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Beliefs | Fodor | IV 114 Meaning holism/belief/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: if, according to Lewis' thesis, belief prevails over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, the following would have to be assumed: Def thesis of the primacy of belief/Lewis: the conditions of intentional attribution contain the conditions for belief attribution. Therefore, if the former is holistic, so must also be the latter. Semantic Holism/SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that the semantic holism might follow from this thesis ((s) belief holism seems plausible). IV 117 Belief holism does not lead to content holism, because content can be contradictory. Belief/Davidson: thesis: centrality of belief: there is no propositional attitude without some beliefs. Fodor/Lepore Vs: you can wish for this and that without believing this and that. Semantic holism is stronger: only semantically evaluable (true/false) states can be propositional attitudes. Belief/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: there is no connection between mental images (not true/false) and semantics (true/false). Orthogonal: belief properties: strength, vitality/representation: properties are ultimately geometric, i.e. the truth conditions are completely independent of the causal role. IV 156 Holism/Davidson: the fact that most beliefs are true implies that they are also coherent. New: also vice versa! > Holism: New: the interpreter cannot discover that the speaker is wrong in most utterances. He/she can only interpret the sentences that are caused by events and objects of the external world. IV 157 Beliefs/radical interpretation/Davidson: most of our beliefs are true: if true, causes ipso facto (in the light of the interpreter!). Fodor/Lepore Vs: truth conditions for a sentence must not be identified with the currently prevailing truth conditions >Radical Interpretation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Beliefs | Schiffer | I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 --- I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Conceptual Role | Schiffer | I 108f Conceptual Role/Schiffer: the conceptual role tells us how to get from stimuli to beliefs. >Stimuli, >Beliefs. The conceptual role of a mental representation is then the counterfactual role of the formula in the perceptual belief formation and in the reasoning. >Counterfactuals, >Mental representation. It is a counterfactual property. - A formal property of internal sentences. - It can be determined without reference to t-theoretical properties. The conceptual role of a mental representation does not determine the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Twin earth; E.g. twin earth H2O and XYZ have the same conceptual role - i.e. the conceptual role is used in addition to the truth conditions. >Twin earth. I 109 Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)(1): the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s. SchifferVs: that never happens. Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either. 1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409 I 167 Conceptual Role/Schiffer: the conceptual role of an inner formula is then the complex counterfactual property of the formula, whose knowledge informs us about the conditions under which the formula occurs. Conceptual role instead of definition: with it, it is impossible to eliminate by paraphrase. - Then it is irreducible >controlled use! Schiffer: Thesis: simply conceptual role instead of platonist irreducible property e.g. of being a dog: cute hairy barking quadrupeds. Accordingly we need no primitive propositional attitude and no belief properties. Language development: proto-humans: have beliefs and desires, but no concepts for them - later God gives simple concepts for them (increases the survival value) - they are recognized as irreducible. I 169 Conceptual role: does not allow law-like generalization as e.g. x does A, because he wants P and believes that he achieves P if he does A - nevertheless there is reliability. >Intentionality, >Attribution, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Reliability theory. I 186 Conceptual Role/Schiffer: must be determined without reference to the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. It does not determine the truth conditions. Twin Earth: water and twin earth water have the same conceptual role. Use is synonymous to possession of a conceptual role. Internal language/Mentalese: here, the conceptual role is independent from reference. - Therefore no compositional semantics is assumed. This is not about situations, speech acts or utterances. