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The author or concept searched is found in the following 39 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certainty | Duhem | I 237 Certainty/indeterminacy/Duhem: Accuracy in detail can only be attained by the physical laws by sacrificing something of the firm and absolute certainty of the laws of the ordinary mind. >Laws, >Natural laws. There is some kind of compensation between accuracy and safety. Cf. >Forms of thinking. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Consciousness | Chalmers | I XI Definition The Easy Problem/Consciousness/Chalmers: “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation? I XII How does it integrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? I XIII If you only work on the "easy” problem, you get one sort of theory; if you believe, that there is a further “hard” problem, then you get another. Cf. >Computer model, >Computation, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Information, >Cognition, >Cognitive psychology. I XII Definition The Hard Problem of Consciousness/Chalmers: Why is all this processing (of stimulation, of information) accompanied by an experienced inner life? Thesis: The standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work in addressing them. I 4 Central is experience, but it is not definition. It is fruitless to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions. >Experience. I 5 When I am talking about it here, I mean only the subjective quality of experience. ((s) And this is not to be confused with self-experience). Cf. >Knowing how, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness. I 26 Consciousness/Chalmers: also this term has two aspects: A) psychological (behavior explaining, functional) - concerns reports and introspective accessibility to information. (From now on called "consciousness"). >Awareness/Chalmers, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Introspection. B) phenomenal (>Qualia/Chalmers, see also more authors on qualities). Psychological Consciousness/Chalmers: psychological consciousness is introspection, alertness, ability to reflect the content of mental states, self-awareness. >Content, >Mental states. 71 Consciousness/Chalmers: as almost the only phenomenon, conscious experience does not logically supervene on something else. Otherwise, virtually all natural phenomena are globally logically supervenient to facts about atoms, electromagnetic fields, etc. But that does not mean that all higher-level properties are based on micro-physical laws. >Supervenience. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Constants | Hacking | I 393 Constants/Hacking: we use constants mostly to determine the quotient between two constants. >Mathematics/Hartry Field, >Physics/Hartry Field. The redefinition and better identification of constants never comes to a conclusion. This is not a "continuation of the theory by other means". I 394 Constant/Constant of Nature/Hacking: the value of a constant is not part of the theory. Most of them are connected with other constants by physical laws. The gravitational constant is connected with nothing else. >Natural constants, >Values, >Theories, >Natural laws, >Gravitation. I 396 Duhem: it is a qualitative fact that the universe can be represented by certain mathematical models. A further qualitative fact is that there is a number that goes best with our mathematics. >Numbers, >Mathematics, >Pierre Duhem. I 397 Hacking: we use constants usually to determine the quotient between two constants. We do not reach an end in the improvements. >Science. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Covariance | Einstein | Kanitscheider I 169 Covariance/Einstein: old: the physical laws always had to be related to an existing coordinate system. (Even in the special theory of relativity (SR), its laws also only apply in inertial systems and in reference systems that result from Lorentz transformation. Accordingly, the SR is Lorentz covariant but not generally covariant. Old: the validity of laws was limited to local inertial systems and always had to be supplemented by fictitious forces such as the Coriolis force and centrifugal force in accelerated systems. New: Covariance: here laws can be formulated in any coordinate system, solution by tensors. The actual essence of the covariance principle is to choose the law of gravitation in such a way that no primordial (original) geometry is assumed for the space. Covariance eliminates the frame of reference! Reference system: There is no reference system with which one could transform away relative accelerations. >Relativity theory. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Descriptions | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth. I 57 Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law. And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law. Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus. I 131 Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations. Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles. The best descriptions are those that best match the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Empiricism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Positivism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Experiments | Duhem | I XIII Experiment/Duhem: The experimenter does not merely read the instruments, he uses the instruments. The following are required: 1.Theory about the domain in which measurements are made. 2.Theory of used measuring instruments. In every device there are systematic errors, the experimenter knows that. Duhem: the Ex works constantly with two devices: the concrete measuring device and an ideal structure for which the physical laws "exactly" apply. Between the phenomena ascertained in the experiment and the result of the experiment formulated by the physicist is a complex translation process. The facts which the experimenter determines are already "theoretical facts". The experimenter must always use theories for his work. The results are only useful for other physicists, if it is know which theories he has used. And whether corrections were already made. >Method. I XII An experimentum crucis (whose failure would disprove the whole theory) is rejected. (> Holism). I XXVI VsExperimentum crucis: (for example, by Quine, 1951, as the main attack against logical empiricism: Holistic view of science.) No experiment can show where the fault is located in the system. The examination of a particular hypothesis is only possible by using a whole group of further laws, ultimately the whole theory. Since Bacon, hope was linked to an experimentum crucis: a decision-making experiment between competing theories. E.g. Foucault's attempt to decide between Newton's theory of emission of light and Huygens' undulation theory sees Duhem as an experiment of the experimentum crucis. Foucault was able to show that light actually spreads slower in water, which made Newton look refuted. Duhem shows that this conclusion is not valid. The error could be in a secondary hypothesis. I 189 Experiment/Duhem: disintegrates into two parts. I 190 1. Observation of certain facts. For this, the knowledge of physics is not necessary at all. 2. Interpretation of the observed facts. For this you have to know the physics. The physicist does not write in his protocol that the instrument has indicated a certain stroke, he notes that the gas has reached a certain volume. What are the size of the volume, the temperature, the pressure? Three concrete objects? No, there are three abstract symbols that connect physical theory with facts. I 192 Definition experiment: accurate observation of a group of phenomena, plus interpretation of them. This interpretation replaces the concrete given with the help of the observation of actual ones obtained by abstract and symbolic representations which agree with them on the basis of the theories which the observer accepts as permissible. I 193 Experiment: The result is the establishment of a relationship between different concrete facts. A certain fact was artificially produced, another stems from it. I 210 Experiment/Duhem: We must know the theories that the physicist considers valid. During the experiment, the physicist continued to operate two apparatuses side by side: the actual measuring apparatus and the ideal one defined by mathematical formulas and symbols. I 215 The result of a physical experiment has not a security of the same level as a fact, established by non-scientific methods, from a healthy person by simple observation. The experiment is less direct and more dependent on a whole group of theories. I 273 Experiment/Duhem: The experiment is not the basis of theory, but the highlight. The totality of the theorems gives an ever more similar picture of the totality of the experimental facts. >Theories, >Facts. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| God | Kanitscheider | II 137 God/Kanitscheider: In the thermodynamic equilibrium prevailing at late times no order can grow. The highest being must therefore be able to restore the thermodynamic imbalance or to suspend all physical laws on the "last day" (Last Judgment). >Omnipotence. