Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Civilization Rousseau Höffe I 272
Civilisation/Rousseau/Höffe: In civilization "a child commands the adults, a fool commands wise men and a handful of rich
Höffe I 273
command the mass of the hungry" (Second Treatise, Part 2)(1). According to Rousseau, the combination of property and state protection is the cause of the many crimes and wars and the countless miseries that have marked the history of mankind up to now. Above all, innate freedom has been irrevocably destroyed.
>Property, >Economic theories on crime, >State, >Freedom.
Rousseau does recognise the advantage of civilisation, education and a more intensive, i.e. not just saturated, existence.
Höffe: What a superficial reading still attributes to him today - a "return to nature" - he does not demand. Although he stirs up the longing for a natural life, he considers its repetition illusory, if only because the developments once introduced cannot be taken back. However, it is possible to correct wrong developments and work towards a new naturalness. Only in this way, as a mirror and critic, does nature serve as a model.

1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Correctness Millikan I 308
Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction?
>Learning, >Prediction, >Judgment, >Stimulus.
Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same.
Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above).
>Sentence, >Negation, >Fact.
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity).
>Contradiction.
I 309
Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment.
Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world.
Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s) >inegalitarian theories/Nozick). There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast.
E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence.
Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time.
>Objectivity.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Human Rights Rousseau Höffe I 271
Human Rights/Rousseau/Höffe: According to Rousseau, there is no natural law, no law of nature that precedes the civil state. The right arises only in political society and with it.(1) >State/Rousseau. >Natural State/Rousseau.
Höffe I 275
Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by the means of a free consent, i.e. the >Social Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement which is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully (2). >Justification/Rousseau, >State/Rousseau, >Social Contract/Rousseau.
Höffe I 278
Common good: Since [the common good] is oriented towards the good of the whole, both the common preservation and the general welfare, it always and without restriction has normative precedence over the (particular) will of the individuals. The common good is based on the will of those concerned. Höffe: Question: How do you determine this will? A conception of the common will (volonté général) as a thought experiment could lead to a criterion of consentability: The answer could (...) consist in human rights according to this strict understanding, i.e. in rights that are due to a person simply because he or she is a human being.
Rousseau/Höffe: Even if one can interpret some references in this sense, Rousseau does not defend such rights in the articles of association. Instead, he votes for an empirical reading of the common will. >General Will/Rousseau.


1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755
2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Inequalities Rousseau Höffe I 271
Inequality/Rousseau/Höffe: [Rousseau] is not so unrealistic as to deny the inequality that actually exists among people. However, one must distinguish between a natural and a legal-political inequality and then realize what Rousseau considers a revolutionary thesis, that there is no essential connection (liason essentielle) between the two. In the relevant treatise on the origin and foundations of inequality among human beings(1), the radical critique of civilization in the First Treatise is given a new scope of application, at the same time a philosophical deepening. The "secularized theory of sin" of the first Scripture is followed here by a "secularized theodicy" (justification of God).
Höffe I 272
Natural inequality: [Rousseau acknowledges] (...) inequality, for example in health, age and strength. But it does not justify the reprehensible "moral or political inequality". >Natural State/Rousseau.

1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755

Mause I 46
Inequality/Rousseau: in his discourse on inequality (Discours sur l'inégalité) of 1755, Rousseau notes the equiprimordial of the historical establishment of property with the emergence of civil society (Rousseau 1988, p. 230) and attributes to it the loss of natural freedom, equality and innocence of the natural state. This loss is irreversible, but the lack of freedom, inequality and moral depravity of the bourgeois society driven by the selfishness (amour propre) of individuals can be overcome politically. (1) According to Rousseau, the extensive homogeneity of property relations is one of the social functional conditions of a good, republican order.
>Property.

1. J.-J. Rousseau, Abhandlung über den Ursprung und die Grundlagen der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen. In Rousseau, Schriften, Hrsg. Henning Ritter, Bd.   1, Frankfurt a. M. S. 230

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Law Rousseau Höffe I 271
Law/Rousseau/Höffe: According to Rousseau (…) there is (…) no natural law, no law of nature that precedes the civil state. The right arises only in and with political society(1). >State/Rousseau, >Natural State/Rousseau.
Höffe I 275
Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by means of a free consent, i.e. the >Societal Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement which is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully(2). >Justification/Rousseau, >State/Rousseau, >Social Contract/Rousseau.

1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755
2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Natural State Gadamer I 279
Natural State/Gadamer: A (...) case of romantic reflection lies (...) in the concept of "natural society" (German: "naturwüchsige Gesellschaft", i.e. "growing from nature"), which was introduced (after Ladendorf) by H. Leo(1). Cf. >Enlightenment/Romanticism.
In Karl Marx it appears as a kind of relic of natural law, which limits the validity of his economic social theory of class struggle(2). Does the term go back to Rousseau's description of society before the division of labour and the introduction of property(3)?
In any case, Plato already unmasked the illusionism of this theory of the state in his ironic description of a natural state, which he gives in the third book of the state(4).
>Nature/Plato.

