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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Stigler | Rothbard III 326 Action/Stigler/Böhm-Bawerk/Rothbard: (…) the mathematics of simultaneous equations, dealing in physics with unmotivated motion, stresses mutual determination. In human action, however, the known causal force of action unilinearly determines the results. This gross misconception by mathematically inclined writers on the study of human action was exemplified during a running attack on Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, one of the greatest of all economists, by (…) George Stigler: StiglerVsBöhm-Bawerk: „. . . yet the postulate of continuity of utility and demand functions (which is unrealistic only to a minor degree, and essential to analytic treatment) is never granted. A more important weakness is Böhm-Bawerk’s failure to understand some of the most essential elements of modern economic theory, the concepts of mutual determination and equilibrium (developed by the use of the theory of simultaneous equations). Mutual determination is spurned for the older concept of cause and effect.“(1) RothbardVsStigler: The “weakness” displayed here is not that of Böhm-Bawerk, but of those, like Professor Stigler, who attempt vainly and fallaciously to construct economics on the model of mathematical physics, specifically, of classical mechanics.(2) 1. George J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1946), p. 181. For Carl Menger's attack on the concept of mutual determination and his critique of mathematical economics in general, see T.W. Hutchison, A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 195 3), pp. 147-48, and the interesting article by Emil Kauder, "Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School," Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie XVII, 4 (1958), 412 ff. 2. Stigler appends a footnote to the above paragraph which is meant as the coup de grace to Böhm-Bawerk: "Böhm-Bawerk was not trained in mathematics." Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories. Mathematics, it must be realized, is only the servant oflogic and reason, and not their master. "Training" in mathematics is no more necessary to the realization of its uselessness for and inapplicability to the sciences of human action than, for example, "training" in agricultural techniques is essential to knowing that they are not applicable on board an ocean liner. Indeed, training in mathematics, without adequate attention to the epistemology of the sciences of human action, is likely to yield unfortunate results when applied to the latter, as this example demonstrates. Böhm-Bawerk's greatness as an economist needs no defense at this date. For a sensitive tribute to Böhm-Bawerk, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, 1851-1914" in Ten Great Economists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 143-90. For apurely assertive and unsupported depreciation of Böhm-Bawerk's stature as an economist, see Howard S. Ellis' review of Schumpeter's book in theJournal of Political Economy, October, 1952, p. 434. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Cairnes, John Elliott | Rothbard | Rothbard II 290 John Elliott Cairnes/Rothbard: J.E. Cairnes has been known as 'the last of the classical economists'; after Mill's death he assumed the mantle of outstanding British economist in the minds of the public, and in 1874 he lashed out in incomprehension at the revolutionary marginal utility theory of William Stanley Jevons (in Cairnes's Some Leading Principles of Political Economy). Cairnes was a determined cost-of-production theorist, granting his only significant exception in his well-known 'theory of non-competing groups'. This theory recognized that where factors of production, in particular labour, did not immediately and fully compete with each other, the prices of the factors are determined by demand rather than by cost. Unfortunately, Cairnes lifted the theory from Longfield's Lectures on Political Economy without giving him credit; we know that this was not a case of ignorance of a distinguished predecessor, since Cairnes assigned Longfield's work in his own classes.(1) >Mountifort Longfield, >John Stuart Mill, >Classical Economics. Method/Cairnes: Cairnes's work of most lasting value, his Character and Logical Method, while including some Millian positivism, was essentially a methodological work in the great Nassau Senior-praxeological tradition. >Positivism. Thus Cairnes, after agreeing with Mill that there can be no controlled experiments in the social sciences, adds the important point that the social sciences, nevertheless, have a crucial advantage over the physical sciences. For, in the latter, 'mankind have no direct knowledge ofultimate physical principles'. The laws of physics are not themselves evident to our consciousness nor are they directly apparent; their truth rests on the fact that they account for natural phenomena. But, in contrast, Cairnes goes on, 'the economist starts with a knowledge of ultimate causes'. How? Because the economist realizes that the 'ultimate principles governing economic phenomena' are 'certain mental feelings and certain animal propensities in human beings; [and] the physical conditions under which production takes Ppace'. To arrive at these premises of economics 'no elaborate process of induction is needed'. For all we need to do is 'to turn our attention to the subject', and we obtain 'direct knowledge of these causes in our consciousness of what passes in our own minds, and in the information which our senses convey... to us of external facts'.