Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Appraisal Theory | Corr I 63 Beliefs/appraisal theory/Reisenzein/Weber: There is (…) evidence that appraisal-related, general beliefs influence emotional reactions to events. The two general beliefs that have been most extensively researched in this regard are (a) optimism (versus pessimism), defined as a generalized expectancy for positive (versus negative) outcomes (Scheier, Carver and Bridges 2001)(1); and (b) general self-efficacy, defined as a person’s generalized belief in her ability to reach her goals and to master difficult or stressful situations (Bandura 1997(2); Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1995(3)). >Optimism, >Self-efficacy. General self-efficacy has been found, for example, to be associated with lower state anxiety during a stressful cognitive task (Endler, Speer, Johnson and Flett 2001)(4) and lower levels of depression and anxiety in medical patients (e.g., Luszczynska, Gutiérrez-Doña and Schwarzer 2005)(5). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that optimism and general self-efficacy affect emotional states at least partly by influencing the appraisals of events; it should be noted, however, that direct evidence for this mediating path is so far scarce (e.g., Kaiser, Major and McCoy 2004(6); Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1999)(7). >Emotion, >Behavior. 1. Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S. and Bridges, M. W. 2001. Optimism, pessimism, and psychological well-being, in E. C. Chang (ed.), Optimism and pessimism: implications for theory, research, and practice, pp. 189–216. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Bandura, A. 1997. Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 3. Schwarzer, R. and Jerusalem, M. 1995. Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale, in J. Weinman, S. Wright and M. Johnston (eds.), Measures in health psychology: a user’s portfolio. Causal and control beliefs, pp. 35–7. Windsor: NFER-Nelson 4. Endler, N. S., Speer, R. L., Johnson, J. M. and Flett, G. L. 2001. General self-efficacy and control in relation to anxiety and cognitive performance, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social 20: 36–52 5. Luszczynska, A., Gutiérrez-Doña, B. and Schwarzer, R. 2005. General self-efficacy in various domains of human functioning: evidence from five countries, International Journal of Psychology 40: 80–9 6. Kaiser, C. R., Major, B. and McCoy, S. K. 2004. Expectations about the future and the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 173–84 7. Schwarzer, R., and Jerusalem, M. 1999. Skalen zur Erfassung von Lehrer- und Schülermerkmalen [Scales for the assessment of teacher and student characteristics]. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Control Processes | Shoda | Corr I 479 Control processes/CAPS/Cognitive-Affective Processing System/self-regulation/Shoda/Smith: The cognitive-affective components are interconnected. The >encoding units respond to specific aspects of the situation (producing the psychological situation) and the encodings both influence and are affected by other units (expectancies, goals, affects). The total pattern of activations and inhibitions results in certain behaviours, which may themselves alter the situation. In the CAPS model, the focus is not just on ‘how much’ of a particular unit (e.g., self-efficacy belief, performance anxiety, mastery goal orientation) a person has, but in how these cognitive-affective units are organized with one another within the person, forming a network of interconnections that can operate, in a parallel rather than serial manner, at multiple levels of accessibility, awareness and automaticity. Individuals differ stably and uniquely in this network of interconnections or associations, and such differences constitute a major aspect of personality (Mischel and Shoda 1995(1); Shoda and Mischel 1998(2)). For a given individual the likelihood that a particular feature of a situation triggers thought A, which leads to thought B, emotion C, and behaviour D may be relatively stable and predictable, reflecting a network of chronically accessible associations among cognitions and affects available to that individual. Thus, the CAPS model posits an internal set of if...then...relations as well the external situation-behaviour if...then...relations (…), and the cognitions and affects that are activated at a given time depend on situations, either internal or external to an individual. The system that underlies an individual’s cognitive-affective and behavioural dynamics typically contains extensive internal feedback loops, meaning that ‘downstream’ units can activate ‘upstream’ units, generating a flow of thoughts, feelings and even behaviours without necessarily requiring an outside stimulus. For example, the many beliefs we maintain are not independent of each other, but support one another in a way that helps us ‘make sense’ of the world and constitutes a personal philosophy of life. Further, components of a belief system are related to affective reactions, goals and values, and behaviours in a way that forms a coherent organic whole (Shoda and Smith 2004)(3). >Networks/Shoda/Smith. 1. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 2. Shoda, Y. and Mischel, W. 1998. Personality as a stable cognitive-affective activation network: characteristic patterns of behaviour variation emerge from a stable personality structure, in S. J. Read and L. C. Miller (eds.), Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour, pp. 175–208. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Shoda, Y. and Smith, R. E. 2004. Conceptualizing personality as a cognitive-affective processing system: a framework for models of maladaptive behaviour patterns and change, Behaviour Therapy 35: 147–65 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Expectancies | Shoda | Corr I 477 Expectancies/Shoda/Smith: Expectancies have always occupied a central role in cognitive conceptions of learning and behaviour (e.g., Bolles 1972(1); Tolman 1932(2)), and they are well represented in contemporary social-cognitive theories (Bandura1997). >Encodings frequently evoke expectancies, as when a student with facilitative anxiety anticipates that his arousal will enhance test performance. Expectancies take a variety of forms. Stimulus-outcome expectancies represent a predictive relation between a stimulus and a later outcome. They are the basis for classical conditioning (i.e., the CS-UCS relation), as illustrated in the ability of situational cues to evoke automatic emotional reactions in many individuals. The perceived relation between situational demands and personal resources is the basis for self-efficacy expectancies (Bandura1997)(3). A more generalized expectancy, locus of control, relates to individual differences in the tendency to see one’s outcomes as under the control of personal or situational influences (Rotter 1966)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Bolles, R. C. 1972. Reinforcement, expectancy, and learning, Psychological Review 79: 394–409 2. Tolman, E. C. 1932.Purposive behaviour in animals and men. New York: Century 3. Bandura, A. 1986. Social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 4. Rotter, J. B. 1966. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external locus of control of reinforcement, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 80: 1–28 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Expectancies | Smith | Corr I 477 Expectancies/Shoda/Smith: Expectancies have always occupied a central role in cognitive conceptions of learning and behaviour (e.g., Bolles 1972(1); Tolman 1932(2)), and they are well represented in contemporary social-cognitive theories (Bandura1997). >Encodings frequently evoke expectancies, as when a student with facilitative anxiety anticipates that his arousal will enhance test performance. Expectancies take a variety of forms. Stimulus-outcome expectancies represent a predictive relation between a stimulus and a later outcome. They are the basis for classical conditioning (i.e., the CS-UCS relation), as illustrated in the ability of situational cues to evoke automatic emotional reactions in many individuals. The perceived relation between situational demands and personal resources is the basis for self-efficacy expectancies (Bandura1997)(3). A more generalized expectancy, locus of control, relates to individual differences in the tendency to see one’s outcomes as under the control of personal or situational influences (Rotter 1966)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Bolles, R. C. 1972. Reinforcement, expectancy, and learning, Psychological Review 79: 394–409 2. Tolman, E. C. 1932.Purposive behaviour in animals and men. New York: Century 3. Bandura, A. 1986. Social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 4. Rotter, J. B. 1966. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external locus of control of reinforcement, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 80: 1–28 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Groupthink | Baron | Haslam I 193 Groupthink/Group dynamics/Baron: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)(1) argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. >Groupthink, >Group behavior, >Conformity. Baron (2005)(1) further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. Group think model/Baron: Baron (2005) proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink, arguing that many of the symptoms identified by Janis (1972(2), 1982(3)) are common in groups and arise from three interactive (again, not additive) antecedent factors. 1) At least a minimal degree of social identification (defined in social identity/self-categorization-like terms) is required. Identification with the group matters, in part, because it tends to increase both normative social influence (i.e., compliance), as well as informational social influence (i.e., internalization). 2) For social influence to occur and for identification to produce groupthink-like symptoms, the group must have a clear norm or set of norms for individuals to follow. 3) Social influence is more likely to the degree that individual group members possess low self-efficacy or confidence regarding their abilities to understand or uniquely contribute to decision-making. >Social influence, >Social identity, >Decision-making processes. 1. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. 2. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Method | Forbes | Haslam I 253 Method/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The contextualized frame that stereotype threat gives to performance gaps allows researchers to create ‘identity safe’ environments that avoid cuing stereotype threat. In the original laboratory studies, this was done by framing the task in a non-diagnostic way. Later studies created identity safety by directly communicating an expectation that groups would perform equally well (Good et aL, 2008(1); Spencer et al., 1999(2)) or by retraining implicit stereotypes (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(3)). Because these methods of creating identity-safe environments are not always practical to implement in field settings, researchers have sought to test other interventions to reduce naturalistic experiences of stereotype threat. >Stereotype threat, >Performance. Performance: (…)moving demographic questions to the end of an Advanced Placement exam boosted women’s performance on a calculus test, though the size and significance of these effects has been debated (i.e., the manipulation did not improve performance for minorities; Danaher and Crandall, 2008(4); Stricker and Ward, 2004(5)). Positive role models are also effective in both the lab and the field in combatting stereotype threat, changing implicit stereotypes, and increasing students’ self-efficacy (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004(6); Marx and Goff, 2005(6); McIntyre et al., 2003(7), 2005(8)). Coping strategies: in both the lab and the field, prompting students to affirm important values improves stigmatized students’ performance by mitigating stereotype threat (Martens et al., 2006)(9). In a remarkable field study at an elite university, minority students who completed brief self-affirmation exercises in their first semester in school showed improved grades up to two years later compared with those in a no-affirmation control condition (Cohen et al., 2006(10); Cohen et al., 2009(11); see also Miyake et al., 2010(12), and Sherman et aL, 2013(13), for similar studies with women in physics and middle-school students, respectively). >Problem solving, >Information processing. 1. Good, C., Aronson, J. and Harder, J.A. (2008) Problems in the pipeline: Stereotype threat and women’s achievement in high-level math courses’, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 29 (1): 17—28. 2. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 3. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 4. Danaher, K. and Crandall, C.S. (2008) ‘Stereotype threat in applied settings re-examined’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38: 1639—55. 5. Stricker, L.J. and Ward, W.C. (2004) ‘Stereotype threat, inquiring about test takers’ ethnicity and gender, and standardized test performance’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34:665—93. 6 .Marx, D.M. and Goff, P.A. (2005) Clearing the air: The effect of experimenter race on target’s test performance and subjective experience’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44(4): 645—57. 7. McIntyre, R.B., Paulson, R. and Lord, C. (2003) ‘Alleviating women’s mathematics stereo type threat through salience of group achievements’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 8 3—90. 8. McIntyre, R.B., Lord, C.G., Gresky, D.M., Ten Eyck, L.L., Frye, G.D.J. and Bond Jr., C.F. (2005) ‘A social impact trend in the effects of role models on alleviating women’s mathematics stereotype threat’, Current Research in Social Psychology, 10: 116—36. 9. Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J. and Schimel, J. (2006) ‘Combating stereotype threat: The effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 236—43. 10. Cohen, G .L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N. and Master, A. (2006) Reducing the racial achievement gap: A social-psychological intervention’, Science, 313: 1307—10. 11. Cohen, G.L., Garcia, J., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Apfel, N. and Brzustoski, P. (2009) ‘Recursive processes in self-affirmation: Intervening to close the minority achievement gap’, Science, 324:400—3. 12. Miyake,A., Kost-Smith, L.E., Finkeistein, N.D., Pollock, S.J., Cohen, G.L. and Ito, T.A. (2010) ‘Reducing the gender achievement gap in college science: A classroom study of values affirmation’, Science, 330: 1234—7. 13. Sherman, D.K., Hartson, K.A., Binning, K.R., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Garcia, J., Taborsky-Barba, S. ... and Cohen, G.L. (2013) ‘Deflecting the trajectory and changing the narrative: How self-affirmation affects academic performance and motivation under identity threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104: 591—618. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Method | Schmader | Haslam I 253 Method/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The contextualized frame that stereotype threat gives to performance gaps allows researchers to create ‘identity safe’ environments that avoid cuing stereotype threat. In the original laboratory studies, this was done by framing the task in a non-diagnostic way. >Stereotype Threat. Later studies created identity safety by directly communicating an expectation that groups would perform equally well (Good et aL, 2008(1); Spencer et al., 1999(2)) or by retraining implicit stereotypes (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(3)). Because these methods of creating identity-safe environments are not always practical to implement in field settings, researchers have sought to test other interventions to reduce naturalistic experiences of stereotype threat. Performance: (…)moving demographic questions to the end of an Advanced Placement exam boosted women’s performance on a calculus test, though the size and significance of these effects has been debated (i.e., the manipulation did not improve performance for minorities; Danaher and Crandall, 2008(4); Stricker and