1. H. Leo, Studien und Skizzen zu einer Naturlehre des Staates, 1833.
2. Cf. the reflections that formerly G. von Lukacs in "Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein" (1923) devoted to this important question.
3. Rousseau, Discours sur l'origme et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes.
4. Cf. from the author: „Plato und die Dichter“ p. 12 f. now in Vol. 5 of Ges. Werke, p. 187-211

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Natural State Rousseau Höffe I 271
Natural State/State of Nature/Rousseau/Höffe: For Hobbes, the founder, the state of nature is a thought experiment that sketches a coexistence of already reasonable people who, however, lack law and state. RousseauVsHobbes: In Rousseau's view of the history of development(1) it becomes a primordial, "animal state".
Human/Speech/Rousseau: Humans who live in this state, the animal humans, have neither language nor reason or a consciousness of death. They know neither ambition nor contempt or a need for revenge; moreover, they live without any lasting relationship. In this "true state of nature", a primordial state which, historically, is even further back than Locke's state of nature, humans have two things in common with the other living beings.
Self-love: It is determined by a thoroughly positive self-love (amour de soi), which, in contrast to the antisocial self-love (amour-propre) of the civilized human being, amounts to an emotional self-sufficiency. Moreover, the human possesses a sense of existence
Höffe I 272
(sentiment de l'existence). Freedom: Above all, the human is characterized by a natural freedom, an independence from his fellow men, which also includes an indifference towards them.
The natural state qua primordial state does not recognise privileges that some people enjoy to the detriment of others; there are neither privileges nor discrimination. The two basic evils that destroy this ideal state are private property and the state (which protects it), "civil society". In French it says "société civile", not "société bourgoise". Rousseau's bourgeois society here, as with other authors of modern times, is not an economic bourgeois society in contrast to a civic society, but the community with the power of coercion, the state, itself. >Social Contract/Rousseau.
Höffe I 274
RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: Unlike Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >Natural state/Hobbes, >Natural State/Locke, >Constitution/Spinoza, >Contract theory/Spinoza, >Democracy/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza, >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >Politics/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza,

1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Nature Rousseau Höffe I 271
Nature/Rousseau/Höffe: In place of Leibniz's treatises on theodicy (1710) [in Rousseau(2)] there is a justification of nature, because it is considered good and the natural human is the ideal. In doing so, a fundamental idea of modern political thought, the state of nature, is radically changed (...) >Natural State/Rousseau.
Höffe I 273
Höffe: What a superficial reading still attributes to him today - a "return to nature" - he does not demand. Although he stirs up the longing for a natural life, he considers its repetition illusory, if only because the developments once introduced cannot be taken back. However, it is possible to correct wrong developments and work towards a new naturalness. Only in this way, as a mirror and critic, does nature serve as a model. >Civilisation/Rousseau.
1. Leibniz, Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal ,1710
2. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Piketty Economic Theories Góes I 22
Piketty model/IMF/Góes(1): Piketty’s conclusion that inequality will increase in the future rests on the underlying assumption that, as growth decreases over time, driving the r − g spread to increase, capital-to-income ratios will increase. GoesVsPiketty: However, the results [from our testing models 2 an 3]* fail to show robust positive responses of capital share to shocks in r - g and cast doubt on Piketty’s conjecture.
Elasticity: A possible reason for this is that Piketty could be underestimating diminishing returns of capital - thereby overestimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, whose empirical estimates tend to be much lower than what he assumes (cf. Rognlie 2014)(1).
Krusell and Smith: This relationship is illustrated in this paper by the negative median responses of r - g to positive capital share shocks. Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(2), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis.
Piketty: Piketty (2012(3)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output.
GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners.
Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1* contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase.
Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries.
MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1 does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(5) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising.
Góes I 23
MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(6) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g.
In fact, there is evidence that recent inequality trends are not related to the distribution of national income between factors of production but primarily to the rising inequality of labor income (cf. Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015)(7). Indeed, there are many potential explanations for the rising labor income inequality - as, for instance:
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)(8), after evaluating cross-country evidence, find that past changes in inequality in advanced economies are associated the most with two labor market changes: higher skill premia and lower union membership rates. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also present results that correlate changes in labor market institutions, particularly lower union density, with increases in income inequality in advanced economies.
Aghion et al. (2015)(9) suggest innovation plays a significant role. If innovators are rewarded with higher incomes due to a temporary technological advantage (in a Schumpeterian fashion), inequality would be exacerbated. The authors show that innovation explains about a fifth of the higher inequality observed in the U.S. since 1975.
Mare (2016)(10) and Greenwood et al. (2012)(11) argue that changes in mating behavior helped exacerbate income inequality. The probability that someone will marry another person with a similar socio-educational background (labeled “assortative mating”) increased in tandem with the rise in income inequality in U.S. in the recent decades. The interaction between higher skill premia and higher assortative mating exacerbates household income inequality, because the gap between higher and lower earners became larger and couples became more segregated.
Chong and Gradstein (2007)(12) use a dynamic panel to show inequality tends to decrease as institutional quality improves. The underlying logic is that if the basic rules of economic behavior are not symmetrically enforced, the rich will have a higher chance to extract economic rents, thereby increasing inequality.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4) make a similar argument. They say that economic institutions affect the distribution of skills in society, indirectly determining inequality patterns.
Piketty: Some years after the publication of Capital(13), Piketty (2015)(14) himself recognized the “rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r - g, and it is clearly a very important historical development.” He nonetheless emphasized that a higher r - g spread will be important and will exacerbate future inequality changes.
GóesVsPiketty: However, the results in this paper show that this is likely not to be the case. The results corroborate the idea that recent inequality changes are not explained by r - g but also that new shocks to r − g will likely not lead to higher inequality, as there is no evidence that shocks to r - g increase income inequality. Combined, the observed endogenous dynamics of r - g and the share of the top 1% and the capital share, respectively, cast doubt on the reasonability of Piketty’s prediction about inequality trends.
Góes I 24
GoesVsPiketty: I found no evidence to corroborate the idea that the r-g gap drives the capital share in national income. Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share.
Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either.

