Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Content | Perry | Newen I 110 Multiple Statement Contents/Singular Terms/Names/Descriptions/Indicators/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: Name/Content/Perry: Thesis: the content is always the designated object. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Designation. Informative Identity Sentences/Perry: it need not be possible to fully deal with the problem within the semantics. Description/Perry: has an identifying condition as referential content that can be specified by the description. >Descriptions. Designatory Content: (of the description) is then the object. Semantics/Pragmatics/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: that way, even within the semantic pragmatic aspects become relevant (interpretation, use). >Language use, >Semantics, >Pragmatics. Perry: Thesis: there are multiple statement contents for descriptions and indicators. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is beautiful today, but tomorrow do not believe that it was nice yesterday. - Another thought, same content. Then the thought is not the informational content. >Thoughts, >Information. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Meaning | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Rabbit-Duck-Head | Lewis | V 274 Perception/view/match/Lewis: does not mean that in your mind or the soul the same is going on as is goning on before the eyes - rather it is about a informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical >causal role. - The >content is the content of belief, which tends to be caused by it. - Problem: the same visual experience can produce very different beliefs - but not the entire content can be characterized by belief. - Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then it results in the belief that there are ink and paper. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Representation | Peacocke | I 7 Representation/Content/Peacocke: representational content is the way how the experience presents the world as being. >Representational content, >Content. On the other hand: Informational content: contains the proposition that a bundle of light rays meets the eye. >Propositional content. Representational content: has nothing to do with this. Representational content: is opaque (because of the individual mode of presentation). >Opacity, >Propositions. Informational content: is transparent (for the causal explanation). >Causal explanation, >Causation. I 9 Representational content always seems to contain indexicals like 'here', 'I'. >Index Words, >Indexicality. I 20 Perception/overdetermined/overdetermination/Peacocke: E.g. the angle could be changed without changing the representational content. >Overdetermination. Such problems arise when one tries to construct a sensation-like property (e.g. size) as a representational property. >Properties, >Qualities, >Perception. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Seeing | Lewis | V 274 Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role. >Causal role/Lewis. The content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it. >Content/Lewis. Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper. >Experience/Lewis, >Belief/Lewis, >Rabbit-duck-head/Lewis. V 275 Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance. t’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>veridical). V 280 Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process. V 281 Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself. V 280 Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (Kripke 1972)(1) LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid. >Description/Kripke, >Rigidity/Kripke. V 283 Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing. 1.Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Thoughts | Perry | Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is a nice day today, but tomorrow do not think that it was nice yesterday, another thought, same content. - Then the thought is not the informational content. >Content, >Informational Content, >Information. Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mentalesese | Stalnaker Vs Mentalesese | II 234 Semantic structure/belief/Stalnaker: beliefs can also be about semantic structure or about internal or external representations with a semantic structure. You can believe that a belief has a certain semantic structure II 235 without assuming a certain truth value of this belief! Semantics/belief/belief ascription/Stalnaker: why is semantic knowledge or lack of knowledge relevant to the problem of belief objects? Informational content: e.g. M and N have the same informational content. Suppose x believes M but not N. Solution/Stalnaker: then it must be the way that x either does not know what content M has or does not know what content N has. And that is purely semantic information. Information/content/belief/Stalnaker: thesis: so there must always be a difference in the information not only in the way the content is saved. (> StalnakerVsMentalese, ((s) > hyperintensionality: this concept is here not used by Stalnaker.). Since the believer precisely distinguishes between M and N a (semantic) information about the difference between necessary equivalent statements must be available to him! Semantic knowledge: is in simple cases obvious. E.g. if O’Leary does not know that 12 = a dozen (Stalnaker: a fortnight = 14 days) then he is missing information on the semantic value of certain words. ((s) Semantic value/Stalnaker/(s): e.g. the semantic value of "a dozen" is twelve pieces. (or a fortnight = two weeks). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
R.C. Stalnaker I Stalnaker Ways a world may be Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays Clarendon Press Oxford New York 2003 II Stalnaker Context and Content Oxford University Press NY 1999 |
| Tradition | Peacocke Vs Tradition | I 4 Perception/Peacocke: Thesis: sensation concepts (sensory perception, sensations) are indispensable for the description of any perception. VsTradition: against the view that sensations are not to be found in the main stream if the subject is to concentrate on its own perception, I 5 or when sensations occur as a byproduct of perception. Perception/Sensation/Tradition/Peacocke: historical distinction between perceptions (perceptual experience) that have a content, namely being propositionally (representational) about objects in the surroundings that appear in a certain way, and sensations: that have no such content, e.g. the sensation of smallness, which can be determined nonetheless. Content/Peacocke: I only use it for the representational content of perceptions. Never for sensations. PeacockeVsTradition: it used to be reversed and "object" or "meaning" were used for representational content. I 10 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: the adequacy thesis is obliged. Because if the adequacy thesis is wrong, there are intrinsic properties of visual perception that are not covered by the representational content. Representatives: Hintikka. Hintikka: the right way to speak about our spontaneous perceptions is to use the same vocabulary and the same syntax that we apply to the objects of perception. We just need to determine the information! Information/Hintikka: unlike here: no informational content, but information given by the perception system. I 11 extreme theory of perception: main motivation. If the adequacy thesis is false, then there are intrinsic properties of an experience that can never be known by the person who makes the experience! PeacockeVs: this may be strengthened by the following argument that superficially seems correct: we can tell what experiences someone makes if we know which are his desires or intentions. Or if he is so and so predisposed. Or his behavior: E.g. if he suddenly swerves, he may have perceived an obstacle. Point: this can only ever discover representational content! I.e. never the intrinsic (perhaps sensory) portion of the experience. Peacocke: there must be a gap here. Three counter-examples are to show this. (see below). Perception/Peacocke: is always more differentiated than the perception concepts! Qualia/Criterion/Goodman: identity conditions for qualia: >N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1951 p.290 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: claims that the intrinsic properties of a visual experience are exhausted in determining the representational content along with a further-reaching determination of the properties mentioned there. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Three counter-examples: 1) E.g. road straight to the horizon with two trees. We perceive the trees as different in size, but we know (or assume) that they are the same size and at different distances from us. Both versions are equally properties of the experience itself! For this we do not need concepts like perception field (visual field), which is more or less cut out by the tree. You simply have the experience. VsAdequacy Thesis: no true-making experience can represent one tree as larger and farther away or the other as a smaller and closer. Problem of additional characterization. Form of thought: added second or third. VsTheory of Perception: the challenge for the perception theorist is that has to hold on to the adequacy thesis (all intrinsic characterization given by "appears to the subject that...") even if he has to admit these facts about the size of trees. I 13 2) Additional characterization: can vary even if the representational content remains constant: E.g. seeing with one eye closed or with both eyes open: the difference in perception is independent of the double images of binocular perception. I 14 Depth Perception/Peacocke: a) It would be incompatible with our view to say that there is an additional way in which the depth is represented, with this additional feature being purely representational. b) The difference between monocular and binocular vision is both representational and sensory. (Peacocke pro). Vs a): here it would be unthinkable that there are cases where the alleged sensory property exists, but the representation of certain objects was not present behind others in the surroundings. pro b): according to this version that is conceivable. I 15 Peacocke: and it is also conceivable. E.g. TVSS: a system that "writes" information from a TV camera on the back of blind persons: idea of depth and spatial perception. Intrinsic! "Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property is present that distinguishes monocular of binocular vision, then a sense of depth is present, but depth is a sensational property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is precisely not purely representational! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representational there must be sensory content). Depth/Perception/Concepts/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: depth is never a sensational property: concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1) every depth perception depends on you considering your visual sensation of depth as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance. 2) monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations might be indistinguishable, and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, evoke different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different sensations of depth, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually viewed surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: that is indeed confirmed by the optical facts, but he only considers the beams that fall into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains the sensation of depth, but also why this property decreases at large distances. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: 3) E.g. tipping aspect, wire cube, first seen with one eye, and then without any modification of the cube with reversed front and rear: Wittgenstein: "I see that it has not changed"! Peacocke: another example of non-representational similarities between experiences. The problem for the extreme perception theorist is to explain how these non-representational similarities came to pass without abandoning the adequacy thesis. He could simply introduce a new classification of visual experience, I 17 that refers to something before the event of experience, for example, the fact that the surroundings have not changed. PeacockeVs: but this is based on the character of successive experiences! Then we would still have to say on which properties of these experiences this "new property (classification)" is based. This does not work with memory loss or longer time spans between experienced: because this does not require the sensation that the scene has not changed. Nor does it explain the matching non-representational experiences of two different subjects who both see the other side of the cube as the front. Rabbit-Duck Head/Peacocke: why do I not use it as an example? Because there is nothing here that is first seen as a rabbit and then as a duck, but rather as a representation of a rabbit than as a representation of a duck, while nothing changes in the network of lines! So this example cannot explain that there may be non-representational similarities between experiences. Because someone who denies them can simply say that the component of the representational content that relates to the lines remains constant thus explaining the similarity. E.g. wire cube: here this explanation is not possible: because the network of lines looks quite different afterwards than it did before! I 17/18 Translation/Theory of PerceptionVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements which seem to be in conflict with the adequacy thesis could be translated into statements that add no properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. E.g. "to cover the nearer tree, a larger area would have to be put between the tree and the viewer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsTheory of Perception/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this is supposed to work against the second type of example. But is it effective against the first one? What should the translation explain? 1) It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and for the field of vision. That is also sufficient for "above" or "next to". But the adequacy thesis needs more than that! It needs an explanation for why something is bigger than something else in the field of vision. Therefore: 2) Problem: as approach which introduces meanings the approach of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. E.g. disturbances in the visual field, curved beams ...+... counterfactual: problem: whether an object is bigger in the visual field of a subject is a property of its experience that in the real world counterfactual circumstances are what they want to be. One approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the reference and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: E.g. we could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by the fact that demanding that he should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: E.g. Julius, the inventor of the zipper). Point: yet the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the nearer tree in the field of vision is bigger is consistent with the fact that a larger area has to be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the experience type does not satisfy the condition! Just like Bright would not have needed to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Translation: provides no access that leaves open the possibility that the experience type that actually meets the conditions of the translation, might as well fail. I 22 Sensational Content/PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: these points refer to the first counter-example against the adequacy thesis, but they also apply to the second one: for that purpose, we introduce the asterisked predicate behind*: it refers in terms of physical conditions that normally produce this sensational quality binocular seeing of objects at different depths. ad 3): non-representational similarity of experiences should consist in sameness or equality of sensational properties. Reversible Figures: in all standard cases, successive experiences have the same asterisked sensational properties: namely, those that can be expressed by the presented interposed coverage area. E.g. suppose someone wakes up in unfamiliar surroundings: initially he has a minimal representational content: he perceives all objects as surfaces with different angles. I 23 Suddenly everything shifts into place and he has a rich representational content. But in the scene nothing has changed in the sense in which something changed in the wire cube. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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