Ward, 2004(5)). Positive role models are also effective in both the lab and the field in combatting stereotype threat, changing implicit stereotypes, and increasing students’ self-efficacy (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004(6); Marx and Goff, 2005(6); McIntyre et al., 2003(7), 2005(8)). Coping strategies: in both the lab and the field, prompting students to affirm important values improves stigmatized students’ performance by mitigating stereotype threat (Martens et al., 2006)(9). In a remarkable field study at an elite university, minority students who completed brief self-affirmation exercises in their first semester in school showed improved grades up to two years later compared with those in a no-affirmation control condition (Cohen et al., 2006(10); Cohen et al., 2009(11); see also Miyake et al., 2010(12), and Sherman et aL, 2013(13), for similar studies with women in physics and middle-school students, respectively). >Performance. 1. Good, C., Aronson, J. and Harder, J.A. (2008) Problems in the pipeline: Stereotype threat and women’s achievement in high-level math courses’, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 29 (1): 17—28. 2. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 3. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 4. Danaher, K. and Crandall, C.S. (2008) ‘Stereotype threat in applied settings re-examined’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38: 1639—55. 5. Stricker, L.J. and Ward, W.C. (2004) ‘Stereotype threat, inquiring about test takers’ ethnicity and gender, and standardized test performance’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34:665—93. 6 .Marx, D.M. and Goff, P.A. (2005) Clearing the air: The effect of experimenter race on target’s test performance and subjective experience’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44(4): 645—57. 7. McIntyre, R.B., Paulson, R. and Lord, C. (2003) ‘Alleviating women’s mathematics stereo type threat through salience of group achievements’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 8 3—90. 8. McIntyre, R.B., Lord, C.G., Gresky, D.M., Ten Eyck, L.L., Frye, G.D.J. and Bond Jr., C.F. (2005) ‘A social impact trend in the effects of role models on alleviating women’s mathematics stereotype threat’, Current Research in Social Psychology, 10: 116—36. 9. Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J. and Schimel, J. (2006) ‘Combating stereotype threat: The effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 236—43. 10. Cohen, G .L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N. and Master, A. (2006) Reducing the racial achievement gap: A social-psychological intervention’, Science, 313: 1307—10. 11. Cohen, G.L., Garcia, J., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Apfel, N. and Brzustoski, P. (2009) ‘Recursive processes in self-affirmation: Intervening to close the minority achievement gap’, Science, 324:400—3. 12. Miyake,A., Kost-Smith, L.E., Finkeistein, N.D., Pollock, S.J., Cohen, G.L. and Ito, T.A. (2010) ‘Reducing the gender achievement gap in college science: A classroom study of values affirmation’, Science, 330: 1234—7. 13. Sherman, D.K., Hartson, K.A., Binning, K.R., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Garcia, J., Taborsky-Barba, S. ... and Cohen, G.L. (2013) ‘Deflecting the trajectory and changing the narrative: How self-affirmation affects academic performance and motivation under identity threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104: 591—618. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Motivation | Shoda | Corr I 478 Motivation/emotion/Shoda/Smith: Motivation and emotion are intimately connected. According to Lazarus (1991)(1), emotions are aroused when personally significant goals are attained, threatened or frustrated. Shoda/Smith: Within the CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) model, motives and values play a central role, guiding the short- and long-term goals that people seek, the ways they encode certain events, the situations and outcomes they approach or avoid, and their emotional reactions to such situations. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Individual differences in the meaning ascribed to an athletic situation depend in part on the goals and subjective values that people bring to it. Expectancies and values also interact in important ways (Brehm and Self 1989)(2). Competencies and self-regulation skills People’s cognitive, affective and behavioural capabilities are key factors in how they are influenced by, respond to, and influence their environments. The final CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) component – competencies and self-regulatory systems – receive strong emphasis in current social-cognitive theories (e.g., Bandura 1997(3); Mischel and Shoda 1995(4)). >Self-regulation, >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Brehm, J. W. and Self, E. A. 1989. The intensity of motivation, Annual Review of Psychology 40: 109–31 3. Bandura, A. 1997.Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 4. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Motivation | Smith | Corr I 478 Motivation/emotion/Shoda/Smith: Motivation and emotion are intimately connected. According to Lazarus (1991)(1), emotions are aroused when personally significant goals are attained, threatened or frustrated. Shoda/Smith: Within the CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) model, motives and values play a central role, guiding the short- and long-term goals that people seek, the ways they encode certain events, the situations and outcomes they approach or avoid, and their emotional reactions to such situations. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Individual differences in the meaning ascribed to an athletic situation depend in part on the goals and subjective values that people bring to it. Expectancies and values also interact in important ways (Brehm and Self 1989)(2). Competencies and self-regulation skills People’s cognitive, affective and behavioural capabilities are key factors in how they are influenced by, respond to, and influence their environments. The final CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) component – competencies and self-regulatory systems – receive strong emphasis in current social-cognitive theories (e.g., Bandura 1997(3); Mischel and Shoda 1995(4)). >Self-regulation, >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Brehm, J. W. and Self, E. A. 1989. The intensity of motivation, Annual Review of Psychology 40: 109–31 3. Bandura, A. 1997.Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 4. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychological Resilience | Rutter | Slater I 206 Resilience/psychology/Rutter: in his 1987 review “Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms” (Rutter 1987)(1) Rutter comments on some of the commonly observed protective factors noted by earlier reviews (e.g., Garmezy, 1985)(2), such as self-esteem, harmonious families, and external support systems. Then he raises a critical question as to whether these protective factors represent something distinct from widely established risk factors (i.e., low self-esteem, discordant families, and lack of support) or the positive pole of bi-polar dimensions. In other words, has something “new” been identified or are we rediscovering the full range of key variables that relate to adaptation along a continuum from negative to positive? In a well-known passage on the utility of naming the opposite poles of the same underlying dimension. >Distinctions/order/Rutter. RutterVsTradition: Rutter focused on interactions and moderating effects. >Resilience/psychological theories. Tradition: Much confusion accompanied the early research on resilience in relation to distinguishing factors that were generally “good” or “bad” under most circumstances from factors that played a special role under particular circumstances. RutterVsTradition: In this article, Rutter emphasized that protective factors imply interactions or special roles when risk is high; in other words, these variables moderate risk in some way with differential effects that cannot be predicted simply from what may happen under low-risk conditions. There is a different or multiplicative effect under high- compared to low-risk conditions. Slater I 207 Personality traits/resilience/Rutter: thesis: resilience is not a personality trait. (Cf. Cicchetti and Garmezy, 1993(3). Given that the same trait can function in different ways across people and situations and the life course, and given that development changes the capacity of a person to respond and adapt, the notion of a resiliency trait is untenable. Protection/Rutter: a protective function is not the same thing as a pleasant or rewarding experience. Inoculations are a classic example of a protective intervention in medicine. Similarly, discipline by parents, often implicated as protective for young people in risky contexts, may not be enjoyable at the time the intervention is imposed. Slater I 208 Rutter: Four factors might lead to resilience: 1) reduction of risk; 2) reduction of negative chain reactions; 3) promotion or support of self-esteem and self-efficacy; 4) opening up of opportunities. >Resilience/developmental psychology. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. 2. Garmezy, N. (1985). Stress-resistant children: The search for protective factors. In J. E. Stevenson (Ed.), Recent research in developmental psychopathology: Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry Book Supplement 4 (pp. 213—233). Oxford: Pergamon Press. 3. Cicchetti, D., & Garmezy, N. (199 3). Prospects and promises in the study of resilience. Development and Psychopathology, 5,497—502. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Sensory Impressions | Frith | I 179 Sensory Impression/sense-perception/meaning/Frith: thesis: we are not the slaves of our senses. Cf. >Sensualism, >D. Hume. I 180 Experience/Frith: experience is not constantly dominated by sensory signals. We could not have hallucinations, but it would not be a good idea. >Experience. Problem: sensory signals are too unreliable. We should not be slaves of our senses. This only occurs in brain damage. For example, when these people see a glass, they have to drink from it. >Stimuli. Fantasy: controlled fantasy saves the brain from the tyranny of the environment. Imagination/phantasy/brain/Frith: 1. How do we know that the model of the world that our brain designs is the right one? Solution: this is not a real problem: the model does not have to be the right one, it just has to work so that we can influence the world. >Imagination, >Reality, >Actions, >Causality, >Self-efficacy. 