*For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

1. Rognlie, Matthew (2014). A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. http://www.mit. edu/~mrognlie/piketty_diminishing_returns.pdf. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
2. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574.
3. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
4. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3.
5. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016.
6. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059.
7. Francese, Maura and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2015). Functional Income Distribution and Its Role in Explaining Inequality. IMF Working Paper 15/244. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10. 5089/9781513549828.001.
8. Dabla-Norris, Era et al. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/13. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10.5089/9781513555188.006.
9. Aghion, Philippe et al. (2015). Innovation and Top Income Inequality. Working Paper 21247. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w21247.
10. Mare, Robert D. (2016). “Educational Homogamy in Two Gilded Ages: Evidence from Inter-generational Social Mobility Data”. In: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663.1, pp. 117–139. doi: 10.1177/0002716215596967.
11. Greenwood, Jeremy et al. (2012). Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation. Working Paper 17735. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w17735.
12. Chong, Alberto and Mark Gradstein (2007). “Inequality and Institutions”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 89.3, pp. 454–465. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.3.454.
13. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap
14. Piketty, T. About Capital in the Twenty-First Century American Economic Review vol. 105, no. 5, May 2015(pp. 48–53)


Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

Piketty Hypothesis Economic Theories Góes I 22
Piketty model/IMF/Góes(1): Piketty’s conclusion that inequality will increase in the future rests on the underlying assumption that, as growth decreases over time, driving the r − g spread to increase, capital-to-income ratios will increase. GoesVsPiketty: However, the results [from our testing models 2 an 3]* fail to show robust positive responses of capital share to shocks in r - g and cast doubt on Piketty’s conjecture.
Elasticity: A possible reason for this is that Piketty could be underestimating diminishing returns of capital - thereby overestimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, whose empirical estimates tend to be much lower than what he assumes (cf. Rognlie 2014)(1).
Krusell and Smith: This relationship is illustrated in this paper by the negative median responses of r - g to positive capital share shocks. Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(2), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis.
Piketty: Piketty (2012(3)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output.
GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners.
Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1* contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase.
Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries.
MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1 does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(5) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising.
Góes I 23
MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(6) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g.
In fact, there is evidence that recent inequality trends are not related to the distribution of national income between factors of production but primarily to the rising inequality of labor income (cf. Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015)(7). Indeed, there are many potential explanations for the rising labor income inequality - as, for instance:
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)(8), after evaluating cross-country evidence, find that past changes in inequality in advanced economies are associated the most with two labor market changes: higher skill premia and lower union membership rates. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also present results that correlate changes in labor market institutions, particularly lower union density, with increases in income inequality in advanced economies.
Aghion et al. (2015)(9) suggest innovation plays a significant role. If innovators are rewarded with higher incomes due to a temporary technological advantage (in a Schumpeterian fashion), inequality would be exacerbated. The authors show that innovation explains about a fifth of the higher inequality observed in the U.S. since 1975.
Mare (2016)(10) and Greenwood et al. (2012)(11) argue that changes in mating behavior helped exacerbate income inequality. The probability that someone will marry another person with a similar socio-educational background (labeled “assortative mating”) increased in tandem with the rise in income inequality in U.S. in the recent decades. The interaction between higher skill premia and higher assortative mating exacerbates household income inequality, because the gap between higher and lower earners became larger and couples became more segregated.
Chong and Gradstein (2007)(12) use a dynamic panel to show inequality tends to decrease as institutional quality improves. The underlying logic is that if the basic rules of economic behavior are not symmetrically enforced, the rich will have a higher chance to extract economic rents, thereby increasing inequality.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4) make a similar argument. They say that economic institutions affect the distribution of skills in society, indirectly determining inequality patterns.
Piketty: Some years after the publication of Capital(13), Piketty (2015)(14) himself recognized the “rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r - g, and it is clearly a very important historical development.” He nonetheless emphasized that a higher r - g spread will be important and will exacerbate future inequality changes.
GóesVsPiketty: However, the results in this paper show that this is likely not to be the case. The results corroborate the idea that recent inequality changes are not explained by r - g but also that new shocks to r − g will likely not lead to higher inequality, as there is no evidence that shocks to r - g increase income inequality. Combined, the observed endogenous dynamics of r - g and the share of the top 1% and the capital share, respectively, cast doubt on the reasonability of Piketty’s prediction about inequality trends.
Góes I 24
GoesVsPiketty: I found no evidence to corroborate the idea that the r-g gap drives the capital share in national income. Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share.
Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either.