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Dualism | Schiffer | I 151 Property dualism/Schiffer: assumes the same physicalist and irreducible mental (intentional) properties. SchifferVs: this is superfluous, leading to over-determination. >Property Dualism. I 156 ff Sententialistic dualism/Schiffer: true statements about belief instead of existing belief-properties. >Substitutional quantification, >Belief properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Natural Kinds | Schiffer | I 37 Description theory/natural kind/twin earth/Schiffer: no solution: "the beings that are co-specific with such and such looking beings which I met". >Twin earth, >Description theory, >Identification, >Reference. Then "cat" refers to both. - That does not work (see below). Belief/Schiffer: belief must not be single digit, then it would not be indexed to the person. - (Twin earth: then both had the same belief anyway). >Beliefs. I 41 Natural kind/belief/Schiffer: Problem: the theories of Kripke/Putnam for natural kinds are unsuitable for belief predicates. Kripke: original term "dog": "this kind of thing" - (paradigmatic instances). >Natural kinds/Kripke, >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Belief properties. I 54 Natural kind/proposition/belief/Schiffer: E.g. Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog. Problem: the proposition cannot be the content of belief, because there is no representation of the role that represents the natural kind term "dog" here. >Proposition, >Belief content. 1. possibility: that-sentence with predicate, "that" refers to property (dog) - (Classic: they are introduced directly into the proposition). 2. Frege: the proposition does not contain the dog property, but a way of givenness, which is how Tanya imagines dog property (belief de re). >Way of givenness. Problem: then the that-sentence does not refer to the complete content of belief, but e.g. (∃m) (m is a manner of presentation of dog property & B (Tanya)). Then (3) cannot be the content of belief: (3) ‹Gustav, the property of being a dog› >That-clause. Natural kind: it may be that there is no non-pleonastic language-independent characteristic of being a dog. I 55 Natural kind/Wittgenstein/Putnam/Kripke: natural kinds are not to define by obsertion terms (or observable properties). Because we lack appropriate expressions for dog-like appearance and behavior. Correct: properties of acquaintance/Russell. >Acquaintance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Physicalism | Schiffer | I 138 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Schiffer. I 142f Def Ontological physicalism/Schiffer: thesis: ontological physicalism has no irreducible psychological entities. Def Sententialist physicalism: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong). If there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. Def Sententialist Dualism: there are true psychological sentences. Belief properties: if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable. Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism/Schiffer: because both are true, there are no belief propositions. NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs. >Dualism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Semantics | Schiffer | I 13 Semantic Property/Schiffer: e.g. to have content. Truth theoretical property: to be true. I 14 Relation theories/intention bases semantics/i.b.s./Grice: Solution: semantic properties (s.p.) are permitted if they do not stem from the public language - then no circularity. Propositions: not-public. Sentences: public. I 221 Verificationist Semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-conditional): Verification conditions instead of truth conditions. >Truth-conditional semantics, >Verification conditions. DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain a truth theory. >Meaning theory/Davidson, >Truth theory. I 241 Intentionality/Semantics/Schiffer: semantic concepts can be defined in terms of propostional atittudes - but not vice versa. Schiffer:There are no propositional attitudes as belief properties or belief objects. >Belief properties, >Objects of belief. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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Platonism | Schiffer Vs Platonism | I 107 SchifferVsPhysicalism: this can only be true if the Platonic realism (Platonism) is correct with respect to intentional properties and intentional facts. And there is no reason to assume that Platonism is correct. SchifferVsPlatonismus. I 152 Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (the mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that's the way to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (contradiction). 2. Do you believe that if they can: problem: the superfluity is even more serious: SchifferVsPlatonism: in Plato's heaven, there are many things that unnecessarily do something that other things already do for them. But these latter now do not do anything anymore! The 2nd stage property to be causally necessary that the neural Z-Token has its effect, is completely empty because B is not part of a broader property that would be necessary and sufficient for the effect. ((s) because B is to stand on its own). I 234 Anti-Realism/Schiffer: the anti-realism I represent is not plausible when natural languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. SchifferVsPlatonism: for my attitude in this case, the same applies. (With regard to objects of propositional attitudes or belief properties. Problem: a question is still: how is the rejection of the relation theory compatible with the validity of such forms as E.g. "So and so believes that this and that", so "there is something that he believes". Platonic realism: E.g. (a) Mother Teresa is modest after realism we need to actually distinguish four entities here: 1. Mother Teresa as a language-independent object 2. linguistically: the singular term "Mother Teresa" with the reference ratio referenced ("Mother Teresa", Mother Teresa) Pointe: this requires that the speaker understands the term and knows the relation. 