# Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Entry
Reference
de dicto Logic Texts Read III 127
Initial problem:
Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion.
Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina."
"Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven".
Re III 128
Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example.
Re III 129
QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds.
>Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide.
Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements.
But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism.
>Essentialism.
Re III 130
Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote - "7" and "9" is now embedded - so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle - statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true " - the scope is limited. >de re.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Descriptions Logic Texts Read III 127f
Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions- only real names allow the substitution that can be found in the indistinguishability of identical. Improper names: lead to more complex form: E.g. "among the Roman orators there is a major one, and he denounced Catiline that".
E.g. "Just one number counts the planets and it is more than seven"/Russell: here is only 7 a real name - hence these sentences may not be sentences in a conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical.
>Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability,
QuineVs:. problem : range: the marks must be eliminated, so that in the new wording no part corresponds with them.
>Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide.

Strobach I 104
Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Stro I
N. Strobach
Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005
Descriptions Strawson VII 118/19
Description/Meaning/Strawson: e.g. "He": minimal descriptive meaning.
E.g. "Blue Grotto": maximum descriptive meaning.
E.g. "The Blue Grotto": middle position, "impure" proper name. (Russell).
>Name, >Description, >Improper name.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Scope Logic Texts Read III 127f
Improper names/Quine: (= descriptions). Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical.
>Name, >Description, >Rigidity, >Substitution.
Improper names: they lead to more complex forms: e.g. "There is one greatest among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina". - e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven."
Russell: here, only 7 is a real name.
Therefore, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical.
>Indistinguishability, >Leibniz principle, >Identity.
QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that no new constituent will correspond to them in the new formulation.
---
Strobach I 104
Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. ---
Scope/Descriptions/Possible World/Read: Narrow scope: the description refers to different objects in different possible worlds - wide scope: the same object in different possible worlds - real names: always large scope. >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms, >Proper names.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Stro I
N. Strobach
Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005
Substitution Logic Texts Read III 127f
Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions) - Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. Improper names: lead to a more complex form: for example, "there is one greatest orator among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina." - e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven."
Russell: here only 7 is a real name.
>Description.
Hence, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical.
QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that in the new formulation no component corresponds to them.
---
Strobach I 104
Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Stro I
N. Strobach
Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005
Syntax Geach I 116
Syntax: replacing salva congruitate: the word chain remains correct when it is replaced. QuineVs: Replacing changes syntax: e.g. Copernicus was a complete idiot, if and only if the earth is adisk. - different ranges:
a) Copernicus with predicate + sentence
b) complex predicate.
Then there is no ambiguous word chain, but different analyzes are possible. Ambiguity: "An astronomer is a great idiot iff the earth is flat" can be seen as an operator (like negation). Different brackets are possible.
Syntax/Quine/Geach: Quine's
1st Syntactic insight: spurious names: these are a problem of range - for real names the problem does not exist.
>Names/Quine, >Range/Quine, >Improper names.
GeachVsQuine: he, himself blurs the distinction by regarding names as abbreviations of certain descriptions.
>Descriptions/Quine.
I 120
3rd Syntactic insight of Quine: E.g. "lx (2x² + 3x³)". This function of a number: twice its square plus three times its third power - such complex descriptions can be eliminated by usage definition. (Russell):> Relative-clause.
I 126
4th Syntactic insight of Quine: Introducing a predicate by a schema letter F. >Schematic letters/Quine.
Problem: E.g.: "Every sentence or its opposite is true" must not become "(Every sentence is true) or (Every sentence is not true)".
Solution: "F() is then -__ or __s opposite is true".
Geach: sub-clauses (relative-clauses) and pronouns are not mere substitutes. - This is even a mistake in modern logic books.
>Clauses, >Substitution, >Proxy.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972