*For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

1. Rognlie, Matthew (2014). A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. http://www.mit. edu/~mrognlie/piketty_diminishing_returns.pdf. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
2. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574.
3. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
4. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3.
5. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016.
6. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059.
7. Francese, Maura and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2015). Functional Income Distribution and Its Role in Explaining Inequality. IMF Working Paper 15/244. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10. 5089/9781513549828.001.
8. Dabla-Norris, Era et al. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/13. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10.5089/9781513555188.006.
9. Aghion, Philippe et al. (2015). Innovation and Top Income Inequality. Working Paper 21247. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w21247.
10. Mare, Robert D. (2016). “Educational Homogamy in Two Gilded Ages: Evidence from Inter-generational Social Mobility Data”. In: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663.1, pp. 117–139. doi: 10.1177/0002716215596967.
11. Greenwood, Jeremy et al. (2012). Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation. Working Paper 17735. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w17735.
12. Chong, Alberto and Mark Gradstein (2007). “Inequality and Institutions”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 89.3, pp. 454–465. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.3.454.
13. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap
14. Piketty, T. About Capital in the Twenty-First Century American Economic Review vol. 105, no. 5, May 2015(pp. 48–53)

Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

Piketty Hypothesis Góes Góes I 22
Piketty model/IMF/Góes(1): Piketty’s conclusion that inequality will increase in the future rests on the underlying assumption that, as growth decreases over time, driving the r − g spread to increase, capital-to-income ratios will increase. GoesVsPiketty: However, the results [from our testing models 2 an 3]* fail to show robust positive responses of capital share to shocks in r - g and cast doubt on Piketty’s conjecture.
Elasticity: A possible reason for this is that Piketty could be underestimating diminishing returns of capital - thereby overestimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, whose empirical estimates tend to be much lower than what he assumes (cf. Rognlie 2014)(1).
Krusell and Smith: This relationship is illustrated in this paper by the negative median responses of r - g to positive capital share shocks. Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(2), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis.
Piketty: Piketty (2012(3)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output.
GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners.
Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1* contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase.
Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries.
MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1 does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(5) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising.
Góes I 23
MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(6) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g.
In fact, there is evidence that recent inequality trends are not related to the distribution of national income between factors of production but primarily to the rising inequality of labor income (cf. Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015)(7). Indeed, there are many potential explanations for the rising labor income inequality - as, for instance:
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)(8), after evaluating cross-country evidence, find that past changes in inequality in advanced economies are associated the most with two labor market changes: higher skill premia and lower union membership rates. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also present results that correlate changes in labor market institutions, particularly lower union density, with increases in income inequality in advanced economies.
Aghion et al. (2015)(9) suggest innovation plays a significant role. If innovators are rewarded with higher incomes due to a temporary technological advantage (in a Schumpeterian fashion), inequality would be exacerbated. The authors show that innovation explains about a fifth of the higher inequality observed in the U.S. since 1975.
Mare (2016)(10) and Greenwood et al. (2012)(11) argue that changes in mating behavior helped exacerbate income inequality. The probability that someone will marry another person with a similar socio-educational background (labeled “assortative mating”) increased in tandem with the rise in income inequality in U.S. in the recent decades. The interaction between higher skill premia and higher assortative mating exacerbates household income inequality, because the gap between higher and lower earners became larger and couples became more segregated.
Chong and Gradstein (2007)(12) use a dynamic panel to show inequality tends to decrease as institutional quality improves. The underlying logic is that if the basic rules of economic behavior are not symmetrically enforced, the rich will have a higher chance to extract economic rents, thereby increasing inequality.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(4) make a similar argument. They say that economic institutions affect the distribution of skills in society, indirectly determining inequality patterns.
Piketty: Some years after the publication of Capital(13), Piketty (2015)(14) himself recognized the “rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has evidently little to do with r - g, and it is clearly a very important historical development.” He nonetheless emphasized that a higher r - g spread will be important and will exacerbate future inequality changes.
GóesVsPiketty: However, the results in this paper show that this is likely not to be the case. The results corroborate the idea that recent inequality changes are not explained by r - g but also that new shocks to r − g will likely not lead to higher inequality, as there is no evidence that shocks to r - g increase income inequality. Combined, the observed endogenous dynamics of r - g and the share of the top 1% and the capital share, respectively, cast doubt on the reasonability of Piketty’s prediction about inequality trends.
Góes I 24
GoesVsPiketty: I found no evidence to corroborate the idea that the r-g gap drives the capital share in national income. Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share.
Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either.