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Indeterminacy | Duhem | I 174 A theoretical fact has nothing indefinite, nothing fluctuating. The body being studied is geometrically defined. Its edges are real lines, without thickness, its corners are real points without dimensions. Each point of a body corresponds to a temperature, and this temperature is, for each point, a number which is sharply distinguished from every other. This theoretical fact is opposed to the practical fact which is the translation of it. There is nothing more to see of precision here. The body is no longer a geometric one, but a concrete block, its edges jagged ridges, its points more or less broad, its temperature a medium one in a certain volume. It is also not that definite number, distinctly distinguished from any other number. I 175 Nor could we explain that the temperature is exactly 10°, but only that it does not exceed a certain fraction of the degree which depends on the accuracy of the instrument. An infinite number of different theoretical facts can serve as a translation of the same practical fact. >Facts. I 222 A law of the ordinary mind is a simple general judgment that is right or wrong. E.g. the sun rises every day in the east. Here we have a real law, without condition, without restriction. On the other hand, e.g. the moon is always full. Here we have a wrong law. This does not apply to physical laws; they are always symbolic. A symbol is not correct or wrong, but more or less well chosen. The logician would not understand if one asked whether a certain physical law is right or wrong. >Natural laws. I 223 The degree of indeterminacy of the symbol is the error limit of the law in question. > Indeterminacy/Duhem. For the physicist, the discovery of the law of analogous facts means the discovery of a formula containing the symbolic representation of each of these facts. The indeterminacy of the symbols involves the indeterminacy of the formula. Each of these laws, in order to be accepted, must not correspond to any fact, not the symbol, but any of the symbols from the infinite number which can represent this fact. This is what is meant when one explains that the laws of physics are only approximated. E.g. Let us imagine that we cannot be content with the law: "The sun is rising in the east": the sun will be replaced by a huge sphere despite its unevenness. >Laws. I 224 If we want to find the law of motion of the sun, we can apply not only a single formula, but an infinite number of different formulas, to represent a change in length as a function of time. All these laws are equally acceptable to the physicist. The motives by which he chooses between different possibilities are not the same, which force him to prefer truth over error. >Truth, >Errors. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Information | Wheeler | Chalmers I 302 Information/"It from bit"/Wheeler/Chalmers: (Wheeler 1989(1)), thesis: Information is fundamental to the physics of the universe, and even physical properties and physical laws could stem from information properties and the laws of information processing. (See also Fredkin (1990)(2), Zureck (1990)(3), Matzke (1992)(4), 1994)(5)). >Existence. Note Chalmers I 388: Wheeler is concerned about yes/no responses in measurements as a basis for everything. Thus, he is closer to idealism than I am with my approach. 1. J. A. Wheeler (1989). Information, Physics, Quantum: TThe search for links. The 3rd International Symposium Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Tokyo, 310-336. 2. Edward Fredkin (1990). Digital Mechanics - An informational process based on reversible universal cellular automata. Physica D 45 (1-3):254-70 (1990) 3. Wojciech H. Zurek (1990). Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Wojciech H. Zurek (ed.) Addison-Wesley (1990). 4. Douglas Matzke (1993). Proceedings of the 1992 Workshop on Physics and Computation. Los Alamitos, Calif.:IEEE Computer Society Press. 5. Douglas Matzke (1995).Proceedings of the 1994 Workshop on Physics and Computation. Los Alamitos, Calif.:IEEE Computer Society Press. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Judgments | Duhem | I 222 Judgment/generality/Generalization/Duhem: A law of the ordinary mind is a simple general judgment that is right or wrong. E.g. The sun rises every day in the east. Here we have a real law, without condition, without restriction. on the other hand, e.g. the moon is always full. Here we have a wrong law. >Laws, >Beliefs, >Generalization, >Generality. This does not apply to physical laws; they are always symbolic. A symbol is not correct or wrong, but more or less well chosen. The logician would not understand if one asked whether a certain physical law is right or wrong. >Natural laws, >Symbols, >Correctness. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Laws | Cartwright | I 12 Theoretical Laws/Cartwright: determine the contribution of individual causes. I 12 Physical Laws/Cartwright: do not determine facts - because they are tailored for individual areas. >Causes, >Facts. I 46f Physical Laws/(s)/Laws of Nature/LoN/Cartwright: never exclusively valid - E.g. Snell's law of refraction of light at the interface between two dielectric materials: different with isotropic/anisotropic optical properties. In the textbook at first only the 1st version - this then not literal -> principle of charity. Important argument: most cases fall under the 2nd version - therefore, "ceteris paribus" here particularly bad. >ceteris paribus, >Literal truth, >Theories, >Models, >Description. I 50f Law/Science/Physics/LoN/Explanation/Cartwright: there are never enough laws, because we have no theory about what happens at the boundary regions of E.g. optics, genetics, hydrodynamics, laser theory, etc. - there are no laws for cases where theories overlap. I 55 Biology/Laws/Cartwright: its laws actually state - unlike those of physics - how objects of the theory behave: - E.g. swordfish hides during the day - Smart: Thesis: Biology has no own laws. I 111 Law/Truth/Cartwright: if there was a law that covers one case exactly, it would hardly apply to any other case. I 139 Law/Physics/Cartwright: the laws of physics lie, because we destroy our image by adapting mathematical structures. >Structures. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Laws | Chalmers | I 86 Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply. >Laws of nature, >Possible worlds, >Indistinguishability, >Twin earth, >Supervenience, cf. >Determinism. Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b(1), Mackie 1974(2), Skyrms 1980(3). VsHueme's view: Armstrong 1982(4), Carroll 1994(5), Dretske 1977(6), Molnar 1969(7), Tooley 1977)(8) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible. I 213/214 Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure. I 216 Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation. First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >Regularities. I 308 Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered: 1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia? >Qualia/Chalmers, >Exchanged spectra. 2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space? I 309 How can complex emotional experiences be explained? >Explanation/Chalmers. 4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information? >Phenomena, >Experience. 5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured? >Consciousness/Chalmers. 6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences? 1. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol II, New York 1986 2. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford 1974 3. B. Skyrms Causal Necessity, New Haven 1980 4. D. M. Armstrong, Metaphysics and supervenience, Critica 42, 1982: pp. 3-17 5. J. W. Caroll, Laws of Nature, Cambridge 1994 6. F. Dretske, Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science 44, 1977: pp. 248-68 7. G. Molnar, Kneale's argument revisited. Oghilosophical Review 78, 1969: pp. 79-89 8. M. Tooley, The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977: pp. 667-98 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Laws | Davidson | Glüer II 103 "Comprehensive, completed theory"/Davidson/Glüer: a) Def comprehensive: described in the terminology of the theory b) Def closed: subsumed under a law of the theory. Glüer II 105 Law/Natural law/theory/Davidson/Glüer: only the ideal physics represents such a closed system in which strict laws are possible. Outside of it there can be no strict laws. >Anomalous monism. Event/Causality/Laws/Description/Davidson/Glüer: if two events are in causal relation to each other, there must be descriptions on the basis of which they can be subsumed under a strict law. I.e. they must be tokens of types for which there is a causal law. There can also be other descriptions independently of this. I.e. there can be any number of true singular causal statements in which x and y are not described as instantiations of a causal law. Nevertheless, we know that there must be a law if the statement is true. >Description/Davidson. Glüer II 137 Laws/Davidson: three types: a) MM-laws (intentionalist vocabularies) between propositional attitudes and actions - these laws are not possible (no prediction of actions) b) MX-laws: connect the intentionalist with a physicalist vocabulary (these laws are available) c) physical laws. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Laws | Duhem | I 23 Definition Experimental Law/Duhem: Summary of experimental experiences that allow for predictions. ((s) Only predictions about future experiments, not about reality). >Predictions, >Reality, >Nature. I 24 Instead of remembering the various cases of the refraction of light, we can reproduce or simulate all those occurring instances immediately. >Generalization. I 26 Experimental physics gives us the laws as a whole group, unsegmented. The theorist classifies the variation that opposes the observer. Wherever there is order, there is also beauty. >Experiments. I 187 The goal of every physical theory is the representation of experimental laws. I 189 The physical law is not only the essence of a myriad of experiments. I 217 Laws/Duhem: In the same way as the laws of ordinary understanding are based on the observation of facts by the natural resources of man, the laws of physics are based on the results of physical experiments. Almost everything we have said about the experiments can be extended to the physical laws. E.g. the law of the ordinary mind: Every man is mortal. This law certainly combines abstract expressions. But these abstractions are by no means theoretical symbols. >Symbols, >Theoretical terms, >Observation language, >Observation sentences. I 219 Abstractions/Duhem: E.g. Abstraction of the ordinary mind: Before the thunder is heard, one sees the flash. The concepts are abstract, but the sensory rumbling and twitching is recognizable. This is no longer the case with the laws of physics. E.g. at constant