Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dualism | Searle | I 32 ff Dualism: there is: a) >property dualism, b) >substance dualism and c) "concept dualism". I 40 SearleVsMonism: it is wrong to start counting. >Monism. I 54 f SearleVsKripke: Kripke thinks dualistically in reference to mind and body. II 326 VsDualism: behaviorism: e.g. to have hands is to have a disposition to certain behavior. >Functionalism: hands can be completely described by causes and effects. Turing theory: means to be in a computer state with specific inputs and outputs (for hands). >Action theory: to say, a system had hands, i.e. to take a certain attitude towards the system. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eccles, J.C. | Pauen Vs Eccles, J.C. | Pauen I 52 Def Psychons/Eccles: the smallest elements of mental states. Their activity only changes the probability of the release of transmitters. Therefore no conflict with energy conservation. Solution: quantum-mechanical deviations. (>Consciousness/Penrose). Eccles/Pauen: with this he approaches substance dualism again! Psychons are not properties, but independent entities that instantiate consciousness. Only dualism can ensure the free will (like Popper). Eccles/Popper: Thesis: the self-conscious mind is busy actively modifying brain events in accordance with its interests. Def Attachment Problem/Pauen: in view of the diversity of neuronal activity, the consistency of the first-person perspective can be explained only by the intervention of a conscious mind, but not by the neuronal activities. I 53 Attachment Problem/Pauen: there are now concrete neuro-biological proposals for a solution. Attachment Problem/Eccles: brings empirical evidence: Libet. "Ability of self-conscious mind" to perform "temporal tricks". Mind/Consciousness/Brain/Experiment/Benjamin Libet/Pauen: e.g. weak skin stimuli are only registered after 0.5 sec, but are dated back to the time when they actually occurred. Mind/Brain/Experiment/Kornhuber: even in the complete absence of physical stimuli neuronal activity can be caused solely by mental processes. EcclesVsMaterialism/EcclesVsIdentity Theory: unscientific superstition. PauenVsEccles: it is unclear whether the undisputed effects of the ideal world 3 on the physical world 1 can only be explained under the assumption of the existence of autonomous mental processes. E.g. If a glass breaks while a soprano singer is practicing, this explanation is inadmissible in any case! I 54 E.g. congresses have undisputed physical procedures, but they can all be explained intra-physically. E.g. the energy balance in the congress center. The mere discovery of a new method does not bring the scientists together. Only if acts of will were found that cannot be explained neurobiologically, the position of the monists would be shaken. I 55 VsEccles: he claims to possess such evidence, but the experiments by Libet and Kornhuber do not yield that: the results could only be evaluated as products of autonomous mental acts if physical causes can be excluded, and the experiments did not show that in the least. Since the brain has the ability to maintain activity for long periods even without external stimuli, also seemingly "spontaneous" reactions can be explained neurobiologically. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Materialism | Searle Vs Materialism | I 40 SearleVsMonism/SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally misguided. The real mistake was ever to start counting! Dualism: two flavors: substance dualism and property dualism. Searle: you can add a third: "conceptual dualism": that is, taking the dualistic terms so serious that "physically" implies "not mentally" and vice versa. I 41 SearleVsMaterialism: Materialism is in fact a form of Dualism: it takes at least at the beginning the Cartesian categories seriously. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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