3. and 4 .: the entity of modesty (the property of being modest) and the adjective "modest". I 235 Universal/Schiffer: first is modesty, as Mother Teresa a language-independent object! But it has no place and no time. Familiarity/Universal/Schiffer: you may be familiar with modesty, without knowing the term. Predicate: expresses the property, that means we have again a relation Expresses ("modest", the property to be modest). Schiffer: this canonical representation shows that the fact that is notified, contains two separate things that are connected by a relation. And it is precisely this fact, in which the meaning of "modest" is. ((s) then the meaning of each predicate would be the expressed (not identical with the predicate) property.) Schiffer: the knowledge that the term expresses the properties, belongs to the understanding of the term. Without that one could not understand propositions that include "modest". Realism/Schiffer: (that here always requires the (rejected) realism (or the relation theory). Realism then equals the two relations.: 1. Between names and object. 2. Between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiated the second. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Property Dualism | Schiffer Vs Property Dualism | I 150 Schiffer: Thesis: There is no irreducible belief properties. Suppose there were, then we have the following reductio ad absurdum: if there are any, they cannot be irreducible. This has unacceptable consequences: (1) Ava is n in a neural state token. n has B, the non-pleonastic property to be a belief that a car is coming) and B is not identical to any property which is intrinsically to be specified in a non-mentalist, non-intentionalist vocabulary. We have already said that there is a full neuro physical explanation for Ava's stepping back, and we assume that implies: (2) there is a neurophysiological property P of n's, which is the most comprehensive property that enters the neurophysiological explanation of Ava's stepping back and therefore is necessary and sufficient that n is a cause of the stepping back. The property P is now completely explanatory of the body movement. (3) But if there is a non-pleonastic property B, then it also is a causal essential property, in view of the cause of stepping back. If n had not have had B, n (the neural state token) had not caused Ava's stepping back. Def Property Dualism/Schiffer/(s): assumes the simultaneous existence of physical and irreducible mentalistic or intentional properties. SchifferVsProperty Dualism: assuming the property dualism for (1), it is not possible, then one have to explain the simultaneous truth of (1) - (3), and follow one of the four ways (A) - (D), which are all wrong: A. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could argue that the causal efficacy of B (the irreducible mental, intentional property) cannot be explained in terms of the effectiveness of P. So that there is no causal overdetermination at the level of the causes (as we assume, as belief-Z-tokens = neural Z-Tokens) but at the level of causal laws. (…+…) I 152 B. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that is as if to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (…+…) C. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could try as epiphenomenalism: that the neural Z token has n P caused that it also has B. Causality/Epiphenomenalism: the causal relevance is then inherited. SchifferVsProperty Dualism/SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: the talk of "nomological appendages" shows that B does not even now do the empty part of a superfluous jobs! (…+…) D. Property Dualism/Schiffer: last rescue: supervenience: to have B "superveniere" on the Doing of P, where "supervenience" to be a primitive metaphysical relationship that is to have nothing to do with causation, but rather to have something to do with a primitive form of Entailment (to Include). So: although B is not identical or contained in P, and although there is no formal Entailment, it should be a naked, inexplicable fact that there is no possible world in which a state has P but not B. (…+…) |
Stephen Schiffer I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge (MIT) 1987 |
