Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attitude-Semantics | Cresswell | I 64 Attitude Semantics/VsPossible World Semantics/Semantics of Possible Worlds/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, yet the other one is not, but still both are true in the same possible world. >Pierre eyample. Cresswell: E.g. all logical and mathematical truths. But they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress. >Logical omniscience. I 65 CresswellVsSituation Semantics: the situations are to play roles that cannot be played simultaneously. Solution: possible world semantics: the roles are played by entities of various kinds. >Semantics of possible worlds. Solution: context with space-time indication - incorrect sentences: describe non-actual situations. >Situations, >Situation Semantics. I 66 Sentences describe situations in a context. - The context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. >Context. Interpretation/Barwise: meaning of sentences in context. >Intepretation, >Barwise/Perry. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Completeness | Cresswell | I 69 Incompleteness/completeness/incompleteness/CresswellVsSituational semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: the question of completeness is less clear than it seems: 1. How to understand u [[φ]] e ? "In context u, φ describes situation e". e: we have understood as a proposition until now. But one can just as well understand a situation as a world, so that it would then say: "with respect to context u, φ is true in e". Disjunction/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: Barwise and Perry's construction requires that situations be conceived of as possible worlds, but this turns situation semantics into semantics of possible worlds. >Barwise/Perry, >Situation semantics, >Possible world semantics. Incompleteness/incomplete/partial/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: e.g. disjunction: (1) Tomorrow morning between 9 and 12 I will either be at home or at the university. This is not a sentence disjunction, but it is equivalent to (2) Either I will be at home between 9 and 12 tomorrow or I will be at the university between 9 and 12 tomorrow. which is a disjunction of (3) I will be at home between 9 and 12 tomorrow and (4) I will be at the university between 9 and 12 tomorrow. If we also have speaker, date etc., the possible worlds divide into two classes, those in which (1) is true and those in which (1) is false. ((s) It is always about (1) not about the single alternatives.) Cresswell: Among the worlds in which (1) is true, there can also be some in which I am in both places, even if not at the same time! I 70 Incomplete/cisjunction/possible Worlds/Cresswell: but of course there will also be such worlds in the crowd where I am in one place but not in the other. In this sense (1) is incomplete. I.e. the proposition can be made true in different ways. Situation/incomolete/Cresswell: if a situation is to be like a proposition, then for the situation to be incomplete, a single (only) situation must be described by (1), which is the situation of my-being-at-home-or-at-university. ((s) "disjunctive situation", "all in one"; and not one (disjunction of situations) where I am in situation a) at home or situation b) at the university.) Situations/Cresswell. Cresswell: Each element of the class is either a at-home world or an at-university world but it is not true that each element is a at-home world or each is an at-university world. That is, the proposition is incomplete (a partial proposition). Incompleteness/Cresswell: Barwise/Perry can be understood (Perry 1986(1), p 85) as saying that they consider situations to be incomplete. Reason: a situation does not give an answer to every question. 1. Perry. J. 1986. From worlds to situations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 15. pp.83-107 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Decidability | Hintikka | I 7 Standard Semantics/Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: what differences are there? The ditch between them is much deeper than it first appears. Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella has shown, however, that even in the simplest quantifying case, of the monadic predicate logic, the standard logic is radically different from its Kripkean cousin. Decidability: monadic predicate logic is, as Kripke has shown, decidable. Kripke semantics: Kripke semantics is undecidable. Decidability: decidability implies axiomatizability. I 208 Decision Problem/predicate calculus/Hao Wang: thesis: the problem corresponds to the task of completely filling the Euclidean surface with square dominoes of different sizes. At least one stone of each size must be used. E.g. logical omniscience now comes in in the following way: At certain points I can truthfully say according to my perception: (5) I see that this Domino task is impossible to solve. In other cases, I cannot say that truthfully. >Logical omniscience. Problem/HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: according to Barwise/Perry, it should be true of any unsolvable Domino problem that I see the unsolvability immediately as soon as I see the forms of available stones because the unsolvability follows logically from the visual information. Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: according to the urn model there is no problem. >Possible world semantics. I 209 Omniscience/symmetry/Hintikka: situational semantics: situational semantics needs the urn model to solve the second problem of logical omniscience. Semantics of possible worlds: on the other hand, it needs situational semantics itself to solve the first problem. >Situation semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| I, Ego, Self | Barwise | Peacocke I 137f I/Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry: rule for use might be feasible: ""E "will always refer to the speaker". >Situation semantics. Peacocke: that determined fully the meaning, however: it requires more than just understanding of the language in which it happens - the speaker must always know that he himself, for example, is Smith, or fulfills any other description - therefore a rule is not sufficient. I/Reference Rule/Peacocke: needs additional intension: manner of presentation of the first person. >First person. |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Information | Chalmers | I 277 Information/Chalmers: (I draw upon Shannon 1948)(1). I 278 Information in this sense is not always about something. It is rather the choice of possibilities. >"Aboutness", >Probability. Choosing a point from a 3-dimensional space carries more information than a point from a 2-dimensional one. >Complexity). I 279 Information state: an information state can be viewed as a waveform, or another function with a continuous range of functions and values. Information space: the information space has two types of structure: each complex state will have an internal structure (the combinatorial structure) and each element in this state will belong to a subspace with its own topological structure (the relational structure). I 280 Information space/Chalmers: informartion space (different from Dretske 1981 (2) and Barwise/Perry 1983 (3)) is independent of further considerations with regard to semantic content. >Content/Chalmers, >Semantic Content, >F. Dretske, >J. Barwise, >J. Perry. Information: we can find information in the physical as well as the phenomenal world. >Phenomena, >Qualia. I 281 The structure of the information space will correspond to a structure of the effect space. I 282 Transferability principle: Physically realized information is only information, if it can be processed (see Mackay 1969 (4)). This corresponds to the transferability in Shannon. I 283 Message/Shannon: Information sets must be separated to count as individual messages. When two physical states of a system are transformed into the same signal, they count as the same message. I 284 Phenomenal Information/Chalmers: there are natural patterns of differences between phenomenal states. These provide the difference structure for an information space. Therefore, we can assume that phenomenal states realize information states. Since every experience has natural similarity and distinction relations, we will always find suitable information spaces. >Experience, >Experience/Chalmers. 1. C. E. Shannon,A mathematical theory of communication. Bell Systems Technical Journal 27, 1948: pp. 379-423 2. F. Dretske, Knowledge and the flow of information, Cambridge 1981. 3. J. Barwise and J. Perry, Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge 1983 4. D. M. Mackay Information, Mechanism, and Meaning, Cambridge 1969 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Propositions | Montague | Cresswell I 67 Proposition/Cresswell: there are certainly semantics that accept propositions as basic entities and attribute them as values to sentences (Montague, 1974(1), 227, and Cresswell, 1966(2)). >Sentences, >Functions, >Possible worlds, >Semantics of possible worlds. I 68 (Also Thomason, 1980)(3). Sentence functor/Montague/Thomason: in such theories the meaning of the sentence functor is: a function of propositions on propositions, of predicates: functions of individuals on propositions, etc. Cf. >Propositions/Cresswell, >Sentence Meaning, Thus, the generation property is obtained for all sentences. Situational Semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: it is not certain whether Barwise and Perry can accept this - at least not, if the meaning of each sentence operator (and when expanding each modifier) must be represented by a function. For they must have infinite domains, and the two do not want infinite entities in the semantics (> Cresswell 1985b(4) 210f, 215f). >Situation semantics. 1. R. Montague Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. New Haven: Yale University Press (1974). 2. M. J. Cresswell. The completeness of S0. 5 Logique Et Analyse 9:263-6 (1966) 3. Richmond H. Thomason A model theory for propositional attitudes Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):47 - 70 (1980) 4. M. J. Cresswell. Situations and Attitudes Philosophical Review 94 (2):293 (1985) |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Propositions | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perform this function. >Content. SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought. >Representation, >Language of thought. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I XVIIff SchifferVsPropositions/late: propositions should contain E.g. dog property. Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences. Problem: there are no truth conditions in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Truth conditions. I 14 Propositions: have their truth values essentially. Phrases/expressionsSchiffer: have their truth values contingently. - (in public speech or in mentalese) Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented. I 49f Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: a proposition always requires natural kind terms. Even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory. Propositional theory: says 1) that "p" is a real object variable 2) that propositions are their values. Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components. E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY". But only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties). - They are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations. >Pain, >Mental representation. "Thought"/Frege: = Proposition; also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow. Problem: VsPropositions: they carry an ontological commitment to Platonism. >Platonism. I 51 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are superfluous such as facts and features. - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...). - This is a doubling. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of) Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white. Different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. I 52 Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers do not function as components. - Then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white. Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical. - Then the problem of logical omniscience follows. >Omniscience. Solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Sentence Meaning | Barwise | Cresswell II 169 Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: sentence meaning is a relation between situations. >Meaning, >Word Meaning, >Sentences, >Subsententials, >Situations, >Situation Semantics, cf. >Possible worlds, >Semantics of Possible Worlds. |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Situation Semantics | Armstrong | Place I 27 Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry: Situation: extra-linguistic counterpart of the sentence. The linguistic representation of extralinguistic depends on a correspondence between the ontology and the sentence structure. ((s) Cf. >Picture theory.) |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Situation Semantics | Barwise | Cresswell II 169 Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Equivalence, >Double negation. Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ..."). >Situations. Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations. Cresswell I 63 Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations. >Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics. Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete). CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7) Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds. Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations. Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation. >Possible World Semantics. What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds. I 64 Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress. I 65 CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification. >Context. False sentences: describe non-actual situations. I 66 Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. >Interpretation, >Sentence meaning. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true. Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time. I 67 On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks e*: = in I, Mollie, yes. That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?). Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that u[[φ]] e iff e* < e. ((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.) The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context. Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property. >Atomic sentences. Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u. In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely. 1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry 2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293 3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press 4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Situation Semantics | Cresswell | I 63 Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry: possible worlds (poss.w.) are too big to explain what the speaker of a sentence knows. Possible World: complete possible situations. >Situations, >Possible worlds, >Facts. CresswellVsBarwise: Situations need only be partial in the sense that they are small possible worlds. >Barwise/Perry. I 69 CresswellVsBarweise/Perry: disjunction: their construction requires that situations are considered as possible worlds: E.g. I am at home or at the university: as a proposition incomplete, because both made true. The situation can only be one of the two. Making true/truthmaker: the total (disjunction) does not have to be made true by an alternative, because it can also be made true by another alternative. >Truthmakers. I 72 Situations seem incomplete. (E.g. Does the dog bark loudly or quietly?) - But they are not as incomplete as propositions. >Propositions. I 71 Problem: Total situation: The machine is working (shows red or green). - still contradiction: is the situation described by a or by b? If the signal was neither showing red nor green, the incompleteness would be too radical. >Descriptions, >Incompleteness. I 73 Incomplete/situation/Barwise/Perry: E.g. naked infinitives with "see". Joe saw Fred coming in and Sally was smoking or not smoking. >Naked infinitive. Cresswell: so everything possible; but then they are possible worlds. Everything that can be a possible world is a possible world. Possible worlds do not have to be large, they can be as small as situations at Barwise/Perry. Different: Aspect/Hintikka: (= incompleteness of possible world): all facts about who slept during the lecture. >Aspects. CresswellVsHintikka: we do not want lists, these are metaphysical