temperature, the volumes occupied by the same gas mass are inversely proportional to the pressures under which it is placed. The notions are not only abstract, but symbolic to boot, and the symbols get a meaning only through the physical theories. The relations are by no means immediate; they are only produced by means of instruments. Now there are theories which in a certain way exclude each other, or components, which are assigned in different ways depending on the theory. I 221 E.g. Law: All gases compress and dilate in the same way. Now we ask a physicist whether the iodine vapor follows this law or not. A physicist argues that the iodine vapor is a simple gas. The density relative to the air is constant. The experiment now shows that the density of the iodine vapor relative to air depends on the temperature and the pressure. He now concludes that iodine vapor does not correspond to the given law. According to another physicist, iodine vapor is not a simple gas, but the mixture of two gases. Then the law is no longer valid that the density is constant with respect to the air, but rather that it varies with temperature and pressure. Our second physicist now concludes that iodine vapor is no exception to the rule. I 222 Thus the two physicists have completely different opinions as to a law which they both pronounce in the same form. They utter the same word and mean different theorems. In order to compare this expression with the reality, they carry out calculations so different that the one can find that the law is confirmed by the facts while the other considers it to be disproved. Definition Physical Law/Duhem: a symbolic relationship whose application to concrete reality demands that one should know and accept a whole group of theories. I 233 ... It will be said that an original law was by no means overturned by the later attempts, but the experiments had merely shown that the new law must be added. But those who say this must recognize that the primitive law must be given with special conditions, so that it does not lead to serious errors. The old law can no longer stand alone! The physical laws are therefore all provisional, since no revisions can be ruled out for the future. I 234 E.g. the gravitational law is violated by capillary phenomena. So that it is not disproved, one must change it. One may consider that the formula according to which the attraction is inversely proportional to the square of the distance is not an exact, but only an approximate one. >Idealization. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Laws | Feynman | I 114 Theory/Physics/Gravitation/Feynman: it is characteristic of physical laws to be so abstract. No one has so far indicated a machinery of laws. These are the great laws of mechanics; there is no machinery for them; they are abstractly mathematical. >Natural laws, >Equations, >Abstractness. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Laws | Field | III 59 Laws/physics/scalar quantities/temperature/Field: physical laws for scalar variables are often formulated as laws on a scalar T, that maps the quadruple of real numbers (space-time localization) to real numbers (e.g. temperature). Function T: (scalar) then has the form T = y  ° φ-1. Sseveral space points mapped to a point on the scale. φ -1: inverse of the function: (archetype instead of image): because it is processed twice: the second time backwards). φ (x): x coordinates of in space φ -1 (x): images of the coordinates on the line R). >Natural laws, >Natural constants, >Measurements, >Theories, >Physics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Laws, fundamental | Chalmers | I 275 Fundamental Law/Laws/Chalmers: according to the arguments in connection with the missing, dancing and inverted Qualia, it is a law that certain functional organizations F, F will be accompanied by a certain kind of conscious experience. We can expect it to be a result of simple yet fundamental psychophysical laws. >Qualia/Chalmers, >Experience/Chalmers, cf. >Switched Spectra. Until then, our principle of functional invariance (invariance principle, the thesis that two systems with unchanged functional structure will have the same conscious experience when one of the systems has it) serves as a guide for an ultimately valid theory. I 276 Psychophysical Law/Chalmers: Problem: Our principles (two coherence principles (a) psychological/physical, b) structural) and the invariance principle) are too indeterminate with regard to the psychophysical link between the organization of a system and consciousness. >Principles, >Laws/Chalmers. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Metaphysical Possibility | Stalnaker | I 64 Metaphysically necessary/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Stalnaker: that means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then the quantifiers. >Quantifiers, >Domains, >Quantification. Error: one can also be mistaken, but only about how one should understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Conditions, >Verificationism. I 102 Def metaphysically possible world/metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: metaphysically possible are all possible worlds. ((s) They are not a particular subset of all possible worlds, metaphysical is not something "special".) Stalnaker: If a world is not metaphysically possible, it is impossible. If there are metaphysical laws, then they are contingent. >Impossible world, >Contingency. I 102 Metaphysically possible/metaphysical possibility/epistemic/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke: there are epistemic possibilities that are metaphysically impossible, e.g. that water is not H2O, e.g. that Charles is not the son of Elizabeth II. Kripke: but these are metaphysical possibilities in other descriptions. I 167 Metaphysically possible/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Shakespeare did not have to write any of his works - but he could not have been anything other than a human being. He could not have had other parents than the ones he had (essentialism). >Essentialism. I 168 Some VsKripke: Shakespeare could have had some properties counterfactually, but not all. >Properties, >Counterfactuals. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 201 Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989(1), Jackson 1998(2), Chalmers 1996(3)) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,... I 202 ...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. >Necessity, >Necessity de re. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. >Necessity a posteriori, >Two-dimensional semantics. I 203 Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998(2), 67-84, Chalmers 1996(3), 136-8). I 204 Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts. >Facts. 1. Alan Sidelle. [1989] Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press 2. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. David J. Chalmers [1996]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Models | Meteorology | Edwards I 371 Models/Meteorology/Climatology/Edwards: With ever more sophisticated interpolation algorithms and better methods for adjudicating differences between incoming data and the first-guess field, objective analysis became a modeling process in its own right.( >Weather forecasting/Edwards). Gridded analysis “products,” as they are known, constituted models of data, in Patrick Suppes’s well-known phrase(1): “structures into which data are embedded that add additional mathematical structure.”(2) The philosopher Ronald Giere once put the point as follows: . . . when testing the fit of a model with the world, one does not compare that model with data but with another model, a model of the data. . . .The actual data are processed in various ways so as to fit into a model of the Edwards I 372 data. It is this latter model, and not the data itself, that is used to judge the similarity between the higher level model and the world. . . . It is models almost all the way down.(3) >Climate data/Edwards. Weather forecasting: Traditionally, scientists and philosophers alike understood mathematical models as expressions of theory - as constructs that relate dependent and independent variables to one another according to physical laws. On this view, you make a model to test a theory (or one expression of a theory). You take some measurements, fill them in as values for initial conditions in the model, then solve the equations, iterating into the future. from the point of view of operational forecasting, the main goal of analysis is not to explain weather but to reproduce it. You are generating a global data image, simulating and observing at the same time, checking and adjusting your simulation and your observations against each other. As the philosopher Eric Winsberg has argued, simulation modeling of this sort doesn’t test theory; it applies theory. This mode—application, not justification, of theory - is “unfamiliar to most philosophy of science.”(4) Edwards I 394 Models/data/Edwards: Meanwhile, global data sets are produced by simulations, which are constrained but not determined by instrumental observations. In earlier work I described this relationship as “model-data symbiosis,” a mutually beneficial but also mutually dependent relationship.(5) This idea aligns with recent work by philosophers of science on “models as mediators” - a semi-autonomous “third force” in science, functioning in the spaces between the real world, instrumentation, and theory.(6) As Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan argue, Scientific models have certain features which enable us to treat them as a technology. They provide us with a tool for investigation, giving the user the potential to learn about the world or about theories or both. Because of their characteristics of autonomy and representational power, and their ability to effect a relation between scientific theories and the world, they can act as a powerful agent in the learning process. That is to say, models are both a means to and a source of knowledge.(7) >Weather data/metereology, >Model bias/climatology. 