*For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

1. Rognlie, Matthew (2014). A note on Piketty and diminishing returns to capital. http://www.mit. edu/~mrognlie/piketty_diminishing_returns.pdf. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
2. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574.
3. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
4. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3.
5. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016.
6. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059.
7. Francese, Maura and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2015). Functional Income Distribution and Its Role in Explaining Inequality. IMF Working Paper 15/244. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10. 5089/9781513549828.001.
8. Dabla-Norris, Era et al. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/13. International Monetary Fund. doi: 10.5089/9781513555188.006.
9. Aghion, Philippe et al. (2015). Innovation and Top Income Inequality. Working Paper 21247. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w21247.
10. Mare, Robert D. (2016). “Educational Homogamy in Two Gilded Ages: Evidence from Inter-generational Social Mobility Data”. In: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663.1, pp. 117–139. doi: 10.1177/0002716215596967.
11. Greenwood, Jeremy et al. (2012). Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation. Working Paper 17735. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w17735.
12. Chong, Alberto and Mark Gradstein (2007). “Inequality and Institutions”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 89.3, pp. 454–465. doi: 10.1162/rest.89.3.454.
13. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap
14. Piketty, T. About Capital in the Twenty-First Century American Economic Review vol. 105, no. 5, May 2015(pp. 48–53)


Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

Principles Nozick II 10
Principle/Nozick: to show that principles explain a p, involves that they contain it. But that does not prove that p. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Involvement, >Inclusion,
>Proofs, >Provability.
II 128
Richness/principle/existence/Nozick: thesis: "All possibilities are realized." - This follows from the assumption of the egalitarian theory that the options "something"/"nothing" are equal. >Ultimate justification/Nozick.
This requires infinitely separate possible worlds because options can be contradictory. - Then you need no explanation why something is or is not, because everything is (somewhere) realized. - Then there is no fact "X instead of Y".
>Possible worlds, >Totality.
II 130
Nothing: one of the unrealized possibilities is also that there is nothing - but that is one among many, not the inegalitary situation that there would be "exclusively nothing". >Nothing, cf. >Impossible World.
II 347
Consciousness/explanation/evolution theory/Nozick: consciousness allows other types of behavior: - to be guided by principles. >Consciousness, >Behavior.

---
Singer I 220
Principles/Responsibility/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles. (R. Nozick 1974)(1): Def historical principle/Nozick: in order to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its history.
Are the parties entitled to ownership as a result of originally justified acquisition?
Def time-slice principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about their realization.
>Time-slice.

1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Property Rousseau Höffe I 272
Property/Rousseau/Höffe: Instead of helping people to significant achievements, a “being-with-oneself”, the two interwoven basic evils of private property and the state create a threefold inequality among people and, as a result, a threefold alienation (aliénation)(1): If property - someone fences in a piece of land and declares it his own - surrounds itself with law and justice, it creates rich and poor, if an authority is added, additionally rulers and ruled, and in case of arbitrariness and tyranny, masters and slaves as well. >Civilization/Rousseau.
Höffe I 275
État civil: With the conclusion of the social contract, people leave the state of nature and enter into the (civic) civil state (état civil). On the debit side [thereby] is the loss of natural freedom with
Höffe I 276
its unlimited right to everything to which the request is directed. In return, for the loss of independence, everyone receives the freedom of a citizen with the ownership of all that one owns. According to the Partnership Contract(2), legitimate property begins historically and de facto with the possession of a piece of land, that is, with the erection of fences, as rejected by the Second Treatise(1). Conditions: Like Locke, Rousseau ties legitimate property to three conditions:
1) The corresponding area must not already be inhabited, which tacitly makes European colonialism appear illegitimate (RousseauVsColonialism);
2) One may not take possession of more than is necessary for subsistence, which is contrary to large scale properties (RousseauVsColonialism)
3) Where legal titles are lacking, "empty ceremony" is not enough, but "work and cultivation" is needed.
>Property/Locke, >Colonialism.

