Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Kripke | I 46 Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: Goldbach's conjecture will turn out to be true or false but then by necessity. I 75f A priori/not necessary: e.g. determining the reference of the term "one meter"/stadard meter: it is possible to know a priori that the length of this stick is one meter, and this would not be seen as a necessary truth. I 127 Difference: a priori/necessary: Kripke: one could empirically discover the essence (e.g. water = H20). >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity de re, >standard meter, >Necessity a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Causal Relation | Armstrong | Martin II 134 Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure. II (d) 154 Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change). Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke. Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated. II (d) 155 Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Causal Relation | Place | Martin II 134 Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure. Armstrong II (d) 154 Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change). Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke. Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated. Armstrong II (d) 155 Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Centered Worlds | Chalmers | I 133 Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H2O) provides a perfect non-indexical property. Cf. >Identity across worlds, >Identification, >Indexicality, >Intensions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world. >Zombies. ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness. >Necessity a posteriori. Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H2O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world. >Consciousness/Chalmers. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Conceivability | Chalmers | I 73 Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena. >Possible worlds, >Distinctions, >Levels/order, >Properties, >Phenomena. This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience. I 98 Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account. ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are. Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds. >a posteriori necessity. Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable. >Explanation/Chalmers. I 99 Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied. I 130 Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not. VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example? >Zombies. I 131 ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! >Supervenience, >Identity. If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Dispositions | Rorty | Frank I 594 Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true. - Then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore. >Physicalism, >Realism. Frank I 595 Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why >counterfactual conditionals are true. >Phenomenalism. Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 --- Rorty I 115 Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness. >Sensation, >Necessity, >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless. I 119 Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intensions | Stalnaker | I 16 Def C-intension/Jackson: a c-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. ((s) This is where the semantics in possible world x causes the content c to be expressed, which is perhaps different from what can be meant by it in another possible world), i.e. it is relative to possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity. Def A-intension/Jackson: the A-intension is solely determined by the idea of propositino ((s) what is meant?) (regardless of possible worlds). Then there is a difference between modal and epistemic distinctions. There are no propositions that are both necessary and a posterori, and no propositions that are both contingent and a priori - but statements! Def necessary a posteriori statement: a necessary a posteriori statement is one with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. >Necessity a posteriori. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is, on the other hand, one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional sentence intension/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional sentence intension is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. Def A-intensions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/Stalnaker: A intensions function with one argument and one centered world - their value is a truth value. Def C-intension/secondary intension/secondary sentence intension/Stalnaker: C-intensions function with one argument and one possible world - their value is a truth value. Cf. >Twodimensional semantics. I 208 Two-dimensional intension/thought/non-rigid/content/Stalnaker: the two-dimensional intension for thoughts defines a non-rigid description of a proposition: the secondary intension is the reference of this description. >Thoughts, >Rigidity. Secondary proposition/Stalnaker: the secondary proposition is not the content of the thoughts of the speaker, but is determined by the content, as a function of the facts. >Content/Stalnaker, >Facts. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 201 Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989(1), Jackson 1998(2), Chalmers 1996(3)) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,... I 202 ...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. >Necessity, >Necessity de re. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. >Necessity a posteriori, >Two-dimensional semantics. I 203 Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998(2), 67-84, Chalmers 1996(3), 136-8). I 204 Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts. >Facts. 1. Alan Sidelle. [1989] Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press 2. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. David J. Chalmers [1996]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Microstructure | Armstrong | Place I 29 Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers. Place I 30 The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional. Place I 29 Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions. II (b) 39 Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori. Place II 58 Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure. Place II 60 Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties. Place II 62 PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Microstructure | Place | Place I 29 Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers. Place I 30 The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional. Place I 29 Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions. Armstrong II (b) 39 Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori. Place II 58 Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure. Place II 60 Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties. Place II 62 PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Necessity | Jackson | Schwarz I 226 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). --- Stalnaker I 18 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context. >Two-dimensional semantics. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space. >Context. 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Logic Texts | Read III 67 Necessity: the classical criterion of logical concluding does not mention necessity! >Conclusion. III 140 Necessity a posteriori (empirical): Kripke: believes in the necessity of the origin. - E.g., Margret Thatcher could not have been Stalin's daughter. Naturally the KGB could reveal a gigantic conspiracy that the baby had been foisted at the time. - But this is an epistemic possibility - metaphysical, there is no possibility. >Possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Necessity a posteriori. III 141 Necessary/a priori/Kripke/Read: the separation between the necessary and the apriori: surprising consequence: every statement a priori is equivalent to a contingent statement. >Contingency. Distinction with a rigid designator for the truth value: not "the truth value of A" but "the actual truth value of A"- truth is not a property. >Truth, >Rigidity. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Pain | Chalmers | I 17 Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person. >Qualia/Chalmers. Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain! I 18 Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger. >Psychology/Chalmers. I 19 Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. >Phenomena, >Aspects, >Emotion. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Beliefs, >Intentionality. Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360). >Intentionality/Searle, >Content. I 146f Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. >Pain/Kripke, >Identity/Kripke. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O: Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery. >a posteriori necessity. I 147 ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. >S. A. Kripke, >Essentialism, >Modality, >Necessity, >Possibility. I 148 Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). >Brain states. Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world. >Materialism, >Actual World, >Possible Worlds. I 149 Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing. ChalmersVsKripke: 1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity. 3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain". 4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (>cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established. >Rigidity, >Supervenience. 1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642. 2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76 3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80 4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Pain | Rorty | I 83f Pain/Descartes: pain are particulars RortyVs). Their being is constituted in a single property: painfulness. --- I 93f Pain/Kripke/Rorty: difference: a) heat: Even in the absence of heat you can feel heat - (same epistemic situation) b) Not so in the case of pain. Difference: a) reference in heat is determined by an accidental property - b) in pain: by an essential property. >Pain/Kripke, cf. >Necessity a posteriori. I 127 f E.g. The not yet speaking child knows in the same way that it is in pain, as the plant knows the direction of the sun and the amoeba the temperature of the water. Knowledge: this way of knowledge, however, is unrelated to what a user of language knows, if he knows what pain is. Wittgenstein: it is a mistake to think that we learn what pain is in this second sense in putting our knowledge, of what pain in the first sense is, in a linguistic construct. >Linguistic disguise. I 128 Wittgensteinians: make a fuss about the facts about behavior and environment. RortyVs: these are irrelevant to the nature of pain. Because the nature of pain is simply determined by what is named. --- VI 172 Rorty: Pain, people and beliefs (I'm not so sure with hairstyles) are not entities, about which one can learn to talk by obtaining succinct definitions. >Definition. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Possibility | Lewis | V 10 Comparative possibility/"rather true"/Lewis: Notation A ‹ B: A is more true than B gdw. an A-world is closer to i than any B-world. >Similarity metrics. V 253 E.g. Heat/Lewis: could have turned out to be something other than molecular motion. (Kripke ditto) >Necessity a posteriori. Schwarz I 59/60 Possibility/possible world/Lewis/Black: not all possibilities are possible worlds. For example, when I learn that it is 5 p.m., I do not know anything about the world. The possibilities I can exclude are not other possible worlds where it is 4 p.m. Present is not distinguished. >Actuality/Lewis, >Information/Lewis. Example twin earth: one of them will be blown up tomorrow: possibility: that I am on one or the other, but these are not two possible worlds. - Detailed knowledge does not help, because both possible worlds are the same! >Twin earth. Schwarz I 184 Metaphysically possible/Lewis/Schwarz: For example, traveling at the speed of superlight - yet when I said yesterday that it were impossible, I said something true. >Context dependence. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Poundstone | I 206 Possible world/Poundstone: modified arithmetic is true in no possible world. >Logic, >Logical truth, >Mathematics. Kripke: "Gold has the atomic number 79" is true in every world. >Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke, >de re necessity, cf. >Necessity a posteriori. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Privileged Access | Rorty | I 119f Dosposition / SellarsVsRyle / RortyVsRyle: Ryle's error was: to assume that a proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states showed that there were no internal states in reality. >Sensation, >Necessity, cf. >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Wittgenstein (PI § 308), the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things, and leave open what their nature is. >Incorrigibility, >First Person, >Introspection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Twodimensional Semantics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 204 Two-dimensional framework/Jackson/Stalnaker: with the two-dimensional framework one can reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. This solves the problem of intentionality. (> Metaphysics/Jackson). Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret this framework: A) semantically B) metasemantically. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Zombies | Chalmers | I 94 Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. >Robots, >Experience, >Qualia, >Phenomena, cf. >Artificial Consciousness, >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong AI. I 95 Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do. 2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior. Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences. I 96 Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. >Analyticity. I 97 Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 131 Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. >Necessity a posteriori, >Metaphysical possibility. Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O. VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism. ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself). I 132 ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. I 180 Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Chalmers, D. | Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. | I 194 Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w.. Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context) I 195 defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token). Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference. StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device. Difference: a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning, b) not as meaning. Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth. I 202 Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages. I 210 Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended b) meta-semantically. I 211 Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently. Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts. Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Kripke | Chalmers, D. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Kripke | Jackson, F. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: theses of Kripke can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 |
| Two Dimensional Sem. | Stalnaker, R. | I 201/202 Two-Dimensional Semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: Thesis: I think this shows something about the nature of mental representation and not just about the contingent functioning of languages. I 204 Two-dimensional Frame/Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret it. a) semantic, b) metasemantic. Thesis: with this distinction I would like to reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. Thus the problem of intentionality can be solved. |
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