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Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Correctness Millikan I 308
Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction?
Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same.
Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity).
---
I 309
Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment.
Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world.
Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s) >inegalitarian theories/Nozick). There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast.
E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence.
Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Inequalities Rousseau Mause I 46
Inequality/Rousseau: in his discourse on inequality (Discours sur l'inégalité) of 1755, Rousseau notes the equiprimordial of the historical establishment of property with the emergence of civil society (Rousseau 1988, p. 230) and attributes to it the loss of natural freedom, equality and innocence of the natural state. This loss is irreversible, but the lack of freedom, inequality and moral depravity of the bourgeois society driven by the selfishness (amour propre) of individuals can be overcome politically. (1) According to Rousseau, the extensive homogeneity of property relations is one of the social functional conditions of a good, republican order.


1. J.-J. Rousseau, Abhandlung über den Ursprung und die Grundlagen der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen. In Rousseau, Schriften, Hrsg. Henning Ritter, Bd.   1, Frankfurt a. M. S. 230

Rousseau I
J. J. Rousseau
Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789
German Edition:
The Confessions 1953


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Principles Nozick II 10
Principle/Nozick: to show that principles explain a p, involves that they contain it. But that does not prove that p. ---
II 128
Richness/principle/existence/Nozick: thesis: "All possibilities are realized." - This follows from the assumption of the egalitarian theory that the options "something"/"nothing" are equal. - This requires infinitely separate possible worlds because options can be contradictory. - Then you need no explanation why something is or is not, because everything is (somewhere) realized. - Then there is no fact "X instead of Y". ---
II 130
Nothing: one of the unrealized possibilities is also that there is nothing - but that is one among many, not the inegalitary situation that there would be "exclusively nothing". ---
II 347
Consciousness/explanation/evolution theory/Nozick: consciousness allows other types of behavior: - to be guided by principles. ---
Singer I 220
Principles/Responsibility/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles. (R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974): Definition historical principle/Nozick: in order to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its history. Are the parties entitled to ownership as a result of originally justified acquisition?
Definition two-disc principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about their realization.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Theories Nozick II 121
Inegalitarian Theory /ig. Th./Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". - This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. - E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state. - For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer, 1. Why this state is the natural. - 2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference. - To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him. ---
II 122
R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. - NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts. - Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary. - Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state. ---
II 126
1. We do not know what the natural state is - 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary. - Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state". ---
II 127
Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?". ---
II 127
Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. - Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one. - Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist. ---
II 128
Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. - Solution:> richness.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Ultimate Justification Nozick II 131 ff
Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing - 2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist. - Richness: all possibilities are realized. - Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds - in addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance). ---
II 137
Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. ---
II 138
Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). - Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation. ---
II 278
Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. - A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Harré, H.R. Nozick Vs Harré, H.R. II 121
Inegalitarian Theories/IGT/Inegalitarianism/Existence/Explanation/Nozick: IGT: they assume that a situation or a small number of states are privileged or natural, and therefore require no explanation, while other states or situations have to be explained as deviations from them. E.g. Newton considered idleness or uniformity of movement of the natural state, and everything else had to be explained by the assumption of forces.
Aristotle: Idleness.
Nozick: but that is not limited to theories of motion. (Footnote). IGT: distinguish two classes of states or situations:
1) those requiring an explanation
2) those that do not need an explanation, and do not allow one!
IGT: are particularly suitable for questions such as: "why does X exist and Y not?"
That also means that there is rather a non-N state (not nothing) than an N state.
IGT: leave two questions unanswered:
1) Why should N be the natural state, and not perhaps a different species, a species N'?
2) Given N be the natural state, why are there forces that are assumed to be F and should provide deviations, and not other forces, perhaps '?
Natural State/Nozick: to assuming something as nZ also means attributing a specific content to it! But here one should be careful with a priori arguments in favor of certain content.
II 122
Declaration/R.Harré: Thesis: that something remains the same does not need to be explained: that is the most fundamental principle. (1970, p 248) NozickVsHarré: But do we not need an explanation of why one thing is considered as the same for the purposes of this principle, but another is not? The principle is trivialized if we say that what is always assumed as not needing no explanation, is thought to be constant with respect to a set of concepts that are fitting. ((s) circular).
IGT: the question of "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" is set against the backdrop of an assumed IGT. If there was nothing, the question would have to be asked just as well (even there were nobody to ask it). "Why is there nothing instead of something?"
Problem: then any causal factor that is in question for the nothing is itself a deviation from nothing! Then there can be no explanation as to why these forces F exist which does not introduce these Fs itself as explanatory factors (circular).
II 123
Nothing/Nozick: now we might assume that there is a special force that produces nothingness, a "nothinging power". In the film "Yellow Submarine" there is a vacuum cleaner that absorbs everything and also absorbs itself in the end. Then there is a "pop" and a multicolored scenery emerges. According to this view, nothingness has produced something by destroying itself.
Nozick: perhaps nothingness only destroys a little and still leaves room for a force for real nothing.
Let us imagine a nothinging force that operates at an angle of 45°, and alternative stronger and weaker forces ...+...
II 124
the nothinging force will eventually take over itself and slow itself down or this is somehow prevented... Problem: even if there was an original nothinging force, the question is still, at which point it became effective and at what angle it operated! Somehow, a 45° curve seems less random, but that is only because of our representation system: on logarithmic graph paper it looks completely random!