1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755
2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique, 1762, I, 8.

Mause I 47
Property/Rousseau: According to Rousseau, the extensive homogeneity of property relations belongs to the social functional conditions of a good, republican order. The guarantee of property, which is constitutive for the existence of a republican community, is in tension with its sovereign self-determination, since not only a policy aimed at equality of property, but taxes already levied by the state "directly attack property rights and thus the true basis of political society".(1) For taxes today see:
>Tax avoidence, >Tax competition, >Tax compliance, >Tax evasion, >Tax havens, >Tax incidence, >Tax loopholes, >Tax system, >Taxation.


1. J.-J. Rousseau, Abhandlung über die Politische Ökonomie. In Politische Schriften, Hrsg. Ludwig Schmidts, Bd.  1, Paderborn 1977, S. 56.

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Savings Rate Economic Theories Góes I 22
Savings rate/Piketty-Model/Economic theories: (…) Another less emphasized but equally important problem with Piketty’s conjecture is highlighted by Krusell and Smith (2015)(1), who argue that Piketty’s predictions are grounded on a flawed theory of savings - namely, that the savings rate net of depreciation is constant - which exacerbates the expected increase in capital-to-income ratios as growth rates tend to zero. They present an alternative model in which agents maximize inter-temporal utility and arrive in a setting in which, on an optimal growth path, the savings rate is pro-cyclical. By showing that the savings rate responds negatively to negative growth shocks (which, in turn, are translated into positive r−g shocks) for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the results of [our] Model 3* provide empirical support to Krusell and Smith’s analysis. Piketty: Piketty (2012(2)) says in his online notes: “with g = 0%, we’re back to Marx apocalyptic conclusions,” in which capital share goes to 100% and workers take home none of the output.
GóesVsPiketty: While this is logically consistent with the model’s assumptions, empirically there seem to be endogenous forces preventing that: non-negligible diminishing returns on capital and pro-cyclical changes in the savings rate. These are two different ways in which the transmission mechanism from r − g to the capital share might get stuck: with the former, at the limit the rate of return on capital tends to zero and there is no dynamic transmission; with the latter, if growth approaches zero, the savings might ultimately become zero, offsetting any effect of lower growth on capital share. They are, however, fundamentally different: the first regards the production function and technological change, while the second has to do life-cycle behavior of capital owners.
Inequality: Regarding inequality, the results from [our] Model 1 contradict Piketty’s prediction stating that following exogenous shocks in r − g inequality should increase.
Acemoglu and Robinson: In fact, for at least 75% of the countries in the sample, the result is negative. These findings are in line with previous results by Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)(3), who found negative coefficients in single-equation panel models when regressing r −g on the share of the top 1%. This paper goes further, not only because the model takes all variables as endogenous, but also because it incorporates tax variability across countries.
MilanovicVsAcemoglu: Additionally, by decomposing between common and idiosyncratic shocks, rather than using time dummies, Model 1* does not throw away potentially important information about the effect of structural forces (e.g., globalization) on these dynamics —which, as Milanovic (2014)(4) argues, is a problem with Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis. The fact that a positive r − g spread does not lead to higher inequality is not necessarily surprising.
Góes I 23
MankivVsPiketty: As illustrated by Mankiw (2015)(5) through a standard model that incorporates taxation and depreciation, even if r > g, one can arrive in a steady state inequality which does not evolve into an endless inegalitarian spiral. MilanovicVsPiketty: Milanovic (2017, forthcoming) explains that the transmission mechanism between r > g and higher income inequality requires all of the following conditions to hold: (a) savings rates have to be sufficiently high; (b) capital income needs to more unequally distributed than labor income; and (c) a high correlation between drawing capital income and being on the top of the income distribution. In a dynamic fashion, this paper shows that this mechanism is getting stuck because the negative responses of the savings rate to r - g shocks violate the first condition, thereby preventing higher levels inequality when compared to those observed before the increases in r - g. Since estimated dynamics do not confirm Piketty’s theory, observed income inequality in many advanced economies over the past decades are probably explained by factors other than the spread between r and g.
Góes I 24
Savings/cyclicality: There are endogenous forces overlooked by Piketty - particularly the cyclicality of the savings rate - which balance out predicted large increases in the capital share. Inequality: On inequality, the evidence against Piketty’s predictions is even stronger: for at least 75% of the countries, the response of inequality to increases in r - g has the opposite sign to that postulated by Piketty. These results are robust to different calculations of r - g. Regardless of taking the real return on capital as long-term sovereign bond yields, short-term interest rates or implied returns from national accounting tables, the dynamics move in the same direction. Additionally, including or excluding taxes does not alter the qualitative takeaways from the results either.