1. P. Suppes, “Models of Data,” in Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 Congress, ed. E. Nagel et al. (Stanford University Press, 1962). 2. F. Suppe, “Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969–8,” Philosophy of Science 67 (2000), 112. See also S. D. Norton and F. Suppe, “Why Atmospheric Modeling Is Good Science,” in Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, ed. C. A. Miller and P. N. Edwards (MIT Press, 2001). 3. R. N. Giere, “Using Models to Represent Reality,” in Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, ed. L. Magnani et al. (Springer, 1999), 55. 4. E. Winsberg, “Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation,” Science in Context 12, no. 2 (1999), 275. 5. Edwards, “Global Climate Science, Uncertainty and Politics.” 6.. Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators. 7. M. Morrison and M. S. Morgan, “Models as Mediating Instruments,” in Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Sciences, ed. M. S. Morgan and M. Morrison (Cambridge University Press, 1999). |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Natural Laws | Laws of Nature, philosophy: laws of nature (physical laws) are descriptions of dependencies of physical quantities among each other. From the fact that these are descriptions, it follows that these are no regulations in the sense of e.g. legal regulations. N. Goodman suggests in “Fact, Fiction and Forecast” (1954) that natural laws should be formulated in the form of irreal conditional sentences (also known as counterfactual conditionals); If A were the case, B would have been the case. |
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| Numbers | Poincaré | Thiel I 18 Numbers/Mathematics/Ontology/Mathematical Entities/Poincaré/Thiel: Definition Conventionalism (Poincaré:) Poincaré considers this concept to be a mistake for his contemporaries, who think that geometric statements, such as that the angular sum of the triangle can be proved via two right angles. >Conventionalism/Poincaré, >Mathematical Entities. The empirical finding about spatial reality cannot clearly prescribe a geometry which characterizes this finding. The N.B. is not the measurement accuracy, but Poincaré says that the geometry remains freely selectable even with results within this measuring accuracy. >Measuring, >Geometry. We could also introduce additional physical laws for a measured triangle with less than 180°, e.g. the effect of "fields". The name "conventionalism" refers to this "free selectability" of the system of geometry. >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Physical laws. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Parameterization | Meteorology | Edwards I 393 Parameterization/meteorology/climatology/Edwards: far from expressing pure theory, analysis models are data-laden.(1) And the same can also be said of all forecast models and general circulation models. Stephen Schneider writes: . . . even our most sophisticated ‘first principles’ models contain ‘empirical statistical’ elements within the model structure. . . .We can describe the known physical laws mathematically, at least in principle. In practice, however, solving these equations in full, explicit detail is impossible. First, the possible scales of motion in the atmospheric and oceanic components range from the submolecular to the global. Second are the interactions of energy transfers among the different scales of motion. Finally, many scales of disturbance are inherently unstable; small disturbances, for example, grow rapidly in size if conditions are favorable.(2) Edwards: Hence the necessity of parameterization, much of which can be described as the integration of observationally derived approximations into the “model physics.” Schneider and others sometimes refer to parameters as “semi-empirical,” an apt description that highlights their fuzzy relationship with observational data. For the foreseeable future, all analysis models, forecast models, and climate models will contain many “semi-empirical” elements. >Wheather forecasting/Edwards, >Models/meteorology, cf. >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology. Edwards I 465 Parameter: (…) the term is often used to distinguish, from dependent variables, quantities that may be more or less arbitrarily assigned values for purposes of the problem at hand” (emphasis added). So a parameter is a kind of proxy - a stand-in for something that cannot be modeled directly but can still be estimated, or at least guessed. Parameterization illustrates the interaction of computational friction with the limits of human knowledge. In an ideal climate model, the only fixed conditions would be the distribution and the altitude of continental surfaces. Virtually all other variables - sea-surface temperature, land-surface albedo (reflectance), cloud formation, etc. - would be generated internally by the model itself from the lower-level physical properties of air, water, and other basic elements of the climate system. Instead, most physical processes operating in the atmosphere require some degree of parameterization; these parameterized processes are known as the “model physics.” >Models/climatology. Parameter: (…) parameters represent a variable physical process rather than a fixed quantity. Edwards I 466 Parameterization/Example: A major parameterization in all climate models is radiative transfer. The atmosphere contains both gases (CO2, methane, nitrogen, ozone, oxygen, water vapor, etc.) and solids (particulate aerosols, ice clouds, etc.). Each one of these materials absorbs solar energy at particular frequencies. Each also emits radiation at other frequencies. Those emissions are then absorbed and re-radiated by other gases and solids. These radiative transfers play a huge role in governing the atmosphere’s temperature. Thus, models must somehow estimate how much radiation the atmosphere in a given grid box absorbs, reflects, and transmits, at every level and horizontal location. “Line-by-line models,” which combine databases of spectrographic measurements for the various gases with physical models, can carry out this summing.(3) Edwards I 469 Ad hoc parameter/example: An example of an ad hoc parameter is “flux adjustment” in coupled atmosphere-ocean circulation models (AOGCMs). The interface between the atmospheric model and the ocean model must represent exchanges of heat, momentum (wind and surface resistance), and water (precipitation, evaporation) between the atmosphere and the ocean. These fluxes - flows of energy and matter between atmosphere and ocean—are very difficult to measure empirically. Yet they profoundly affect model behavior. Modelers spoke of flux adjustments as “non-physical” parameterizations - i.e., ones not based on physical theory—but also sometimes characterized them as “empirically determined.”(4) Any given GCM’s model physics contains hundreds or even thousands of parameterizations. Edwards I 470 An entire subfield—climate model diagnosis - works out ways to isolate the origin of particular problems to specific parameterizations and their interactions. Tuning: “Tuning” means adjusting the values of coefficients and even, sometimes, reconstructing equations in order to produce a better overall model result. “Better” may mean that the result agrees more closely with observations, or that it corresponds more closely to the modeler’s expert judgment about what one modeler I interviewed called the “physical plausibility” of the change. >Models/climatology. 1. P. N. Edwards, “Global Climate Science, Uncertainty and Politics: Data-Laden Models, Model-Filtered Data,” Science as Culture 8, no. 4 (1999): 437–. 2. S. H. Schneider, “Introduction to Climate Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 3. J. T. Kiehl, “Atmospheric General Circulation Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 338. 4. 8. J. T. Houghton et al., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996). |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Physical/Psychic | Chalmers | I 42 Psychological/Physical/Law/Law-like/Chalmers: Thesis: It is natural to assume that my principles of coherence between consciousness and awareness that is, that consciousness is always accompanied by awareness, and vice versa, are the same in all human organisms, and are therefore a law-like correlation. >Awareness/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience, >Knowing how. We can argue that this coherence is a natural law. That is, that it applies to all systems. ((s) If a system has any kind of consciousness at all). Chalmers: this also applies to the remarkable correlation between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. It is too specific to be a coincidence. I 243 Chalmer's thesis: for every system the structure of consciousness ((s) phenomenal) is mirrored and reversed by the structure of consciousness somewhere (awareness, psychologically). Then we can say that consciousness arises from the functional organization of a system that is necessary for awareness. Then the structure of consciousness is determined by the structure of attention (psychological awareness). This, of course, is not a fundamental psychophysical law. This would have to link more basic structures than something like "consciousness". I 244 Can we rule out that there must be some additional X-factor, so we can talk about consciousness? I 245 Solution/Chalmers: if we accept consciousness as an additional non-physical fact - in addition to the physical - as well as independent psychophysical laws, an "X-factor", no matter how it is structured, becomes superflous. >Independence. I 246 Best explanation/simplicity/Chalmers: my approach is the simplest and therefore a conclusion on the best explanation as it is often practiced in physical theories. >Best explanation, >Simplicity. I 276 Psychological/physical/Chalmers: how simple can the organization of a system with conscious experiences become before experience disappears? I 277 We will need a lot of psycho-physical laws. I 284 Physical/psychological/Information/Chalmers: whenever we receive a phenomenal information, we will also find this information physically realized: I 285 We do not know exactly how the phenomenal information is encoded, so we do not know exactly how the information space is physically realized, but we know that it has to be realized. The physical information does not have to be realized locally. Cf. >Brain/Deacon. Psychological/phenomenal/Chalmers: it is natural to suppose that this double live of information spaces corresponds to a duality on a deeper level. We might even assume that this double realization is the key to a fundamental link between physical processes... I 286 ...and conscious experiences. We need a kind of construct here and information seems to be as suitable as anything. Thesis: It could be that principles of the double realization of information can be developed into a system of fundamental laws for a combination of the physical and the phenomenal domain. Cf. >Theory of multiple designs. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Platonism | Field | I 8 Platonism/Field: his only argument is the applicability of mathematics. >Mathematics/Field, >Mathematical entities. I 14 FieldVsPlatonism: Platonism has to answer the fictionalist in his language - it cannot rely on it's "initial plausibility". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. >Numbers/Frege, >Gottlob Frege. Def Gödelian Platonism/Crispin Wright: in addition: the thesis that mathematical knowledge must be explained by a quasi-perceptual relation. FregeVsGödel. WrightVsGödel: we do not need that. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: In which sense is a Platonist statement (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and a nominalistic statement equivalent (c1 is parallel to c2)? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a sequence of the first. >Nominalism. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. FieldVs: instead only between objects. --- II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical fields do not need to be indistinguishable. >Field theory. II 334 Quinish Platonism/Field: as a basic concept a certain concept of quantity, from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. III 31 Number/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ( "What line?") - What should be zero point - What should be 1? III 90 Platonistic/Field: are terms such as e.g. gradient, Laplace Equation, etc. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic - Problem: but he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Positivism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Empiricism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Principles | Thorne | I 80 Principle of Relativity/Einstein/Thorne: in physical laws, of whatever kind, all states of motion must be treated as coordinate (equal). >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Relativity theory, >Symmetries, >Conservation laws. |
Thorne I Kip S. Thorne Gekrümmter Raum und verbogene Zeit München 1996 Thorne II Kip S. Thorne Christopher Nolan The Science of Interstellar New York 2014 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Wright | Horwich I 110 Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: this is not a sentence about truth, but a sentence about physical laws, laws of nature, and it does not help us here. Cf. >Tarski-scheme. Wright I 85 Tarski/Disquotation scheme/semantic definition of truth, disquotation: it is well known that it is incompatible with it, to accept a failure of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence. E.g. if "P" is neither true nor false, then the assertion that "P" is true will be probably wrong and its biconditional probably incorrect. Disquotation scheme (DS): is the producer platitude for all other: thus correspondence, negation, distinction between truth and assertibility. >Correspondence, >Truth, >Assertibility, >Negation. It itself is neutral in terms of stability and absoluteness. Wright I 27ff Disquotation/Tarski/Wright: one does not need to understand the content. >Content, >Understanding. I 33 The disquotation scheme does not exclude that there will be a divergence in the extension: the aiming on an object with the property F does not need not be the aiming on a property with G - they only coincide normatively in relation to practice. >Practice, >Norms, >Language community, >Community, >Convention. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Supervenience | Chalmers | I 33 Supervenience/Chalmers: supervenience is in general a relation between two sets of properties: B properties: higher-level properties A properties: lower-level properties (for us physical properties). The specific nature of these properties is not relevant to us. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Basic pattern: Definition Supervenience/Chalmers: B-properties supervene on A-properties, if two possible situations are not identical with regard to their A-properties and at the same time differ in their B-properties. For example, biological properties supervene on physical ones insofar as two possible physically identical situations are also biologically identical. Local/Global Supervenience/Chalmers: we distinguish global supervenience, depending on how the situations under consideration, refer to individuals or possible worlds. Local Supervenience/Chalmers: B supervenes locally on A when the A properties of an individual determine the B properties of that individual. I 34 E.g. form supervenes on physical properties. Definition Global Supervenience/Chalmers: when A facts about the world determine B facts about the world. That is, there are no two possible worlds which are identical with respect to A, which are not also identical with regard to B. For example biological properties supervene globally on physical properties. Definition local supervenience implies global supervenience, but not vice versa. E.g. two physical organisms can differ in certain biological characteristics, one individual can be fitter than the other, triggered by environmental conditions. >Extrinsic properties,> Niches. Chalmers: For example, one could imagine that two physically identical organisms might belong to different species, if they had different evolutionary stories. Consciousness: here it will be more about local supervenience. I 35 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: logical supervenience is conceptual and stronger than natural supervenience. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: this term is used to distinguish between logical supervenience. I 38 A situation would be conceivable in which laws that automatically produce B facts might not produce these for once. (Kripke 1972, 1980)(1). I 39 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: Problem: There could be a possible world which is identical to our actual world, but not additionally with non-physical elements such as angels and ghosts. These could be physically identical with us, but biologically different from us. This has led some authors (Haugeland 1982(2), Petrie 1987(3)) to say that the logical possibility and logical necessity are too strong terms for our supervenience relations. Solution/Chalmers: we must explicitly refer to our actual world or specified possible worlds. I 40 Other problems have to do with negative existence statements about what does not exist in our world, or does not exist in other possible worlds. Such problems can never be determined by local facts or local characteristics. Supervenience should always be determined by reference to positive facts and characteristics. I 84 Name/Supervenience/Explanation/Chalmers: E.g. according to Kaplan (1989)(4) the name "Rolf Harris" simply picks out its speaker directly. Does that mean that the property to be Rolf Harris does not logically supervene on physical facts? >Names, >Reference, >Identification, >Vivid name/Kaplan. Secondary intension of the name: what resulted from a certain egg and sperm in all possible worlds. This supervenes logically on facts. Primary intension of the name: is that what results from the linguistic usage, of those who have, or had assiociate with Rolf Harris, or heard of Rolf Harris. The primary intension may be absent, which is a problem for the supervenience >Propositions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. I 87 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: apart from conscious experience, indexicality, and negative existence theorems everything supervenes logically on physical facts, including physical laws. >Indexicality, >Experience, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(5), Horgan (1993)(6): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference over possible worlds remains preserved (is rigid). Thereby, the supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept picks out a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (See Horgan and Timmons 1992b.(7)) Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the ussual case. I 124 Supervenience/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that conscious experience does not logically supervene on the physical facts, but not that it does not supervene at all! 1. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980 2. J. Haugeland, Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982: pp. 93-103 3. B. Petrie, Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 119-30 4. D. Kaplan, Demonstratives. In: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (Eds) Themes from Kaplan. New York 1989 5. S. Blackburn, Supervenience revisited. In: I. Hacking (ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essay by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge 1985 6. T. Horgan, From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102, 1993: pp. 555-86 7. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Symmetries | Feynman | L 159 Def Symmetry/Weyl: a thing is symmetrical, if it can be subjected to a certain operation and it then appears as exactly the same as before. Symmetry/Physics/Laws/Feynman: For example, if we move a machine, it will still work. I 726 Symmetry Operations/Physics/Feynman: Translation in space - translation in time - rotation around a fixed angle - constant speed in a straight line (Lorentz transformation) - time reversal - reflection of space - exchange of the same atoms or particles - quantum mechanical phase Matter antimatter (charge conjugation). >Time reversal. I 728 Asymmetry/Scale/Scale Change/Feynman: in the case of scale changes, the physical laws are not symmetrical! Question: will an apparatus which is re-built five times larger work in the same way? - No! E.g. The light wavelength, e.g. emitted by sodium atoms in a container, is the same when the volume quintuples. It is not made five times longer by that Consequently, the ratio of the wavelength to the size of the emitter changes. E.g. Cathedral made of matches: if it were built on a real scale, it would collapse, because enlarged matches are not strong enough. We might think that it is enough to take a larger earth (because of the same gravitation). But then it would become even worse! I 730 Symmetry/Law/Conservation Law/Quantum Mechanics: in quantum mechanics there is a corresponding conservation law for every symmetry! This is a very profound fact. The fact that the laws of translation are symmetrical in time means, in quantum mechanics, that the energy is conserved. Invariance in rotation corresponds to the conservation of the angular momentum. (In quantum mechanics). I 731 Symmetry/reflection of Space/Right/Left/Direction/Space Direction/Feynman: a clock whose every part was mirror symmetrical, would run the same way. If this was correct, however, it would be impossible to distinguish between "right" and "left" by any physical phenomenon, just as it is impossible to define an absolute speed by a physical phenomenon. The empirical world, of course, need not be symmetrical. We can define the direction in geography. But it does not seem to violate the physical laws that everything is changed from right to left. E.g. right/left: If you wanted to find out where "right" is, a good method would be to buy a screw in a hardware store. Most have legal threads. It's just a lot more likely. >Convention. I, 732 E.g. right/left: next possibility: Light turns its polarization plane when it penetrates sugar water. So we can define "right-turning". But not with artificially made sugar, only with that from living creatures. >Monod, molecular structure, right-turning/left-turning. I 733 Feynman: it looks as if the phenomena of life (with much more frequent molecules in a certain direction) allow the distinction between left/right. But that is not the case! The Schrödinger equation tells us that molecules rotating right and left behave the same physically. Nevertheless, there is only one direction in life! I 734 Conservation Law: there is no preservation of the number of right-sided molecules. Once started, evolution has increased their number and we can further multiply them. We can assume that the phenomena of life do not violate symmetry but, on the contrary, demonstrate the universal nature and the ultimate origin of all living creatures. I 737 Mirror Symmetry: is fulfilled by the laws of: electricity, gravitation, magnetism, nuclear forces. They cannot be used to define right/left! But there is a violation of symmetry in nature: the weak decay (beta decay): (1954): there is a particle, a certain cobalt isotope, which decays into three π mesons, and another one that decays into two. I 738 Def South Pole: can only be defined by cobalt isotopes: it is such that the electrons in a beta decay prefer to lead away from it. This is the only way to explain right/left unambiguously to the Martian: he gets building instructions for a beta decay in a cooled system. I 739 Parity/Law of Violation of Parity Conservation/Asymmetry/Symmetry/Feynman: only unsymmetrical law in nature: the violation only occurs with these very slow reactions: the particles that bear a spin (electron, neutrino, etc.) come out with a left-tending spin. The law combines the polar vector of a speed and the axial vector of a rotational momentum, stating that the rotational momentum is more likely to be opposite to the velocity than being parallel to it. I 742 Symmetry/Nature/Feynman: where does it come from? We don't know. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Terminology | Field | I 18 Explanation/Field: a) Def intrinsic explanation/Field: does not contain causally irrelevant entities (namely: mathematical entities) b) Def extrinsic explanation/Field: also contains causally irrelevant entities. For example, the attribution of finite sentences for the behavior of animals. II 159 Linguistic view/Field: assumes no meanings as mind-independent entities, but assigns words of a speaker to words of an interpreter. - The relations are based on different characteristics. - I.e. to inferences that contain this word - that's what I call "meaning-characteristic". - E.g. II 226 Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement. Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides. II 201 Signification/Terminology/Field: here: Relations are signed - objects are denoted. - predicates signify their extension. II 211 Def Basis/Field: here: E.g. the basis for predicates whose extension depends on other predicates: - E.g. "rabbit", "dinosaur": depend on the basis: predicate "identical". - The functional dependency of the other predicates from the basic predicate "identical" allows the partial extensions of the predicate to be correlated with the partial extension of the others. Def dependent: is a predicate, if it has a basis. - Now we can define relevance. Def Relevance/Structure/Language/Gavagai/Field: a structure partially agrees with the semantics of O, iff a) each independent term t of L denoted or signified partially m(t) b) each dependent term t of L denoted or signified m(t) with b(t) relative to the correlation of m(b(t)). ((s) in b) not partial). Still unsolved: how do we know which terms have a basis and which that is? - Problem: the words should also have a physical sense. II 287 Def "weak true"/truew/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "p". Def "strongly true"/trues/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "There is a certain fact that p". Det-Operator/D/Field: "It is a certain fact that". - This cannot be explained with "true". III 12 Def Principle C/Conservativity/Field: Let A be a nominalistic formulated claim. N: a corpus of such nominalistic assertions. - S a mathematical theory. A* is then not a consequence of N* + S if A is not itself a consequence of N* alone. ((s) "A* only if A", that is, if A * is not determined yet, that any nominalistic formulation is sufficient). III 60 Nominalization/Field: ... this suggests that laws about T (i.e., T obeying a particular differential equation) can be reformulated as laws over the relation between f and y. That is, ultimately the predicates Scal-Cong, St-Bet, Simul, S-Cong and perhaps Scal-Less. II 230 Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. - FieldVs: instead only between objects. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic. Problem: anyway he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. II 230 Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theories | Poundstone | I 278 Theory/Poundstone: Newton's law of gravitation could be confirmed even in ancient times, if you had drawn the right conclusions. >Confirmation, >Verification, >Laws of nature, >Laws, >Gravitation, >Physical laws. I 339ff TheoryPoundstone: should make the world readibly like the key to a cryptography. >Understanding, >Explanations, >Causal explanations. Some theories put a lot of information in the theory itself. >Information Theory of the Brains in a vat: assumes a single Hypoothese about everything and encrypted: "iii ...". >Brains in vat/Putnam, >Brains in vat. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Time | Newton | Genz II 250 Time/Newton/Mechanics/Genz: in the Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point in time determines the later one, but also the later one the earlier. Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws. >Laws of nature, >Physical laws, >Laws, >Determinism. II 251 Question: Are there also purely backward deterministic laws? Cf. >Initial conditions, cf. >Time reversal. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time Reversal | Baudrillard | Sokal I 171 Time Reversal/Baudrillard/Bricmont/Sokal: (Baudrillard 1991)(1): Baudrillard speaks here of a reversibility of the causal order...triumph of effect over cause.... "floundering and fuzziness of laws"... "possible reversibility".... SokalVsBaudrillard: It is difficult to decide what Baudrillard means by "reversing" a physical law." In physics, one speaks of the reversibility of laws as an abbreviation for "invariance to time reversal. This applies to all physical laws except that of the weak interaction. >Symmetries/Physics. Sokal I 172 However, this is already valid for Newtonian mechanics. On the contrary, a new discovery is that of the non-reversibility of the weak interactions in 1964. Causality/Sokal: Anyway, the reversibility of the physical laws has nothing to do with an alleged "reversibility of the causal order". ((s) explanation/(s): Physics is represented in equations. In these equations there are no causes and effects.) >Causality, >Time, >Cause, >Effect, >Natural laws, >Physics. For the correct use of physical concepts see >Sokal/Bricmont. 1. J. Baudrillard Die fatalen Strategien, München, 1991. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Time Reversal | Feynman | I 657 Time Reversal/Movement Reversal/Reversibility/Feynman: E.g. A movie played backwards: here entropy is not as high as you might think, since all elements have exactly the right speed to return to their starting point. >Symmetries/Feynman. Reversibility/Irreversibility/Physics/Time Inversion/Feynman: E.g. retarded electric field: t: time, r: distance from the charge: field corresponding to the acceleration at the time t r/c and not t + r/c. Consequently, it appears that the law of electricity is not reversible. Vs: but in fact Maxwell's equations are reversible! In addition, we could take the advanced field instead of the retarded field and everything goes the same way. This also means that an oscillating charge in a closed container (black body) will lead to an equilibrium. >Equations. I 729 Time Reversal/Time/Backward Movement/Film/Reversibility/Feynman: e.g. movie playing backwards: if we were able to see the individual molecules, we could not see if the machine was moving forward or backward. Nothing contradicts the physical laws. On the other hand, if we do not see all the details, it will be clearly detectable, e.g. as a forward movement. For example, if we looked at the individual atoms of an egg, we could not determine whether the egg was bursting or assembling. At the level of the individual atoms the laws look completely reversible. >Atoms/Feynman, >Natural laws. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Time Reversal | Sokal | Sokal I 171 Time Reversal/Baudrillard/Bricmont/Sokal: (J. Baudrillard 1991)(1): Baudrillard speaks here of a reversibility of the causal order... triumph of the effect on the cause... "Floating and blurring of the laws"..."possible reversibility".... >Symmetries, >Equations, >Laws of Nature. >Physical laws, >J. Baudrillard. SokalVsBaudrillard: it is difficult to decide what Baudrillard means by the "reversal" of a physical law. In physics, we speak of the reversibility of laws as an abbreviation for the "invariance to time reversal". This applies to all physical laws except for the weak interaction. Sokal I 172 However, this also applies to Newtonian mechanics. On the contrary, a new discovery is the non-reversibility of weak interactions in 1964. Causality/Sokal: in any case, the reversibility of physical laws has nothing to do with an alleged "reversibility of the causal order". >Causality, >Time, >Causation, >Cause >Effect. 1. J. Baudrillard Die fatalen Strategien, München, 1991. |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Vectors | Bigelow | I 65 Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: a vector explains the positions of the object, not vice versa. Problem: this seems to require the assumption that a body could have a velocity without taking several positions. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the connection between velocity and positions is created so that the vector explains the change of position, not because it is defined by the change. >Definition, >Definability, >Explanation. Motion/location/change/position/change/status/Bigelow/Pargetter: although both are logically independent of each other, they are connected by physical laws. >Motion, >Change. Explanation/Theory/Explanation Direction/Bigelow/Pargetter: The theory of flux changes the direction of the explanation. >Flux/Bigelow. I 66 Independence/Explanation/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: logical independence must not be pushed to the point where there is no relevant link between the entities. (Here properties of the 1st and 2nd level). >Independence, >Dependence. I 67 Independence/Movement/before/after/Pre-history/Determination/Ockhamists/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: at the top of a parabola (trajectory of a projectile), the body moves horizontally, but this is not independent of the before and after. Flux/Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: considers the movement at this point as independent. There is at least one logical independence. Velocity/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be completely independent of 2nd level properties: e.g. transmission of velocities by impact. (+...) I 68 Consistency/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: after that, it is not even absurd to attribute a velocity of 0 to a body that does not move noticeably. Vector/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, it is not logically necessary that a vector is linked to attributes that change over time. Change of location/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: when we look at the sequence of positions in time, the Ockhamists do not imply instantaneous velocity (entails). >William of Ockham, >Time. Malebranche/Change/Movement/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Ockhamist): according to Malebranche, God creates the object anew at every point. This is not a causal process. >Malebranche. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Weather Forecasting | Edwards | Edwards I 362 Weather Forecasting/Edwards: From the dawn of synoptic forecasting, weather forecasting comprised three principal steps: (1) collect the available data, (2) interpret the data to create a picture of the weather situation, and (3) predict how that picture will change during the forecast period. The second step, originally known as “diagnosis,” transformed raw data from a relatively few points into a coherent, self-consistent picture of atmospheric structure and motion.(1) As in a medical diagnosis, forecasters combined theory and experiential knowledge to reach a shared understanding of reality from incomplete and potentially ambiguous indications (symptoms). Analysis: For early NWP (Numerical Weather Prediction) , diagnosis or “analysis” proved the most difficult aspect of forecasting. Ultimately, it was also the most rewarding. In the long run, analysis would also connect forecasting with climatology in new, unexpected, and important ways. >Reanalysis/Climatology. Edwards I 364 Interpretation: Before numerical weather prediction, analysis was an interpretive process that involved a shifting combination of mathematics, graphical techniques, and pattern recognition. Human interpretation played a crucial role in data collection; (…).(2) Edwards I 369 Objective analysis: The JNWPU’s (Northwestern Polytechnical University) first, experimental analysis program defined a 1000×1000 km square around each gridpoint. Next, it searched for all available observed data within that square. If it found no data, the program skipped that gridpoint and moved to the next one. If it did find data, the program fitted a quadratic surface to all the data points within the search square. It then interpolated a value on that surface for the gridpoint. (…)This technique worked well for areas densely covered by observations, but performed poorly in large data-void regions.(3) >Models/Climatology, >Climate data/Edwards. Edwards I 391 Models/weather forecasting: Traditionally, scientists and philosophers alike understood mathematical models as expressions of theory - as constructs that relate dependent and independent variables to one another according to physical laws. On this view, you make a model to test a theory (or one expression of a theory). You take some measurements, fill them in as values for initial conditions in the model, then solve the equations, iterating into the future. from the point of view of operational forecasting, the main goal of analysis is not to explain weather but to reproduce it. You are generating a global data image, simulating and observing at the same time, checking and adjusting your simulation and your observations against each other. As the philosopher Eric Winsberg has argued, simulation modeling of this sort doesn’t test theory; it applies theory. This mode - application, not justification, of theory - is “unfamiliar to most philosophy of science.”(4) 1. V. Bjerknes, Dynamic Meteorology and Hydrography, Part II. Kinematics (Gibson Bros., Carnegie Institute, 1911); R. Daley, Atmospheric Data Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 2. See 14. P. Bergthorsson and B. R. Döös, “Numerical Weather Map Analysis,” Tellus 7, no. 3 (1955), 329. 3. As one of the method’s designers observed, “straightforward interpolation between observations hundreds or thousands of miles apart is not going to give a usable value.” G. P. Cressman, “Dynamic Weather Prediction,” in Meteorological Challenges: A History, ed. D. P. McIntyre (Information Canada, 1972), 188. 4. E. Winsberg, “Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation,” Science in Context 12, no. 2 (1999), 275. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Creary, L | Cartwright Vs Creary, L | I 62 Factual View/Causal forces/Lewis Creary/Cartwright: Creary tries to maintain separate causal laws and at the same time to save the facts-view by postulating an intermediate effect: physical laws/Creary: Thesis: there are two types of them: a) Laws on causal influence: E.g. law of gravity. Coulomb’s Law: they tell us, what forces or other causal impacts become effective in different circumstances. b) Laws about causal action: ("Action laws"): they tell us what results arise from such combinations. E.g. law of vector addition, provides satisfactory explanations. Composition/Creary: less satisfactory types: E.g. amplification, interference, elimination (predomination). I 63 Truth/Physical laws/Creary/Cartwright: according to Creary these laws are true, because they correctly describe what influences are produced. Truth/Law/CartwrightVsCreary: this is a plausible representation of the structure of many causal explanations, but it has two disadvantages: 1) often there are no general laws of interaction. The dynamics of the vector addition is fortunate in this regard. Problem: irreversible processes: flux, Laws of transport (heat transport) distribution functions. The equations in statistical mechanics do not apply in 90% of cases. (Kline, Similitude and Approximation, NY, 1969, p. 140). I 65 Creary/Cartwright: his action laws (which provide the resulting overall behavior) only apply to individual cases. CartwrightVsCreary: better correct laws like Fick’s law. Nature/Cartwright: should rather be described by many phenomenological laws which are tailored to individual situations, than ruled by first principles. (s) VsCartwright: there can be no laws for individual situations (specific situations). CartwrightVsCreary: 2) causal influence: E.g. resulting force in vector addition: Creary: Thesis: there is