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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pain | Rorty | I 83f Pain/Descartes: pain are particulars RortyVs). Their being is constituted in a single property: painfulness. --- I 93f Pain/Kripke/Rorty: difference: a) heat: Even in the absence of heat you can feel heat - (same epistemic situation) b) Not so in the case of pain. Difference: a) reference in heat is determined by an accidental property - b) in pain: by an essential property. >Pain/Kripke, cf. >Necessity a posteriori. I 127 f E.g. The not yet speaking child knows in the same way that it is in pain, as the plant knows the direction of the sun and the amoeba the temperature of the water. Knowledge: this way of knowledge, however, is unrelated to what a user of language knows, if he knows what pain is. Wittgenstein: it is a mistake to think that we learn what pain is in this second sense in putting our knowledge, of what pain in the first sense is, in a linguistic construct. >Linguistic disguise. I 128 Wittgensteinians: make a fuss about the facts about behavior and environment. RortyVs: these are irrelevant to the nature of pain. Because the nature of pain is simply determined by what is named. --- VI 172 Rorty: Pain, people and beliefs (I'm not so sure with hairstyles) are not entities, about which one can learn to talk by obtaining succinct definitions. >Definition. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Synonymy | Geach | 169/70 Synonymy/Criteria/propositional identity/Geach: we know that strict reciprocal implication is not a sufficient criterion for synonymy. E.g. "Necessarily either both, p and q, or neither p nor q" usually does not suffice: that does not justify the conclusion: Everyone believes that p if and only if he believes that q". ((s) because of lack of identity criteria for intensional objects.) >Identity criteria, >Intensional objects. Geach: entailment as a substitute for strict implication is complicated, but does not help. >Entailment/Geach. Transitivity must be abolished - even from reciprocal entailment, the identity of propositions does not follow. >Transitivity. Geach: no one knows what he says when he says that two propositions are identical. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Objects of thought. If the difference between two propositions is not an obstacle, that both are believed at the same time, why should it be an obstacle being expressed simultaneously by one and the same proposition? - Problem: then the whole apparatus of synonymy and non-ambiguity threatens to collapse. On the other hand, if we cannot recognize the same meaning (sense) in different linguistic disguises, there is also little purpose in postulating propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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