Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Hegel Bubner I 182
Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.) >Absolute Spirit.
I 183
Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object.
>Aristotle.
HegelVsAristotle: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature.
>Teleology, >Nature/Aristotle, >Nature.
Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities.
I 184
Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. >Self-reference, >Idea, >Logic/Hegel.


Adorno XII 115
Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. >Absolute spirit, >Proof of God.
KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Customs/Morality Hegel Brocker I 791
Sittlichkeit/HegelVsHobbes/Hegel/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings.(1) Hegel develops a concept of morality that has a principally progressive thrust and therefore also points "beyond the institutional horizon" of Hegel's own present.(2)
The social struggle of individuals for recognition is characterized by a distinctive dynamic; for Hegel, it proves to be an event that is open to the future and can never be finally concluded. With the motif of recognition, Hegel inscribes a principal tension in his understanding of social life, which integrates the social conflicts between individuals and groups into the historical horizon of a moral process of progress that is open to the future.
>Recognition/Honneth, >Identity/Honneth.

1. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986.
2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I 334
Morality/Hegel/Höffe: The basic lines(1) reach their climax, the synthesis as reconciliation of abstract law and subjective morality, morality, in a will that is free both externally, qua law, and internally, qua morality. This includes social forms and institutions in which a free >self-consciousness can recognize and acknowledge itself. Because they realize a far higher degree of rationality, they have an "infinitely more solid authority and power than the being of nature" (§ 146).
Polis: To his thought of morality Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states.
HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois
Höffe I 335
society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel. Normative elements are clearly included in the description of the process.
a) Hegel begins with the "immediate by-oneself", the family shaped by love. According to a further triune section this is divided into marriage, in which an initially only external unity is transformed, by free consent, into a spiritual unity of a self-conscious love. b) According to the antithesis, marriage requires a "lasting and secure possession, a property" (§ 170), for the acquisition of which, according to Hegel, the man is primarily responsible.
c) According to the synthesis, the children who guarantee the progress of humanity have the right to be nourished and educated from the common family property.
Alienation: With the coming of age of the children, the possibility of new families of their own arises, in which the transition to the next step, the antithesis within morality, becomes apparent. Their essence is alienation from the family, including history and religion. It is the economic and working society, known as the "civil society", which on the one hand is necessary for the development of freedom, but on the other hand does not get rid of its problem of poverty and wealth.
Welfare state: The welfare state as a corrective does not come into view here. In order for bourgeois society to "function", it needs a legal system that Hegel calls the state of necessity and understanding.


1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Dialectic Plato Bubner I 34
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming.
I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato.
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Def "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial.
>Dialectics/Aristotle.
Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary.
I 39
Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. >Kant, >Dialectic/Hegel.
HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language.
I 111
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures.
B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference.
C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic.
>Knowledge/Plato, cf. >Propositional logic.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Logos Aristotle Bubner I 190
Logos/Aristotle: it surpasses the elementary natural conditionality. In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, there is no contract conclusion, which leads out of nature (natural right). Logos: to be understood in Aristotle as language and not as reason, which emerges from the comparison with animals.
>Language/Aristotle, >Animal/Aristotle.
Language reveals the good and the just in mutual exchange.
The good as leading design of action is indeed controversial, so that it must be debated.
>The Good/Aristotle.
The Logos is such a means to discover, but not a set goal and not content in itself.
It is only thanks to the insinuation of common interests that the dialogue is set in motion.
Without polis no function of the logos and no logos, no politics.
>Politics/Aristotle.
The growing complexity is self-sustaining without forming a political community of action. HegelVsAristotle recognizes this.
>HegelVsAristotle.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Polis Hegel Höffe I 334
Polis/Hegel/Höffe: In accordance with his thought of morality(1) Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. >Aristotle, >Polis.
Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states.
>Community, >State/Hegel.
HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois
Höffe I 335
society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel, >Oikos.

1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016


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