here. Solution/Cresswell. "Everything that interests us in the situation". ((s) So lists after all.) Thus the truth of the propositions can be determined. I 74 Definition essentially incomplete/Cresswell: a situation is essentially incomplete when it only needs to be part of an accumulation of situations (disjunction). CresswellVsBarwise: but this does not work with naked infinitives with "see": E.g. of "Ralph saw Ortcutt or Hortcutt hide the letter". - at "Ralph saw... or saw... ". (This is not a that-sentence!) >That-clause. This is not possible if seeing should be a relation between subject and situation. - ((s) Then only one of the two.) >Seeing. I 77 Situation Semantics/CresswellVs: knows only one kind of entities (situations). - instead: possible world semantics: three types: 1. possible world, single and complete (assessed with regard to truth) 2. Propositions: classes of possible worlds, are in logical relations and are the meanings of sentences in a context 3. Individuals (individuals) among them events. >Possible world semantics. Situations/Cresswell: can be considered as one of each of these kind of entities. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Situation Semantics | Hintikka | II XVII Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/Hintikka: situation semantics is not so much different than the semantics of possible worlds. Possible Worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds are often more like situations, they are not always closed worlds. They are rather event progresses in a small corner of the universe and related to situations. Difference: alternative situations could occur in one and the same world. >Possible worlds, >Situations. II XVIII Situation Semantics/Hintikka: situation semantics is not a serious rival of the semantics of possible worlds. --- II 206 Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Hintikka: Barwise's and Perry's situation semantics is a welcome addition to the semantics of possible worlds. >Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry. Situation/Hintikka: an interesting question is how small egocentric situations can be when put together to form a larger comprehensive "world view". Relations: there should be at least three types of relations between situations: 1. spatial, 2. temporal and 3. the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained situations. It is best to study these separately. II 207 Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/omniscience/Hintikka: how can situation semantics solve the problem of logical omniscience? Barwise/Perry: give the following example: (1) a sees how b X-t therefore (2) a sees how b Y-t If X-en implies logically, to Y-en ((s) e.g. to go, to move). Solution/Barwise/Perry: Barwise and Perry assume that there are richer and poorer situations and relations between them. HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: but this is not a triumph over the semantics of possible worlds, for two reasons: 1. Because it is now about the relation fine/coarse (fine-grained/coarse-grained) which is nothing with which the semantics of possible worlds has to do. 2. The semantics of possible worlds has solved the problem by using Rantala's urn models (changing worlds depending on whether drawn balls are returned or not). Barwise/Perry: Barwise and Perry consider only instances of omniscience, which arise through the introduction of new descriptive terms into the conclusion,... II 208 ...and go beyond what is mentioned in the premises. Hintikka/Rantala: we have both looked at cases which require the introduction of new individuals in order to ensure the validity of the inference. E.g. (3) Robert saw someone giving each boy his own book. (4) Robert saw every boy how a book was given him by someone. Question: does (3) logically entail (4)? Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry: according to situation semantics, yes it does. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to semantics of possible worlds it is at least questionable. >Semantics of possible worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| That-Clauses | Cresswell | II 54 Definition content: be the meaning of the that-clause - it is about contents in this book - different objects (sentences) can have the same content. >Content, >Sentences, >Propositions, >Propositional content. II 89 That-clause/intension/Cresswell: the intension of the that-clause is not always equal to the intension of the complement clause - (the clause following the "that"). >Intensions, >Propositions. Iterated propositional attitude: Problem: occurs when the most outside "that" operates on the sense (structure) of the complement clause - analogously: the plus sign would then contain itself as one of its arguments. II 159 Propositional attitude/attribution/that-clause/truth conditions/content/Cresswell: thesis: the truth conditions of clauses with propositional attitudes are determined by the contents of the that-clauses - that is the only thing I want. >Truth conditions. II 160 More than just the truth conditions of the complement clauses are involved in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Attribution. II 172 Naked infinitive/Cresswell: behaves quite differently from the that-clause - E.g. a) Fred saw Betty coming in b) Fred saw Betty coming in and he saw Sally smoking or not smoking Barwise/Perry: one cannot go from a) to b) Cresswell dito. Naked infinitives have no proposition as a semantic value but a situation type. >Semantic value. Event/Cresswell: there are no disjunctive events. Negation of event/negative event: also not possible: - E.g. "Fred saw Betty not smoking". Events/Cresswell: are only used because some expressions do not behave as whole sentences. >Sentence meaning, >Subsententials. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Barwise, J. | Hintikka Vs Barwise, J. | II 207 Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Omniscience//Hintikka: how can it solve the problem of logical omniscience?. B/P: bring the following E.g. (1) a sees how b X-t therefore (2) a sees how b Y-t If Xing logically implies to Y. ((s) E.g. walking implies moving). Problem/(s): from this follows a lot more of which one cannot always assume that a) it is seen, b) that it is known. Solution/B/P: assume that there are richer and poorer situations and relations between them. HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: but that’s not a triumph over the possible world semantics, for two reasons: 1) because it is now about the relation fine/coarse (fine-grained/coarse) ((s) of the description), it is nothing with which the semantics of possible worlds has to do. 2) The semantics of possible worlds has solved the problem with Rantala urn models (see above changing possible worlds). B/P: they consider only cases of omniscience that arise in the wake of the introducing new descriptive terms in the conclusion. II 208 and go beyond what is mentioned in the premises. Hintikka/Rantala: we both have seen cases that require the introduction of new individuals to ensure the validity of the inference. E.g. (3) Robert saw someone giving every boy his own book. (4) Robert saw every boy as he was given a book by someone. Question: does (3) logically entail (4)? Situations Semantics/B/P: according to her it does. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to her, it is at least questionable. Decision Problem/Predicate Calculus/Hao Wang: Thesis: it corresponds to the task of filling out the Euclidean space with square dominoes of different sizes without leaving gaps. At least one piece of every size must be used. E.g. logical omniscience: comes in as follows now: At certain points, I can say truthfully according to my perception: (5) I see that this domino task is impossible to solve. In other cases I cannot truthfully say that. Problem/HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: according to B/P it should be true of any unsolvable domino problem that I see the insolubility as soon as I see the shapes of the available stones, because the insolubility follows logically from the visual information. Solution/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to the urn model, there is no problem. II 209 Omniscience/Symmetry/Hintikka: Situation Semantics: needs the urn model to solve the second problem of logical omniscience Semantics of possible worlds: needs situations semantics in turn to solve the first problem. II 211 HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: you can find many problems solved with semantics of possible worlds, but not the situation semantics. Opacity/Hintikka: besides the one that is understood as the failure of substitutivity (the identity), there is one that is understood as the failure of the existential generalization (even if it is about non-existence) (see above). Questions/Hintikka: We still need a semantics for direct questions along with criteria for complete answers. (see below, see above). Direct object: can also be an event or a particular. Problem: Questions that contain a (external) quantifier. Problem: semantics for questions with T-constructions with epistemic verbs. Question: Why are W-constructions not found under the relevant verbs?. II 212 HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/HintikkaVsBarwise/Hintikka: Barwise and Perry introduce a "function c" (p 671): this seems obscure: Semantics/Hintikka: intended to provide a model that shows how speakers can refer to anything they want and can mean what they mean. Function/Semantics of Possible Worlds: here, the speaker or the listener detects a function of possible worlds on speakers. Situation Semantics/B/P: explains meaning from facts of reference-in-situation: "... a component implicitly represents the connections c between certain words and things in the world in the meaningful use of these words". HintikkaVsBarwisse/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/: it should be the reverse: a realistic theory of meaning and reference should show how such a function c is determined by the meanings. For understanding means to detect the meanings c determined. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Description Theory | Craig Vs Description Theory | II 156 Synonymie/Burge: er akzeptiert, daß „vixen“ und „weiblicher Fuchs“ synonym sind und argumentiert, daß daher ein ersetzen durch synonyme Wahrheit in Glaubenskontexten nicht erhalten muß. Kripke: (1979. 