(2) Cairnes also demonstrates that the economist uses mental experiments as replacements for laboratory experiments of the physical scientist. He shows too, that deduced economic laws are 'tendency', or 'if-then', laws, and furthermore that they are necessarily qualitative and not quantitative, and therefore cannot admit of mathematical or statistical expression. 1. Cairnes's successor to the Whately chair in 1861, and the last holder of that chair in the archbishop's lifetime, was Arthur Houston (1833-1914), who continued in the new Mill-Cairnes cost of production tradition. In his Principles of Value in Exchange (1864), Houston held that the 'net cost ofproduction' was the dominent causal force in determining value, and even tried to arrive at a mathematically expressed 'unit of sacrifice' that could measure that cost. 'Criticism' of this theory, as Black noted, 'would be superfluous'. R.D.C. Black, 'Trinity College, Dublin, and the Theory ofValue, 1832-1863', Economica, n.s. 12 (August 1945), p. 148. Houston wrote other books on comparative law and the English drama. J.G. Smith, 'some Nineteenth Century Irish Economists', Economica n.s. 2 (Feb. 1935), pp. 30-31. 2. J.E. Cairnes, The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy (2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1875) pp. 83-7, 88. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Causal Explanation | Allport | Corr I 29 (XXIX) Causal force/Causation/Psychology/Personality Traits/Allport: Allport (1937)(1) saw personality traits as possessing causal force. >Personality traits, >Personality traits/Allport. Traits correspond to ‘generalized neuropsychic structures’ that modulate the individual’s understanding of stimuli and choice of adaptive behaviours. Thus, traits represent more than some running average of behaviour. Cf. the philosophical discussion on causal forces and causality >Causal forces/Philosophy, >Causal Explanation/Philosophy. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Causality | Kripke | Rorty II 131 Kripke/RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description. Causal forces are independent of description. >Description dependence/Kripke, >Description independence, >Description/Kripke, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal explanation, >Vocabulary/Kripke. --- Stegmüller IV 82 Causality/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripke/Stegmüller: even an omniscient being could, if it considers the individual events, only see the sequence, but not the necessity - in the universe it encounters possible worlds where less strict laws apply. >Possible world, >Possible world/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Causality | Parsons | Habermas IV 309 Causality/Action/Motives/Moral/Durkheim/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons considers Durkheim's distinction between moral and causal force the decisive breakthrough. >Empiricism, >E. Durkheim, >Morals/Durkheim, >VsEmpirism. Parsons: the fear of sanctions is always secondary, the sense of moral obligation is primary.(1) >Duties. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 709. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Evolution | Tomasello | Genz II 173 Human/Evolution/Tomasello/Genz: Tomasello Thesis: All typical human possibilities are based on a single genetic progress. Homo sapiens: has, as the only one, the possibility of identification with others. >Intersubjectivity, >Communication. Genetic development: the time since the occurrence of the first human being about 1 million years ago is for a genetic development much too short. II 174 Tomasello: Thesis: Only the human has the ability to understand external events through mediating intentions or causal forces. In this way he is able to predict the behavior of his conspecifics. >Theory of Mind, >Behavior. |
Tomasello I Michael Tomasello Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation Frankfurt/M. 2011 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Flux | Bigelow | I 71 Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: cooperates very well with the Cartesian law of inertia. Thereafter, the same speed is not a change. Defintion law of inertia/Descartes/Bigelow/Pargetter: an object moves at a constant velocity when no forces act on it. Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we assume that any change needs a cause, the Flux doctrine revises the Aristotelian view of the movement. (FluxVsAristotle). >Change/Aristotle. Change/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Flux-Doctrine states that a change of location is an extrinsic change for a body, because the intrinsic property of speed does not have to change for this. Flux/explanation: for most changes flux is the better explanation. I 72 Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: for a few changes, Ockham's explanation ((s) is not a vector for instantaneous velocity) better: for example twilight, for example, cooling, for example, moral improvement, simply much that people contemplated about in the Middle Ages. Impulse/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: has a body according to the Ockhamists because it had that and that position at the time. Problem: this requires that, e.g. a meteor has a "memory". Acceleration/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem becomes more difficult when e.g. the meteor has still an acceleration, because this still needs additional assumptions. Then the movement of the meteor depends on the distances of points in space. Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: that the movement depends on the prehistory, cannot simply be lead ad absurdum. Only the flux doctrine is more elegant. Impulse/Shock/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: The meteor has the impulse according to the flux doctrine due to its instantaneous properties. Prehistory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can play an epistemic role to explain why the body has its instantaneous speed. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the causal cause, however, is the instantaneous velocity and not the prehistory. >Cause, >Causality. VsOckhamism/VsOckham/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: For example, the perfectly homogeneous, rotating disk. I 73 Motion/Bigelow/Pargetter: the movement of this disk does not lead to any change in the distribution of qualities. Nevertheless, it differs from an inactive disk. The two are distinguished by their causal forces. Explanation: change the material parts. Time sections of the rotating disk provide circles, the ones of the stationary disk do not. Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the concept of identity that is used here is controversial. It does not rely on the possibility of qualitative distinction or tracking back in time cannot rely on tracking an identifiable piece of matter. This leads to haecceitas Haecceitism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is based on the assumption that identity cannot always be based on the same qualities. For example a perfectly rotating homogeneous disk. Haecceitas: This-ness. Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not resist against non-qualitative identity. We accept that the rotating disk has a pattern of changing identities. >Haecceitism, >Identity. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not the whole story: Causal forces: e.g. the rotating disk: are not provided by the non-qualitative identities. Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the individual parts of the homogeneous disk have an instantaneous speed. I 74 These lead to the fact that the time sections describe circles. Universals/Physics/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is the reason why we say that instantaneous speed - a vector with magnitude and direction - is a universal that body at a time can possess. It is an intrinsic property. >Universals, >Intrinsic. Property/Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we have to explain what kind of property this is that has a size and direction. Size/Direction/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to the flux doctrine, the size and direction of a vector are more difficult to explain. We cannot explain the necessary instantaneous velocity by the pattern of the earlier positions. >Vectors. Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need a theory of relations between properties. Size/direction/vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: can simply say that both are given by the previous history of the earlier positions. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Forces | Cartwright | I 59 Composition/causes/forces / Physics / Cartwright: E.g. mix of electromagnetics and gravity. - Vector addition: is a calculation! - It is not nature, what "adds" the forces - because the "component forces" are not there! MillVs: the partial forces exist. CartwrightVsMill: Partial forces do not exist - not even - "partial movement towards the north and the east" where the body moves to the northeast. I 61 Solution/Cartwright: we have to give up the "facts-view": In the vector addition causal forces are added - no physical forces. - Then not "behavior" of the body, but "ability" to behave". Problem: so easily the "facts" cannot be abandoned. >Facts, >Complex/complexity. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Forces | Danto | I 309 Force/Causality/Cause/Effect: Causal processes contain states of representation as causes or effects. >Representation, >Cause, >Effect, >Causality, >Judgments. We evaluate a causal process as an action only if the effect is not only caused by the representation but makes the representation true at the same time. >Truth makers. I 310 Causality takes place only between material states. "Make true"/Danto: Causality is always material, representation is made true, embodied. Idealist: is just as right: if no representations were embodied, we would be purely physical systems. Truth becomes a causal force, so to speak. The way we represent the world becomes a factor of the way the world is. >World/thinking, >World, >Reality. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Measurements | Davidson | I (b) 23 Propositional objects/Davidson: Thesis: attribution of propositional objects to other persons is analog to measuring. E.g. objects of wishes, beliefs, intentions. >Propositional attitudes, >Attribution, >Desire, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. They have no causal forces and therefore they cannot affect our mind and our brain, or us at all. In what relation can we stand to them at all? These are the two tools that allow a finite vocabulary to cover infinite regions. Objects allow us to get adjectives under control. Events do the same for some adverbs. And when measuring, this task is fulfilled by the numbers. Now we can separate the semantic need for objects by which one can specify the content of propositions from the idea that there must be any objects at all with which someone who has a propositional attitude is in psychic contact. E.g.: weights of different objects: some weigh the same, some weigh twice as much, some nothing. The introduction of a scale does not change this. The only objects we need are the numbers and the things that have weight. With the statement: in Karat, the weight of the diamond