*For the models in detail see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

1. Krusell, Per and Anthony Smith (2015). “Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?” In: Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 725–748. doi: 10.1086/682574.
2. Piketty, Thomas (2012). ”Economics of Inequality. Course Notes: Models of Growth & Capital Accumulation. Is Balanced Growth Possible?”. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/teaching/10/25. Accessed: 11-Feb-2016.
3. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1, pp. 3–28. doi: 10.1257/jep.29.1.3.
4. Milanovic, Branko (2014). My take on the Acemoglu-Robinson critique of Piketty. http://glineq. blogspot.com/2014/08/my-take-on-acemoglu-robinson-critique.html. Accessed: 11-Feb2016.
5. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059.

Carlos Góes. 2016. Testing Piketty’s Hypothesis on the Drivers of Income Inequality: Evidence from Panel VARs with Heterogeneous Dynamics. IMF Working Paper WP16/160
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16160.pdf

State (Polity) Rousseau Höffe I 270
State/Rousseau/Höffe: (...) although himself a vagabond loner, [Rousseau] defends society in its forcibly reinforced form, as a state order.
Höffe I 272
The natural state qua primordial state does not recognise privileges that some people enjoy to the detriment of others; there are neither privileges nor discrimination. The two basic evils that destroy this ideal state are private property and the state (which protects it), "civil society". In French it says "société civile", not "société bourgoise". Rousseau's bourgeois society here, as with other authors of modern times, is not an economic bourgeois society as opposed to a civic society, but the community with the power of coercion, the state, itself.
Property: Instead of helping people to achieve the decisive achievement of being with themselves, the two interwoven basic evils, private property and the state, create a threefold inequality among people and, as a result, a threefold alienation: If property - someone fences in a piece of land and declares it his own - surrounds itself with law and justice, it creates rich and poor, if an authority is added, additionally rulers and ruled, and in case of arbitrariness and tyranny, masters and slaves as well. >Civilization/Rousseau.
Höffe I 273
In the text [of the second treatise(1)] (...) the establishment of a state appears as a primal sin, with which Rousseau rejects Aristotle's political anthropology (the "inherently political" nature of man) even more sharply than Hobbes. Here the state is not only considered artificial, as it was for Hobbes, but even unnatural. Paradoxically, however, in the end it proves to be necessary.
Höffe I 275
Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by the means of a free consent, i.e. the >Social Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement that is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully. >Justification. État civil: With the conclusion of the social contract, people leave the state of nature and enter into the (civic) civil state (état civil). In this transition they undergo a change which, because of its radical nature, can be described as a revolution, admittedly a non-violent one. From now on their behaviour is no longer determined by a physical instinct, but by a "voice of duty"(2) or justice, where the right takes the place of the request.
Höffe I 278
Separation of powers: Rousseau rejects the idea of separation of powers just as radically as the idea of representation. However, he wisely considers the democracy he propagates to be an ideal that can never be achieved. >Parliamentarism/Rousseau: RousseauVsPolitical Representation.

1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755
2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique, 1762, I, 8.