274, n12) gibt ein ähnliches Beispiel mit Nervenärzten und Psychiatern. Pointe: VsBeschreibungstheorie: hier scheint es nicht gut zu sein, „vixen“ als „wird vixen genannt“ zu analysieren. Kompositionalität/Glauben/Burge: Kompositionalität schlägt in Glaubenskontexten fehl. CresswellVsBurge: wenn wir die Kompositionalität erhalten wollen, müssen wir annehmen, daß „vixen“ lexikalisch mehrdeutig ist. Oder es muß (evtl. Nicht-Standard-) Kontexte geben, in denen es tatsächlich bedeutet „wird „vixen“ genannt“. Pointe: wenn das hier erlaubt ist, dann vielleicht doch auch für Fälle mit „Phosphorus“! II 166 PutnamVsBeschreibungstheorie/natürliche Art-Begriffe/Cresswell: (Putnam 1975, 148) (ebenso wie KripkeVsBeschreibungstheorie der Namen). Problem/Cresswell: Bsp Der Satz „Es gibt Wasser auf der Zwillingserde." (ZE). Angenommen, auf der ZE gibt es kein H2O, dann sollte der Satz, geäußert auf der Erde, falsch sein. Aber da etwas – nämlich XYZ – auf der ZE die Rolle von Wasser spielt, dann scheint die Beschreibungstheorie den Satz wahr zu machen. Lösung/Fodor: (Fodor 1982, 111-113): Ein Wort wie „Wasser“ ist in gewisser Weise kontextuell beschränkt. D.h. indem wir es auf der Erde äußern, meinen wir mit dem Wort „Wasser“ so etwas wie „das, was auf der Erde die Rolle von Wasser spielt“. Fodor/Cresswell: seine Idee ist, daß diese Beschränkungen, nicht Teil des Glaubens sind! Dann kann Oscars Zwilling auf der ZE dasselbe Glauben, wenn er das Wort „Wasser“ in einem Satz gebraucht. Pointe: damit bleibt der methodologische Solipsismus gewahrt, daß eine prop Einst ohne externe Faktoren klassifiziert werden sollte. II 174 Situation/sprachunabhängig/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1981b, 679): Bsp man kann nicht jemand küssen, ohne ihn zu berühren. sprachunabhängig: nun kann man für „küssen“ jedes andere Wort einsetzen und ebenso für „berühren“. D.h. das hat nichts mit Bedeutungspostulaten oder anderen semantischen Tatsachen zu tun. CresswellVsSituations-Semantik/CresswellvsBarwise: Barwise/Perry setzen das aber einfach nur fest, sie können es nicht erklären. MöWe-Semantik/Cresswell: diese kann es erklären: die Eigenschaft des Küssens wird eine Funktion von Paaren von Individuen auf Mengen von MöWe sein. Dasselbe wird wahr sein von der Eigenschaft des Berührens. Aber für jedes Paar von Individuen (a, b) wird die Menge der MöWe in denen a b küßt eine Teilmenge der Menge der MöWe sein, in denen a b berührt. Dazu brauchen wir also keine Bedeutungspostulate. |
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| Possible World Sem. | Hintikka Vs Possible World Sem. | II 74 Cross World Identity/Cross World Identification/Identity/Identification/Individuation/Hintikka: is the main problem of the possible worlds semantics/semantics of possible worlds. This is also about the relation between individuation and identification. VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: problem: it seems to absolutize possible worlds and complete sets of possibilia II 75 Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: on it you can build a theory of questions and answers. I 76 This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this, we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/Possible Worlds Semantics: here it is not enough to assume only those references that have our expressions in the actual world. Extensional Language/Hintikka: assumes much less than possible worlds semantics. Namely, only the references from the real world. World Line/Hintikka: is used here for identification (or re-identification) between possible worlds. I 77 VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: some authors: the drawing of the world lines is too dependent on the context of use and other pragmatic factors, much more so than in other semantics of natural language. II 205 Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: does not need any conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", more like event histories or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the term is misleading if you conceive it as complete worlds. Cross World Identification/Cross Identification/Perception/Hintikka: here we must assume situations when it comes to perceptual identification. Because there must be a perceiver in them, and the different situations (possible worlds) must share the perception space of the subject. Possible Worlds Semantics/Perception/HintikkaVsPossible Worlds Semantics: has overlooked this point. Situation/Possible World Semantics/Hintikka. In addition, the possible worlds semantics should study the relations between smaller and larger situations. I 206 Descriptive Cross World Identification/By Way of Description/Hintikka: descriptive identification should take place between parts of the world which are larger than the current perceptual cross identification. I.e. a comparison between "major" and "minor" situations. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Hintikka: their situations semantics is a welcome addition to the possible worlds semantics. Situation/Hintikka: an interesting question is how small egocentric situations can be put together to give a larger comprehensive "worldview". Relations: there should be at least three types of relations between situations: 1) spatial 2) temporal 3) the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained situations. It is best to study them insulated from each other. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Situation Semantics | Perry, J. | Cresswell I 63 Situations-SemantikVsMöWe-Semantik/Wissen/Bedeutung/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: die MöWe seien zu groß um das zu erklären, was der Sprecher weiß, wenn er einen bedeutungsvollen Satz äußert. MöWe: sind vollständige mögliche Situationen. Situations-Semantik: wir brauchen eine mehr partielle Art von Entität. ((s) partial, nichts vollständiges). CresswellVsSituations-Semantik: (Cresswell 1985a, 168 ff, 1985b, Kapitel 7) Lösung/Cresswell: These die Situationen müssen nur in dem Sinn partiell sein, daß sie kleine MöWe sind. I 64 Einstellungs-Semantik/Cresswell: (Cresswell 1985b) These: ich verteidige den Zugang zu prop Einst über MöWe-Semantik. I 73 BP: These damit Joe sieht, daß Sally raucht oder nicht raucht müßte er entweder sehen wie sie raucht oder sehen, wie sie nicht raucht. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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