is 109, we do not specify weights in the sense of objects. According to this, there is no alternative for the conceptions of doctrines as relational sentences. This "relativism", however, contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real". I (b) 26 Measuring/Davidson: a scale does not alter the fact of weight or ratios - numbers are needed but do not belong to the object - ontology: weight is nothing objectual - analogy to measurement: attribution of intentional states - numbers: here only the proportions have to be preserved - however: if there is no contradiction between 0° Celsius and 32° Fahrenheit, this does not show that the measured properties are not "real". |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Negation | Millikan | I 221 Not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: Thesis: "not" is an operator who operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the sense of the entire sentence. >Operator. Negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences cannot have non-existent facts as the real value. Reason: Negative facts do not have causal forces that could play a role in a normal explanation. Negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. E.g. "not-p" is called "the fact that -p does not exist" In a similar way, Wittgenstein has understood it as well. >Fact. N.B.: we had said above, that existence sentences are not representations. Image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but understood sentences of the form "x does not exist" are understood in this way as to map a non-existent fact. Then the variable "x" in "x does not exist" does not go via names of single objects (objects, elementary objects) but via representations of possible states (possible facts). >Picture theory. Meaning/Non-existence/Negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning ((s)> Non-Existence/Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology it means that they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time, he could claim that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. N.B.: that made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: could we not maintain at least half of this equivalence? The from "not-p" to "that -p does not exist"? >Equivalence. MillikanVsWittgenstein: No, not even this we can do. If Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that -p does not exist," then that would mean for my position that negative sentences do not map world states and are not representations. Millikan: instead, they would represent linguistic facts, "not-p" would then be an icon, but it does not represent, whereby a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Protoreferent/Millikan. "p" would not be a representative of "not-p" but a protoreferent. Question: would "not-p" be an icon of which the "p is false" ((s) linguistically) explicitly represented? Vs: then "not" would be no operator anymore! Not/Negation/Operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: i.e. The mapping rule for "not-p" is a function of the mapping rule for "p". 1. If "not" is not an operator, it might happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p," but still the sense of "not-p" absurd. 2. If "not-p" says "that -p does not exist", "not-p" must also be true if some variant in "p" is not fully determined, i.e. has no adapted meaning. E.g. "Pegasus was not a winged horse" e.g. "The present king of France is not bald" would be true sentences! 3. Certainly, it is the case that "'p' is false" at least maps (icons) that "p" has no real value. Correspondingly, "x does not exist" maps then the fact that "x" does not have referents. N.B.: if "not-p" says "that -p does not exist" it still maps a negative fact. > Facts/Millikan. I 224 Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: Thesis: negative sentences, whose opposites are normal representative sentences, must themselves represent positive facts. >Prepresentation, >Sentence. I 224 Negation/stabilization function/not/representation/Millikan: what is the stabilization function of "not" in normal representing sentences? It is not needed to "erase" the rest of the sentence. "Erase": sometimes occurs, but then it is called "Sorry" or "I did not mean that". Negation/"not": its function is not to produce no believe. That would not be a function. Eigenfunction: of "not" is relational. That is, it is a (mathematical) function of the eigenfunction of the sentence without "not". Sentence: has the function of producing a belief. Likewise, a sentence with "not" has to produce something that has a potential benefit. Negative sentence: perhaps it should eliminate a false belief? But that would be similar to "does not exist" works. >Existence, >Nonexistence. I 224 Negative sentence/"not"/imperative/Millikan: an imperative like "bring no dirt into the house" has very well a positive function. E.g. if you do it anyway, it is not done with an excuse "I did not want it". For the command was not, to do it without purpose. Not sufficient: "I did not intend it". Correct: I intended not to do it. Not sufficient: "I did not know I did it" Correct: you have to know that you do not do it. Not/imperative: here the usage is not parallel to the function of "does not exist". I 257 Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence maps a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reduction | Searle | I 133 ff Reduction/Searle: There are different types of reduction: a) property reduction: is nothing but average kinetic energy, b) theoretical reduction: is reduction between theories, e.g. recycling the gas laws to the laws of statistical thermodynamics, c) logical or