Propositions | Schiffer Vs Propositions | I XVII SchifferVsPropositions: (For reasons that have nothing to do with the mind-body-problem): Belief/Schiffer: (late): cannot be a relation to propositions: E.g. Tanya's belief that Gustav is a dog: Proposition: if the propositional theory is correct, the proposition has to, in order to present the full content, so to speak contain doghood or a manner of the representation of doghood. I 43 SchifferVsPropositions: if a functional theory can also be set up with sentences or even uninterpreted formulas, propositions are surely completely superfluous. I 44 Why should an arbitrary formulation that uses propositions to index functional roles, be considered as determination of the extension of the colloquial "believes"?. I 51 Proposition/Schiffer: There are several things that can be taken as propositions: rough-grained: propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values. These have no structure as functions. fine-grained: Complex that contain individuals (as components) and properties as structure. (E.g. situation semantics, Barweise/Perry 1983, Bealer 1982, Adams 1974, Lewis 1970a, Loar 1981, Plantinga 1974). SchifferVsPropositions: no matter whether to accept propositions as fine-grained or rough-grained, there are problems: E.g. Suppose (a) Ralph believes that snow is white and all theoreticians agree that one can analyze it like this: (b) B (Ralph, the proposition that snow is white). FN I 277 But they are all not obliged to (b). I 51 But they will agree that the expression "that snow is white" in A functions as a complex singular term that refers to this proposition and that the reference of this singular term is defined by the references of its components. ((s)> compositionality of reference). I 52 Then the proposition is necessarily true if snow is white. Schiffer: the two theorists may differ in whether the propositions contain their speakers as components. Function/Structure/Schiffer: if propositions are functions of possible worlds in truth value, they contain their references not as components. They do not include the entities they determine. I 70 SchifferVsPropositions/As belief content/SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsPropositional Theory/Conclusion: if the theory were true, the proposition would contain as belief content either doghood itself or a BT of it But if there were a truly language-independent property of doghood, they would belong to the biologically determined natural type and E.g. show "shmog" I 71 That doghood itself cannot be the component of propositions that we seek. That the content of natural-type-concepts should include BT, is only credible if there was a specific approach for what those BT should be at all. And we have not found such an approach. So the propositional theory (propositionalism) is wrong. Another reason against propositions as belief content: Property/Doghood/Schiffer: if there should be a non-pleonastic, voice-independent 1. property of being a dog that it would have to be the only one. But there is not. If it existed, it might not be irreducible. 2. if there were a reducible such property, there would be a property that is specifiable in phenotypic and/or genetic etc. terms that would be this property of being a dog, 3. but there is not such a property: none of Gustav's properties, however complex. But that is not so important. It only later plays a role for the existence of language-independent belief properties. |
Stephen Schiffer I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge (MIT) 1987 |
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Epiphenomenon Epiphenomenalism | Versus | Schiffer I 152 MaterialismVsEpiphenomenalism / materialismVsBelief Properties: (Jackson 1982, 135): b.p. (as epiphenomena) do not explain anything they just soothe the intuitions of dualists, it s a mystery how they should fit into science - epiphenomenalism : argues only to ensure that qualia are epiphenomena. |
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Conceptual Role | Schiffer, St. | I 93 Thesis: There is a single (clearly fixable) package of conceptual role and causal relations for reference that determines the truth condition function for each system of mental representations. I 167 Conceptual Role/Schiffer: Thesis: Simple conceptual role instead of platonistic irreducible property e.g. "being a dog": hairy nice barking four-legged friends - accordingly one does not need primitive propositional attitudes and no belief properties. I 187 Theory of Use/Reference/Meaning/Compositionality/Schiffer: Recent Tendency: (Putnam 1978): Thesis: We can have theories of use for language understanding (not meaning) that do not presuppose truth-theoretical semantics - the theories of understanding and reference do not have as much to do with truth as most believe. - Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use), nothing at all is assumed of a "correspondence" of words and things. |
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Belief Properties | Schiffer, St. | I 143 belief properties/ Schiffer: we assume that there are no b.p., and therefore the physicalisms will differ, therefore you will not be able to connect the truth of ontological physicalism to the truth of sententialist. I 150 Schiffer: There are no irreducible b. pr. |
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