no force that results, but a movement (behavior). With that we can deny the reality of a resulting force. Cartwright: We both agree that there cannot be three forces: the first two, and in addition the resulting one. CartwrightVsCreary: but I assert the reality of the resulting force while Creary asserts the component forces. Causal influence/Creary: is an intermediary factor between cause and what was initially thought to be the effect. CartwrightVsCreary: this will not work in general. E.g. two laws: a) C causes E b) C’ causes E’. In addition: C and C’ together cause E’’. Then we do not want to assume three effects E, E ’and E’’, but we need to assume some other incidents F and F’ as the actual effects of the two laws a) and b). And, according to another law, these will produce E’’. CartwrightVsCreary: this can work in individual cases, but not always. I see no reason why such intermediate factors should be found all the time. These seem to me more shadowy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Davidson, D. | Loar Vs Davidson, D. | I 20 Anomalous Monism/Davidson/Loar: there are no psychophysical laws. Loar: this does not concern me, but the argument for it does: because then there can also be no functionalist reduction. (Which is a stronger thesis). Davidson/Loar: his most important premise is: the "constitutive force of rationality" in the attribution of belief and desire. Without a certain logical consistency we cannot ascribe any attitudes at all. Davidson: Thesis: it would always be possible to find a person whose belief has a different content, with the same physical state. Therefore, a psychophysical generalization G cannot be a law. Reason: mental and physical schemata have different commitments. I 21 Mental states: are fixed on rationality Physical states: are fixed to nothing comparable. I.e. a physical state is never correlated in this way with other physical states as a mental state is with other mental states. Coherence/Davidson: concerns mental states and has no echo in the physical. Functionalism/LoarVsDavidson: shows that Davidson's argument is false. Functional States; are physical states of the 2. level Structural physical states: 1. level. LoarVsDavidson: there is a much simpler reason against adopting psychophysical laws: 1. that there is no 1:1 correlation between propositional attitude and structural physical states. Functional Role/Loar: may look different in each person depending on how they have learned something. However, people with the same attitude may also have something physical in common. But according to functionalism, this is a quality of the 2. level! I 22 2. Rationality/Loar: it would be surprising if our theory of rationality had structural parallels to the structure of a physical system. But that is not Davidson's argument and it does not convince either. It would be no wonder at all if a person had a correspondence between the physical and the mental. Functionalism/Loar: Main question: can it recognize the constitutive power of rationality? Of course! And it must! (see below chapter 4) Thesis: each predicate of the form "z believes that p" attributes a certain functional state that determines the role of the predicate in theory, including constraints on rationality. Problem: this must be said in physical vocabulary and how can we do this with propositions? I 23 Functionalism/LoarVsDavidson: functionalism is not about reducing laws to laws. There can be contingencies on both sides. I 24 Rationality: their ingredients are not contingent, but that certain physical states fulfill them is. Psychology/Unrevocability/Rationality/Davidson/Loar: other authors read Davidson's argument as follows: Rationality is constitutive of rational psychology, which is therefore irrevocable. And revisability is a central feature of scientific laws! Loar: that is not my argument. I 25 Rationality/Physical States/LoarVsDavidson/Loar: Thesis: the idea is not incoherent that certain physical states meet the conditions of rationality ((s) coherence, consistency, etc.). |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Horwich, P. | Wright Vs Horwich, P. | I 111 CP (Correspondence Platitude)/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are the way "P" says they are. Can be easily resolved to DS. CP+ /Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: That is not a sentence about truth, it is a sentence about physical laws, natural laws, and it does not help us here at all! It is not useful for our purposes. Subject missed! It has nothing to do with representation, which we worry about here. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Identity Theory | Verschiedene Vs Identity Theory | Lanz I 280 VsIdentity Theory: Sensations cannot be identical with brain processes, because one can know that one feels something certain without knowing that the corresponding brain process takes place. Complete ignorance of neurophysiology does not prevent anyone from being a good everyday psychologist. Identity/Leibniz: (VsIdentity Thesis) all characteristics must be shared. Popular argument against the identity thesis: if one finds characteristics that possess mental phenomena, but not the supposedly identical neural states or processes, one believes that the thesis is done. For example, pain can be like stabbing, neuronal events cannot, thoughts can be astute, neural states cannot, my memory picture of the Eiffel Tower has shape, form and color, but not the neural state, thoughts cannot be localized, but neuronal processes, etc. Allegedly, a category mistake is made here. VsVs: confusion of word and object, word meaning (description) different, nevertheless the object can be the same. Te I 45 Mind/Brain/TetensVsIdentity Theory: the answer to the question: "are mental states brain states? In the end it turns out to be more complicated: on the one hand, they are revealed as causes of behaviour: Te I 145 No identity due to psycho-physical laws, the same behavior can be accompanied by different brain states (>Davidson). On the other hand, we refer to interaction patterns that include the attribution of mental states. In this respect, it makes no sense to say that we only refer to brain states. So there is no unambiguous answer for an identity of both states. Te I 147 TetensVsIdentity Theory: this leaves out the effectiveness of the attributions of mental states for interactions. Vollmer I 108 Identity Theory/Monism/Vollmer: most important monistic theory: mind is a function of the central nervous system that only emerges at a certain evolutionary level. Representative: Feigl, Armstrong, Smart, Place, Bunge, Lewis. Function/Explanation/Evolution Theory/Vollmer: by evolution one can explain a function only if this function means a selective advantage. For example memory, representing function of our central nervous system, simulation function. VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: there is an evolutionary argument: if mental processes are identical with physical processes, then the selective advantage of mental processes must be an advantage of physical processes at the same time. But then this advantage would also exist if the physical processes had no internal aspect at all. The biological significance (and selective advantage) would be ensured without any psychological by-products (>epiphenomenalism). Then the whole internal aspect, that the world somehow feels to us, is unexplained, superfluous. Then why did it develop at all? Vollmer II 89 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological processes are subjective, but undeniable! In this respect it is easier to doubt the existence of matter (>Descartes). II 90 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. For example, a cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Smart, J. C. | Quine Vs Smart, J. C. | II 118 ff The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics). There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism. Smart's materialism is more robust than that. II 119 Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance. SmartVsEmergence. They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.) Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth. II 120 Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins. On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory. II 121 Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent. Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work. Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances. Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of ignorance, disregard details. There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute. Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle. They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al. As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added. II 122 Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explanation | Cartwright, N. | I 4 Explanation/Cartwright: thesis: is not a signpost to the truth. I 8 Forecast/Prediction/Success/Cartwright: Thesis: is no help when it comes to saying if the theory is true! I 11 Equations/Science/Physics/Cartwright: thesis: is to ask the wrong question: "What are the right equations?". Different models bring different aspects to the fore, some equations give a rough estimate, but are easier to solve. No single model serves all purposes. We apply these and other equations. Causal Explanation/Cartwright: are different from physical practice: we don't tell a causal story first, then another! I 12 Thesis: if we take the evidence seriously, we must say that the physical laws are wrong! One reason is the tension between causal and theoretical explanation. I 44 CartwrightVsTradition: Thesis: truth and explanation are two completely different functions and should be kept apart, which usually does not happen. I 44 Explanation/Deductive-Nomological Model/Hempel: Thesis: one factor explains the other if the occurrence of the second can be deductively deduced from that of the first from the laws of nature. |
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