ontological reduction: concerns laws of numbers on laws of quantities and... I 135 ...d) causal reduction, causal powers of an entity to causal forces of another phenomenon: is the vibration in molecular lattice instead of solid bodies. I 136 Consciousness/Searle: even a perfect science of the brain would not lead to an ontological reduction of the kind that our contemporary science can provide for heat, firmness, color and sound. I 137 SearleVsReductionism: that changes nothing for our scientific world view. >Reductionism. I 139f From the irreducibility of consciousness arises nothing important. >Consciousness/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Robots | Searle | I 83 Robot/Zombie/Mind/Brain/Searle: example: imagine your brain is starting to change in a way that leads to a gradual connection. You then implant silicon chips. In the end your whole brain is replaced by such chips. A logical possibility, which cannot be excluded with a priori reasons alone, is that one continues to have all kinds of thoughts, experiences, memories etc. >Zombies, >computer model. I 84 Variant: you notice in the course that the area of your conscious experience becomes smaller and smaller, but that this has no influence on your external behavior. (Also not to be excluded a priori). You want to shout: "I can't see anything at all; I'm totally blind." But you hear your voice say, "I see a red object in front of me." In these thought experiments, it is important to always think them through from the point of view of the first person. One loses consciousness, but receives the same behavior. I 84/85 3rd variant: the chips do not cause any change in your spiritual life, but they become increasingly incapable of translating your thoughts, feelings and intentions into actions. The wit of these three variations is to illustrate the causal relationships. In the first case, the silicon chips have causal forces equivalent to those of the brain. In the second case, the mediation between the mind and the behavioral patterns was interrupted, the chips are not duplicates of the causal forces of the brain, but only duplicates of certain of the input output functions of the brain. I 86 In the third case, the person concerned would have the same spiritual life, but the spiritual phenomena would no longer be expressed in behavior. What is the philosophical significance of these three thought experiments? What exactly is the importance of behavior for the concept of mind? But ontologically, the phenomena in question, with all their essential characteristics, can exist in complete independence from any output behavior. Most philosophers whom I have criticized would accept the following two statements: 1. The brain causes conscious mental phenomena. 2. There is some kind of logical or conceptual connection between conscious mental phenomena and external behavior (SearleVs). However, we have shown that these two are not compatible with the following statements: I 87 3. The ability of the brain to cause consciousness is conceptually different from its ability to produce motor behavior. A system could have consciousness without behavior and behavior without consciousness. We can call this "the principle of independence from consciousness and behavior". Therefore, behavior is not a necessary condition for the existence of the spiritual. The ontology of the spiritual is essentially an ontology of the first person. It is merely a swollen formulation that every state of mind must be someone's state of mind. I 88 Robot Example: there is a wedge between mind states and behavior. >Consciousness, >Artificial consciousness, cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Robots. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Science | Kripke | Rorty II 131 Kripke/RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description - causal powers are independent from description. >Description dependence/Kripke, >Description independent, >Causal theory of knowledge. RortyVsScientism: its weakness lies in the fact that it concludes from the prognosis and use of the causal forces of objects made possible by a certain descriptive vocabulary that this vocabulary is superior to others. The Kripkeans still refer to this fallacy today. RortyVsKripke. > |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Scientism | Rorty | II (f) 131 Scientism/Rorty: pro: its strength lies in the fact that understanding always refers to the objects described in a certain way, but the causal forces of the objects that are detrimental or beneficial to us remain unaffected by the way they are described! We get sick and die, no matter how the disease is described. (RortyVs "Christian Science"). RortyVsScientism: its weakness lies in the fact that it concludes from the prognosis and use of the causal forces of objects made possible by a certain descriptive vocabulary that this vocabulary is superior to others. The Kripkeans still refer to this fallacy today. (RortyVsKripke). >Vocabulary/Rorty. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Armstrong, D. | Putnam Vs Armstrong, D. | I (g) 176 Materialism/PutnamVsArmstrong: fearlessly uses the medieval "causal powers" and "built-in" similarities. Even "essence"! PutnamVs. >Causal forces, >Universals/Armstrong. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Burge, T. | Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. | II 171 Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term? II 187 Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981a Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987 Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983. Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states. Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects. Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation. II 188 Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up, II 189 t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior. StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic). II 193 Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose. II 194 Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow. Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself. Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and II 195 I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal? 2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content? 3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Creary, L | Cartwright Vs Creary, L | I 62 Factual View/Causal forces/Lewis Creary/Cartwright: Creary tries to maintain separate causal laws and at the same time to save the facts-view by postulating an intermediate effect: physical laws/Creary: Thesis: there are two types of them: a) Laws on causal influence: E.g. law of gravity. Coulomb’s Law: they tell us, what forces or other causal impacts become effective in different circumstances. b) Laws about causal action: ("Action laws"): they tell us what results arise from such combinations. E.g. law of vector addition, provides satisfactory explanations. Composition/Creary: less satisfactory types: E.g. amplification, interference, elimination (predomination). I 63 Truth/Physical laws/Creary/Cartwright: according to Creary these laws are true, because they correctly describe what influences are produced. Truth/Law/CartwrightVsCreary: this is a plausible representation of the structure of many causal explanations, but it has two disadvantages: 1) often there are no general laws of interaction. The dynamics of the vector addition is fortunate in this regard. Problem: irreversible processes: flux, Laws of transport (heat transport) distribution functions. The equations in statistical mechanics do not apply in 90% of cases. (Kline, Similitude and Approximation, NY, 1969, p. 140). I 65 Creary/Cartwright: his action laws (which provide the resulting overall behavior) only apply to individual cases. CartwrightVsCreary: better correct laws like Fick’s law. Nature/Cartwright: should rather be described by many phenomenological laws which are tailored to individual situations, than ruled by first principles. (s) VsCartwright: there can be no laws for individual situations (specific situations). CartwrightVsCreary: 2) causal influence: E.g. resulting force in vector addition: Creary: Thesis: there is no force that results, but a movement (behavior). With that we can deny the reality of a resulting force. Cartwright: We both agree that there cannot be three forces: the first two, and in addition the resulting one. CartwrightVsCreary: but I assert the reality of the resulting force while Creary asserts the component forces. Causal influence/Creary: is an intermediary factor between cause and what was initially thought to be the effect. CartwrightVsCreary: this will not work in general. E.g. two laws: a) C causes E b) C’ causes E’. In addition: C and C’ together cause E’’. Then we do not want to assume three effects E, E ’and E’’, but we need to assume some other incidents F and F’ as the actual effects of the two laws a) and b). And, according to another law, these will produce E’’. CartwrightVsCreary: this can work in individual cases, but not always. I see no reason why such intermediate factors should be found all the time. These seem to me more shadowy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Hume, D. | Cartwright Vs Hume, D. | I 10 Causation/Causal explanation/CartwrightVsHume: the laws of association are not sufficient to explain the difference between effective strategies (e.g. fight against malaria) and ineffective ones. Causal laws: are needed just as well. Simpson’s Paradox/Probability//Statistics/Causal explanation/Cartwright: was used by many authors as a counter-E.g. to probabilistic models of causation. I 42 Humeean world/Cartwright: this type of example (Figure 1) brings comfort to the representatives of the Humeean world. HumeVsCausal laws: the representatives reject them, because they have no independent access to them. They consider themselves able to determine laws of association, but they think that they will never have the causal initial information to apply condition C. If they are lucky, they do not need this initial knowledge: Perhaps they live in a world that is not a Humean world. ((s) because then this knowledge would be irrelevant). CartwrightVsHume: but a Humean world might still be one in which causal laws could be inferred from the laws of association. I 61 Force//Hume: it is wrong to distinguish between a force and its exercise. (Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford 1978, p 311). CartwrightVsHume: we need exactly this apparent distinction here. Causal force/Law of gravity/Cartwright: says that two bodies have the power to produce a force Gm m’/r², but they do not manage to exercise it. (Because other forces are at play). So the law does not speak of the behavior of the bodies, but of the powers they have. Problem: the facts-view cannot be given up so easily. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Scientism | Rorty, R. | II 131 RortyVsScientism: its weakness lies in the fact that it concludes from the prognosis and use of the causal forces of objects made possible by a certain descriptive vocabulary that this vocabulary is superior to others. The Kripkeans still refer to this fallacy today. (RortyVsKripke). |
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