in the real world, but in a broader sense - as a cp - he exists in many possible worlds, of course. KripkeVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis: deny that there are possible worlds which include Humphrey as a real part. Kris McDaniel/Schwarz: is the only one who ever claimed that the possible worlds e.g. contain Humphrey as a real spatio-temporal part. (2004)(2). 1. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2. Kris McDaniel [2004]: “Modal Realism with Overlap”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 137–152 |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Meinong, A. | Meixner Vs Meinong, A. | I 62 Round Square/Description/Meinong/Meixner: the Meinongian does not say that the round square exists, he goes even further and says that it cannot exist at all, he insists only that it is an entity. I 63 MeinongVsRussell: if the description "the golden mountain" designates an incomplete individual, then probably also the following description is exactly the same: "the existing golden mountain". MeixnerVsMeinong: not very convincing. However: "Weak Sense"/Existence: like Holmes, you can say in the weak sense, "it has the property F to exist". But that is not the strong sense. Possibilia/Meixner: individual-like entities that are at least in principle able to exist. ((s) So not a round square). Question: Is there such a thing? That would be exactly the ee maximum consistent individuals. The impossible are not ee maximum consistent. Maximum consistent individuals: e.g. Meixner, Bush, (sets of properties). Pure Posssibilia: only possible individuals. Are there any? Language: interestingly, has no names for pure Possibilia! I 64 Nevertheless, there is some ontological evidence of the presence of pure possibilia: It is clear that some individuals are actual, but could not have been actual (e.g. humans). Meixner: Thesis: the reverse assumption, that some are not actual but could have been actual, naturally occurs next to this fact. Meixner: certain actual individuals refer to non-actual ones: egg and sperm cells from which a human never emerges. Should we now say here that it merely seems as if it refers to a possible human being, and that at the other end there is no reference relationship (reference). Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the merely possible human does not have certain qualities, e.g. an exact date of birth, (i.e. he does not have them in the real (actual) world, but nevertheless he has the negation of these qualities. Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the predisposition for blue eyes (the egg and sperm cells) leave nothing to be desired in positive determination! Def maximum consistent/Meixner: of every individual characteristic the individual contains either this or his negation. ((s) > continuous determination/Kant). Pure Possibilia/Meixner: this applies to merely possible. The individual is, so to speak, nothing other than this set of properties (see above). |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Possible Worlds | Verschiedene Vs Possible Worlds | Schwarz I 41 Def Possible World/poss.w./Lewis: early: ways how things could be. Van InwagenVs: These are characteristics rather than concrete universes. (StalnakerVsLewis, RichardsVsLewis: ditto). Lewis: later: possible worlds correspond to ways how things could be. Schwarz: but we do not necessarily have to introduce special entities for it. They could also be grammatical illusions. Even considering possible worlds as entities does not determine what kind of entities they are. E.g.: Def Possible World/Stalnaker/Schwarz: the determination as (maximum) ways how things could be: then they are special properties or propositions. (Stalnaker 1976(1), Robert Adams, 1974(2)). Def Possible World/Plantinga: (1974(3), Chapter 4) Maximum circumstances. According to this, a distinction must be made between the existence and existence of a state of affairs. Example: The state of affairs that donkeys could speak exists, but it does not exist. (Existence: Possibility - Existence: Reality? - rather reality (as another term): contains possibilities). Schw I 42 Def Possible World/Decision Theory/Richard Jeffrey: (1965(4),196f): maximum consistent sentence sets. Since the phrase "donkeys can speak" is consistent, there is a maximum consistent set of sentences that contains it. We express this when we say that there is a possible world... Def Surrogate Four-Dimensionalism/Schwarz: These positions correspond to the facts of the philosophy of time (see above 22), which perceives other times as abstract entities of a different kind from the present. LewisVs: other times are just as real. Def Co-Existence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible Worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is no causality between them. No event in one possible world causes another in another possible world. This means further that possible worlds just were not created by us! We also cannot see, measure or visit them from here. (1986e(5),3,80f). Lewis does not care if you call your possible world concrete or abstract. This has no clear meaning (1986e(5),§1,7). Real World/Lewis: what makes it different from the other possible worlds? Not its concreteness, but the fact that we live in it. Objectively, the real world is as little excellent as any other, or as the present. "Actual"/Lewis: is an indexical expression like "here" or "now". Therefore, we cannot meaningfully ask whether we live in the real world or in a possible one. Likewise, we cannot ask whether we live in the present or perhaps in the future. Reality/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis's analysis of "real" is also shared by opponents of modal realism: Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "Concretism". Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism". Lewis IV 85 Meaning/Reference/Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: if we have the denotation of theoretical terms, what about its meaning? But we already have it! Because we have specified its denotation in every possible world. Def Sense/Lewis: Denotation of an expression in each possible world. I.e. in every possible world the theoretical terms must name the components of whatever the theory T realizes uniquely in this world. If there is no realization in the world, they do not name anything. Def Sense/Lewis: therefore we can say, the sense is a function (of all or some) possible worlds on named entities. VsPossible Worlds/VsPossible Worlds/Lewis: some call them occult, VsVs: but they are not more occult than e.g. infinite amounts, which we can handle very well. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1976]: “Possible Worlds”. Nous, 10: 65–75 2. Robert M. Adams [1974]: “Theories of Actuality”. Noˆus, 8: 211–231 3. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University P 4. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Niominalism | Meixner, U. | I 87 Nominalism/Meixner: the thesis: that all entities are individuals, that universals are "mere names". For the nominalist, however, these words must then be concrete sound events or concrete inscriptions. For its part, the word "word" may not designate a type object. (also called "ontological individualism"). Radical Nominalism/Meixner: thesis: that all entities are actual individuals. Most Radical Nominalism/Meixner: thesis that all entities are actual physical individuals. Materialism/Meixner: would like to represent the most radical nominalism, but it turns out that only a limited nominalism can be represented. I 88 Reconstructive Nominalism: thesis: all entities, individuals and the basic individuals (BI) are physically, but simultaneously: 1. Most individuals (also the basic individuals) are not up to date. 2. All sets via basic individuals are also individuals (honorary "physical"). Then universals can be regarded as individual-like entities. a) Variant of Carnap: Basic individuals as individuals. b) David Lewis: baisc individuals on the contrary equated with maximum consistent individuals. (sets of properties). (see Chapter XI.3 below). |
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