2. How does the brain know whether I actually see a face or just imagine one? Solution: Imagination: in a pure representation there are no sensory signals, and thus also no possible error message. I 182 Reality/Frith: reality is always unexpected. Imagination/Frith: imagination is boring in the long run, e.g. there is no deception in the imagination, an imagined necker cube never veers round. Creativity/Frith: we create nothing in our head alone. Solution: first by doodling, writing, sketching, etc.: we are shifting to the outside. >Creativity. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Social Cognition | Shoda | Corr I 475 Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith: Social cognitive theory’s concept of reciprocal determinism (Bandura 1986)(1) provides a useful framework for analysing bidirectional causal interactions involving person, environment and behaviour. VsBandura: Mischel and Shoda’s (1995)(2) cognitive-affective processing system (CAPS) fleshed out the ‘person’ portion of the triadic framework by specifying important person variables and the processing dynamics that create a stable personality structure capable of producing situation-behaviour regularities. The CAPS model was inspired in part by recent information-processing, connectionist and neural network models in areas such as perception, social cognition and cognitive neuroscience (Read and Miller 1998(3); Rumelhart and McClelland 1986)(4). >Neural Networks/Rumelhart. Individuals differ in the chronic accessibility of network elements, that is, the ease with which the particular cognitive-affective units become activated (Higgins 1990)(5). They also differ in the levels of activation that occur in response to (a) elements of the ‘psychological situation’ that is being processed, and (b) the activity of other associated units, which can stimulate, inhibit or exert no influence on the unit. Solution: Mischel and Shoda’s person variables, or ‘cognitive-affective units’ include the person’s encoding (i.e., ‘construal’ or interpretation) of the self and of situations, expectancies (including stimulus-stimulus, response-outcome and self-efficacy expectancies), enduring goals and values, affective states and dis-positions, and competencies and self-regulation capabilities. >Self-Regulation. In this model, therefore, invariance resides not at the situation-behavioural level, but at the level of internal processing dynamics. >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Bandura, A. 1986. Social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 2. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 3. Read, S. J. and Miller, L. C. (eds.) 1998.Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 4. Rumelhart, D.E. and McClelland, J.L. 1986.Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vols. I and II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 5. Higgins, E. T. 1990. Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: stand-ards and knowledge activation as a common language, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 301–38. New York: Guilford Press Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Social Cognition | Smith | Corr I 475 Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith: Social cognitive theory’s concept of reciprocal determinism (Bandura 1986)(1) provides a useful framework for analysing bidirectional causal interactions involving person, environment and behaviour. VsBandura: Mischel and Shoda’s (1995)(2) cognitive-affective processing system (CAPS) fleshed out the ‘person’ portion of the triadic framework by specifying important person variables and the processing dynamics that create a stable personality structure capable of producing situation-behaviour regularities. The CAPS model was inspired in part by recent information-processing, connectionist and neural network models in areas such as perception, social cognition and cognitive neuroscience (Read and Miller 1998(3); Rumelhart and McClelland 1986)(4). >Neural Networks/Rumelhart. Individuals differ in the chronic accessibility of network elements, that is, the ease with which the particular cognitive-affective units become activated (Higgins 1990)(5). They also differ in the levels of activation that occur in response to (a) elements of the ‘psychological situation’ that is being processed, and (b) the activity of other associated units, which can stimulate, inhibit or exert no influence on the unit. Solution: Mischel and Shoda’s person variables, or ‘cognitive-affective units’ include the person’s encoding (i.e., ‘construal’ or interpretation) of the self and of situations, expectancies (including stimulus-stimulus, response-outcome and self-efficacy expectancies), enduring goals and values, affective states and dis-positions, and competencies and self-regulation capabilities. >Self-Regulation. In this model, therefore, invariance resides not at the situation-behavioural level, but at the level of internal processing dynamics. >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Bandura, A. 1986. Social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 2. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 3. Read, S. J. and Miller, L. C. (eds.) 1998.Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 4. Rumelhart, D.E. and McClelland, J.L. 1986.Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vols. I and II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 5. Higgins, E. T. 1990. Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: stand-ards and knowledge activation as a common language, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 301–38. New York: Guilford Press Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
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