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Theories Nozick II 121
Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state.
For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer,
1. Why this state is the natural.
2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference.
To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him.
II 122
R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy.
NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts.
Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary.
Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state.
Cf. >Existence/Leibniz.
II 126
1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary.
Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state".
II 127
Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?".
II 127
Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one.
Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist.
II 128
Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Ultimate Justification Nozick II 131 ff
Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing
2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist.
Richness: all possibilities are realized.
Cf. >Possible Worlds/Leibniz, >Possible Worlds.
Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds.
>Possibility, cf. >Real world.
In addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance).
>Invariance, >Bare Facts, >Existence/Nozick.
II 137
Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. >Reflexivity, >Description levels, >Levels/order.
II 138
Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). >Circular reasoning, >Lists.
Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation.
>Sufficient reason.
II 278
Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. >Wholes, >Totality.
A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence.
>Justification, >Explanation, >Evidence.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Harré, H.R. Nozick Vs Harré, H.R. II 121
Inegalitarian Theories/IGT/Inegalitarianism/Existence/Explanation/Nozick: IGT: they assume that a situation or a small number of states are privileged or natural, and therefore require no explanation, while other states or situations have to be explained as deviations from them. E.g. Newton considered idleness or uniformity of movement of the natural state, and everything else had to be explained by the assumption of forces.
Aristotle: Idleness.
Nozick: but that is not limited to theories of motion. (Footnote). IGT: distinguish two classes of states or situations:
1) those requiring an explanation
2) those that do not need an explanation, and do not allow one!
IGT: are particularly suitable for questions such as: "why does X exist and Y not?"
That also means that there is rather a non-N state (not nothing) than an N state.
IGT: leave two questions unanswered:
1) Why should N be the natural state, and not perhaps a different species, a species N'?
2) Given N be the natural state, why are there forces that are assumed to be F and should provide deviations, and not other forces, perhaps '?
Natural State/Nozick: to assuming something as nZ also means attributing a specific content to it! But here one should be careful with a priori arguments in favor of certain content.
II 122
Declaration/R.Harré: Thesis: that something remains the same does not need to be explained: that is the most fundamental principle. (1970, p 248) NozickVsHarré: But do we not need an explanation of why one thing is considered as the same for the purposes of this principle, but another is not? The principle is trivialized if we say that what is always assumed as not needing no explanation, is thought to be constant with respect to a set of concepts that are fitting. ((s) circular).
IGT: the question of "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" is set against the backdrop of an assumed IGT. If there was nothing, the question would have to be asked just as well (even there were nobody to ask it). "Why is there nothing instead of something?"
Problem: then any causal factor that is in question for the nothing is itself a deviation from nothing! Then there can be no explanation as to why these forces F exist which does not introduce these Fs itself as explanatory factors (circular).
II 123
Nothing/Nozick: now we might assume that there is a special force that produces nothingness, a "nothinging power". In the film "Yellow Submarine" there is a vacuum cleaner that absorbs everything and also absorbs itself in the end. Then there is a "pop" and a multicolored scenery emerges. According to this view, nothingness has produced something by destroying itself.
Nozick: perhaps nothingness only destroys a little and still leaves room for a force for real nothing.
Let us imagine a nothinging force that operates at an angle of 45°, and alternative stronger and weaker forces ...+...
II 124
the nothinging force will eventually take over itself and slow itself down or this is somehow prevented... Problem: even if there was an original nothinging force, the question is still, at which point it became effective and at what angle it operated! Somehow, a 45° curve seems less random, but that is only because of our representation system: on logarithmic graph paper it looks completely random!

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Pascal, B. Mackie Vs Pascal, B. Stegmüller IV 481
Pascal's Wager/Pascal/Stegmüller: we know that God exists or does not exist. But our theoretical reason can not decide. One can also not just contain judgment, one has to decide. Possible benefit: bliss and knowledge of the truth. What we risk is error and misery. The stakes are reason and will. Whatever choice we make, we will in no case violate reason.
IV 482
The situation is different with bliss: one loses nothing in the case of God's non-existence, but also wins nothing. Thus practical reason is in favor of God. Pascal adds: however, one could lose one's earthly happiness (when it lies in debauchery) but the comparison to eternal bliss speaks for the latter.
One need not assume that the probabilities of existence or nonexistence are equal! Even if the difference tends to infinity it is worth working for the benefit of existence. ((s) Cf. egalitarian/inegalitarian theories/Nozick).
Mackie offers a table of the probability distribution in his book.
IV 483
VsPascal: what does it mean to believe anything on such a basis? Maybe someone is simply unable to believe in God? Faith/Stegmüller: you can not willingly believe in something.
Pascal: but perhaps the impediment lies somewhere in the mind - which can be influenced. One can decide to practice faith! Indirectly willful.
MackieVsPascal: 1. opposition to his own assertion that a bet doesn't violate reason: whoever thereby reaches faith, does violate his reason and discernment.
2. Who decides against infinite improbability, discards indeed their rational principles!
IV 484
3. Pascal's additional requirements come into play: the doctrine of predestination could indeed be correct, in the case, everyone should strive to make their earthly life as happy as possible. Additionally, the bet is based on an extremely primitive concept of God: a stupid and vain God.
4. Even if there should be such a God, it would perhaps not be content with belief in him, but would call for a church, etc.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.

I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity).

I 309
Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment.
agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world.
agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing).
Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time.
Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time.

I 312
Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary
I 313
to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data.
I 314
Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data.
I 317
Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things.
Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan. No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa.
Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees."
I 318
Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake.
Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real.
I 321
Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body."
Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Egalitarian Theory Nozick, R. II 122
Theory/Explanation/R. Harré: The thesis that something remains the same does not need to be explained. (1970,S 248) NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing counts as the same thing for the purposes of this principle and not in another context.
II 128
Abundance/principle/existence/Nozick: Thesis "All possibilities are realized": this follows from the assumption of the egalitarian theory that possibilities are something/nothing equal. This presupposes infinitely many separate worlds, since possibilities can contradict each other. Then you do not need an explanation why something is or isn't, because everything is realized (somewhere). Then there is also no fact "X instead of Y".
II 130
Nothing: one of the realized possibilities is also that there is nothing - but this is now one among many, not the inegalitarian situation that there is "exclusively nothing".