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Pascal, B. Mackie Vs Pascal, B. Stegmüller IV 481
Pascal's Wager/Pascal/Stegmüller: we know that God exists or does not exist. But our theoretical reason can not decide. One can also not just contain judgment, one has to decide. Possible benefit: bliss and knowledge of the truth. What we risk is error and misery. The stakes are reason and will. Whatever choice we make, we will in no case violate reason.
IV 482
The situation is different with bliss: one loses nothing in the case of God's non-existence, but also wins nothing. Thus practical reason is in favor of God. Pascal adds: however, one could lose one's earthly happiness (when it lies in debauchery) but the comparison to eternal bliss speaks for the latter.
One need not assume that the probabilities of existence or nonexistence are equal! Even if the difference tends to infinity it is worth working for the benefit of existence. ((s) Cf. egalitarian/inegalitarian theories/Nozick).
Mackie offers a table of the probability distribution in his book.
IV 483
VsPascal: what does it mean to believe anything on such a basis? Maybe someone is simply unable to believe in God? Faith/Stegmüller: you can not willingly believe in something.
Pascal: but perhaps the impediment lies somewhere in the mind - which can be influenced. One can decide to practice faith! Indirectly willful.
MackieVsPascal: 1. opposition to his own assertion that a bet doesn't violate reason: whoever thereby reaches faith, does violate his reason and discernment.
2. Who decides against infinite improbability, discards indeed their rational principles!
IV 484
3. Pascal's additional requirements come into play: the doctrine of predestination could indeed be correct, in the case, everyone should strive to make their earthly life as happy as possible. Additionally, the bet is based on an extremely primitive concept of God: a stupid and vain God.
4. Even if there should be such a God, it would perhaps not be content with belief in him, but would call for a church, etc.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.

I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity).

I 309
Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment.
agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world.
agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing).
Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time.
Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time.

I 312
Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary
I 313
to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data.
I 314
Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data.
I 317
Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things.
Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan. No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa.
Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees."
I 318
Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake.
Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real.
I 321
Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body."
Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Egalitarian Theory Nozick, R. II 122
Theory/Explanation/R. Harré: The thesis that something remains the same does not need to be explained. (1970,S 248) NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing counts as the same thing for the purposes of this principle and not in another context.
II 128
Abundance/principle/existence/Nozick: Thesis "All possibilities are realized": this follows from the assumption of the egalitarian theory that possibilities are something/nothing equal. This presupposes infinitely many separate worlds, since possibilities can contradict each other. Then you do not need an explanation why something is or isn't, because everything is realized (somewhere). Then there is also no fact "X instead of Y".
II 130
Nothing: one of the realized possibilities is also that there is nothing - but this is now one among many, not the inegalitarian situation that there is "exclusively nothing".